On July 20, Joseph Poliszuk and his colleagues celebrated the 10th anniversary of Armando.Info, a Venezuelan investigative news outlet he co-founded. The ICIJ partner had survived threats and censorship and was preparing to cover the Latin American country’s presidential election eight days later. Like other journalists there, Poliszuk and his team were worried repression could become more intense and hoped their jobs would not become even harder.
President Nicolás Maduro was reelected, but the results were disputed by Venezuela’s opposition party, which claimed to have proof their candidate won. This sparked protests against Maduro’s victory across the country which the government reacted to with the “harshest and most violent” repression tools, according to a report published by the U.N.-backed Human Rights Council. The report said that a fact-finding mission had found rights violations including arbitrary detentions, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence by law enforcement. Venezuela’s National Electoral Council said in a press release that the report was “illegal, contrary to the principles of the UN, violating the Terms of Reference agreed with this Constitutional Power and, above all, riddled with lies and contradictions.”
Journalists faced their own set of targeted threats, Poliszuk told ICIJ. “After the elections, the government canceled passports, not only of journalists, but of activists and political leaders as well,” he said. “It was a pressure and censorship tactic that sent the message ‘you are on the list, you better watch yourself.’”
As a precaution, Poliszuk said his team helped two Armando.Info reporters based in Caracas, the capital city, temporarily leave the country. This made reporting harder. Armando.Info has operated a hybrid newsroom since early 2018, when a handful of its journalists had to flee the country after they were sued by a business executive they exposed as having ties to Maduro’s political party. Currently, half of the team works remotely from outside Venezuela.
“Some are referring to it as ‘journalism in exile’ and I think it has been romanticized a lot,” Poliszuk said. “Of course, it is great that technology has allowed us to come up with methodologies to continue this work from the outside — something that was not an option during past dictatorships in the 20th century. But it is not ideal. We lose timing, we lose reporting from the streets, we lose sources.”
The trade-off is security, he said. Poliszuck found a home in Mexico, an unlikely refuge as one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists, according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. “It appears that the modus operandi in Venezuela is to jail journalists, while here they are murdered,” Poliszuk said. “We all follow some basic security measures. I feel much safer here than even in Colombia. Not because Mexico is safer, but because the interests I touch are not here.”
Want to know when we publish?
Help us change the world. Get our stories by email.
Meanwhile, in Venezuela, at least 10 journalists have been arrested since the recent electoral campaigns began, and eight remain in prison “under false charges and in worrying conditions,” according to Reporters Without Borders, which advocates for freedom of information. Half of those were arrested during the post-election protests. State-orchestrated censorship and disinformation campaigns, which reportedly intensified around the elections, have compounded the challenges faced by reporters and citizens in Venezuela. Rolling blackouts, intermittent water supply and limited internet bandwidth already made reporting hard, Poliszuk said. The Committee to Protect Journalists found that since the election, reporters had self-censored, not appeared on camera and avoided attending or covering opposition rallies. Some radio news programs went off the air, the press freedom organization reported.
Armando.Info, a long-term ICIJ partner that has worked on investigations such as the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers, also stopped publishing bylines for months after the election to protect their identities. Journalists’ identities became especially sensitive during the post-electoral unrest as the Government brought back a repression tactic first introduced in 2017 dubbed “Operación Tun Tun,” or “Operation Knock Knock,” as has been reported by Armando.Info and several international outlets.
The “operation,” as it was described in at least one social media post by an account run by the military, consists of identifying those who speak negatively about the government, knocking on their door and detaining them. Armando.Info has labeled the tactic “lynching 2.0 of opponents.”
Do you have a story about corruption, fraud, or abuse of power?
ICIJ accepts information about wrongdoing by corporate, government or public services around the world. We do our utmost to guarantee the confidentiality of our sources.
The Venezuelan non-governmental organization Foro Penal published a report last week that counted 1,848 political detainees since election day on July 28. Twenty-four people have been murdered in the same period amid social unrest, according to Human Rights Watch.
“Many journalists have left, others are afraid, and for others, their outlets do not have the resources to pay them,” said Poliszuk. “The effort we make goes beyond the news-making process.”
Once relegated to the fringes of business operations, cybersecurity has evolved into a front-and-center concern for organizations worldwide. What was once considered a technical issue managed by IT departments has become a boardroom topic of utmost importance. With the rise of sophisticated cyberattacks, the growing use of generative AI by threat actors and massive data breach costs, it is no longer a question of whether cybersecurity matters but how deeply it affects every facet of modern operations.
The 2024 Allianz Risk Barometer named cyber events the top global business risk, further solidifying that cybersecurity is not just a technical issue but a strategic imperative. This shift in perception is observed across nearly all C-suite, small businesses, national security and critical infrastructure concerns. Meanwhile, Gartner forecasts a 15% growth in global information security spending by 2025 – a clear indication that organizations are increasing their investments to fortify their defenses.
From afterthought to boardroom priority
Not too long ago, cybersecurity was viewed as a fringe concern — a technical safeguard implemented to mitigate small-scale threats. Now, the exponential rise in attack volume, sophistication and impact has transformed cyber into a matter of critical importance. Cyberattacks like ransomware, data breaches and phishing campaigns have skyrocketed in recent years. In 2023, an all-time high of over 72% of businesses worldwide were affected by ransomware attacks.
The financial costs associated with cyber crime are staggering. Global cyber crime damage is projected to reach $10.5 trillion by 2025. And the average cost of a data breach, according to IBM’s 2024 data, was $4.88 million — a 10% increase over last year and the highest total ever. Given these statistics, it’s clear why cybersecurity has become the number one concern for executives worldwide.
C-suite leaders are increasingly aware that cybersecurity is not just a technical challenge but a business-critical issue. According to a 2024 KPMG survey, 40% of C-suite leaders reported suffering from a recent cyberattack. And 76% of security leaders worry about the increasing sophistication of new cyber threats, especially those who have experienced a cyberattack in the past year.
Meanwhile, the 2024 Report on the Cybersecurity Posture of the United States highlights that the United States government is undergoing a “fundamental transformation” in its approach to cybersecurity. The White House’s National Cybersecurity Strategy emphasizes that defending critical infrastructure, such as healthcare, energy and financial systems, is vital for national security.
Small businesses feel the heat
The rise of remote work and cloud computing has expanded the attack surface for businesses, and small businesses are no exception. While large enterprises have the resources to invest in robust cybersecurity measures, small businesses often lack the same level of protection, making them attractive targets for cyber criminals.
According to a survey conducted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, small businesses now view cyberattacks as their biggest threat as well. Approximately 60% of small businesses rank cybersecurity risks such as phishing and ransomware as major concerns. These findings demonstrate that cyber is no longer just a big business issue; small businesses, which often lack the financial resources to recover from a major breach, are increasingly vulnerable.
In response, many small businesses are taking proactive steps to address these threats. While some are enhancing supply chains and building contingency plans, others are investing in cybersecurity tools and services to defend against potential attacks.
The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence (gen AI) tools has introduced a new dimension to the cybersecurity landscape. Attackers are increasingly leveraging large language models (LLMs) and generative AI to conduct more sophisticated and large-scale social engineering attacks. And as AI becomes more integrated into the attacker arsenal, organizations are scrambling to stay ahead of these evolving risks.
Gartner predicts that by 2027, 17% of total cyberattacks and data leaks will involve generative AI. Analysts predict that the increased use of generative AI in cyberattacks will lead to significant investments in security software, particularly in areas like application security, data security and privacy. This surge in AI-driven threats underscores the need for organizations to adopt advanced security solutions that can defend against these emerging risks.
However, while AI poses new risks, it also offers opportunities for improving cybersecurity. AI cybersecurity is being increasingly used to enhance security operations, particularly in areas like threat detection, monitoring and incident response. The 2024 KPMG survey found that two-thirds of C-suite leaders consider AI-based automation critical for staying ahead of new cyber threats. The key will be in striking a balance between leveraging AI for defense and mitigating the risks it introduces.
The global response: Increasing investments in cybersecurity
With cybersecurity risks growing in complexity and scale, organizations are ramping up their investments to fortify their defenses. Worldwide end-user spending on information security is projected to total $212 billion in 2025, an increase of 15.1% from 2024, according to Gartner forecasts. In 2024, global information security end-user spending is estimated to reach $183.9 billion. This uptick in spending is driven by a combination of factors, including the heightened threat environment, the adoption of cloud technologies and the widening cybersecurity skills gap.
As businesses move more operations to the cloud, the need for robust cloud security solutions has become paramount. Gartner predicts that the market share of cloud-native security solutions will grow significantly in the coming years, with the combined market for cloud access security brokers (CASB) and cloud workload protection platforms (CWPP) expected to reach $8.7 billion by 2025.
The shortage of cybersecurity talent is another driving force behind increased spending. With a growing number of organizations struggling to attract and retain skilled cybersecurity professionals, the demand for security services — such as consulting, managed services and professional services— is expected to outpace other segments of the cybersecurity market.
Cybersecurity’s unprecedented relevance
Whether it’s ransomware targeting businesses or AI-driven attacks on critical infrastructure, cybersecurity will continue to dominate discussions in the C-suite, among small business owners and at the national level. The challenge for organizations will be to stay one step ahead of the evolving threat landscape, investing in the tools, talent and strategies needed to ensure their long-term resilience in the face of ever-present cyber risks.
In March 2023, amid a wartime clampdown on secretive Russian financial networks around the world, the accounting giant Deloitte publicly denied having any recent affiliation with an obscure financial firm in the Mediterranean republic of Cyprus.
The firm, MeritServus, was on the verge of being sanctioned by British authorities for helping hide assets tied to a key billionaire close to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“Since 2005, MeritServus has not been part of, or affiliated with, Deloitte Cyprus or any other Deloitte firm,” the accounting firm told The Guardian.
Deloitte had good reason to make the statement: MeritServus had started as a division of Deloitte in Cyprus and was now coming under intense scrutiny from media and regulators.
But Deloitte’s statement masked more than a decade of the two firms’ official business relationship, according to corporate filings in Cyprus and leaked email exchanges.
MeritServus’ managing director, Demetris Ioannides, a former Deloitte partner, sat on the board of a Deloitte subsidiary in Cyprus that oversaw consulting operations in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other countries, and signed off on numerous management decisions, records show. What’s more, MeritServus itself served as corporate secretary of the Deloitte firm, responsible for things like meeting minutes, corporate recordkeeping and filing annual financial statements. The directorship lasted well into 2023, according to corporate records, nearly 20 years after Deloitte said it severed official ties with MeritServus.
The records also show its relationship with MeritServus brought Deloitte extensive work on shell companies and trusts controlled by now-sanctioned Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich.
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks as billionaire businessman Roman Abramovich looks on during a meeting in Sochi, Russia in 2016.
Deloitte did not respond to questions about Ioannides’ position as director of — and MeritServus administering — several of its Cyprus units or why it publicly denied any affiliation with MeritServus since 2005. In a statement provided to ICIJ, Deloitte said it believed it had complied with the law after it shed its Russia-linked businesses in response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. “Deloitte acted rapidly to separate our practices in Russia and Belarus from the Deloitte global network,” the firm said. “We believe that all separation-related actions were informed by and in compliance with local laws and regulations.” The firm added that its Deloitte Cyprus operation was required to “exit a number of client relationships” under the 2022 rules, and that “those exits were completed.”
The records detailing Deloitte’s extensive work with MeritServus were among a cache of 3.6 million leaked documents at the heart of Cyprus Confidential, a global investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and 68 media partners, first published in November 2023. Hundreds of thousands of the leaked documents came from MeritServus.
The 3.6 million leaked files at the heart of the Cyprus Confidential investigation come from six financial services providers and a website company.
The providers are: ConnectedSky, Cypcodirect, DJC Accountants, Kallias & Associates, MeritKapital, and MeritServus in Cyprus. The MeritServus and MeritKapital records were obtained by Distributed Denial of Secrets. Leaked records from Cypcodirect, ConnectedSky and i-Cyprus were obtained by Paper Trail Media. In the case of Kallias & Associates, the documents were obtained from Distributed Denial of Secrets, which shared them with Paper Trail Media and ICIJ. DJC Accountants’ records were obtained by Distributed Denial of Secrets and shared by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. The partner organizations shared all the leaked records in the project with ICIJ, which structured, stored and translated them from several languages before sharing them with journalists from around the world. Additional records came from Latvia-based Dataset SIA, which maintains the i-Cyprus website, through which it sells information about Cyprus companies, including Cyprus corporate registry documents.
The Cyprus Confidential probe examined the activities of a number of global firms. This included reporting on the close affiliation the accounting giant PwC maintained with a different Cyprus-based firm serving Russian billionaires, providing public-facing audits and tax work while PwC affiliates set up shell companies and trusts. ICIJ’s reporting also showed that PwC helped Russian billionaires rapidly move assets in 2022 as wartime sanctions loomed, including $1.4 billion for Russian billionaire Alexey Mordashov on the day he was sanctioned by the European Union.
Together, the documents reveal a troubling willingness of global accounting firms to provide audits and other services to entities registered in secretive offshore jurisdictions and ultimately controlled by members of Putin’s inner circle and others who have contributed directly to his Ukraine war effort.
“These oligarch-affiliated trusts and shell companies should have at a minimum raised red flags for financial crime,” Justyna Gudzowska, an attorney specializing in financial crime and sanctions who has worked for the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions office, told ICIJ after reviewing records detailing Deloitte and MeritServus’ work together. The records, she said, offer an example of lax oversight of the accounting profession. “Accounting firms have for too long flown under the radar,” Gudzowska said.
‘Air of legitimacy’
Ioannides, now 81, got his start in Cyprus’ growing financial industry by establishing the Cyprus branch of Deloitte in 1988. Over the next two decades, Ioannides made a name for himself in an industry of Cypriot lawyers and accountants that helped to move vast fortunes — many of questionable origin — out of Russia. MeritServus was founded as a Cyprus-based division within Deloitte. In 2005, after U.S. regulators strengthened rules requiring auditors to maintain independence from the firms they audit, MeritServus split from Deloitte to become a separate firm, according to internal records.
Its new independence allowed MeritServus to appoint Deloitte as the independent auditor of the shell companies it administered on behalf of owners whose identities were often kept secret in public filings. Records show MeritServus, which Ioannides ran with his son, Panos, routinely sent Deloitte this auditing business.
Along the way, MeritServus took on elite clients of its own, including Roman Abramovich, a Russian oligarch close to Vladimir Putin, who worked with MeritServus since at least 2001, according to The Guardian. Recent reporting revealed MeritServus’ work setting up and administering a vast constellation of offshore trusts and shell companies that Abramovich used to hold billions of dollars. Abramovich has been linked to a covert financial network suspected of secretly holding assets on behalf of the Russian president and, in one case, he used a Cyprus-registered shell company to buy an apartment for Putin’s childhood teacher. Abramovich has denied having a financial relationship with Putin.
Experts say the imprimatur of a global accounting powerhouse like Deloitte on accounting statements can lend a shell entity the appearance of respectability in the eyes of police, tax authorities and the public.
“These people are only able to hide their money because big firms like Deloitte are adding some air of legitimacy to these financial mechanisms,” Debra LaPrevotte, a financial crime expert and former FBI agent, said referring to Russian oligarchs.
An offshore fortune
Thousands of pages of leaked emails show that, while Ioannides served as director and MeritServus administered portions of Deloitte’s business in Cyprus, the two firms collaborated intimately to support Abramovich’s vast offshore network.
In early February 2022, Abramovich began shifting the ownership of at least seven of his trusts to his children in an apparent bid to avoid anticipated sanctions, The Guardian later reported. Leaked records now show that in September and November 2021, after Russian troops started amassing near the Ukraine border, Deloitte signed agreements with Ioannides and MeritServus to provide auditing and other corporate services to nine Abramovich-controlled trusts registered in Cyprus. The records include Ioannides and other MeritServus employees approving Deloitte engagement letters for audits covering a nine-year period of activity of the Abramovich trusts, which reportedly hold billions of dollars. These include the Europa Trust, KPG Trust, HF Trust, Grano Trust, Proteus Trust, Zeus Trust, Perseus Trust, Ermis Trust, and Zephros Trust. Deloitte’s role in these trusts has not previously been reported.
Last year, the BBC reported that in 2010, two Abramovich-controlled shell companies transferred roughly $40 million in assets to a company nominally owned by Sergei Roldugin. U.S. authorities call Roldugin “a custodian of President Putin’s offshore wealth”, and another close Putin associate. The transfers to the Putin associates were done on extremely favorable terms, the BBC reported.
Corporate records show that MeritServus appointed Deloitte to perform audit services for the pair of Cyprus shell companies reported to have shifted the assets into the firms controlled by Roldugin and the other Putin associate. Records show that Deloitte signed off on the 2010 financial statements of the two Cyprus-registered shell companies, Finoto Holdings Ltd. and Grosora Holdings Ltd. The two sets of financial statements were signed by MeritServus employees acting as directors of the shell companies.
The records show that Deloitte also submitted tax filings to Cyprus authorities for both Grosora Holdings and Finoto Holdings.
In auditing these transfers, Deloitte’s financial statements for the two shell companies noted no irregularities.
Deloitte did not respond to specific questions about its work on trusts and companies controlled by Abramovich.
Deloitte also worked with MeritServus employees to audit a British Virgin Islands-registered shell company called Wenham Overseas Ltd. that would be named in a June 2022 affidavit by an FBI agent in the U.S. government’s confiscation of two private jets owned by Abramovich — a Boeing 787 Dreamliner and a Gulfstream G650 — for alleged violations of U.S. export laws. In 2017, the BVI firm acquired the Boeing aircraft, which the agent said was scheduled to be customized to make it “one of the world’s most expensive private airplanes, worth approximately $350 million.” Records describing Deloitte’s audit services to Wenham appear in MeritServus’ customer files until at least 2019.
In some cases, the relationship between MeritServus and Deloitte went even deeper than working with common clients. MeritServus and its chairman, Demetris Ioannides, went so far as to help manage pieces of Deloitte’s business, according to corporate records. Before and after the firms split, MeritServus and Ioannides administered several Deloitte subsidiaries based in Cyprus, with Ioannides serving as a director of Deloitte firms while MeritServus acted as their corporate secretary.
Until mid-2023, Ioannides held a board seat on a Deloitte subsidiary that controlled Deloitte consulting offices in Ukraine, Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and other former Soviet states, according to a recent corporate filing in Cyprus. Indeed, records show Ioannides appeared to exercise extensive management control over this firm, called Deloitte & Touche Regional Consulting Services Ltd. The full scope of the firm’s work is not clear, but, in 2011, The Kyiv Post reported that the firm had won a major contract to audit and evaluate the business operations of Russian state-owned oil giant Gazprom. As of 2020, this firm had 140 employees, according to its financial statements.
These people are only able to hide their money because big firms like Deloitte are adding some air of legitimacy to these financial mechanisms.
– Debra LaPrevotte, financial crime expert and former FBI agent
Leaked meeting minutes show that, as a director of the Deloitte firm, Ioannides signed off on an array of business activities. He approved large loans between Deloitte companies, an employee health insurance plan, dividend distributions, disbursements to tax authorities, agreements with third parties, address changes of the firm’s subsidiaries, and alterations to loan agreements between the company and individual executives at Deloitte, according to the records.
MeritServus’ involvement with Deloitte’s operations went so deep that, in 2010, one Deloitte attorney in Moscow appeared to mistake MeritServus for an arm of the accounting giant. “Thank you for regarding us as a part of Deloitte,” a MeritServus employee replied, “but strictly speaking, we need to be independent.” This nominal independence, the employee added, allowed MeritServus employees to sit on boards of directors of Deloitte subsidiaries.
According to its 2021 annual financial statement, Deloitte & Touche Regional Consulting Services Ltd. was owned by a holding company controlled by a Guernsey entity called the Deloitte CIS Foundation. ICIJ found little additional information about this foundation and Deloitte did not respond to questions about it.
The coastal town of Limassol in Cyprus. Image: ICIJ
MeritServus and its founder, Ioannides, suffered serious consequences after the United Kingdom imposed sanctions in April 2023. Earlier this year, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus, a national regulatory body, revoked the firm’s license to do business. Two related firms and Ioannides himself also lost licenses to do business in Cyprus, according to ICPAC.
Deloitte, meanwhile, has faced no known consequences for its work with the same customer — Roman Abramovich — who the U.K. cited in sanctioning MeritServus and Ioannides.
Ioannides couldn’t be reached and his son didn’t respond to ICIJ’s repeated requests for comment.
The Liberian opposition could attempt to counter Russian expansion through legislative action, public advocacy, alliances with Western countries, and media campaigns. However, their success would depend on a range of factors, including their political strength, public support, and the willingness of Western allies to back their efforts.
Ultimately, while the opposition could pose obstacles to Russian engagement, completely stopping it would be challenging if the current administration is determined to pursue closer ties with Russia. The most likely outcome is that the opposition could slow down or influence the terms of engagement, rather than fully preventing it.
The opposition Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) has warned that President Joseph Boakai’s administration’s efforts to establish diplomatic ties with Russia, despite Liberia’s longstanding relationship with the United States, pose a serious threat to the country’s peace and stability.
The CDC’s statement, delivered by its Secretary General, Jefferson Tamba Koijee, follows an announcement that Moscow plans to open an embassy in Liberia. This development was publicly disclosed by Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov at the first Russia-Africa Partnership Forum.
Addressing a news conference on November 12, 2024, at the party’s national headquarters in Congo Town, Koijee asserted that the Unity Party government’s engagement with Russia validates CDC officials’ earlier claims that President Boakai collaborated with Russia to fund his campaign during the 2023 presidential election.
The party revealed how Mr. Boakai was actively doing business with the Russians, but he and his ‘risky mission’ denied it,” Koijee stated. He alleged that during the election, Boakai and his political party secretly held meetings with Russian officials and sought financial support to fund their ‘risky mission’ at the expense of the Liberian people.
Koijee clarified that the CDC is not angered by the administration’s actions but is deeply concerned about the partnership with Russia, especially given Liberia’s historic ties with the United States. “Even if you’re angry with the American people, you don’t have to disrespect them in this manner,” he said.
He characterized the Boakai-Koung administration’s alignment with Russia as a disgrace and a distortion of Liberia’s longstanding diplomatic relationship with the United States. He further warned that maintaining close ties with both the United States and Russia, two global superpowers with complex relations, is a matter of serious concern not only for the CDC but also for the Liberian people.
Mr. Boakai cannot gamble with an entire nation,” Koijee emphasized. He argued that the CDC and the Liberian people will not allow President Boakai to treat the country as his personal property.
Koijee called on citizens and national stakeholders, including political leaders, the media, civil society, and human rights organizations, to oppose any international alliance that threatens Liberia’s stability, particularly the emerging Russia-Liberia relationship.
“We cannot sit idly by and watch our country descend into chaos as Mr. Boakai attempts to diplomatically insult the United States,” he said. Koijee clarified that the CDC has no personal issue with Russia, but is deeply concerned about Liberia’s approach to its diplomatic engagements.
He urged the Boakai-Koung administration to be forthright about its foreign policy stance, suggesting that if the government truly believes Russia can serve Liberia better than the United States, it should openly embrace that choice instead of playing a “double game” with the nation’s future, peace, stability, and foreign policy amid the tense relationship between the two superpowers.
Russia’s interest in opening an embassy in Liberia could be motivated by several strategic, economic, and geopolitical factors. Here are some possible reasons:
1. Geopolitical Influence in Africa
– Expanding Influence: Russia has been actively increasing its presence in Africa, seeking to establish itself as a key player on the continent. Opening an embassy in Liberia aligns with Russia’s broader strategy to expand its diplomatic footprint in West Africa.
– Countering Western Influence: Liberia has historically strong ties with the United States and Western countries. By establishing an embassy, Russia might aim to counterbalance Western influence in the region and establish itself as an alternative partner.
2. Economic Opportunities
– Natural Resources: Liberia is rich in natural resources such as iron ore, gold, diamonds, and timber. Russia, with its strong mining and energy sectors, may see opportunities for investment and resource extraction.
– Agricultural Investments: Liberia has vast areas of arable land that are underutilized. Russia may be interested in agricultural projects or securing food supplies, particularly in the context of global food security challenges.
Moscow also plans to create an independent financial system for settlements with African countries by the end of this decade.
3. Strengthening Political Alliances
– Strategic Partnerships: Strengthening ties with Liberia could provide Russia with a reliable ally in West Africa, especially in the context of growing competition with Western and Chinese interests in the region.
– Support in International Forums: Russia may seek Liberia’s support in international organizations like the United Nations, where African nations often vote as a bloc. Building closer ties could secure votes on key resolutions that align with Russian interests.
### 4. Military and Security Cooperation
– Military Presence: Russia has been expanding its military cooperation with several African nations, offering training, equipment, and advisory services. Liberia, which has been rebuilding its security forces after years of civil conflict, may benefit from Russian military expertise and resources.
– Arms Trade: Liberia could be a potential market for Russian arms and military technology, as Russia looks to expand its defense exports in Africa.
5. Diplomatic and Cultural Engagement
– Soft Power Expansion: Establishing an embassy allows Russia to engage in cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges, and people-to-people contacts, which can help improve its image and influence in the region.
– Humanitarian Aid and Development: Russia could use its diplomatic presence to launch humanitarian aid projects, infrastructure development, or healthcare initiatives, thus increasing its soft power influence.
6. Positioning for Future Opportunities
– Access to the Atlantic Ocean: Liberia’s location on the Atlantic coast could be strategically significant for Russia in terms of maritime access and trade routes.
– Investment in Emerging Markets: As part of its broader strategy to diversify economic partnerships, Russia may see Liberia as an emerging market with growth potential, especially in sectors like infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications.
Overall, opening an embassy in Liberia would be a multifaceted move that aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of expanding its influence in Africa, diversifying its economic partnerships, and countering Western dominance in the region.
· During the Cold War, Liberia was largely aligned with the United States due to historical ties (Liberia was founded by freed American slaves and has long had a close relationship with the U.S.). As a result, the Soviet Union had limited influence and engagement in the country.
· Ideological Divide: The Cold War was marked by an ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, with many African nations becoming battlegrounds for influence. However, Liberia remained largely outside the Soviet sphere, focusing instead on maintaining its pro-Western stance.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s focus shifted towards internal restructuring, leading to reduced engagement in Africa, including Liberia. However, in the early 2000s, under President Vladimir Putin, Russia began to renew its focus on Africa as part of a broader strategy to reassert itself on the global stage.
Africa-Russia Summit (2019): The first-ever Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in 2019 marked a turning point, where Russia expressed a renewed commitment to strengthening ties with African nations, including Liberia. Liberia’s President George Weah attended the summit, highlighting a potential warming of relations.
As tensions between Russia and Western countries escalate, particularly in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, Russia is seeking to diversify its alliances and economic partners. Africa, including Liberia, presents an opportunity to build new alliances and counter Western influence.
While Russia’s historical presence in Liberia has been limited, there is a clear trend towards increased engagement in recent years. This is part of Russia’s broader strategy to expand its influence in Africa, driven by economic interests, geopolitical competition with the West, and the desire to build new diplomatic and military alliances. Opening an embassy in Liberia would symbolize a deeper commitment to strengthening ties and exploring economic and strategic opportunities in the country.
Joseph Boakai, the newly elected President of Liberia, may have several motivations for strengthening relations with Russia, driven by both economic and strategic interests.
Reducing Dependence on the West: Liberia has historically maintained strong ties with Western countries, particularly the United States. However, Joseph Boakai might seek to diversify Liberia’s international partnerships by engaging with non-Western powers like Russia. This could provide Liberia with alternative sources of investment, aid, and diplomatic support.
Strategic Balancing: By strengthening ties with Russia, Boakai could adopt a more balanced foreign policy, positioning Liberia as a neutral player open to cooperation with a variety of global powers. This could enhance Liberia’s leverage in negotiations with Western countries and international organizations.
2. Economic and Infrastructure Development
Attracting Investment: Liberia faces significant economic challenges, including high unemployment, poor infrastructure, and a need for diversification beyond its traditional reliance on mining and agriculture. Boakai may see Russia as a potential partner for investment in key sectors such as energy, mining, agriculture, and infrastructure development.
Natural Resources and Trade: Liberia is rich in natural resources, including iron ore, gold, and timber, which could attract Russian investment. Boakai could be looking to tap into Russia’s expertise in mining and energy to boost Liberia’s economic growth and create jobs.
3. Military and Security Cooperation
Strengthening Security Capabilities: Liberia’s security forces are still rebuilding after years of civil conflict, and Boakai may be interested in diversifying Liberia’s security partnerships. Russia has been expanding its military cooperation in Africa, providing training, equipment, and advisory services to several countries. Boakai might explore opportunities for Russian support in strengthening Liberia’s defense capabilities.
Counterterrorism and Stability: With regional instability in West Africa, particularly due to jihadist threats in neighboring countries, Boakai could seek Russian assistance in enhancing Liberia’s counterterrorism capabilities and overall security infrastructure.
4. Technical and Educational Assistance
Scholarships and Training: Russia has offered scholarships and educational opportunities to students from African countries as part of its soft power strategy. Boakai could be interested in securing more educational partnerships, scholarships, and training programs for Liberian students in Russian universities, which would help build capacity in various sectors.
Technology Transfer: Collaborating with Russia in areas like healthcare, agriculture technology, and scientific research could be appealing to Boakai’s administration, especially as Liberia looks to modernize its economy.
5. Geopolitical Considerations
Non-Alignment Strategy: Given the increasing polarization between the West and Russia (especially after the invasion of Ukraine), Boakai might pursue a non-alignment strategy, seeking to build relationships with both Western and non-Western countries. This could allow Liberia to remain flexible in its foreign policy and avoid being caught in the middle of great power rivalries.
Support in International Forums: Closer ties with Russia could provide Liberia with an ally in international organizations like the United Nations. Russia has been known to support African nations on various global issues, which could benefit Liberia in securing international aid, debt relief, or support for development projects.
Negotiating Power: By engaging with Russia, Boakai could be looking to increase Liberia’s bargaining power with traditional Western partners. Showing openness to Russian investments or diplomatic support might push Western countries to offer better terms on aid, trade, or development projects to maintain their influence in Liberia.
Access to Russian Aid and Loans: Boakai might also be interested in exploring financial assistance from Russia, especially if it comes with fewer conditions than aid from Western institutions like the IMF and World Bank.
Conclusion
Joseph Boakai’s interest in relations with Russia is likely driven by a combination of economic, security, and diplomatic considerations. By engaging with Russia, he may seek to diversify Liberia’s international partnerships, attract new investments, strengthen security capabilities, and enhance Liberia’s geopolitical leverage. While Liberia will likely continue to maintain strong ties with the West, Boakai’s outreach to Russia could be part of a broader strategy to ensure that Liberia is not overly dependent on any single external partner.
For eight years, an article of faith within Trumpworld and the right-wing media cosmos has been that the Trump-Russia scandal was a hoax, a canard cooked up by nefarious Deep State actors and bolstered by their co-conspirators in the press and the Democratic Party to sabotage and destroy Donald Trump. Trump himself continues to rail in shorthand about “Russia, Russia, Russia.” He has pointed to this “witch hunt” as evidence of extensive corruption within the intelligence and law enforcement communities of the federal government and called for the criminal prosecution of those whom he accuses of orchestrating this diabolical plot against him.
How then to explain his decision to tap for top national security slots in his Cabinet two Republican legislators with access to top-secret information who have previously confirmed that Vladimir Putin in 2016 attacked the US election to help elect Trump president and that Trump failed as an American leader to acknowledge and condemn this devious assault on the republic? One of these lawmakers even oversaw an investigation that concluded the most senior Trump campaign aide in 2016 had colluded with a Russian intelligence officer while the Kremlin was mounting its information warfare against America.
“I am concerned about some of the contacts between Russians and surrogates within the Trump Organization and the Trump campaign,” Elise Stefanik, Trump’s pick as UN ambassador, said in 2018.
The pair are Rep. Elise Stefanik (R-NY), whom Trump has picked to be UN ambassador, and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Flas), whom Trump has selected to be secretary of state. Each is a veteran member of the intelligence committee of the chamber in which they serve and privy to the most sensitive secrets of US intelligence.
After the 2016 contest, Trump tried to con the public about the Russian attack—which included a hack-and-leak operation that disseminated stolen Democratic emails and materials to harm Hillary Clinton’s candidacy and a covert social media scheme to spread messages, memes, and disinformation to sow discord and benefit Trump. The intelligence community and cybersecurity firms had concluded the Kremlin had waged this secret campaign against the United States to boost Trump, but Trump claimed no such thing happened. He dismissed all talk of the multiple contacts between the Trump camp and Russian representatives during the 2016 contest. He also covered up his own secret business dealings with Russian developers and Putin’s office during the campaign, as well as a hush-hush meeting held between his senior campaign advisers and a Moscow intermediary.
Stefanik didn’t buy Trump’s subterfuge. In an interview with the Watertown Daily Times in March 2018, she said, “Russia meddled in our electoral process.” And she noted the Kremlin skullduggery was designed to benefit Trump: “We’ve seen evidence that Russia tried to hurt the Hillary Clinton campaign.” Moreover, she fretted about the curious Trump-Russia contacts: “I am concerned about some of the contacts between Russians and surrogates within the Trump Organization and the Trump campaign.”
A year later, with Trump still pushing his phony “Russia hoax” claim, Stefanik, at a town hall meeting, disagreed with the Trump line that the Moscow assault was no big deal. It was, she said, “much more systemic, much more targeted, with very sophisticated hacking efforts, disinformation efforts targeted to specific campaigns.” Stefanik added that the Trump administration needed to be pressed “to take the threat from Russia very seriously.” She criticized the Trump campaign for holding that covert meeting with the Moscow go-between.
There was no Russia witch-hunt, Stefanik contended. According to her view, Trump was peddling a self-serving and false narrative about an important issue of national security: an attack by a foreign adversary on the United States.
Rubio went much further than this.
As chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, Rubio, in August 2020, released a massive 966-page report on the Russian assault. In a press release, he noted, “Over the last three years, the Senate Intelligence Committee conducted a bipartisan and thorough investigation into Russian efforts to influence the 2016 election and undermine our democracy. We interviewed over 200 witnesses and reviewed over one million pages of documents. No probe into this matter has been more exhaustive.” And he stated the committee “found irrefutable evidence of Russian meddling.”
That is, no hoax.
The detailed report confirmed what other investigations had concluded: “Putin ordered the Russian effort to hack computer networks and accounts affiliated with the Democratic Party and leak information [via WikiLeaks] damaging to Hillary Clinton and her campaign for president. Moscow’s intent was to harm the Clinton Campaign, tarnish an expected Clinton presidential administration, help the Trump Campaign after Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee, and undermine the U.S. democratic process.”
Worse for Trump, the report pointed out that he and his campaign had tried to exploit the Russian assault and had aided and abetted it by denying the Russians were engaged in such activity, thus helping Moscow cover up its effort to subvert an American election: “The Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those leaks to aid Trump’s electoral prospects. Staff on the Trump Campaign sought advance notice about WikiLeaks releases, created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release, and encouraged further leaks. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.”
A large chunk focused on Paul Manafort, who was a senior Trump campaign official in 2016. The committee noted that Manafort, who was imprisoned in 2018 for committing fraud and money laundering (and pardoned by Trump in 2020), posed a “grave counterintelligence threat” due to his Russian connections. The report detailed his extensive dealings during the campaign with a onetime business associate named Konstantin Kilimnik, who the committee described as a “Russian intelligence officer.” The committee put it bluntly: “Kilimnik likely served as a channel to Manafort for Russian intelligence services.” Throughout the election, according to the report, Manafort “directly and indirectly communicated with Kilimnik,” Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and several pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine.
When the report was released, Rubio declared in a press release that the committee had uncovered “absolutely no evidence that then-candidate Donald Trump or his campaign colluded with the Russian government to meddle in the 2016 election.” Yet that was misleading. The report stated, “The Committee obtained some information suggesting Kilimnik may have been connected to the [Russian intelligence service’s] hack and leak operation targeting the 2016 U.S. election.” That meant Trump’s campaign manager was in close contact with a Russian intelligence officer possibly tied to Putin’s covert attack on the 2016 campaign. The committee also revealed it had found “two pieces of information” that “raise the possibility” that Manafort himself was connected “to the hack-and-leak operations.” Perhaps there was some collusion. But the report’s discussion of that information was redacted.
Rubio’s report was a slam-dunk counter to the Trump-Russia deniers on the right who had strived mightily to turn this serious matter into nothing but a left-wing fantasy, and to Trump himself. It declared that Trump’s campaign was run by a counterintelligence threat who had covertly huddled with a Russian intelligence officer and that Trump and his lieutenants assisted the Kremlin’s attack on the United States by echoing Putin’s denials.
The report was proof Trump had betrayed the nation. This is a truth that he and his enablers within the GOP and the conservative movement have attempted to smother for years. To do so, they concocted the notion of a Deep State conspiracy and relentlessly derided Democrats, liberals, journalists, and anyone else who voiced concern about or interest in Russian interference and Trump’s acquiescence to Moscow.
Now Trump has embraced two senior Republican lawmakers who challenged Trump’s claim of a hoax and who affirmed the reality of the Trump-Russia scandal and Trump’s role in it. Were they part of that Deep State scheme against Trump? Neither have renounced their previous statements. Rubio has not disavowed the report he once proudly hailed. As the denizens of MAGA World—and Trump himself—should see it, Rubio and Stefanik were part of the traitorous cabal that pushed disinformation to demolish Trump. In their eyes, Rubio even produced a nearly 1000-page-long report to advance this treasonous con job.
Their appointments show the absurdity of Trump’s Russia-denying endeavors—though these efforts succeeded. Now Trump has included in his new administrations two prominent Republicans who know that he has been lying all along about Russia. While both Stefanik and Rubio were once critics of Trump, they have, like most within the GOP, bent the knee, and they don’t mind serving a fellow who provided cover for Putin and who cared more for his own political interests than the country’s security. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile for Democrats to question Stefanik and Rubio on this matter during their Senate confirmation hearings. They ought to be asked about their previous statements and Rubio’s report. This will probably yield a fair amount of squirming. More important, it will serve as a reminder that Trump has gotten away with a foul deed that has profoundly shaped the nation.
As the digital world evolves, businesses increasingly rely on cloud solutions to store data, run operations and manage applications. However, with this growth comes the challenge of ensuring that cloud environments remain secure and compliant with ever-changing regulations. This is where the idea of autonomous security for cloud (ASC) comes into play.
Security and compliance aren’t just technical buzzwords; they are crucial for businesses of all sizes. With data breaches and cyber threats on the rise, having systems that ensure your data is secure and meets regulatory standards is no longer optional. However traditional methods of managing security and compliance often require significant manual effort, which can lead to delays, errors or overlooked vulnerabilities.
What is ASC?
ASC is a groundbreaking solution that automates the complex tasks involved in securing your cloud environment and making it compliant with regulatory and organizational standards. Powered by generative artificial intelligence (gen AI), ASC is designed to meet the security needs of today and adapt to the challenges of tomorrow. ASC is currently designed for workloads running on Amazon Web Services (AWS).
At its heart, ASC is an intelligent system that continuously monitors your AWS environment for any changes or risks. This means that as your business evolves — whether you’re adding new cloud services, changing configurations, or scaling up — your security and compliance framework automatically adjusts in real-time.
Why security and compliance matter
For many organizations, keeping up with the latest regulations, such as data privacy laws, industry standards or cybersecurity frameworks, is a constant headache. Failing to meet these regulations can result in hefty fines, loss of trust and even business disruption.
ASC acts as a 24/7 guardian, ensuring that your cloud setup remains in line with industry standards like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS), the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and other regulations and standards. ASC detects issues and proactively addresses them, helping you stay ahead of threats and compliance requirements before they become problems.
The functionalities of ASC can be defined as follows:
Continuous monitoring: ASC keeps an eye on your cloud environment at all times, scanning for potential risks, security gaps or compliance violations.
Automatic adjustments: If ASC detects any issues — such as misconfigurations or new security threats — it automatically makes the necessary changes to fix them.
Proactive protection: Using AI-powered predictions, ASC can review your business requirements and recommend secured and compliant configurations of AWS resources required for your business. It can also generate infrastructure as code (IaC) templates to deploy resources in your AWS cloud with secured configurations necessary for your organization’s compliance with regulatory standards and internal policies. Whether it’s a change in regulatory standards or a new cyber threat, ASC is ready to adjust your security settings accordingly.
Human expertise when needed: While ASC is largely autonomous, it doesn’t eliminate the need for human oversight. Experts can step in when critical decisions are required, ensuring that human judgment complements AI efficiency.
The role of AI in building a resilient future
Gen AI is at the core of ASC, which powers the system’s ability to think, learn and predict. By integrating gen AI capabilities, ASC continuously evolves and improves. This means the system gets smarter over time, adapting to new challenges in the security landscape.
For example, if a new type of cyberattack emerges, ASC can learn from external data sources and apply the right protection to your AWS environment automatically. This ability to self-heal and adjust in real-time is what sets ASC apart from traditional security solutions.
The future of compliance: Less stress, more security
The world of compliance is becoming more complicated, but ASC offers a future where managing compliance doesn’t have to be a source of stress. By automating routine tasks like monitoring and reporting, ASC frees up your team to focus on what they do best: Growing your business.
The shift to cloud computing is here to stay, and with it comes the need for smarter, more efficient ways to manage security and compliance in the cloud environment. ASC in AWS, powered by cutting-edge gen AI, is leading the way. By automating complex processes and proactively protecting your cloud environment, ASC ensures that businesses stay secure, compliant and ready for the future.
One year ago, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides vowed a swift response to revelations that the European Union-member state had helped Russian oligarchs evade Western sanctions and fund President Vladimir Putin’s war machine.
“Everything that has come to light will be investigated,” Christodoulides said. “The reputation of our country, the credibility of our country, you understand, is crucial.”
The president’s pledge came in the wake of Cyprus Confidential, a cross-border journalistic investigation led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and Paper Trail Media in collaboration with 67 media partners from around the world. The probe, based on leaked documents, found that Cyprus legal and financial services firms were key cogs in Russia’s offshore financial machine.
But while some reforms have been made, one outspoken government critic now says that Cyprus’ response over the past 12 months has fallen short of the president’s promises. “No criminal investigations were carried out and no arrests have taken place … because the system of power is just as corrupt,” Makarios Drousiotis, a former presidential advisor turned investigative journalist, told ICIJ.
The investigation “confirmed what citizens perceived: that Cyprus was a haven for international criminals,” said Drousiotis, who this year ran for a seat in the European Parliament on an agenda critical of Cypriot corruption.
Cyprus Confidential revealed more than 650 companies and trusts registered in Cyprus that were owned or controlled by Russians who later came under sanctions, including some who were sanctioned as early as 2014.
Elsewhere in Europe, Cyprus Confidential prompted a quick response from politicians, law enforcement officials, and major corporations. European legislators described Cyprus as a “weak link” within the EU’s financial system, and the European Parliament called a session in response to the investigation on how to tighten anti-money laundering rules. “The European Union is turning into a gangster’s paradise, because there is complete impunity,” said Sophie In’t Veld, then a prominent European Parliament member from the Netherlands.
In Germany, meanwhile, a publisher pulled two books by journalist Hubert Seipel from the shelves after a Paper Trail Media investigation revealed that Seipel received over $600,000 from a now-sanctioned Russian oligarch to write a book eventually titled “Putin’s Power: Why Europe Needs Russia.” Seipel, an award-winning German journalist, had previously written a biography of Putin and said that he had met Russia’s president nearly 100 times. He was subsequently expelled from Germany’s investigative journalism association.
Cyprus Confidential also reportedly helped impel a criminal probe of Seipel’s benefactor, Alexey Mordashov, who has a net worth estimated at $25.5 billion according to Forbes’ annual list. ICIJ’s investigation uncovered new details about the Russian oligarch’s attempts to transfer a $1.4 billion investment to his wife in a bid to evade sanctions. Local media subsequently reported that Cyprus’ government had been aware of the suspicious transfer for months, but that authorities had dragged their feet in responding. “Now the ICIJ consortium and international journalistic revelations have beaten them all to it,” read an article in the Cypriot newspaper Phileleftheros.
In Lithuania, Cyprus Confidential revelations led the country to introduce new legislation to allow the government to strip people of Lithuanian citizenship. A report published by Siena, a Lithuanian investigative media outlet and ICIJ partner, found that two of Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich’s children held Lithuanian passports when they were given control of some of his fortune, in an apparent bid to evade sanctions in the run-up to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
A British law enforcement agency also forced the real estate manager for another oligarch, Petr Aven, to forfeit $1 million. Aven is the former head of Russia’s largest privately-owned bank. The forfeiture marked the first time that the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency had recovered money in a sanctions violations case. Cyprus Confidential had previously revealed that Aven transferred millions of dollars from Austria to the U.K. on the day he was sanctioned by the EU. The NCA investigated subsequent transfers made between bank accounts in the U.K. on behalf of Aven after the billionaire had been sanctioned by the British government.
Cyprus Confidential went beyond exposing the underhanded dealings of Russian oligarchs and Putin cronies. It also showed how a former Israeli intelligence officer, Tal Dilian, had used the island to build a notorious cyber-surveillance firm that had sold spyware to some of the world’s most brutal regimes, including a paramilitary group in Sudan and the Egyptian intelligence services. The U.S. subsequently sanctioned Dilian and his firm, Intellexa, for developing spyware that had been used to target Americans. Then in September, Washington slapped sanctions on more individuals and businesses, including two Cyprus citizens, associated with Dilian’s cyber-surveillance network.
Records also showed that a financier of Hamas held a stake in a Cyprus company. The investigation by ICIJ and Israeli news outlet Shomrim showed that Abdelbasit Hamza, who was sanctioned by the U.S. for transferring almost $20 million to the Palestinian organization, owned a stake in a Cyprus company that holds concessions to exploit two gold mines in Egypt. The EU sanctioned him a month after ICIJ and Shomrim’s story was published.
Do you have a story about corruption, fraud, or abuse of power?
ICIJ accepts information about wrongdoing by corporate, government or public services around the world. We do our utmost to guarantee the confidentiality of our sources.
In Cyprus, too, some hold out hope for further reforms. While former President Nicos Anastasiades was bedeviled by corruption allegations, Christodoulides has taken steps to burnish Cyprus’ international reputation, including through an Oval Office meeting with President Joe Biden in October in which he touted the “strategic partnership” between the two countries.
Cyprus Confidential, Drousiotis said, helped provide the impetus for growing cooperation between the two countries and whatever progress has been made in reforming Cyprus’s financial system: “Without international press reports and investigations such as this one, Cyprus might still have been a center of international illegality and money laundering.”
In both Georgia and the breakaway region of Abkhazia, speculation is mounting that the Kremlin might be willing to appease the Georgian authorities by creating an illusion of returning control over occupied territories. While this scenario remains unconfirmed and largely confined to the realm of rumors, its emergence suggests that Moscow is gauging public opinion both within Georgia and beyond the Caucasus.
The floated scenario implies that the Kremlin is prepared to support a friendly Georgian government in exchange for the appearance of returning the contested regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This theory gained traction after recent signs of Moscow extending an olive branch to Tbilisi, including lifting visa requirements for Georgian citizens, resuming direct flights, and instructing the regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to avoid moves that could destabilize the Georgian administration. Notably, discussions about a potential referendum on South Ossetia’s accession to Russia have abruptly ceased.
In March, there were murmurings — bordering on conspiracy theory — about a possible quid pro quo: Georgia’s political loyalty to Moscow in exchange for the re-integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia through the establishment of a confederation. These whispers were fueled by the release of a video by members of the opposition party Droa, capturing a conversation between Georgia’s First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Gia Volski, and Russian businessman David Khidasheli, where this sensitive topic was allegedly discussed.
The release of this information appears to be a strategic move by Russia to test societal reactions to a “confederation plan” aimed at resolving the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though the idea of a confederation to reintegrate these regions has periodically surfaced in peace talks, it was largely dismissed following Russia’s formal recognition of these breakaway territories.
Sources within Tbilisi’s government circles believe that this renewed focus on a confederation aligns with Russia’s pressing need for new transportation corridors amidst Western sanctions. The reopening of railway routes from Russia through Abkhazia into Georgia and beyond to the Southeast is seen as a strategic priority for the Kremlin, which is actively fortifying its “security zone” in the region. In Moscow’s view, a Georgian-Abkhazian-South Ossetian confederation could serve as a strategic project to deepen its influence over Tbilisi and potentially reverse Georgia’s pivot towards NATO.
Meanwhile, in Sukhumi, discussions about a possible confederative arrangement are viewed with skepticism. The maneuver could be designed to distract the Georgian public from the country’s creeping authoritarianism, including the recent adoption of a controversial “foreign agents” law reminiscent of Russia’s own repressive policies.
According to diplomatic sources, Georgian officials remain doubtful that a confederation will ever materialize, dismissing the current discussions as a publicity stunt orchestrated by the ruling Georgian Dream party.
Key Stakeholders Interested in Confederation:
Local Leaders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
Some factions within these regions have, at times, shown interest in exploring confederal arrangements, particularly as a way to secure more autonomy or formal recognition without full reintegration into Georgia.
Georgian Political Figures and Analysts:
There have been proposals from some Georgian political analysts and more moderate factions within Georgia that suggest a confederation as a potential compromise. The idea would be to grant significant autonomy to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while still maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity.
International Mediators:
Organizations like the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other international mediators have been involved in trying to broker peace and could be supportive of creative solutions like a confederal arrangement if it leads to long-term stability in the region.
Russia’s Strategic Interest:
Russia’s position is more complex. While it has been backing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it might consider a confederal solution that grants these regions de facto autonomy while keeping them politically aligned with Moscow. However, Russia’s preference has generally been for maintaining these regions as independent entities to keep Georgia out of Western spheres like NATO.
Key Challenges:
Lack of Trust: There is deep-seated mistrust between the Georgian government and the authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Geopolitical Tensions: The influence of Russia complicates the feasibility of a confederation since Russia recognizes these regions’ independence and has military bases there.
Public Sentiment: In Georgia, there is a strong sentiment against any solution that would appear to legitimize the independence of the breakaway regions, making the idea of a confederation politically sensitive.
In summary, while there are some parties that have shown interest in confederal arrangements as a potential conflict resolution mechanism, it remains a complex and contentious issue given the broader geopolitical and domestic dynamics in the region.
The idea of a confederation in Georgia (Caucasus) has resurfaced in recent times due to a combination of internal pressures, regional dynamics, and shifting geopolitical landscapes. There are several factors contributing to the renewed interest in confederal arrangements, particularly regarding the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Key Reasons Behind the Emergence of the Confederation Idea
Stalled Negotiations and Frozen Conflicts:
The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been largely “frozen” since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, with no significant progress toward a lasting resolution. Both regions declared independence, backed by Russia, but remain largely unrecognized by the international community.
The stalemate has led some political analysts and stakeholders to explore new frameworks, such as a confederation, as a possible compromise that could break the deadlock and move toward normalization.
Changing Geopolitical Climate in the Region:
The broader geopolitical environment in the Caucasus is shifting, particularly after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, which saw a reassertion of Russian influence in the region, as well as increased engagement by Turkey and Western powers.
As regional powers like Russia are increasingly focused on their own challenges (e.g., the war in Ukraine), there may be an opening for Georgia to revisit its approach to resolving its internal conflicts with a fresh perspective, including the idea of confederation.
Growing Calls for Autonomy:
Within Georgia, there are ongoing discussions about decentralization and granting more autonomy to its regions. Proponents of a confederation believe that offering significant self-governance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be a way to reintegrate them into the Georgian state.
This model could potentially offer these regions the autonomy they seek while ensuring that they remain under the formal sovereignty of Georgia, thus addressing both Georgian territorial integrity and the regions’ desire for self-rule.
Influence of External Actors:
Russia, which currently has a military presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, may be open to exploring new arrangements that would allow it to maintain influence while reducing the costs of direct support to these regions. A confederation could serve as a middle ground between full independence and reintegration into Georgia.
Additionally, the European Union and other Western actors may be encouraging dialogue around alternative political frameworks as part of their broader strategy to stabilize the region and counter Russian influence.
Economic Pressures and Regional Cooperation:
Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia face economic isolation and underdevelopment due to their unrecognized status. A confederal model could open up avenues for economic cooperation, development aid, and investment, benefiting all parties involved.
Georgia, which aspires to closer ties with the European Union and NATO, may see a confederation as a way to stabilize its internal situation and improve its chances of integration with Western institutions.
Domestic Political Shifts:
Within Georgia, there are shifts in the political landscape that may be driving the conversation toward confederal solutions. Some political factions might view confederation as a pragmatic solution to the long-standing conflicts, particularly if they believe it could bring stability and economic benefits.
There is also a generational change in leadership, with younger, more pragmatic politicians in Georgia potentially being more open to unconventional solutions like confederation.
Challenges to Implementing a Confederation in Georgia
While the idea of confederation has some potential benefits, it faces significant challenges:
Mistrust and Historical Grievances: There is deep-seated mistrust between the Georgian government and the authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, compounded by years of conflict and hostile rhetoric.
Russian Influence: Russia’s role as the main backer of Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicates any confederal arrangement. Russia may not fully support a solution that diminishes its control over these regions.
Public Opinion in Georgia: Many Georgians are opposed to granting any form of recognition or enhanced status to the breakaway regions, fearing it could lead to further fragmentation of the country.
Legal and Constitutional Hurdles: Implementing a confederal arrangement would require significant legal and constitutional changes in Georgia, which could be politically contentious.
The re-emergence of the idea of a confederation in Georgia reflects a pragmatic search for solutions to long-standing conflicts. It is driven by a mix of internal demands for stability, shifting regional dynamics, and external pressures to find a durable peace. While the concept is not without challenges, it represents an attempt to address the complex realities on the ground and could be a step toward a more stable and integrated Caucasus region.
However, we believe that the idea of a Georgian confederation could later be leveraged by Moscow as a negotiating model for resolving the situation in Ukraine. By introducing this concept into the public discourse, Moscow appears to be testing the waters for a strategy centered on creating the illusion of conflict resolution and the return of occupied territories—while retaining full control over them.
This approach suggests that the Kremlin may be exploring ways to replicate a similar framework in Ukraine, where it could present a semblance of peace and territorial reintegration without relinquishing its influence. By floating the idea of a confederation in Georgia, Moscow is likely gauging international reactions and setting a precedent that could be adapted to its broader geopolitical ambitions, particularly in regions where it seeks to maintain a foothold despite official concessions.
Applying the concept of a confederation in the context of Ukraine—particularly in relation to the conflict in the Donbas region and Crimea—is a complex and potentially controversial idea. However, if we consider it as a theoretical approach to resolving territorial disputes and achieving a stable peace, there are several parallels and potential implementations that can be drawn from the idea of confederation in the Caucasus (i.e., Georgia’s conflict with Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
Key Considerations for Implementing Confederation in Ukraine
Autonomy within a Unified State:
A confederal arrangement would grant significant autonomy to the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas) while keeping them formally within the borders of Ukraine. This might include control over local governance, language policy, and economic matters, while foreign policy and defense could remain under the purview of the central government in Kyiv.
Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014, presents a more complex challenge, as its status is currently disputed internationally but controlled by Russia. A confederal solution could involve some form of special status for Crimea within Ukraine, but this would require significant diplomatic negotiations with Russia.
Decentralization and Power-Sharing:
Similar to proposals for Georgia, Ukraine could adopt a decentralized political system that offers a high degree of self-governance to regions with distinct cultural, linguistic, or political identities.
This approach could be seen as a way to address the concerns of Russian-speaking populations in the east, potentially reducing tensions and fostering reconciliation.
Security Guarantees and Demilitarization:
A confederal solution in Ukraine would likely require international security guarantees, perhaps overseen by the OSCE, the United Nations, or other neutral bodies, to ensure compliance by all parties.
A key aspect of such an arrangement would be the demilitarization of the conflict zones, possibly with the deployment of international peacekeeping forces to maintain stability during the transition.
Legal and Constitutional Reforms:
For confederation to be viable, Ukraine would need to undertake constitutional reforms to define the rights and responsibilities of its autonomous regions.
This could include creating a framework that protects the rights of minority populations, ensures fair representation, and establishes mechanisms for dispute resolution between the central government and autonomous regions.
International Mediation and Support:
Successful implementation would require extensive diplomatic engagement and support from major stakeholders, including the EU, the United States, and Russia.
The Minsk Agreements, which were intended to provide a roadmap for peace in eastern Ukraine, could serve as a starting point for discussions on a confederal structure, though previous efforts have stalled due to lack of trust and compliance.
Potential Benefits
Conflict De-escalation: Confederation could offer a compromise that satisfies some of the demands of separatist regions without fully ceding territory, thus reducing the risk of further conflict.
Preservation of Territorial Integrity: By keeping Donetsk, Luhansk, and potentially Crimea formally within Ukraine’s borders, a confederal arrangement could help maintain the country’s territorial integrity.
Economic Recovery and Stability: Reducing conflict could pave the way for economic recovery in war-torn regions and attract international investment.
Key Challenges and Risks
Sovereignty Concerns: Many in Ukraine(pro-Russian forces) may view a confederal solution as compromising the country’s sovereignty, especially given the fear of further Russian influence.
Lack of Trust: Similar to the situation in Georgia, there is significant mistrust between the Ukrainian government and the authorities in the separatist regions, as well as between Ukraine and Russia.
Geopolitical Tensions: The idea of confederation may not align with the strategic interests of key players, particularly Russia, which has recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and.
Comparative Insights: Georgia vs. Ukraine
Similarities: Both countries face separatist conflicts backed by Russia, and there are ongoing challenges in balancing territorial integrity with regional autonomy.
Differences: The scale of the conflict in Ukraine is much larger, with a higher level of international involvement and geopolitical stakes. Additionally, the legal and political status of Crimea is more complicated due to its annexation.
ConclusionWhile the concept of confederation offers a potential framework for resolving territorial disputes, its implementation in Ukraine would require significant compromises and guarantees from all sides. It would be a delicate balance between granting autonomy to conflict-prone regions and ensuring the sovereignty and unity of the Ukrainian state. Whether this approach could be acceptable to all parties involved is uncertain, but it could be one of the options explored in future peace negotiations.
It is important to emphasize that prior to the annexation of Crimea, the peninsula already enjoyed the highest degree of constitutional autonomy within Ukraine. This status granted Crimea significant self-governance rights, including its own parliament and government, while remaining part of Ukraine’s territorial framework.
Moscow’s current maneuvers, such as the confederation proposal for Georgia, may reflect a strategy to offer similar autonomy arrangements as a facade of compromise, thereby maintaining influence without fully relinquishing control. The precedent of Crimea’s autonomy—followed by annexation—underscores the risks inherent in such proposals, where nominal autonomy can serve as a stepping stone to deeper integration under Russian dominion.
Nation-state adversaries are changing their approach, pivoting from data destruction to prioritizing stealth and espionage. According to the Microsoft 2023 Digital Defense Report, “nation-state attackers are increasing their investments and launching more sophisticated cyberattacks to evade detection and achieve strategic priorities.”
These actors pose a critical threat to United States infrastructure and protected data, and compromising either resource could put citizens at risk.
Thankfully, there’s an upside to these malicious efforts: information. By analyzing nation-state tactics, government agencies and private enterprises are better prepared to track, manage and mitigate these attacks.
Know your enemy: Nation-states in action
The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identifies four prolific nation-state actors: The Chinese government, the Russian government, the North Korean government and the Iranian government. Each of these actors uses various methods to compromise security and gain access to victim networks.
According to CISA’s associate director for threat hunting, Jermaine Roebuck: “These include phishing, use of stolen credentials and exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities and/or security misconfigurations. They conduct extensive pre-compromise reconnaissance to learn about network architecture and identify vulnerabilities. With this information, these state-sponsored actors exploit vulnerabilities in edge-facing devices and take advantage of system misconfigurations to gain initial access. They often use publicly available exploit code for known vulnerabilities but are also adept at discovering and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities. Once they gain access to victim networks, advanced actors use living-off-the-land (LOTL) techniques to avoid detection.”
By understanding the techniques and tactics used by threat actors, organizations are better prepared to allocate limited security resources where they will be the most effective. “Knowing these tactics allows defenders to apply specific security concepts and classes of technologies to mitigate adversarial actors and focus on clearly-defined data properties and value to detect their techniques,” says Roebuck.
In other words, the more enterprises and agencies learn about nation-state attack methods, the better.
Back to basics: The other side of the security coin
While the actions of each nation-state offer protective insight for American cybersecurity, there’s another component in effective defense: Getting back to basics.
These approaches aren’t mutually exclusive — for example. At the same time, government agencies need to identify and dismantle disinformation campaigns, it’s just as critical to ensure that systems include tamper-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the risk of compromise.
According to Roebuck, other CISA recommendations include:
Implementing strong authentication: Multi-factor authentication provides an additional layer of security for organizations. “MFA improves security because it mitigates risks of compromised credentials, reduces the impact of phishing attacks, protects sensitive data, enhances compliance and adapts to evolving security threats,” says Roebuck.
Regularly updating and patching systems: Nation-state attacks are constantly evolving. If cybersecurity remains static, organizations are at risk. Regular system updates and patching provide key security benefits, such as improved system stability, enhanced security compliance and reduced vulnerability risk.
Educating employees: Roebuck makes it clear that employee education is a critical component of effective cybersecurity.
“Organizations should conduct regular training sessions on recognizing phishing attempts and practicing good cyber hygiene,” he says. “According to trusted Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources, 75% of the intrusions were ‘malware-less.’ This means that threat actors ‘walked through the front door’ with valid accounts obtained via phishing and social engineering. Users need to be well-trained to identify social engineering techniques and phishing emails.
Using antivirus and anti-malware solutions: According to Roebuck, antivirus and anti-malware tools act as “digital sentinels” by standing guard against evolving threats. Advantages of these solutions include early threat detection, reduced malware spread and real-time protection for critical data.
Hardening credentials: Credentials are a popular compromise point for nation-state attackers. If bad actors obtain legitimate user credentials, they’re often able to compromise enterprise systems without being detected.
To limit credential concerns, Roebuck recommends that all accounts have strong, unique passwords and suggests that companies change default credentials. “Strong, unique passwords prevent unauthorized access by making unauthorized access much tougher, limit damage by ensuring threat actors can’t easily access other accounts, reduce common attacks targeting default or weak password, protect sensitive information and improve overall security.”
Monitoring and logging activity: It’s also critical for companies to monitor and log all network activity. Roebuck recommends that businesses establish centralized log management and regularly review these logs for suspicious activity. He notes that centralization makes it easier to detect suspicious activity and take immediate action and improves the ability of organizations to carry out forensic analysis to pinpoint the origin and discover the scope of the attack.
Securing remote access: Remote access has become commonplace as organizations embrace the need for agile operations. The access points, however, are tempting targets for nation-state attackers. By using secure configurations for remote services and limiting access to trusted IP addresses, enterprises can minimize remote access risks. “The implementation of secure configurations and IP limitations for remote services are pivotal for minimizing attack surface, preventing unauthorized access, reducing exposure to threats, enhancing monitoring and complying with security standards,” says Roebuck.
A team effort: Navigating the new reality of nation-state attacks
The coordinated nature of nation-state attacks means that no enterprise or governmental agency is an island. Instead, it’s the cooperative efforts of organizations that make improved security possible.
CISA is doing its part to help as well. Roebuck points to the agency’s joint advisory on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which provides recommended actions to detect, mitigate and remediate emerging threats. “We know, however, that sophisticated nation-state threat actors constantly evolve their TTPs,” he says. “Accordingly, CISA has a strong partnership with government agencies, commercial and critical infrastructure partners to provide actionable information to combat evolving malicious cyber activity, such as the PRC.”
Ultimately, Roebuck’s security advice is straightforward: “To protect against the increased prevalence of malicious actors, implement and maintain an effective solution to detect intrusions and evict attackers as quickly as possible.”
A godson of King Charles worked closely with an American financier accused by the U.S. government of evading taxes on more than $350 million in military contract profits, according to corporate documents.
Lord Charles Tryon held positions at a number of companies tied to Douglas Edelman, a former defense contractor who was charged in May on 30 counts of tax evasion, conspiracy, and providing false information to U.S. authorities. Tryon denied any involvement in Edelman’s alleged tax evasion, and prosecutors have not alleged wrongdoing on his part.
The Tryon family has been close to King Charles since the 1970s. The king once described Lord Tryon’s mother, Australian-born Lady Dale “Kanga” Tryon, who died in 1997, as “the only woman who ever understood me.”
Then-Prince Charles, left, holds 9-week-old godson, Charles George Barrington Tryon, after Tryon’s baptism in July 1976. With them is the child’s mother, Dale Tryon. Image: Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
As an infant, Charles Tryon, now a 48-year-old financier, appeared in a famous photo of the king holding him at his christening. He became the 4th Lord Tryon in 2018.
Edelman made a fortune from more than $7 billion worth of contracts with the U.S. military to supply forces in Afghanistan and the Middle East with jet fuel during the post-9/11 war on terror, according to the indictment.
Prosecutors allege that Edelman used several offshore companies as part of an elaborate scheme to place assets in his French wife’s name and thus evade millions in U.S taxes. They claim that Edelman opened overseas bank accounts in the names of these companies, which he used to purchase a $43 million mansion in the upscale London neighborhood of Kensington, an Austrian ski chalet and multiple yachts. Edelman has pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Records obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) from the Pandora Papers list Tryon as a director of one of those companies from 2009 to 2011 and as having power of attorney in connection with another entity in 2009. Another business that Tryon launched was, until 2014, registered to a London address linked to Edelman’s businesses; Tryon asserted that his firm took over the lease from Edelman’s companies. Edelman also invested in a business founded by Tryon in South Sudan until 2017.
In response to questions about his involvement with Edelman, Tryon wrote that he worked in businesses linked to the American financier from 2003 until mid-2008, and split from Edelman “on somewhat acrimonious terms” in early 2009. He strongly denied that he had any involvement in or knowledge of Edelman’s alleged tax evasion, which the indictment alleges took place from 2003 to 2020.
The records reviewed by ICIJ show Tryon’s involvement in Edelman’s companies, but do not detail his activities on their behalf. Tryon is not mentioned in the indictment, and wrote that he has not been contacted by prosecutors in relation to the ongoing case.
Edelman was arrested in Spain in July and extradited to the United States in September to face trial. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, has written that the charges against him “represent one of the largest individual tax evasion schemes in American history.”
Tryon is currently CEO of the Mauritius-based Maris Limited, which he describes as an “Africa frontier market focused venture capital fund.”
Maris Limited’s website reports that the company holds assets of over $125 million, and that its investments include a machinery dealership in Angola, mining businesses in Zimbabwe and a forestry business in South Sudan.
Leaked documents reviewed by ICIJ show that, from 2009 to 2011, Tryon was a director of a British Virgin Islands-based company called Satellite Support Services Limited, which the U.S. indictment alleges was used to conceal Edelman’s profits. The indictment claims Edelman opened bank accounts in Singapore and the United Arab Emirates in the name of the company, and in 2014 and 2015 used it to purchase two yachts, “Divinity” and “Princess Juliet.”
Photos from the indictment against Douglas Edelman showing assets he allegedly purchased using offshore companies, including a London mansion (top left), an Austrian ski chalet (bottom left) and two yachts, right.
Tryon initially wrote in an email that he did not serve as a director for Edelman’s businesses, and subsequently wrote that he was surprised to learn that he had been a director of Satellite Support Services. He wrote that he could not understand why he had been made a director in April 2009, after he said he split with Edelman, and served in that role until September 2011.
Documents also show Tryon as having been issued a power of attorney in October 2009 in connection with the Aspen Wind Corporation, another entity the U.S. indictment alleges was part of Edelman’s tax evasion scheme. Prosecutors claim that Edelman held a bank account at Credit Suisse in the name of the company, and that Edelman shifted its assets to Singapore after the Swiss bank told him in November 2008 that he would either have to disclose the account to U.S. authorities or close it. The assets were transferred before Tryon held power of attorney at the company.
Aspen Wind was described on news site EurasiaNet as an “umbrella” organization that held a wide range of Afghanistan-based businesses, including a company that sold Internet services in Afghanistan of which Tryon was CEO.
Do you have a story about corruption, fraud, or abuse of power?
ICIJ accepts information about wrongdoing by corporate, government or public services around the world. We do our utmost to guarantee the confidentiality of our sources.
Tryon first wrote that he remembered being granted a power of attorney for Aspen Wind so that he could sign an agreement with the Internet services provider. He subsequently wrote that he did not know why he would have been granted a power of attorney several months after ending his business relationship with Edelman.
Satellite Support Services and Aspen Wind shared a London mailing address with a U.K.-registered company of which Tryon served as director, Maris Capital Advisors. Tryon wrote that Maris Capital Advisors took over the lease from Edelman’s businesses at 20 Conduit Street, but that it was completely unconnected to Edelman. Records reviewed by ICIJ show that Edelman’s businesses used the building as their mailing address until 2011, and U.K. corporate records show that Tryon’s Maris Capital Advisors listed 20 Conduit Street as its official address until 2014.
Records reviewed by ICIJ show that a Panamanian law firm which provided corporate services to Edelman listed a similarly named company, Maris Capital Limited, as part of Edelman’s offshore corporate network. Tryon said that this firm had been incorporated by one of his colleagues at his current venture, and that the formation agent accidentally associated it with Edelman’s businesses. He said the company did not conduct any business and was removed from the BVI corporate directory in 2021.
U.S. Air Force aircraft at Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan in 2002. Douglas Edelman’s company supplied jet fuel to U.S. bases in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Image: Joe Raedle/Getty Images
In a 2010 article he wrote for The Daily Telegraph, Tryon described working for a “small, highly specialized venture capital company” in Afghanistan.
He wrote: “Given our successes there and the worsening political and security situation, I was given a remit to look further afield to Africa, which presented a new universe of opportunities.”
After Tryon left Edelman’s employment to launch his own business, they co-invested in two ventures in South Sudan. Tryon and Edelman’s companies both held ownership stakes in a billboard advertising company, and a firm that managed mobile telephone infrastructure in the country.
Tryon wrote that these businesses were his own initiatives and that neither Edelman nor his representatives were involved in their day-to-day operations. He wrote that he decided to close the telecommunications firm in 2015 and that the billboard advertising company was sold in 2017.
The Edelman case is the result of a major international collaboration involving the British tax authority and the IRS’s Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5), called Operation Jetsetter.
The London property purchased by Edelman, 14 Cottesmore Gardens, has a storied history. It was previously owned by both disgraced press baron Lord Conrad Black and the jailed Australian magnate Alan Bond.
