Day: January 17, 2025

By Karen Harutyunyan

This article was published in the book Defeat: The 2020 Karabakh War—Realities and Lessons, released by the Armenian Research Center in Humanities with the support of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Why did Armenia suffer such a devastating defeat in the 2020 Karabakh war, and how did the subsequent domestic, regional, and geopolitical developments ultimately lead to the blockade, loss, and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh? To answer this critical question and explain the catastrophic failures of the Armenian side, it is necessary to address numerous factors—ranging from internal politics, geopolitics, and economics to military, societal, and structural issues.

In February 2022, Armenia’s National Assembly established a commission to investigate the circumstances of the 44-day war. However, in an atmosphere of deep political polarization and general distrust, the commission failed to provide a comprehensive account of the military, political, diplomatic, structural, and other causes of the war.

Following the 2020 defeat, the Armenian people endured their greatest national tragedy since the 1915 Genocide – the loss and ethnic cleansing of Artsakh in September 2023, which had been preceded by a ten-month blockade. Azerbaijan completed what historian and sociologist Georgi Derluguian has described as its “intermediate under-victory” of 2020 (World War of Local Significance, in Storm in the Caucasus, edited by Ruslan Pukhov, Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow, 2021).

The Armenian political elite, across the entire spectrum, failed not only to assess the causes and consequences of the 2020 war but also to grasp the shifting realities in the post-war period amidst the geopolitical upheaval caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. Domestic political disputes and scapegoating often took precedence over national priorities.

Despite these failures in leadership both in Armenia and in Artsakh, several initiatives sought to fill the gap. The first such attempt was the publication of a questionnaire report titled The Causes of Armenia’s Defeat in the 2020 War in May 2021 by researcher Simon Saradzhyan. Another such effort was the White Paper: The Karabakh War of 2020 and Armenia’s Future Foreign and Security Policies, authored by Jirair Libaridian, Robert Aydabirian, and Talin Papazian, published in June 2021.

An additional effort to analyze the military and political factors that led to the 2020 war and the conduct of hostilities was a collection of articles titled Storm in the Caucasus, published in the summer of 2021 by the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, edited by military analyst Ruslan Pukhov. The analysis of the military operations during the Second Karabakh War is the focus of American military historian John Antal’s Seven Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting, published in February 2022.

Military expert and officer Zhirayr Amirkhanyan examined the structural problems of the Armenian army in his work A Failure to Innovate: The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (US Army War College Press, 2022).

Political scientist Arman Grigoryan emphasized the political causes of the defeat in his study Revolutionary Governments, Recklessness, and War: The Case of the Second Karabakh War (2022), analyzing the policies of the political force that came to power in Armenia following the 2018 revolution.

Hovhannes Nikoghosyan and Vahram Ter-Matevosyan examined the foreign policy of Armenia’s revolutionary government in their article From ‘Revolution’ to War: Deciphering Armenia’s Populist Foreign Policy-Making Process (Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2022).

Vicken Cheterian, in his article Technological Determinism or Strategic Advantage? Comparing the Two Karabakh Wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Journal of Strategic Studies, 2022), analyzed the role of drones and modern weaponry in the Second Karabakh War, focusing on the social context and the relationship between armies and societies.

The Second Karabakh War, its political and military causes, and the broader context of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations were the subject of yet another collective effort: a forthcoming anthology edited by Vicken Cheterian, featuring articles by Armenian, Azerbaijani, Turkish, and other authors, to be published by I.B. Tauris with the support of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

The book at hand, separate from the aforementioned anthology, focuses on the military aspects of the 2020 war.

Investigative journalist Mkrtich Karapetyan presents a military chronology of the war’s 44 days, showcasing the deepening failures on the battlefield and the counter-narratives of Armenia’s and Artsakh’s military-political leadership. This work will be valuable to researchers for understanding the overall picture and delving into specific episodes.

The centerpiece of this book is a summary article by Vicken Cheterian, based on three dozens interviews conducted in May 2024 in Yerevan with Armenian and Karabakh political, military figures, and experts who had direct involvement or experience in the events of 2020–2023.

Cheterian’s article attempts to outline the conditions under which the 2020 war occurred; the strategic thinking of the Armenian leadership; the long-term preparations and limitations of the war; the circumstances and causes of its escalation; and the inability of the Armenian armed forces to adequately respond to the Azerbaijani offensive. The article also covers the period from the 2020 defeat to September 2023, which culminated in the fall of Artsakh and the ethnic cleansing of its Armenian population.

Questions Regarding the Causes and Course of the 44-Day War

The scope of questions presented here is not exhaustive but aims to provide a framework for researchers and, most importantly, the decision-makers responsible for Armenia’s future path. These questions highlight the complex, multifactorial nature of Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war. Their goal is not to assign blame but to outline the full picture of the 44-day war. Searching for answers, even belatedly, can help ensure lessons are learned.

Pre-War Period

• To what extent was the Armenian military prepared to confront a technically superior and better-equipped Azerbaijani army? What lessons were learned from Azerbaijan’s military procurement and reforms over the preceding two decades?
• What insights were gained from the April 2016 clashes when Azerbaijan first deployed drones on a larger scale? Why did the Armenian military not prioritize drones or counter-drone measures?
• During the 2016 clashes, partial mobilization in Artsakh revealed issues such as poor discipline among reservists, communication problems between commanders and units, and other logistical challenges. Did similar problems occur during the 44-day war? If so, why?
• Why did Armenia rely primarily on Russian arms procurement? How diversified were Armenia’s sources of military equipment?
• What types of weaponry were acquired prior to the war? How were procurement decisions and priorities determined?
• How prepared were the troops for combat? How were military exercises conducted before the war?
• What impact did the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions have on military readiness?
• Why were reserve units not pre-positioned before the war? Why were certain defensive positions maintained while others were not?
• Reports suggest that the Artsakh Defense Army had received anti-tank Kornet systems that were stored in depots, with some commanders taking delivery while others did not. Why were these critical weapons not properly distributed in time?
• During the war, Azerbaijani strikes reportedly destroyed Armenian weapons depots near Aygestan (Baluja), eliminating important assets like Kornet systems. Why were these depots not relocated prior to or during the war? Were newly acquired weapons stored in the same vulnerable depots?

The July 2020 Clashes

• Why did clashes break out along the Tavush border in July 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan? What were the main challenges for the Armenian side in these skirmishes? Which side initiated the clashes and why?
• What tactical and strategic objectives were achieved through these clashes? To what extent did they accelerate the outbreak of a full-scale war?
• What lessons did the Armenian side learn (or fail to learn) from these skirmishes?
• How did the July clashes influence Turkey’s involvement in the war, in terms of supplying arms, mercenaries, and participating in the management of military operations?
• What impact did Turkey’s military and political involvement have on the course and outcome of the war? How prepared was the Armenian side for large-scale Turkish involvement? If unprepared, why?

The Onset and Course of the War

• How effective was Armenian intelligence in warning of an imminent attack? To what extent did Armenia’s political-military leadership accurately assess the likelihood of war?
• How prepared was the Armenian side for Azerbaijan’s September 27, 2020, offensive?
• It has been reported that much of Armenia’s air defense and artillery capabilities in Artsakh were destroyed early in the war. Why was it not possible to avoid such heavy initial losses? How well-protected and camoflaged were these systems?
• Many claims suggest that Armenian Osa air defense systems were destroyed within the first hours or days of the war. Why were these systems not moved from their permanent positions?
• One of Armenia’s S-300 systems in Artsakh was reportedly destroyed on the first day of the war. Why was it not adequately protected?
• How did these early losses, particularly of air defense and artillery, affect the subsequent course of the war?
• How effective were Armenia’s air defense systems against drones? Which systems were effective, and which were not?
• Why were the Tor air defense systems acquired in limited quantities despite their proven effectiveness during the war?

Strategic and Tactical Decisions

• What led to the decision to launch a counterattack near Jabrayil on October 6–7? Why did the operation fail, and what impact did this have on subsequent battles?
• Why were coordinated attacks from other directions (e.g., north from Kalbajar, Haterk, Yegnikner, or east from Askeran/Agdam) not conducted while Azerbaijani forces were focused on the southern front?
• Why was the southern front so vulnerable, allowing Azerbaijan to achieve breakthroughs, while its successes in other areas were limited? Was this part of Azerbaijan’s initial plan or a result of Armenian weaknesses in the south?
• How was the defense of Shushi organized? What tactical and strategic errors occurred?
• Why was the defense of Shushi organized using disparate and poorly coordinated forces (e.g., conscripts from Hadrut units, anti-tank units from the Crisis Management Center, police forces) instead of a unified force such as Armenia’s 1st Army Corps?
• Why did the planned operation in Sghnakh fail to materialize?
• What efforts were made to retake Shushi on November 8 and 9?
• Who was responsible for the defense of Shushi? Could the city have been defended longer under the circumstances?

End of the War and Aftermath

• Why did multiple ceasefire attempts during the war fail? Were Armenia’s political decisions consistent with the realities on the battlefield?
• Why did the evacuation of Artsakh’s civilian population occur towards the end of the war? Who made this decision, and what rationale underpinned it?

Four years after the 2020 war, Armenia faces existential challenges. Artsakh, a cornerstone of the Third Republic’s political identity, has been lost. The security architecture has collapsed without viable alternatives, and the Russia-Ukraine war has further undermined Armenia’s already fragile security environment. These factors are compounded by deep polarization among the Armenian public and political elites, as well as their inability to objectively examine, analyze, and learn from past and present issues.

The questions in this article, primarily concerning military and combat-related matters, reveal the multifaceted nature of Armenia’s defeat. Their purpose is not to assign blame but to outline a comprehensive picture of the 44-day war. Searching for answers, even belatedly, may allow Armenia to learn critical lessons for the future.

Read the article in Armenian