Political theory that becomes unmoored from political reality creates a dangerous disconnect—one that undermines the fundamental purpose of governance itself: human flourishing. This core truth has repeatedly emerged throughout American constitutional history. The Articles of Confederation, while theoretically sound in their protection of state sovereignty and checks against centralized power, ultimately failed in practice, proving inadequate for addressing the commercial, security, and unity challenges of the early republic. Similarly, the original constitutional provision for state legislatures to elect senators—a system designed to protect federalism and ensure deliberative selection—eventually collapsed under the weight of practical concerns about corruption, deadlock, and democratic representation.
Rogers’s defense of the unitary executive theory would benefit from greater consideration of its practical fit with the underlying purpose of our constitutional order. While intellectually rigorous and grounded in constitutional text and history, it risks becoming another case of constitutional theory that floats above the turbulent waters of actual governance. The daily evidence of administrative turbulence, limited accountability, and expansive uses of executive power contradicts the neat theoretical constructs that unitary executive proponents advance. Rogers himself seems to acknowledge this disconnect by explicitly limiting his analysis to descriptive rather than normative claims.
However, this separation between constitutional description and normative evaluation creates a fundamental problem. Any enduring analysis of the unitary executive must engage with how this structure functions amid contemporary political dynamics—the intense polarization, the weakening of institutional norms, the collapse of congressional oversight capacity, and the increasing concentration of power in the presidency. A constitutional theory that cannot account for these realities may confine its utility to academic discourse.
The fundamental test of any governance structure must be its capacity to advance human flourishing—to create conditions where citizens can lead secure, meaningful, and self-directed lives. By avoiding engagement with how the unitary executive theory operates within our current political landscape, Rogers sidesteps the most crucial question: Rogers sidesteps the most crucial question: Does this constitutional understanding actually serve the interests of the people? Without addressing this question, even the most elegant constitutional theory remains incomplete at best and potentially harmful at worst, perpetuating structures that may undermine the very liberties the Constitution was designed to protect.
The Unitary Executive in Practice
Two key aspects of Rogers’s defense of the unitary executive lack sufficient grounding in the political reality of today. First, he contends that a unitary executive fosters accountability. Second, he contends that this conception of executive power aligns with a robust system of checks and balances. When considered in light of the current political moment, neither rests on sturdy ground.
On accountability, the sort of accountability hoped for by Rogers under a unitary executive does not materialize when subjected to empirical scrutiny of electoral outcomes and political discourse. Ironically, the very concern that Hamilton expressed about a plural executive, which Rogers paraphrases as allowing “blame shifting” and confounding “the ability of voters to hold executives responsible for administration,”—has manifested in a different form under the unitary model.
The current political reality reveals a Congress increasingly controlled by members more loyal to party than to institutional prerogatives.
This manifestation takes the form of what might be called a “unitary dividend”—a phenomenon that parallels the concept of a “liar’s dividend” in public discourse. Just as the liar’s dividend allows those with a tendency toward dishonesty to strategically leverage their mendacity by selectively claiming what they meant what they said, the “unitary dividend” enables administrations to expand executive authority to its furthest boundaries when politically advantageous, while strategically disclaiming responsibility when those same powers produce unfavorable outcomes. Recent administrations—both Biden’s and Trump’s first and second terms—have repeatedly leveraged this dividend, exercising extraordinary executive authority on certain issues while simultaneously arguing that other governmental actors bear the constitutional responsibility when their initiatives falter. The result is a fog of accountability that leaves the public uncertain where to direct their democratic judgment. Though the Biden administration never explicitly embraced Rogers’s conception of the unitary executive—defined as the “president [having] authority to direct all parts of the executive branch”—its operational approach often reflected precisely this understanding.
The COVID-19 pandemic provides a compelling case study of this unitary dividend in action under the Biden administration. President Biden exercised sweeping executive authority by instructing Anthony Fauci and other officials to implement what many considered an expansive and intrusive federal pandemic response, including the suspension and termination of federal employees who failed to comply with Fauci’s directives. Yet when politically expedient, the administration redirected blame toward various external actors—social media platforms, vaccine-resistant citizens, and perhaps most significantly, Congress. This strategic oscillation between asserting maximal executive authority and deflecting responsibility created precisely the accountability confusion that proponents of the unitary executive theory, including Hamilton, had hoped to prevent.
Similarly, despite asserting significant authority in directing the nation’s foreign policy apparatus, President Trump frequently redirected responsibility toward Congress when confronting unfavorable geopolitical developments. In 2017, congressional actions became the administration’s preferred explanation for heightened tensions with Russia, despite the executive branch’s constitutional primacy in foreign affairs. More recently, Trump has partially attributed ongoing trade volatility with China to Congress’s passage of the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, creating a narrative of divided responsibility that obscures the administration’s own policy choices. This pattern of selective accountability coexists with the administration’s willingness to exercise far-reaching foreign policy authority that sometimes operates at the boundaries of established legal and political norms.
This historical pattern reveals a misalignment between the theoretical accountability promised by unitary executive and the lived reality of our democratic system. Rogers, like many constitutional scholars, works from an idealized conception of voter capacity that assumes citizens possess sufficient information, political knowledge, and civic motivation to first identify the responsible governmental actors and then translate that assessment into electoral consequences. The empirical record tells a different story—one where voters consistently support parties that have implemented unpopular or even demonstrably harmful policies, where complex lines of authority remain obscured, and where the theoretical clarity of the unitary executive dissolves into the murky waters of modern media strategy and political messaging.
In short, the promise of democratic accountability through a unitary executive faces significant challenges in today’s political environment. A strong executive with centralized authority may paradoxically dilute accountability by creating a system where responsibility is more difficult to pin down. When executive power is concentrated in a single figure with broad authority and minimal means of accountability outside of the extreme of impeachment, the public may lack an effective means to evaluate the complex chain of decisions and delegations that occur within the executive branch. The tendency of recent administrations to develop and execute sophisticated media strategies may also shift narratives of responsibility away from the administration.
Checks and Balances
This lack of clear accountability invites a broader constitutional concern: How do our traditional checks and balances respond to emerging power vacuums and institutional ambiguity? The systems of checks and balances envisioned by Rogers assumes that Congress and the courts act in defense of their respective institutional powers, thereby counteracting the fervent expression of executive power involved with the unitary executive. Political reality suggests otherwise. A unitary executive is not necessarily in conflict with a system of checks and balances. A Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.-type analysis makes this clear. The first bucket involves each of the three branches fully and vigorously using their respective powers. In this case, checks and balances are firmly in place. The second bucket occurs when the executive operates under the unitary executive theory, yet only one other branch takes the equivalent approach. Here, the system of checks and balances may not immediately or adequately prevent an executive from exceeding their authority. But, on the whole, the system works as intended. Finally, on the third bucket, an executive operates to the full bounds of the unitary executive theory while the other two branches evidence deferential tendencies to the executive. This scenario raises significant concerns as to the viability and sufficiency of the system of checks and balances. We may find ourselves here now, facing a governance landscape in which the legislature hesitates, the courts retreat, and the executive assumes expansive authority over technologies shaping the public sphere.
The current political reality reveals a Congress increasingly controlled by members more loyal to party than to institutional prerogatives. Congressional representatives often demonstrate greater allegiance to a president of their own party than to Congress as an institution, rendering legislative checks ineffective. When public confidence in political institutions erodes, as multiple polling sources indicate is occurring, traditional checks and balances may no longer function as intended.
Effective governance requires systems that can respond to complex challenges with appropriate speed, expertise, and democratic input.
Similarly, the judicial branch, particularly the Supreme Court, has demonstrated a complex relationship with executive power. While sometimes providing checks on executive overreach, the Court has also shown deference to presidential authority in key areas like national security and immigration. The current 6-3 conservative majority on the Court may further complicate this dynamic, potentially showing greater deference to certain uses of executive power while restricting others based on ideological rather than constitutional considerations.
Though the occurrence of this third bucket may seem like an anomaly, it warrants further and more frank analysis by Rogers.
Effective Governance and the Unitary Executive
The primary blind spot in Rogers’s piece rests with his selection of constitutional principles to defend the unitary executive; he omits effective governance. In my own work on the right to effective governance, I argue that “early Americans shared a belief that the underlying purpose of the government was to advance the well-being of the governed.” That belief informed the decision to abandon the flawed Articles of Confederation and adopt a structure more aligned with the social, economic, and political realities of the day. Rogers failed to explore whether a unitary executive, in practice, has advanced the general welfare. As an aside, effective governance need not and should not have a partisan valence—it merely refers to the capacity of the government to address the essential purposes for having a central authority, such as coordinated international and economic policy, provision of national defense, protection against invasions of fundamental rights, and the like.
Effective governance requires systems that can respond to complex challenges with appropriate speed, expertise, and democratic input. The unitary executive theory, while appealing in its theoretical clarity, may actually impede these goals in practice. As evidenced by recurring administrative failures across administrations of both parties, concentrating decision-making power in a single executive has not demonstrably improved government performance on some of the aforementioned basic aspects of effective governance.
The structural flaws of a unitary executive reveal themselves in systematic governance breakdowns that go beyond individual leadership qualities. When presidential authority dominates the executive branch, we often witness the deterioration of institutional expertise as career officials with specialized knowledge depart amid shifting political winds. The centralization of decision-making authority creates bottlenecks that prevent nimble responses to emerging challenges, as evidenced by the sluggish adaptation to numerous crises over the past two decades. Perhaps most concerning is the policy whiplash that occurs when each new administration reorients entire agencies around presidential priorities rather than enduring public needs—a phenomenon we’ve seen play out dramatically across trade policy, healthcare implementation, and immigration enforcement.
Consider the cascading failures we’ve witnessed in critical infrastructure oversight. The Federal Aviation Administration’s delayed response to alarming air traffic controller shortages exemplifies how centralized control can impair timely action. Despite years of internal warnings from technical experts, political appointees delayed implementing recommended staffing reforms. This pattern repeated itself with the East Palestine train derailment, where regulatory capture and centralized decision-making diluted safety standards that independent regulators had long advocated. These weren’t failures of individual leadership but predictable outcomes of a governance model that subordinates expertise to hierarchical control. More generally, a massive reduction in executive branch staff does not bode well for the ability of the federal government to efficiently and sufficiently respond to threats to public well-being. As Andrew Rudalevige, a political scientist at Bowdoin, relayed to The New York Times:
The damage caused to governmental expertise and simple competence could be long lasting. Firing probationary workers en masse may reduce the government employment headcount, slightly, but it also purged those most likely to bring the freshest view and most up-to-date skills to government service, while souring them on that service.
Similarly, troubling patterns emerge in how executive agencies handle fundamental rights. The due process failures in immigration proceedings stem directly from the executive branch’s ability to reshape entire enforcement apparatuses without meaningful checks. When presidents can unilaterally reconstruct agency priorities—as we’ve seen with abrupt shifts in enforcement targeting, detention policies, and asylum procedures—the consistent application of law gives way to political expediency. These compromises of fundamental rights aren’t bugs but features of a system that concentrates too much authority in a single elected official with incentives that often diverge from safeguarding individual liberties.
What these cases highlight is that the unitary executive theory fails to address a fundamental requirement of democratic governance: institutional capacity to deliver results that serve the public good while protecting core rights. A governance model focused solely on hierarchical control without equal attention to expertise, deliberation, and institutional knowledge may consolidate authority without improving outcomes. Historical experience suggests that effective governance emerges not from concentration of power but from thoughtfully designed systems that balance democratic accountability with professional expertise, rapid response capabilities with careful deliberation, and centralized coordination with distributed implementation.
Conclusion
Rogers’s exploration of the unitary executive makes valuable contributions to our understanding of constitutional design. However, its disconnect from contemporary political reality undermines its practical relevance. A more balanced approach would recognize that effective democratic governance requires not just clear lines of authority, but also robust institutional capacity, appropriate checks on power, and mechanisms to ensure that democratic accountability genuinely functions.