Month: September 2024

New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art expelled an attorney for the Cambodian government from a Tuesday meeting between museum officials and the representatives of Cambodia’s culture ministry, heightening tensions in a yearslong campaign to press the museum to return Khmer treasures to their home country.

The attorney, Brad Gordon, has been one of the most prominent faces of Cambodia’s national effort to trace lost ancient artifacts looted during years of turbulent civil war. Gordon has worked for the Cambodian government in that capacity for a decade. Many of the pieces were trafficked to the United States and other Western nations and sold to ultrawealthy art patrons and some of the world’s largest museums, including the Met.

Officials from Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts visited the Met on Tuesday as part of a U.S. State Department program that provides tours of U.S. institutions for foreigners. While the Cambodian delegations’ itinerary included stops at multiple American museums, their visit to the Met held special significance — and sensitivity — because of Cambodia’s extensive push to reclaim cultural objects from the museum.

In recent years, the museum’s Cambodian pieces have been a focal point of increasing scrutiny on the Met’s collection by journalists and law enforcement. In 2021, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and its partners began asking the Met questions about more than a dozen pieces in its collection that had passed through the hands of accused antiquities trafficker Douglas Latchford or his associates. This followed a long run of attention from online sleuths, including the Chasing Aphrodite blog. Latchford was indicted in 2019 by federal prosecutors in New York and accused of helping orchestrate the large-scale looting of Cambodian cultural heritage decades ago. Latchford died in 2020 before the case against him proceeded.

In March 2023, ICIJ and media partners found at least 1,109 pieces in the Met’s collection that were previously owned by individuals who had been either indicted or convicted of antiquities crimes. The museum subsequently hired a team of researchers to vet its collection, and in December it announced it would repatriate more than a dozen works to Cambodia. But that didn’t end the saga. The Cambodian government claims that dozens more of its stolen treasures remain in the Met’s collection, and it wants them back.

Gordon said that when he arrived at the Met on Tuesday, he was led to a conference room where the Cambodian delegation would meet with Met officials. Immediately upon arriving, he said, two Met attorneys approached him and asked to speak with him privately outside the conference room. He said he was then asked to gather his belongings. From there, the officials told Gordon he was barred from the meeting before a guard escorted him out of the museum, according to his account.

A Met spokesperson said that Gordon had not been invited to the meeting and was “asked politely to leave.” The spokesperson said that afterward, “The Met continued amicable discussions with their Cambodian colleagues, including a gallery tour and agreement to meet further to expand cooperation.”

Among the planned attendees at the meeting was Lucian Simmons, the Met’s new head of provenance research. Last year the museum hired Simmons to lead a team of researchers to scour and identify potentially problematic pieces in the museum’s collection. Simmons’ hiring was portrayed in the press as a sign of the museum bolstering its approach toward addressing concerns over trafficked art in its sprawling collection.

Gordon said that the exact agenda of yesterday’s meeting was unclear but related to conservation issues. He told ICIJ that he had been specifically asked to join the meeting by H.E. Hab Touch, a senior official in the Cambodian culture ministry, who is leading the delegation.

“As you know, we are in the midst of negotiations for the return of additional stolen artefacts from the Met,” Gordon said in an email to several State Department officials that he shared with ICIJ. He added that because the situation with the Met was delicate, the Cambodian delegation had been “very clear that they wanted me as their counsel to be present” in the meeting.

Gordon said he pleaded with the Met to let him stay in the meeting, with a member of the delegation even calling Cambodia’s minister of culture to affirm the importance of his attendance. Gordon added that the Met officials offered no explanation for his expulsion apart from saying it was a State Department meeting.

“After the MET rejected the Minister’s request for me to attend, I agreed to leave,” Gordon told the State Department. “I have never felt so humiliated in my life.”

The campaign is drawing to a close for Algeria’s presidential election this weekend. The only real unknown is how many voters will turn out. 

Tuesday was the final day of campaigning for the vote on Saturday, 7 September, with a media blackout to be imposed from Wednesday. The outcome is largely predictable – Incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune willsecure his re-election with a majority of votes in the first of the two rounds of voting. We’ve expected, this election has proceeded without any surprises. In this country, elections tend to be meticulously orchestrated and tightly managed. Tebboune has the support of the administration as the incumbent president.He has eased relations with Algeria’s powerful military. He is also expected to benefit from a change in the election schedule, which left his rivals with less time to campaign. Originally scheduled for December, the poll was brought forward because of what the President called the current international situation and the dangers looming over Algeria.

The country typically avoids holding elections in the summer, when intense heat makes campaigning difficult – but this year’s campaign kicked off in mid-August.

While campaign staff would usually head out into streets and markets to talk to voters, in recent weeks they have tried to meet voters in their homes.

The opposition has complained of intimidation, with dozens of people arrested last month over alleged election fraud and three would-be candidates placed under judicial supervision.

The opposition leader, Fethi Ghares, was detained last week. He stands accused of insulting the president and spreading disinformation online.

 the so-called ban on leaving the national territory (ISTN), rarely justified by a court decision, affects hundreds of activists, journalists, businessmen and politicians.

A prominent figure on Algeria’s secular left, Ghares was involved in the 2019 Hirak movement, the series of mass protests that led to the ousting of long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. His party, the Democratic and Social Movement, succeeded the Algerian Communist Party, but was banned in February 2023.

“The situation is disastrous because civic space and freedoms have been reduced over the years since the start of the Hirak and there are strong reasons to believe that the situation could potentially get worse. 

It is very difficult to do politics in Algeria. and to exist as an opponent. Some journalists or even citizens who have published posts on social media can get arrested.

A lot of people still fear repercussions and do not speak to journalists, for instance, because they are afraid for their safety. People ultimately do not make comments on politics in public, or say things that are a little general.

However Algeria’s political system itself is evolving, and is no longer set around this duality between the armed forces and the political power. Civilians are trying to have a role.

With members of the opposition calling for a boycott, however, some voters are refusing to participate. This is an authoritarian regime that does not respect the rules of democracy. Every Algerian knows the outcome of this election in advance. The current regime fully assumes its authoritarian natureAuthoritarian laws justify the repression of political opponents. In 2021, the Algerian authorities amended the penal code to qualify as a terrorist act and sabotage “any act targeting the security of the state, national unity, stability and the normal functioning of institutions”through actions that “work or incite by any means whatsoever to access power or change the system of governance by non-constitutional means and to undermine the integrity of the national territory.

Article 97 of the penal code, for example, prohibits any type of gathering, while the 2012 laws relating to political parties and associations subject the formation of an NGO or a political party to prior government approval.

In 2023, a new milestone in the restriction of freedom of expression was reached with the adoption of a law on information that bans Algerians with dual nationality from owning or being shareholders in a media outlet in Algeria.

Algerian election campaign marked by social pledges and claims of unfair play.

The last presidential election of 2019 was widely boycotted, resulting in low turnout that undermined the legitimacy of Tebboune’s victory.

The president and his supporters are hoping to up participation this time round.

The public appears to be responding positively to Tebboune’s leadership and policy decisions. The crucial question now is whether this level of support will endure, and what the implications of another five years under Tebboune’s leadership will be for Algeria’s future.”

But In its sixty-two-year modern history, Algeria has never witnessed a smooth transfer of power from one president to another.

The country’s first post-independence president was deposed in a military coup after just three years in office. The coup leader, Houari Boumediene, ruled with an iron grip for more than a decade, entrenching a system of military rule with a thin civilian façade that has endured ever since.

His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, elected in 1979, ruled until an oil price slump obliged the state to curtail social spending, provoking a crisis. His solution, a hasty political opening, nearly delivered the country to an extremist Islamist party. To prevent that outcome, the army seized power in 1992, triggering a civil war. The military tapped independence hero Mohamed Boudiaf—but soon regretted its choice when he launched ambitious anti-corruption and reform campaigns that threatened its interests. After just five months in office, Boudiaf was assassinated on live television by his own bodyguard. the army’s hand-picked candidate, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, won an election intended to turn the page on Algeria’s “dark decade.” He was reelected three times and, despite being incapacitated by poor health, remained le pouvoir’s default pick in 2019.

Tebboune, a former regional governor, housing minister, and failed prime minister—who holds the distinction of being Algeria’s shortest-serving premier, lasting less than three months in 2017—emerged as the army’s anointed pick in the controversial polls, which protesters boycotted. He was elected amid record-low turnout.

The Military Establishment:

• Role in Elections: The military in Algeria has historically played a significant role in the country’s politics. While they may not publicly endorse a specific candidate, their support is crucial for anyone aspiring to hold the presidency. They are likely to back a candidate who aligns with their interests and can ensure stability. This will be the  incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
• Potential Candidates: If the military perceives a candidate as a stabilizing force or someone who will maintain the status quo, they are more likely to support that person, either overtly or behind the scenes.

2. The National Liberation Front (FLN):

• Support Base: The FLN, the party that led Algeria to independence, has been a dominant political force in the country. However, its influence has waned in recent years due to internal divisions and public dissatisfaction.
• Alliances: The FLN may support a candidate who promises to revitalize the party or someone who represents the traditional power structure in Algeria.

3. Islamist Parties:

• Influence: Islamist parties, such as the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), have a substantial support base, especially among those dissatisfied with the current system. They are likely to support a candidate who promises reforms that align with their religious and political goals.
• Unity or Fragmentation: Islamist parties in Algeria have a history of both uniting and fragmenting, so their support could be split among different candidates, depending on who best represents their interests.

4. Civil Society and Protest Movements:

• Hirak Movement: The Hirak protest movement, which began in 2019, represents a significant force in Algerian politics. It includes a broad coalition of civil society groups, activists, and ordinary citizens demanding systemic change.
• Support for Reformist Candidates: This movement is likely to back candidates who advocate for genuine reforms, transparency, and an end to corruption. However, they may also call for a boycott if they believe the elections are not free and fair.

5. International Actors:

• France and Other Foreign Powers: Algeria’s former colonial power, France, as well as other countries, may have an interest in the outcome of the elections. While they may not openly endorse candidates, their diplomatic actions and relationships could indirectly influence the election by signaling preferences for stability or reform. We assured This is incumbent President Tebboune.
•  

6. Incumbent or Government-Backed Candidates:

• Government Support: Candidates backed by the current government or those perceived to be close to the existing power structures, including the presidency and the ruling party, are likely to receive support from state institutions and resources.This is incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
• Public Reception: However, public perception of these candidates could be mixed, especially if they are seen as representatives of the status quo, which has been a source of frustration for many Algerians.

7. Youth and First-Time Voters:

• Decisive Factor: Algeria has a young population, and youth voters could play a crucial role in the elections. Their support may go to candidates who address issues like unemployment, education, and social justice.
• Support for Change: Given the disenchantment with traditional politics, younger voters might gravitate toward newer, more progressive candidates who promise change.

The support in Algeria’s elections will depend on how various candidates position themselves in relation to the military, political parties, civil society, and the general public’s demands. The military’s role is pivotal, but the influence of protest movements and the public’s appetite for reform will also shape the election’s dynamics.

Eswatini’s King Mswati III’s plans to wed Nomcebo Zuma, the daughter of former South African President Jacob Zuma, as his 16th wife. This will strengthen the ties between the two leaders.

A royal delegation from Eswatini visited Jacob Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla in July in accordance with tradition, marking the start of Mswati’s marriage proposal to Zuma.

This union can be seen as a strategic move, cementing economic and political interests.

President Zuma’s role and capacity to be a major ambassador for Swaziland or the Swazi royal family is a noncontestable issue and has become even far more important in view with the development or the emergence of MK [uMkhonto weSizwe] as a political party with President Zuma as its absolute president.

However,  Zuma’s diminished role in South African politics renders him unable to influence Swazi politics.

But the marriage strengthening bilateral relations between the king of Swaziland and the former president. The former president of South Africa and king are actually business partners and so, we expect that part of their relationship will actually blossom.

Zuma is expected to go on trial on multiple corruption and racketeering charges next April. He has pleaded not guilty.

Meanwhile, Mswati has been criticized for his controversial polygamy and lavish lifestyle.

This high-profile wedding, with its steep dowry of 100 cattle and R2 million (2 million rands(, or USD $113,300 and all the other hidden costs associated with a wedding of this nature, puts a significant strain on Swaziland’s economy. Within royal circles, this union has also been met with internal opposition among the royal wives. … This marriage will cause an uproar.

Whether seen as a strategic union of two powerful families or a personal decision to extend influence and financial gain, the king’s marriage to Nomcebo Zuma will have a lasting impact on the two nations’ ties, for better or worse.

The engagement between King Mswati III of Eswatini and Princess Ntandoyesizwe, carries several potential implications:

1. Strengthening of Political Ties between Eswatini and South Africa:

• Diplomatic Relations: The marriage could symbolize a deepening of ties between Eswatini and South Africa, especially given the familial connection to a former South African leader. This could foster stronger diplomatic relations and closer collaboration between the two nations, which already share cultural and historical ties.
• Political Influence: By aligning with a family that has held significant political power in South Africa, King Mswati might gain a more influential position or a channel to influence political matters in the region.

2. Impact on Domestic Politics in Eswatini:

• Public Perception: Eswatini has experienced political unrest, with calls for democratic reforms and more participation from the public in governance. King Mswati’s engagement to someone from a high-profile political family might be seen as a move to bolster his position, but it could also attract criticism if seen as prioritizing alliances over addressing domestic issues.
• Symbolic Unity: For supporters of the monarchy, this engagement might be seen as a strengthening of traditional and royal values, reinforcing the king’s stature as a leader who can unite influential families.

3. Economic Implications:

• Business and Economic Ventures: The Zuma family has various business interests, and this alliance could pave the way for economic collaborations or investments between businesses in South Africa and Eswatini. It could potentially attract South African investors who are aligned with or influenced by the Zuma family.
• Tourism and Cultural Exchange: The engagement could lead to an increase in tourism and cultural exchanges between the two countries, capitalizing on the royal connection and shared cultural heritage.

4. Regional Power Dynamics:

• Influence in Southern Africa: The marriage may influence regional power dynamics, especially within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Zuma family’s involvement in South African politics, coupled with King Mswati’s status as Africa’s last absolute monarch, could create a bloc of influence, affecting negotiations and alliances within the SADC region.
• Potential for Mediation Roles: Given their statuses, both families might be seen as potential mediators or power brokers in regional conflicts or disputes, which could impact political negotiations in southern Africa.

5. Public Opinion and Reactions:

• Criticism and Support: The engagement has already sparked diverse reactions on social media, with some viewing it as a union of power and wealth, while others criticize it as part of ongoing political maneuvering. The public’s reaction will play a crucial role in shaping the narrative around this engagement.
• Gender and Social Justice Issues: In both Eswatini and South Africa, issues related to gender equality and social justice are prominent. The engagement could bring these topics to the forefront, especially considering King Mswati’s history of multiple marriages and the ongoing debates about traditional versus modern values.

6. Potential Impact on Jacob Zuma’s Legacy:

• Public Perception: The engagement could affect how Jacob Zuma is perceived, especially if it is seen as extending his influence beyond his political career. It may also be viewed as a way for him to maintain relevance in South African and regional politics.
• Legal and Corruption Cases: Zuma faces ongoing legal battles in South Africa over corruption charges. The royal connection could be seen as a strategic move to gain favor or leverage, although it is unlikely to directly impact legal proceedings.

7. Cultural and Traditional Significance:

• Traditional Alliances: Marriages have historically been used to cement alliances and strengthen ties between powerful families. This engagement could be seen as a continuation of that tradition, reinforcing the cultural practices of both the Zulu and Swazi peoples.
• Royal Protocols and Customs: The engagement may highlight and reinforce traditional customs and protocols within the royal families, setting an example for other traditional leaders in the region.

In conclusion, while the engagement is primarily a personal and familial matter, it has broader political, economic, and social implications for Eswatini, South Africa, and the southern African region. The actual impact will depend on how these relationships and alliances are managed and perceived by the public and political leaders.

For those working in the information security and cybersecurity industries, the technical impacts of a data breach are generally understood. But for those outside of these technical functions, such as executives, operators and business support functions, “explaining” the real impact of a breach can be difficult. Therefore, explaining impacts in terms of quantifiable financial figures and other simple metrics creates a relatively level playing field for most stakeholders, including law enforcement.

IBM’s 2024 Cost of a Data Breach (“CODB”) Report helps to explain the financial impact when law enforcement is involved in the response. Specifically, the CODB report, which studied over 600 organizations, found that when law enforcement assisted the victim during a ransomware attack the cost of a breach lowered by an average of $1 million, excluding the cost of any ransom paid. That is an increase compared to the 2023 CODB Report when the difference was closer to $470,000.

But law enforcement involvement is not ubiquitous. For example, when an organization faced a ransomware attack only 52% of those surveyed involved law enforcement, but the majority of those (63%) also did not end up paying the ransom. Moreover, the CODB Report found law enforcement support helped reduce the time to identify and contain a breach from 297 days to 281.

So why are nearly half of victims not reaching out to law enforcement? Let us look at a few possibilities.

Read the full report

Awareness, embarrassment, secrecy and trust

Outside of cyberspace, a 911 call to local law enforcement is a pretty reasonable first call when falling victim to a crime. But there is no “911” to dial for a cyberattack, and certainly no menu options for ransomware, data exfiltration or destructive attacks. Even experienced incident responders will likely share experiences where opening questions to the victim are, “Have you contacted law enforcement?” or “Have you reported this IC3?” The first answer is often “no” or “not yet,” while the second is “I see what?” Therefore, the awareness issue is still prevalent.

We must also consider emotional responses, such as embarrassment. Think of the employee who may be thinking, “Was I responsible for this by clicking a wrong link?” Embarrassment leads to reluctance, therefore both organizations and law enforcement must message better to their people and partners that reaching out for help is okay. Moreover, add in another psychological factor: additional threats made by the actor demanding victims not contact law enforcement.

There is the secrecy aspect, especially from a business impact perspective. Decision makers may not yet know the business impact of law enforcement involvement. Will the news go public? Will competitors find out? What privacy assurances are available? All of these are reasonable questions, and likely to be important with the regulatory requirements of reporting cyber crimes.

Trust ties all these factors together, ranging from benign “Can I trust law enforcement?” to explicit “We do not trust law enforcement.” These gaps must be bridged.

Building relationships and the future of reporting

Managing a crisis requires competence, but also trust, so exchange business cards before the incident. The issues identified can be proactively addressed by reaching out to law enforcement partners when you do not need them. Learn the capabilities of your local agencies; request meet-and-greets with those in your state and federal regions.

Remember, there is a little “Customer Service 101” here. When the incident hits, what do you want: the general helpline, or somebody you know and have a bond with?

Moreover, the future of cyber crime reporting is becoming more of a public matter, such as SEC reporting rules. Having relationships in place will be beneficial. They can buy time and serve as extra hands.

The case for involving law enforcement from a cost-savings perspective appears pretty transparent. Therefore, it is more of a cultural issue. Make friends, build two-way trust and establish protocols. These can go a long way to reduce the pain and cost of an attack.

The post Cost of a data breach: Cost savings with law enforcement involvement appeared first on Security Intelligence.