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Voluntary certifications used by companies to tout their green credentials are not fully in line with a new European Union law banning the trade of goods linked to forest destruction, according to a new academic study.

Producers and traders of timber, palm oil and other forestry or agricultural commodities often use so-called green labels to show customers and shareholders that their operations and products do not harm the environment or violate human rights.

However, a study recently published in the Forest Policy and Economics journal found that some sustainability certification schemes awarding such labels “fell short in providing a comprehensive prohibition of deforestation and forest degradation.” The study cautioned companies not to rely on the schemes to prove compliance with the upcoming EU Deforestation Regulation.

The EUDR will go into effect at the end of 2024, requiring most European companies importing certain commodities to be able to prove the products did not originate from deforested land or contribute to forest degradation.

As part of the study, researchers at the University of Padova, in Italy, compared the requirements imposed by the new law with the standards five organizations used to certify the sustainability of timber, soy, palm oil, coffee, rubber and cocoa. Their study did not cover beef because there is no related voluntary certification scheme, the researchers said.

The EUDR makes clear that voluntary sustainability certifications are not mandatory nor sufficient to prove compliance.

Some trade organizations have urged lawmakers to recognize the schemes but the study raises questions about the industry’s position, likening the green labels to “marketing tools” that should be used in tandem with stricter legal requirements.

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The “voluntary initiatives can provide on-the-ground information periodically assessed by an independent third party” and “facilitate the implementation of the EUDR,” the study said, but companies “must be cautious when incorporating these schemes into their due diligence systems.”

For instance, the researchers found that certification organizations don’t require companies to precisely geolocate the land where commodities originate from, allow deforestation and conversion of natural forests in some cases, and are lenient toward companies that violate voluntary standards.

“The evidence collected suggests that conducting deforestation, forest degradation, or non-compliance with legislation, does not result in certificate suspension, cancelation [or] withdraw,” the study said.

The researchers’ findings add to reporting by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and others exposing flaws in a lightly regulated sustainability industry that overlooks environmental harm and human rights violations when granting sustainability certifications.

In 2023, ICIJ’s Deforestation Inc. investigation revealed that certification firms frequently validate products linked to deforestation, logging in conflict zones and other abuses. Certification helped the firms’ clients produce and promote teak yacht decks, high-end furniture and other products in markets around the world.

An ICIJ analysis of records in at least 50 countries showed that, since 1998, more than 340 certified companies in the forest products industry were accused of environmental crimes or other wrongdoing by local communities, environmental groups, and government agencies, among others. About 50 of those firms held sustainability certificates at the time they were fined or convicted by a government agency.

‘Responsibility to keep their promises’

The researchers examined five well-known voluntary certification schemes including Forest Stewardship Council for wood, Rainforest Alliance for cocoa and coffee, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, and others. They then analyzed whether the schemes required products to be deforestation-free and have traceable supply chains, as well as whether the schemes themselves were transparent about their methods of certification and enforcement.

Mauro Masiero, one of the authors of the study, told ICIJ that he found it “surprising” that, with the exception of the FSC, most of the schemes examined in the study have some flaws in monitoring the way non-certified materials enter the supply chain of certified products.

The researchers found that “there is an inherent risk that products managed under such traceability systems are associated with deforestation and non-compliance with legislation.”

The EU law requires national authorities to conduct regular checks and act swiftly against companies that don’t comply; penalties include fines of at least 4% of a company’s annual turnover.

According to Masiero, effective enforcement of the regulation will be key to its success. Though sustainability certifications remain voluntary, he said that national authorities in some EU states may still  view the certifications as indicators of compliance with the law. Masiero noted there were previoulsy “disparities” in the way the old European timber regulation was implemented across countries, with some having less strict controls than others.

Voluntary forest certification organizations, such as the FSC, were founded in the 1990s after environmentalists and regulators failed to agree on an international legal framework for forest conservation. Since then, more than a dozen such organizations and many affiliated programs have been established around the world — each with its own criteria and label.

Experts say that in countries where deforestation is widespread and forestry governance is weak, such as Brazil, voluntary certification can be a better alternative to poorly enforced laws on forest management and supply chains.

However, as more brands became willing to pay for green certifications, some organizations relaxed their standards, and the process became less effective, auditors and forestry experts told ICIJ.

According to Earthsight, an international environmental charity that has long warned about the flaws in the sustainability certification sector, the University of Padova study the first independent examination of “the interplay between these schemes and the EUDR.”

Voluntary certification schemes should not be taken as gospel, Masiero said. “We are aware that there may be mistakes or conditions that can be improved. It is important to acknowledge that and intervene whenever possible,” he said.

The researchers acknowledged that some certification organizations were seeking to change their standards to align with the new EU law, and said that the study will continue.

Masiero warned that consumers should be aware of what green labels mean as well as their limitations. “At the same time, these labels have the responsibility to keep their promises,” he said.

Introduction

The purpose and composition of the United States’ homeland and regional missile defenses has long been the subject of a divisive public debate. In 1973, just a year after the landmark Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed, noted strategic forces scholars Bernard and Fawn Brodie wrote that the “whole ABM question touched off so intense and emotional a debate in this country as to be virtually without precedent on any issue of weaponry.¹ This debate continued through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the passage of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, the George W. Bush administration’s subsequent withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and has now received renewed attention in the recently released report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.²

The primary point of contention in this debate—besides the cost and effectiveness of missile defense programs—has been the reaction of the United States’ main nuclear-armed strategic rivals, Russia and China. Critics have argued that US defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) could generate an arms-race dynamic either by forcing adversaries to increase their nuclear arsenals or by engendering fears of a US preemptive first strike, which could indirectly create crises.³ Similar statements have been expressed by Russian and Chinese officials, who have leveraged complaints that US ballistic missile defenses undermine the efficacy of their states’ nuclear deterrents and therefore their security.⁴

This paper focuses on strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD), defined as systems of interceptors, sensors, and supporting infrastructure designed to defeat medium- to intercontinental- range ballistic missiles, especially those carrying nuclear warheads. This definition preferences medium-range ballistic (MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and ICBMs, as opposed to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for several reasons. While these latter systems can certainly have strategic implications due to their range, precision, and ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, they can be defeated by far less sophisticated air defense systems which may not necessarily be designed specifically for a missile defense role. Developing the capability to intercept long-range ballistic missiles represents a far greater technical barrier and indicates a clearer interest in strategic defense by a given state. This paper will, however, address systems with limited capability against long-range ballistic missiles as a technological steppingstone in strategic BMD.

Often missing from this debate is the context of Russian and Chinese efforts to develop their own strategic missile defense systems, their reasons for doing so, and the implications for US strategy. There is a need for more open-source treatments of both countries’ missile defense programs, especially as their development has accelerated and even begun deployment in recent years.⁵ This research annex follows Matthew R. Costlow and Robert M. Soofer’s paper, US Homeland Missile Defense: Room for Expanded Roles, and seeks to inform debates about missile defense policy by placing arguments that US ballistic missile defenses are uniquely destabilizing in the context of efforts by Russia and China to deploy similar systems.⁶

Russia

Introduction

This section outlines the historical missile defense programs of the Soviet Union, the current development by the Russian Federation, and the broader trends in Russian thinking on missile defense. Of particular note are the A-135 anti-ballistic missile systems around Moscow and new mobile missile defense systems such as the S-500. With regard to doctrine, Russia orients its air and missile defense strategy around defeating a US-led aerospace strike campaign that Moscow believes could include a full spectrum of threats from aircraft to strategic missiles. 

Doctrine

The defense of the homeland against strategic air and missile attack has featured heavily in Russian military planning and doctrine since the early Cold War. This focus likely emerged from the experience of suffering massed German air attacks in World War 2 and continued into the twenty-first century due to a perceived advantage of the United States in the air and space domains.⁷ During the 1950s and 1960s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) sought to defend its airspace against US strategic bombers by deploying hundreds of early generation surface-to-air (SAM) missile batteries across its territory. Later, with the advent of ICBMs, the USSR developed a missile defense system around Moscow. The Soviet Union’s primary goals in developing strategic defenses were to protect party leadership, prevent a decapitation of nuclear command and control, and limit damage in a strategic exchange.⁸ It also likely saw a need to compete technologically with the United States for reputational reasons, especially after the highly public announcement of the SDI in 1983.⁹ 

Since 1991, following observation of US air campaigns, Russian doctrine has emphasized the need to defend against complex threats in the air and space domain, especially a massed aircraft and missile attack by the United States and NATO that would incapacitate Russian military and civilian leadership.¹⁰ To integrate Russia’s capabilities across these domains, then Russian president Dimitry Medvedev authorized the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces in 2011, which was ultimately merged with the Russian Air Force in 2015 to form the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). This move demonstrated the Russian military’s focus on developing an integrated approach to a wide array of offensive long-range strikes, including strategic nuclear attack, as well as conventional aircraft, cruise, and ballistic missile defense. Russian military analysts often cite the US pursuit of concepts such as Conventional Prompt Strike as indicative of the need to address strategic missile attacks across the nuclear and conventional spectrum.¹¹ The VKS is organized into several “Air Force and Air Defense Armies,” including both aviation and ground-based elements, with one typically being subordinated to each Military District of Russia.¹² These armies provide aerospace domain awareness to, and are coordinated by, military and political leadership through the National Defense Management Center, which serves as the primary command-and-control center for the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff.¹³

Moscow’s thinking on missile defense prioritizes protecting Russian leadership, critical command and control, and nuclear forces, with BMD capabilities being a critical component. In the Russian Defense Ministry journal, Военное Мысль (Military Thought), Mikhail N. Kumakshev and Aleksandr V. Kravtsov write: “The main direction of further development of the ПРО [missile defenses] of the Russian Federation is the creation of a layered system covering not only the high levels of leadership, but also the positions of the СЯС [strategic nuclear forces].”¹⁴ Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Defense has officially stated that: 

The main purpose of the missile defense system is to deter threats of use of missile weapons against Russia and to ensure the protection of state and military facilities, groups of troops, administrative and industrial centers, environmentally hazardous facilities and the civilian population from missile attacks.”¹⁵

While this definition is expansive, the relative ordering of priorities is indicative of the weight placed on protecting civil-military leadership. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense assesses that “Russia is developing a layered missile defense to enhance its anti-access/area denial capabilities, preserve its nuclear deterrent, and ensure regime survival.”¹⁶ While defending political leadership and nuclear forces are clearly the primary roles for missile defenses, developing this technology may also have broader benefits from the perspective of the Russian government. It may view its own development of BMD capabilities as necessary not only to keep pace with the United States and NATO allies technologically, but also to defend against possible future contingencies involving Iran, China, North Korea, or even non-state actors.¹⁷

Historical capability development 

The Soviet Union’s development of BMD began with the experimental “System A,” which was developed and tested between 1957 and 1961 at the Sary-Shagan test site in Soviet Kazakhstan. This served as a proof of concept for the possibility of a missile defense system, and Sary-Shagan continues to serve as the main test area for new missile defense technology.¹⁸ The experiments with System A led to the deployment of the Soviet Union’s first early warning radar network. These also influenced the decision to develop the A-35 anti-ballistic missile system designed to protect Moscow over various other prospective BMD projects. The A-35 system became operational fitfully, with various phases being completed between 1967 and 1972; however, ultimately, it did not live up to the expectations of Soviet leaders, helping spur the signing of the ABM Treaty.¹⁹

In 1989, the A-35 system was upgraded and replaced with the A-135 system, which was based around the Don-2N radar; sixty-eight short-range, endoatmospheric 53T6 “Gazelle” interceptors; and sixteen 51T6 “Gorgon” long-range, exoatmospheric interceptors, both armed with nuclear warheads.²⁰These warheads were likely enhanced-radiation weapons, or neutron bombs, designed to use the radiation from their detonations to cause nearby incoming warheads to undergo partial fission and fail to detonate. In 1985, before the deployment of the A-135 system, Soviet official Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev described its capability as providing protection from “1-2 modern ICBMs and up to 35 Pershing 2-type intermediate-range missiles.”²¹ Kataev also described a planned A-235 follow-on system, which would be effective against eight to twelve ICBMs. The use of enhanced-radiation weapons for BMD suggests that this system was primarily for the protection of military and political leadership in the city’s center, given that these systems’ detonations could spread dangerous radiation across much of the countryside and outskirts of Moscow itself.²²

In the 1980s, due to concern about the increasing accuracy of US ICBMs and intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union also experimented with developing terminal defenses to increase the survivability of its missile silos. These terminal defenses involved launching a canister of metal balls or rods above the silos to disrupt an incoming reentry vehicle.“²³ These projects, alternatively referred to as “Sambo,” “Mozyr,” or “Active Defense Complex,” were cancelled after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, but there is some indication that the Russian government may be considering resuming development of a similar capability.²⁴ In the 1980s and 1990s, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, also continued to upgrade its network of national SAM sites, including deploying the S-300 (SA-10) air defense system, with some early versions having limited terminal defense capabilities against MRBMs.²⁵ One notable aspect of the Soviet Union’s and later Russia’s approach to building missile defenses was a tendency to develop and deploy systems with initially relatively limited capabilities that could later be upgraded over time or abandoned if progress proved unfeasible.²⁶ As discussed below, this pattern appears to hold true today, either by design or due to the capacity limitations of the Russian defense industry. 

Current capabilities & future development 

Today, Russia deploys several systems that can provide layered missile defense across its territory. The A-135 system deployed around Moscow is currently Russia’s only system designed specifically to defend against ICBMs. The system is based around the Don-2N radar, which receives data from Russia’s wider early warning system.²⁷ The Don-2N provides targeting data for the sixty-eight silo-based 53T6 “Gazelle” endoatmospheric interceptors, which are based at five sites around Moscow. As noted previously, the system was originally composed of both endo- and exoatmospheric interceptors; however, the sixteen 51T6 “Gorgon” exoatmospheric interceptors were retired between 2006 and 2007.²⁸ The Gazelle interceptors were, until recently, equipped exclusively with nuclear warheads. As such, they likely suffered from the drawback that these warheads were stored separately from the missiles, reducing their readiness.²⁹ The A-135 is operated by the 1st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army of the VKS, which is responsible for the air defense of the Moscow region.³⁰

According to interviews with Col. Andrei Cheburin, the commander of the missile defense wing of the VKS, and retired Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, a former chief of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, Russia is reportedly embarking on a process of overhauling the entire A-135 system.³¹ This redesigned system has been referred to as A-235 and, while it is unclear if this structure is still reflective of current Russian planning, it was described as including three layers of defense: 

• A long-range exoatmospheric interceptor (replacing the 51T6) with an intercept range of 1,500 km and altitude of 800 km; 

• A medium-range interceptor with a range and altitude of 1,000 km and 120 km, respectively; and 

• A short-range interceptor with a maximum range and altitude of 350 km and 40-50 km, respectively.³²

This plan also includes an upgrade of the Don-2N radars and the Elbrus-2 battle-management computer associated with the system, as well as the activation of the Razvyazka space monitoring radar.³³ In 2018, Russia began deploying the short-range missile envisioned in this plan, an upgraded version of the Gazelle interceptors termed the PRS-1M/53T6M, which can reportedly use either a conventional warhead or a nuclear one.³⁴ These missiles are reported to have the 350 km range described above and have either replaced the previous generation of interceptors or are deployed alongside them in the formerly mothballed 51T6 silos.³⁵ If the range reported for these interceptors is to be believed, then they could provide some capability to defend the Russian ICBM sites of the 28^th Rocket Division headquartered in Kozelsk and 54^th Rocket Division in Teykovo (some 200 km southwest and northeast of Moscow, respectively).³⁶

Russia is also reportedly still developing the long-range exoatmospheric midcourse defense component of the A-235 system, which will be the successor to the 51T6.³⁷ While it is unclear what systems will specifically fill that role, the PL-19 “Nudol” direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, which Russia tested in November of 2021, may be the basis of the interceptor that will eventually fill that role.³⁸ In the 2021 test, the PL-19 impacted a defunct Soviet satellite at an altitude of around 480 km, placing it within the described range for the A-235 exoatmospheric interceptor.³⁹ There is also evidence of a program for a midcourse interceptor referred to as “Aerostat,” being developed by the same company, Almaz-Antey, but with a different subcontractor than the PL-19.⁴⁰

The other recent development in Russian missile defenses is the first deployment of the S-500 missile system, which was delivered to the 1^st Special Purpose Air and Missile Defense Army (tasked with the defense of the Moscow area) in 2021.⁴¹ The S-500 is Russia’s latest mobile air and missile defense system, and is designed to target IRBMs, early warning aircraft, and satellites in low-Earth orbit.⁴² In February of 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had successfully tested the weapon against a hypersonic target representative of an ICBM reentry vehicle.⁴³ The system was previously tested at a range of 481 km and has a claimed flight ceiling of 100-200 km, which may indicate that it fills the medium-range role envisioned for the A-235 project.⁴⁴ As currently deployed, it will complement the A-135 system and, in the future, could provide regional terminal ICBM defense across Russia or form the basis of a future sea-based missile defense capability.⁴⁵ The S-500 is designed to use the new 77N6 family of interceptors when engaging ballistic missiles that likely have a kinetic energy hit-to-kill warhead, which is more effective against ballistic missile targets than the blast-fragmentation warheads of interceptors used by the S-400 and S-300 variants.⁴⁶ However, the first operational version of the S-500 reportedly has reduced capabilities, and the further ten units which were slated for production in 2022 have not yet been delivered.⁴⁷ Members of the Russian defense industry have already begun discussing a planned upgrade, the S-550, which will be solely optimized for missile defense and be more capable against ICBMs.⁴⁸ Despite setbacks to the S-500, there have been several proposals for a national mobile nonstrategic missile defense system composed of S-500s, S-400s, and S-300VMs to protect cities and industrial centers from regional missile attacks.⁴⁹ One other notable Russian strategic capability is “Peresvet,” a mobile, high-powered laser system designed to blind imaging satellites in orbit. Peresvet has been based near mobile ICBM bases, such as the one at Teykovo, suggesting that it is intended to inhibit targeting of those missiles.⁵⁰ Peresvet could also potentially be used to prevent adversaries from tracking mobile BMD systems, like the S-500. 

Russia fields a number of systems, including the S-400 as well as the S-300 PMU-2 and S-300VM variants, that have some capability against MRBMs but are primarily designed to defend against airbreathing cruise missiles, aircraft, and SRBMs.⁵¹ The VKS had an estimated 584 S-300 launchers of various types and over 248 S-400 launchers in inventory before the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.⁵² Furthermore, the S-300F variant is integrated into many Russian Navy surface combatants, with newer ships being equipped with the “Redut” air defense system that shares the same 9M96E interceptors with fragmentation warheads as the S-400.⁵³

The Russian VKS is also in the process of modernizing its space-based early warning and ground-based tracking capabilities. The current Soviet-era “Oko” early warning satellite constellation is slated to be replaced by the Единая космическая система (EKS) [Unified Space System] often referred to as “Kupol.” The system was planned to be completed by 2020; however, currently only six of the ten highly elliptical orbit “Tundra” satellites for the constellation have been placed in orbit, and none of the planned geostationary satellites have been launched.⁵⁴ Experts have attributed the lengthy timeline to production delays caused by sanctions and Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.⁵⁵ Russia’s ground-based radar modernization has fared better, with nine 77Ya6 “Voronezh” radar early warning and tracking sites having been constructed around Russia’s borders and five 69Ya6 “Rezonans” radar systems deployed within the Arctic Circle specifically to monitor ICBM launches.⁵⁶ In late May 2024, two Voronezh radar sites were targeted in attacks by Ukrainian UAVs, raising concerns about potential escalation risks by some experts. ⁵⁷

One bottleneck in Russia’s ability to produce advanced capabilities is the capacity of its defense industry, particularly Almaz-Antey, which produces most of its air defense systems. Almaz-Antey has struggled with meeting delivery dates and production quantities in the past, and it can only be assumed that these problems will increase due to export restrictions on critical components resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.⁵⁸ It is also worth noting that, following the invasion, Ukraine has launched several attacks on the Moscow region with various types of UAVs. Although these attacks were not officially acknowledged by the Ukrainian government, they raise questions about the effectiveness of Moscow’s air defenses against small, low-flying targets. In March of 2023, then Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the air and missile defenses of Moscow would be upgraded by the end of the year, likely referencing the threats of drones and cruise missiles, rather than ballistic missiles.⁵⁹

While relatively effective against Ukrainian aircraft, Russian tactical air and missile defense systems seem to have a mixed record in combat since Russia’s February 2022 invasion. So far, Russia has claimed interception of approximately a dozen Ukrainian Soviet-era Tochka-U SRBMs; however, Ukraine has also used the same missile for several successful strikes, including sinking a Russian landing ship in the opening months of the war.⁶⁰ More recently, Ukraine has used US-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) SRBMs in several successful strikes, including a pair of attacks on airfields, which destroyed approximately fourteen Russian helicopters.⁶¹ Russia has claimed to have shot down three US-supplied ATACMS SRBMs in a coordinated strike; however, this claim has been disputed with evidence that some of the missiles reached their target.⁶² Regardless, Russian effectiveness against ATACMS missiles will likely increase, even if slowly, over the course of the conflict, as Russia trains air defense crews to address the threat.⁶³

Despite a mixed record in Ukraine and severe resource constraints due to sanctions, Russia is moving to develop more advanced missile defense systems and modernize existing ones. Key metrics for assessing Russian progress will be further development of a midcourse interceptor, confirmation of a hit-to-kill capability for the existing Moscow defense system, or wider deployment of the S-500. 

China 

This section details the history of China’s development of missile defenses and its ongoing programs. Given the relatively recent nature of China’s missile defense capabilities, this section assesses China’s possible motivations for developing strategic BMD rather than attempting to describe its doctrine. Special attention is also paid to the overlap of China’s BMD development and its ASAT program. 

History

Despite only recently beginning to deploy missile defenses, China’s interest in the technology dates back to the 1960s. In 1964, Mao Zedong ordered the commencement of Project 640, an effort to develop the technology necessary for a BMD system, including research into kinetic kill vehicles, high-powered lasers, as well as early warning and tracking radars.⁶⁴ This research may have been prompted by observation of US and Soviet missile defense developments, as well as a fear that the United States might consider a preemptive attack to eliminate China’s nascent nuclear deterrent.⁶⁵ Early Chinese nuclear planners were preoccupied with the survivability of their forces and the credibility of their retaliatory capabilities, a theme that would persist into the twenty-first century.⁶⁶ As will be discussed later, missile defense may be one possible solution to this survivability problem. Project 640 was hampered by technological challenges and the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution and ultimately ended without deploying any operational systems.⁶⁷ However, the project laid the groundwork for future Chinese missile defense and ASAT capabilities. 

The announcement of the SDI by then US president Ronald Reagan in 1983 prompted renewed Chinese research into missile defense, and particularly space-based technology, under Project 863 launched by then Chinese president Deng Xiaoping.⁶⁸ From this point onward, Chinese research of missile defense technology occurred in parallel with its development of counterspace capabilities designed to neutralize possible US space-based defenses resulting from the SDI. In the 1990s and early 2000s, China repeatedly voiced opposition to US national missile defense development.⁶⁹ China was also outspokenly critical of US-led theater missile defense projects in East Asia, such as the sale of the Patriot system to Taiwan in 1997, participation of Japan in the Aegis BMD program in 2003, and the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in 2016, which China viewed as undermining its strategic deterrent and, potentially, its coercive leverage over Taiwan.⁷⁰ However, in the mid-1990s, the Central Military Commission initiated a ten-year program to develop an indigenous missile defense capability, including interceptors and early warning satellites.⁷¹ This development may have been spurred by Chinese observation of the 1991 Gulf War and the vulnerability of Iraq to a coordinated US air and missile strike campaign.⁷² At this time, China was heavily reliant on Russia for advanced radars and air defense capabilities and purchased the S-300PMU in 1991 as well as the S-300F naval variant in 2002, which would form the basis of its own domestic production.⁷³

In 2001, China introduced the HQ-9 SAM system, which is derived from the S-300 and forms the basis for a family of Chinese air and missile defense systems, including those with some limited capability against SRBMs and MRBMs.⁷⁴ During the 2000s, China continued its development of ASAT weapons, including conducting a destructive direct-ascent test in 2007 at an altitude of 863 km with an interceptor designated SC-19 by US intelligence and believed to be based on its DF-21 MRBM.⁷⁵ Since then, China has continued to expand its ASAT capabilities and, in 2010, claimed to test a midcourse BMD interceptor, as will be further detailed below. China has also gained greater technology independence from Russia over the last decade; however, it has continued to take advantage of Russian technical experience and purchase Russian-designed systems. In 2014, China purchased the S-400, which began delivery in 2018.⁷⁶ China also announced its cooperation with Moscow on developing its space-based early warning system which, as will be discussed later, has been at least partially successful.⁷⁷

Rationale for developing ballistic missile defenses 

Compared to sources on Russian missile defense, there is less public information on Chinese doctrine regarding missile defense; however, it is possible to draw some conclusions from the available evidence. China has strong incentives to develop nonstrategic air and missile defenses to help defend its airspace from hostile attack and allow it to project power into the Pacific. However, China’s interest in strategic ballistic missile defense and its associated technologies likely stems from several related objectives. The list below relies heavily on research conducted by Bruce W. MacDonald and Charles D. Ferguson in 2015, for which they interviewed Chinese experts and officials regarding various rationales for developing BMD.⁷⁸

The most likely drivers of China’s BMD development include: 

• Enhancing the progress of, and providing international legitimacy for, its ASAT weapons program. 

• Providing limited defenses of key objects such as political leadership, command and control, and nuclear forces against preemptive attack by the United States and possibly Russia. 

• Providing a more robust defense against Indian intermediate-range and ICBM class missiles.  

• Gaining further understanding of the nature and vulnerabilities of US BMD technology and operations. 

• Demonstrating international technological achievement and competitiveness. 

Over the past decades, China has demonstrated a commitment to the development of ASAT systems, including kinetic interceptors, as a key part of its strategy for prevailing in a possible conflict with the United States.⁷⁹ The technology for kinetic ASAT weapons overlaps significantly with strategic BMD, as both capabilities involve intercepting high-speed objects at various altitudes outside the Earth’s atmosphere.⁸⁰ Strategic BMD development may be a natural offshoot of China’s efforts to enhance its ASAT capability or an effort to gain additional utility from its research investments. However, Chinese and Russian destructive ASAT testing has drawn international condemnation and provided the United States an avenue to push for limitations and bans on such systems.⁸¹ Therefore, BMD may serve as a useful cover for tests of systems privately envisioned as having a primarily ASAT role. For example, in 2014, China conducted what it claimed was a missile interception test; however, the US Department of State later assessed that it was intended as a test of an ASAT weapon.⁸² One result of China’s incentive to misrepresent is that it is difficult to categorize claimed Chinese BMD tests or determine whether systems in development are primarily intended for BMD or ASAT roles. 

China may also be interested in strategic BMD as one solution to long-standing concerns about its resilience to a first strike by the United States or Russia and the growing sophistication of India’s nuclear arsenal. While a defense against the United States or Russia would only be very limited for the foreseeable future, China may view it as beneficial for complicating a possible strike on Beijing or its ICBM silos.⁸³ Noted expert on Chinese nuclear forces Tong Zhao has suggested that one explanation for the relatively dense arrangement of China’s newly constructed ICBM silos could be to facilitate a possible area defense for those weapons.⁸⁴ Other possible targets to be defended might include military command and control locations during an ongoing conflict or critical infrastructure, such as the Three Gorges Dam.⁸⁵  

Another driver of Chinese interest in strategic BMD could be the increasing range and capability of Indian ballistic missiles.⁸⁶ In 2014, India deployed a small number of Agni-III IRBMs capable of striking the majority of China and is developing an improved Agni-IV IRBM with even greater range.⁸⁷ India also recently successfully tested its developmental Agni-V ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.⁸⁸ Given increased tensions with India, it would be hard to believe that Chinese decisionmakers are not concerned about the potential for India to hold any Chinese target at risk with a new generation of ballistic missiles. However, India will likely deploy a far smaller number of delivery vehicles with nuclear warheads compared to the United States or Russia, making a more comprehensive Chinese BMD shield a potentially attractive goal. 

China may wish to develop strategic BMD as part of a broader technology development strategy beyond the immediate benefits of a BMD capability. Given its outspoken concern over US missile defense capabilities on strategic stability and interest in defeating them, China may hope to gain a greater understanding of how BMD operations are conducted and the limitations of the technology through its own research and development.⁸⁹ Chinese experts have argued that, as long-range strike missiles become increasingly sophisticated and proliferated, it is necessary for China to be competitive in all areas of advanced air and missile defense technology.⁹⁰ As such, achieving an ICBM midcourse intercept capability would be a strong signal of Chinese military technology parity with the United States.  

Finally, Chinese development of the necessary sensor architecture for BMD could complement its interest in the capability to adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) nuclear posture.⁹¹ The ability to detect and accurately characterize an incoming missile attack is a necessary prerequisite of both a LOW posture and a strategic BMD capability. As noted below, China is actively expanding its number of ground-based large, phased-array radars and has recently launched satellites for missile detection. In MacDonald and Ferguson’s study, they noted that “a Chinese move to deploy early warning satellites would be a significant indicator of greater interest in BMD deployment.”⁹² If China does choose to deploy strategic BMD, it will be notable which People’s Liberation Army (PLA) branch is responsible for its operation. The most likely candidates are the PLA Strategic Support Force, which is responsible for counterspace capabilities, or the PLA Air Force, which operates China’s ground-based air defense.⁹³ 

Current capabilities & future development 

Since 2010, China has been actively developing a ground-based midcourse interceptor, with the first tests occurring in 2010, 2013, and 2014. While these early tests may have been primarily oriented around ASAT capabilities, China’s latest interceptor, designated the Dong Neng-3 (DN-3), has undergone recent successful BMD tests in 2018, 2021, and 2023.⁹⁴ The DN-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor that has been used to intercept a target DF-21 MRBM and has been compared to the US Standard Missile-3.⁹⁵ It has yet to be tested against an ICBM-class target, but the US Department of Defense assesses that the DN-3 will “form the upper-layer of a multi-tiered missile defense.”⁹⁶ The DN-3 may be a variant of earlier Chinese ASAT weapons, iterations of which have been occasionally referred to as DN-1 and DN-2.⁹⁷ China has also tested the HQ-19, a kinetic interceptor derived from the HQ-9, which has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 km in their midcourse and terminal flight stage and has been called “roughly analogous to the US [THAAD] system.”⁹⁸ The HQ-19 has not yet publicly been deployed and is presumed not to have the capability to defeat an ICBM-class target; however, it could possibly be adapted to do so in the future. ⁹⁹ Notably, China has also expressed interest in purchasing the S-500 system from Russia, which would likely be complementary to the HQ-19.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reportedly planning to develop the HQ-26, a midcourse interceptor designed to defend against IRBMs, which will eventually be installed on its Type 055 destroyers.¹⁰¹

These systems are complemented by China’s arsenal of SAMs, primarily designed to defeat aircraft and cruise missiles but with residual SRBM defense capability. China has deployed the HQ-9 to contested islands in the South China Sea and has developed a naval variant, which is integrated into a number of PLAN surface ships.¹⁰² Finally, China also fields a number of Russian SAM systems with capabilities to defend against SRBMs, including the S-300 PMU-2 and the S-400.¹⁰³

China’s lack of early warning sensors represents the largest gap in its missile defense architecture.¹⁰⁴ To fill this gap, China is undertaking several initiatives. As noted previously, Russia has signaled that it may aid China in developing satellites for ballistic missile launch detection. This partnership seems to have been successful as the US Department of Defense assesses that “As of 2022, [China] likely has at least three early warning satellites in orbit.”¹⁰⁵ China is also building additional ground-based large phased-array radars to provide coverage of Japan, Russia, and the Korean Peninsula, as well as for space observation.¹⁰⁶ Finally, the PLAN plans to develop a new naval radar system to be integrated into its surface combatants that could support a sea-based BMD capability.¹⁰⁷

China is moving quickly to develop various types of missile defense technology including strategic BMD. The defining feature of its BMD development, however, is its overlap with ASAT testing, an area which likely is a greater priority than missile defense.¹⁰⁸ One of the key enablers of China’s progress is its ability to rely on Russian technology and expertise both in developing its interceptors and sensor architecture. While China has made large strides in exoatmospheric interception with hit-to-kill technology, it still has to develop a robust sensing and data processing system as well as trained personnel to create a true capability. 

Implications and conclusion 

Comparison with US capabilities 

The United States’ BMD capabilities remain more advanced than those of Russia or China. While both Russia and China are developing the capabilities for midcourse interception of ICBMs, only the United States deploys both the interceptors and sensors to achieve a degree of BMD coverage over its entire territory in the form of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Furthermore, only the United States maintains a sea-based midcourse defense and missile tracking capability through the Aegis BMD system. Both Russia and China, however, are actively pursuing parity. China’s midcourse interception capability is being actively tested and Russia has development plans for a similar system. Both countries also aim to match the US THAAD system with the Russian S-500 system and Chinese HQ-19 designed for high-altitude terminal defense. The United States, Russia, and China are also all carrying out programs to update their early warning and tracking capabilities. The United States is embarking on an ambitious plan to modernize its space-based tracking for a wide variety of threats, such as hypersonic glide vehicles.¹⁰⁹ Russia is also recapitalizing its space-based early warning satellites and ground-based radars but faces serious resource and sanction constraints. China is moving quickly to improve its early warning system but is still far from a comprehensive architecture.

The United States, unlike Russia and China, does not deploy significant ground-based defenses on its homeland territory, aside from the GMD system. Other than a THAAD deployment on Guam and cruise missile defense of the national capital area, the United States typically does not deploy terminal defenses near domestic military facilities or critical infrastructure.¹¹⁰ In contrast, both Russia and China deploy a larger number and wider variety of ground-based area air and missile defense systems than the United States. Russia has deployed the S-400 and S-300 systems at military facilities, including those in Kaliningrad, Belarus, Crimea, and the Arctic Circle. China deploys several varieties of air and missile defense systems around Beijing and near military facilities, including basing the HQ-9 at its contested border with India and on artificial islands in the South China Sea.¹¹¹

Strategic and operational use cases 

Ground-based air defenses remain central to Russian and Chinese military thought. Unlike the United States, Russia and China have historically relied on SAMs for homeland defense. Russia and China have clear incentives to develop advanced nonstrategic air and missile defenses systems such as the S-400 and HQ-9. These systems are primarily aimed at denying the United States and its allies and partners the ability to operate aircraft or launch cruise missiles near Russian or Chinese territory.¹¹² As the United States begins to develop longer-range conventional ballistic missiles over the next decade, such as the Precision Strike Missile, the ability of Russian and Chinese systems to defeat these threats will become increasingly operationally relevant. Furthermore, Russia and China likely view US conventional precision-strike capabilities as having strategic deterrence implications. The United States has previously signaled that it would consider responding to limited nuclear escalation with a massed conventional precision-strike campaign.¹¹³ Russia and China may fear that, under various scenarios, US conventional munitions could be used to target their political and military leadership, command-and-control systems, and/or nuclear forces.¹¹⁴ Therefore, systems that might be referred to as nonstrategic or tactical could have strategic significance. 

Russia and China share many motivations for developing strategic BMD systems but emphasize different applications in their approach. Russia’s A-135 system defense of Moscow likely has the primary goals of providing a degree of protection for political and military leadership in case of nuclear attack and also complicating US targeting of the Moscow region. However, if the system’s planned modernization is completed, it could also provide a degree of defense for several Russian ICBM bases in the region. Furthermore, systems like Peresvet and the S-500 can serve as protection for mobile ICBMs. These capabilities coincide with the overarching program of nuclear modernization which Russia has undertaken to increase the survivability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. China may also see a role for strategic BMD in defending its strategic forces and political leadership. China’s pursuit of the capability is intertwined with its development of sophisticated ASAT capabilities. China may frequently label tests of ASATs as BMD efforts. Russia’s PL-19 Nudol system has also been referred to as both an ASAT and BMD system. In fact, most exoatmospheric missile defense systems are at least theoretically usable as ASAT weapons, although the reverse is not always true. This dual functionality likely makes these systems a more attractive investment for Russia and China. 

The most troubling possible use case of missile defenses for Russia and China is to provide a backstop to nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies and partners. While this option is not discussed in Russian or Chinese doctrine, in a conflict, either country might consider using nuclear weapons in a limited manner to coerce war termination and rely on missile defenses to deny a proportionately limited US response. In this case, Russia or China would gamble that the United States would be unwilling to consider a response that would be guaranteed to overcome any missile defenses as doing so would require using a large enough number of weapons to risk provoking a strategic exchange.¹¹⁵

On a positive note, Russian and Chinese development of limited missile defenses could also produce stabilizing effects and create opportunities for arms control agreements. When developing plans for missile defense capabilities, the defender is forced to consider the lowest possible efficacy of their system while the attacker is forced to plan for the highest possible level in order to create a worst-case scenario assessment.¹¹⁶ This means that the attacker may be deterred from conducting a limited strike, for fear it would fail, even while the defender might not be fully confident they could defeat it. This condition could contribute to strategic stability by disincentivizing either side to take provocative actions. This effect primarily applies to a limited system, as opposed to an effort to create a comprehensive defense, as the attacker still has recourse to an overwhelming strike to maintain its deterrent. To the extent that limited missile defenses can reassure Russian and Chinese leaders that they need not fear a decapitating first strike by the United States, they could support crisis stability and reduce the need for Russia and China to expand the size of their nuclear arsenals to ensure survivability. Furthermore, a more robust understanding of missile defense capabilities could moderate Russian and Chinese fears of US missile defense systems, such as their claim that US SM-3 missiles could intercept their ICBMs. Finally, a demonstrated Russian or Chinese strategic BMD could reopen avenues for arms control negotiations on missile defense or strategic forces more broadly. The United States has not been willing in the past to put its own missile defense capabilities on the negotiating table, but, as the United States would have an interest in limiting deployment by Russia or China, it might be possible for all three parties to reach a reciprocal agreement. 

In conclusion, both Russia and China have far greater missile defense capabilities and ongoing development programs than are often acknowledged and are pursuing closer parity with the United States. BMD will likely become a feature of the strategic relationship between the three countries, which could have both positive and negative implications for US national security. Understanding Russian and Chinese reasons for developing this capability can yield insights into their broader defense priorities. 

Table 1: US, Russian, and Chinese Strategic ballistic missile defense systems 

Table 2: US, Russian, and Chinese Nonstrategic ballistic missile defense systems 

Former staff

Jacob Mezey

Former Program Assistant

Forward Defense
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy
Missile Defense

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Russian and Chinese strategic missile defense: Doctrine, capabilities, and development appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After reading about the recent cybersecurity research by Richard Fang, Rohan Bindu, Akul Gupta and Daniel Kang, I had questions. While initially impressed that ChatGPT 4 can exploit the vast majority of one-day vulnerabilities, I started thinking about what the results really mean in the grand scheme of cybersecurity. Most importantly, I wondered how a human cybersecurity professional’s results for the same tasks would compare.

To get some answers, I talked with Shanchieh Yang, Director of Research at the Rochester Institute of Technology’s Global Cybersecurity Institute. He had actually pondered the same questions I did after reading the research.

What are your thoughts on the research study?

Yang: I think that the 87% may be an overstatement, and I think it would be very helpful to the community if the authors shared more details about their experiments and code, as they’d be very helpful for the community to look at it. I look at large language models (LLMs) as a co-pilot for hacking because you have to give them some human instruction, provide some options and ask for user feedback. In my opinion, an LLM is more of an educational training tool instead of asking LRM to hack automatically. I also wondered if the study referred to anonymous, meaning with no human intervention at all.

Compared to even six months ago, LLMs are pretty powerful in providing guidance on how a human can exploit a vulnerability, such as recommending tools, giving commands and even a step-by-step process. They are reasonably accurate but not necessarily 100% of the time. In this study, one-day refers to what could be a pretty big bucket to a vulnerability that’s very similar to past vulnerabilities or totally new malware where the source code is not similar to anything the hackers have seen before. In that case, there isn’t much an LLM can do against the vulnerability because it requires human understanding in trying to break into something new.

The results also depend on whether the vulnerability is a web service, SQL server, print server or router. There are so many different computing vulnerabilities out there. In my opinion, claiming 87% is an overstatement because it also depends on how many times the authors tried. If I’m reviewing this as a paper, I would reject the claim because there is too much generalization.

If you timed a group cybersecurity professional to an LLM agent head-to-head against a target with unknown but existing vulnerabilities, such as a newly released Hack the Box or Try Me Hack, who would complete the hack the fastest?

The experts — the people who are actually world-class hackers, ethical hackers, white hackers — they would beat the LLMs. They have a lot of tools under their belts. They have seen this before. And they are pretty quick. The problem is that an LLM is a machine, meaning that even the most state-of-the-art models will not give you the comments unless you break the guardrail. With an LLM, the results really depend on the prompts that were used. Because the researchers didn’t share the code, we don’t know what was actually used.

Any other thoughts on the research?

Yang: I would like the community to understand that responsible dissemination is very important — reporting something not just to get people to cite you or to talk about your stuff, but be responsible. Sharing the experiment, sharing the code, but also sharing what could be done.

The post ChatGPT 4 can exploit 87% of one-day vulnerabilities: Is it really that impressive? appeared first on Security Intelligence.

Pakistan’s unprecedented arrest and court-martial of a former spy chief raises the heat on Imran Khan and could be the precursor to prosecuting the jailed former prime minister on charges of treason and attempting to incite a mutiny in the military. 

Imran Khan has been feuding with Pakistan’s all-powerful military after a falling out with then-army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2022, following which he was ousted from office in a parliamentary vote that he said was orchestrated by the generals.

The military has denied any involvement in his ouster. Khan has been public about the clash, which has led to the worst political turmoil in the South Asian nation in decades. The 71-year-old former cricket star has a devoted following, and any further military action against him could result in more unrest.

Supporters of Khan went on the rampage on May 9 last year after he was briefly arrested, vandalising military installations across the country. It was the most serious challenge to the power of the military in Pakistan’s 75-year history.

Khan is on trial in a civilian court for allegedly abetting the violence, a charge he has denied. But he can face more serious charges of treason and mutiny after last month’s arrest of Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, a Khan ally who is a former chief of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence.

Treason and mutiny are tried by military court. Such trials are not open to the public, and the charges carry a maximum punishment of death.

The arrest of Faiz Hameed signals the potential prosecution of former Prime Minister Imran Khan on charges of treason and incitement to rebellion.

More on this story: Political turmoil in Pakistan: future scenarios

The conflict between Khan and the military began after a falling-out with General Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2022, which led to Khan’s ouster as prime minister. Despite this, Khan, who remains a popular political figure, asserts that the military orchestrated his removal.

The publication notes that Hameed’s arrest may increase pressure on Imran Khan, who is already under investigation for inciting unrest following his brief detention in May 2023.

We suggest that Hameed’s arrest is part of an effort to bolster the charges against Khan, who has so far managed to avoid more serious accusations.

Thus, the arrest will be used to put pressure on Faiz Hameed to provide information that helps implicate Khan in the May 9 violence which the army chief sees as mutiny and an act of treason. Government officials have repeatedly said Hameed worked with Khan to plan the riots. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told last month that Khan provided the manpower while Hameed masterminded the conspiracy. 

Current army chief General Asim Munir said that there could be no compromise or deal with the planners and architects of this dark chapter in history of Pakistan.

According to Imran Khan, Hameed’s arrest was meant to ultimately target him as other cases against him were falling part.

“He thinks that government is trying his  case in a military court.

Hameed is being tried by court-martial on charges of corruption, misuse of power in service and violation of the Army Act after his 2022 retirement. The charges are punishable by a jail sentence of up to 14 years.

The retired officer is also accused of transgressing legal and constitutional boundaries for his personal interest at the behest of some particular political elements. 

Khan handpicked Hameed in 2019 as ISI chief, one of the most powerful positions in Pakistan, at the intersection of domestic politics, the military and Pakistan’s foreign relations. 

Hameed’s transfer from the ISI to a corps command two years later, which Khan initially opposed, highlighted the first public signs of divisions between Khan and Bajwa, the then army chief.

Khan has acknowledged in interviews to local media that he wanted Hameed to remain as the head of the ISI in 2021, when he said the opposition was planning to oust him.

Hameed’s arrest came after a string of legal victories for Khan in civilian courts, despite allegations by several senior judges, in a letter to the chief justice that was published in local media, of pressure to decide cases against the former premier.

While the military denies pressurising judges, the allegations have put the two institutions at loggerheads.

It would be in the interest of the army’s top brass to hold a trial under military law since that would “forestall any judicial intervention” in support of Kha.

 Media are not allowed at military trials, and verdicts are announced in short statements from the military without details of evidence.

Military courts are secretive and their procedures arcane.

The army, by trying one of its own, was demonstrating it is not ready to provide any space to Khan, who won the most seats in a national election earlier this year despite being in jail.Imran Khan’s trial by a military court would signal the army leadership’s resolve to eliminate Khan from the political scene no matter how high the cost.

More on this story: The Politics of the February 8, 2024, General Elections in Pakistan

More on this story: Pakistani ISI strengthens political influence in the country by lobbying for the legislation amendments 

More on this story: Pakistani ISI head replacement might speak for China’s growing foothold amid developments in Afghanistan

Documents obtained as part of a new case against social media influencers Andrew and Tristan Tate, who have been charged with human trafficking, money laundering and organized crime, deepen questions over their opaque webcam finances.

On Aug. 21, Romanian police raided the homes of the brothers and some of their associates and arrested the pair. The recent allegations list 35 victims and accuse Andrew Tate of trafficking a minor for sexual exploitation and having sexual relations with another minor.

The brothers are also accused of seeking to intimidate and corrupt witnesses to stop them from giving evidence to prosecutors or to pressure them to give false evidence. Two other accomplices are also accused of interfering with the investigation. The prosecutors seized 16 cars and a motorcycle from the Tates, according to a press release.

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The day after the raid, a judge placed Tristan Tate on bail and Andrew Tate on house arrest pending further pre-trial hearings. The same judge also warned that the evidence of money laundering was insufficient in the prosecutors’ case, according to local media. A spokesperson for DIICOT, Romania’s law enforcement unit dedicated to investigating organized crime, declined to comment.

The Tate brothers and two of their associates are currently awaiting trial on separate  charges of human trafficking from 2023; in that case, Andrew Tate was also charged with rape.

The brothers and their alleged accomplices have denied wrongdoing in both cases. A spokesperson for the Tates declined to comment for this article.

EVERY ACCUSATION AGAINST ME IS A LIE.

EVERY SINGLE ONE IS FABRICATED.

ENOUGH OF THE CORRUPTION. pic.twitter.com/3nlGxDJHbV

— Andrew Tate (@Cobratate) August 22, 2024

ICIJ and Romanian partner Context previously reported on Tristan Tate’s account with Paxum, a Canadian company that catered to the adult entertainment industry later purchased by Paxum Bank, a small Caribbean financial institution. The firms shared the name Paxum and similar website branding.  The mother of Paxum Bank’s owner, Anton Postolnikov, was also one of the owners of Paxum Inc., according to Romanian media reports.

Using Tristan Tate’s leaked banking records, ICIJ found that an adult webcam platform deposited a total of $2.6 million into Tate’s Paxum account until shortly before he and his brother were charged with human trafficking. Andrew was also charged with raping one of the women he allegedly trafficked.

As part of the most recent investigation, prosecutors obtained transcripts of text messages and phone conversations that shed further light on the pair’s use of their Paxum account in what was allegedly a complex online webcam business running since at least 2015. Due to stringent anonymity rules, ICIJ could not establish if the women mentioned in the prosecutors’ transcripts are also among the 35 victims in the new set of allegations.

According to the transcripts, on Oct. 23, 2019, Andrew Tate texted his brother to ask about a “missing payment. Paxum? The October 15 payment.” Tristan Tate replied: “it could be a large payment. A double payment is coming up.” (ICIJ translated the relevant exchanges from the transcripts from Romanian to English, based on the prosecutors’ own translation of the Tates’ original English conversation. ICIJ’s translation may not exactly match the original conversation, which was not presented in court.)

On the same day — in an exchange found elsewhere in the wiretap transcripts — Tristan told his brother that one of the women who worked for them “asked to see what is in the bank account. It all goes in at the same time through Paxum. 15,000 went in from all three girls,” he added, without specifying the currency.

We’ll open accounts at all the banks. We’ll spread the money.

— Andrew Tate in wiretap transcripts

An ICIJ review of Tristan Tate’s Paxum account statements shows that multiple payments from webcam platform MFCXY were made to the Paxum account in the weeks leading up to the conversation. On Oct. 1, 2019, three payments of $5,180.95, $9,634.20 and $5,407 were deposited, followed by one payment of $7,034.15 on Oct. 21, 2019.

On Nov. 11 the same year, according to one transcript, Andrew asked Tristan: “Has the video cam money arrived? Paxum? Has it arrived at Paxum only a few days ago? How much was the money from video cam?” A payment of $18,785.15 from MFCXY hit Tristan Tate’s account on Nov 4., 2019, the leaked files show.

The wiretap transcripts circulated by the prosecution, coupled with the account activity reviewed by ICIJ, suggest that Tristan Tate may have been using the Paxum account to collect webcam income from multiple women in his employ. The transcripts appear to show the brothers agreeing to keep a portion of the income the women earned in the Tates’ webcam business.

When Tristan complains that one of the women is demanding a 40% share of her earnings from webcam shows, Andrew tells him to “shoot her” or “falsify” the account statements for their crypto holdings, or “give her 30 and tell her it’s 40, blame the currency exchange rate” — implying that the women did not have access to the bank account where their own earnings were sent.

According to other evidence submitted by prosecutors in court and obtained by ICIJ partner Context, the Tate brothers offered online classes to their followers on how to profit from OnlyFans — an online adult entertainment subscription website — including social media marketing strategies and convincing men to subscribe to paid adult content.OnlyFans’s owner also owns MFCXY Inc., the company that initiated the money transfers to Tristan Tate’s Paxum account. The company did not reply to ICIJ’s request to comment in May.

Ahead of the May article, Paxum Bank denied any impropriety and sent a letter through a lawyer warning that publication of confidential bank information could lead to legal action against ICIJ.

On Sept. 4, a spokesperson for Paxum issued a new explanation.

“Notwithstanding what you purportedly believe to be factual, Paxum Bank has never opened or maintained accounts for either of the Tate brothers. Perhaps you and others are confusing the bank with an unrelated entity called Paxum Inc., which was a Canadian company with a different owner and unrelated management and which no longer operates.”

ICIJ has found multiple transfers out of Tate’s accounts which arrived at his other accounts with banks in Europe such as Santander and Raiffeisen and were marked with the address of Paxum Bank in Dominica, while also bearing the “customer name” of “paxumbank ltd” on the wire transfer document. Tate’s account statements are headed with Paxum Bank’s address in Dominica, rather than the Canadian address of the now-defunct Paxum Inc.

Paxum Bank said in a later statement that after it purchased the assets of Paxum Inc. in late 2022, the bank’s IT system auto-generated a change from Paxum Inc. to Paxum Bank in previous electronic records, which meant that transactions that were made by Paxum Inc. would erroneously appear to have been made by Paxum Bank.

The wiretap transcripts also contain discussions between the brothers about opening multiple bank accounts and keeping relatively low balances, seemingly to avoid attention from compliance departments — a tactic sometimes used by those seeking to evade anti-money laundering checks at banks. “We’ll open accounts at all the banks. We’ll spread the money,” Andrew said, according to the transcripts. “We’ll keep the balance low. We can buy another house. We don’t need large balances in bank accounts.”

In one instance, Andrew says he ignored a request from a bank to update his personal details, and the account remained open despite this.

“Following the rules never works,” Andrew told Tristan, according to the transcript.

In the South Caucasus, a clash of interests involving Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan continues, with Russia aligning itself with Ankara and Baku at the expense of Tehran’s goals.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are pushing to secure control of a key strip of land along Armenia’s southern border with Iran—known as the “Zangezur Corridor”—an extraterritorial route connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkiye. This corridor would provide Turkey direct access to the Caspian Sea and bolster its influence in the region, raising security concerns. The northern part of Iran is home to Azeri populations, and Tehran fears potential future destabilization by Azerbaijan. Iran has taken these risks seriously, asserting that it is prepared to intervene militarily to prevent such a scenario. As a countermeasure, Tehran is advocating for its own route, passing through Iranian territory.

Russia, increasingly isolated on the world stage, finds itself in need of Ankara’s support—a NATO member—and appears willing to sacrifice Tehran’s interests in this matter.

The Russian Foreign Ministry, through spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, has expressed support for the Turkic project. In response, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council for Economic Coordination, took to the social media platform X, denouncing the stance of Russian officials regarding the Zangezur passage. Rezaei stated, “The behavior of Russian officials concerning the Zangezur Corridor is utterly unacceptable and clearly contradicts their purported friendly ties and strategic relations with Iran. These ambiguities must be resolved.”

Moscow, meanwhile, has shown little regard for Armenia’s interests, seemingly preparing for the eventual ousting of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his replacement with a more Russia-aligned figure.

More on this story: Russia will compensate for damage from inaction in Karabakh by toppling Pashinyan in Armenia within next three days

From our perspective, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement is not a result of incompetence. Instead, it likely reflects growing frustration within the Kremlin towards Tehran, which is evident in Moscow’s political maneuvers.

More on this story: The Composition of the Russian Delegation at the Iranian President’s Inauguration Highlights Bilateral Issues

More on this story: Russian delegation level at the funeral of Raisi shows Moscow’s lack of trust in Tehran

We believe this behavior stems from Russia’s expectation that Iran, as a member of the UN Security Council, should show greater flexibility and involvement in Russian-led influence operations in the Middle East—such as escalating tensions with Israel. This is not the first instance where Moscow has taken actions that could be seen as a deliberate affront to Iran’s leadership. The Kremlin likely assumes that Tehran, feeling trapped by its limited options, will ultimately overlook these slights.

More on this story: Kremlin’s Efforts to Incite a Larger War in the Middle East Involving Iran and Israel

More on this story: Russia to further encourage Iran-Israel conflict

Russia’s stance on the Zangezur Corridor involves geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus, is influenced by a range of strategic concerns, and Iran’s interests may not align with Moscow’s broader regional objectives.

1. Russia’s Regional Balancing Act: Russia views the South Caucasus as a critical region for its influence, especially in relation to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia traditionally tries to maintain a balance between the two, and backing a transport corridor that connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia (the Zangezur Corridor) may benefit Azerbaijan, Turkey, and others, but not Iran.

2. Alignment with Azerbaijan and Turkiye: Azerbaijan and Turkey have strong economic and geopolitical interests in the Zangezur Corridor. Russia’s relations with Turkiye, especially in balancing NATO’s influence, and its role as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could explain why it might prioritize the corridor despite Iranian concerns. Turkey’s growing influence in the region serves as both a rival and a partner for Russia, especially considering energy routes and military presence.

3. Iran’s Concerns: Iran sees the Zangezur Corridor as a potential threat to its influence, since it bypasses Iranian territory and strengthens Azerbaijan’s strategic standing. Tehran is also concerned about increased Turkish influence in the region, which could undermine its interests.

4. Economic and Strategic Interests: The corridor would facilitate easier transit for energy and trade between Azerbaijan and Turkey, making it a strategically valuable route. Russia, seeing an opportunity for economic gain and to strengthen ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkiye, might be less inclined to prioritize Iran’s interests.

Ultimately, Russia’s decision to seemingly disregard Iran’s concerns may be a calculated geopolitical move to strengthen its own influence in the South Caucasus, maintain ties with Turkiye, and secure its role as a dominant player in regional politics.

With the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) soaring across industries and use cases, preventing AI-driven software supply chain attacks has never been more important.

Recent research by SentinelOne exposed a new ransomware actor, dubbed NullBulge, which targets software supply chains by weaponizing code in open-source repositories like Hugging Face and GitHub. The group, claiming to be a hacktivist organization motivated by an anti-AI cause, specifically targets these resources to poison data sets used in AI model training.

No matter whether you use mainstream AI solutions, integrate them into your existing tech stacks via application programming interfaces (APIs) or even develop your own models from open-source foundation models, the entire AI software supply chain is now squarely in the spotlight of cyberattackers.

Poisoning open-source data sets

Open-source components play a critical role in the AI supply chain. Only the largest enterprises have access to the vast amounts of data needed to train a model from scratch, so they have to rely heavily on open-source data sets like LAION 5B or Common Corpus. The sheer size of these data sets also means it’s extremely difficult to maintain data quality and compliance with copyright and privacy laws. By contrast, many mainstream generative AI models like ChatGPT are black boxes in that they use their own curated data sets. This comes with its own set of security challenges.

Verticalized and proprietary models may refine open-source foundation models with additional training using their own data sets. For example, a company developing a next-generation customer service chatbot might use its previous customer communications records to create a model tailored to their specific needs. Such data has long been a target for cyber criminals, but the meteoric rise of generative AI has made it all the more attractive to nefarious actors.

By targeting these data sets, cyber criminals can poison them with misinformation or malicious code and data. Then, once that compromised information enters the AI model training process, we start to see a ripple effect spanning the entire AI software lifecycle. It can take thousands of hours and a vast amount of computing power to train a large language model (LLM). It’s an enormously costly endeavor, both financially and environmentally. However, if the data sets used in the training have been compromised, chances are the whole process has to start from scratch.

Explore AI cybersecurity solutions

Other attack vectors on the rise

Most AI software supply chain attacks take place through backdoor tampering methods like those mentioned above. However, that’s certainly not the only way, especially as cyberattacks targeting AI systems become increasingly widespread and sophisticated. Another method is the flood attack, where attackers send huge amounts of non-malicious information through an AI system in an attempt to cover up something else — such as a piece of malicious code.

We’re also seeing a rise in attacks against APIs, especially those lacking robust authentication procedures. APIs are essential for integrating AI into the myriad functions businesses now use it for, and while it’s often assumed that API security is on the solution vendor, in reality, it’s very much a shared responsibility.

Recent examples of AI API attacks include the ZenML compromise or the Nvidia AI Platform vulnerability. While both have been addressed by their respective vendors, more will follow as cyber criminals expand and diversify attacks against software supply chains.

Safeguarding your AI projects

None of this should be taken as a warning to stay away from AI. After all, you wouldn’t stop using email because of the risk of phishing scams. What these developments do mean is that AI is now the new frontier in cyber crime, and security must be hard-baked into everything you do when developing, deploying, using and maintaining AI-powered technologies — whether they’re your own or provided by a third-party vendor.

To do that, businesses need complete traceability for all components used in AI development. They also need full explainability and verification for every AI-generated output. You can’t do that without keeping humans in the loop and putting security at the forefront of your strategy. If, however, you view AI solely as a way to save time and cut costs by laying off workers, with little regard for the consequences, then it’s just a matter of time before disaster strikes.

AI-powered security solutions also play a critical role in countering the threats. They’re not a replacement for talented security analysts but a powerful augmentation that helps them do what they do best on a scale that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.

The post How cyber criminals are compromising AI software supply chains appeared first on Security Intelligence.

The Justice Department on Thursday charged Dimitri Simes, pro-Russian pundit and former head of a Washington think tank, along with his wife, Anastasia Simes, with violating US sanctions by accepting millions of dollars from a Russian state television network and laundering the proceeds.

Reached by phone in Moscow, where he has a home, Dimitri Simes, who was an adviser to Trump’s 2016 campaign, declined to comment on the allegations against him. But he denounced the charges against his wife as “lies and half-truths” and argued that the Biden administration is targeting the couple to punish him for expressing pro-Russian views.

“If you think this is a law abiding administration [it] would be shocking, but no, I am not terribly surprised,” Simes said, of the charges against his wife.

“I think that Mr. Garland would have to be ashamed of producing something like that,” Simes added. “It is beneath the dignity of the Department of Justice.”

Simes indicated that he does not plan to return the US to face the charges. He said he believes the Justice Department charged him “to stop me from coming to the US.”

“They want to punish me” for criticizing US support for Ukraine, he claimed.

Simes said he “would most certainly welcome an opportunity to come to a trial in Washington as a witness” to testify against Biden administration officials “who betrayed the US…and are trying to start World War III.”

The indictment against the couple alleges that they received $1 million, a personal car and driver, and a stipend for an apartment in Moscow, in exchange for work they did for Russia’s state-owned Channel One after the US sanctioned the network over Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

“These defendants allegedly violated sanctions that were put in place in response to Russia’s illegal aggression in Ukraine,” Matthew Graves, the US Attorney for Washington DC, said in a statement announcing the indictments. “Such violations harm our national security interests—a fact that Dimitri Simes, with the deep experience he gained in national affairs after fleeing the Soviet Union and becoming a US citizen, should have uniquely appreciated.”

Simes is the former longtime head of the Center for National Interest, which was founded by Richard Nixon in 1994 and advocates for “strategic realism” in US foreign policy. Simes’ efforts in 2016 to arrange contacts between the Trump campaign and Russia drew scrutiny from special counsel Robert Mueller, but Simes was not accused of wrongdoing.

The charges against the Simes couple are part of a Justice Department crackdown on Russian influence efforts. Federal prosecutors yesterday indicted two employees of Russian state-controlled network Russia Today with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act by secretly running a right-leaning media company they used to push pro-Kremlin messaging.

The site featured content from pro-Trump pundits including Benny Johnson and Tim Pool. Both Johnson and Pool said they are victims of the scheme.

Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, said the defendants in the Tenet case “used American-based individuals and entities to exploit, frankly, our free society to try to undermine our election,” including by deploying “unwitting influencers to push Russian propaganda and pro-Russian messaging.” 

DOJ alleges that Anastasia Simes received funds from a Russian businessman named Alexander Udodov, whom the Treasury Department sanctioned last year for his support for the Russian government. Prosecutors allege that Anastasia Simes helped Udodov evade sanctions by “purchasing art and antiques for the benefit of Udodov from galleries and auction houses in the United States and Europe, and having the items shipped to her residence in Huntly, Virginia, where they were stored for onward shipment to Russia.”

Anastasia Simes could not be reached, but Dimitri Simes said his those charges against his wife are false. “She started working with [Udodov] before the sanctions and was never aware of any sanctions” against the oligarch, Simes said.

He also said his wife took no steps, such as contacting a shipping company, “to ship goods to Russia.”

“There was no conspiracy, nothing,” Simes said. “She has a legitimate business. I am proud of my wife. I am very supportive of what she is doing.”

Simes’ attorney David Rivkin declined to comment.

The gender gap in cybersecurity isn’t a new issue. The lack of women in cybersecurity and IT has been making headlines for years — even decades. While progress has been made, there is still significant work to do, especially regarding salary.

The recent  ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study highlighted numerous cybersecurity issues regarding women in the field. In fact, only 17% of the 14,865 respondents to the survey were women.

Pay gap between men and women

One of the most concerning disparities revealed by the study is a persistent pay gap. The study found that U.S. male cybersecurity professionals are paid higher on average than females of the same level. The results show an average salary of $148,035 for men and $141,066 for women. A pay gap also exists globally, with the average global salary for women being $109,609 and for men $115,003.

ISC2 also found a gender pay disparity among people of color in the U.S. The study found that men of color earned an average of $143,610, and women of color earned $135,630. However, the study wasn’t able to compare salaries for people of color on a global basis.

Lack of women in cybersecurity

The study also showed a gap between the number of men and the number of women who work in cybersecurity. Based on the results, ISC2 found that only 20% to 25% of people working in the cybersecurity field are women. Because the percentage of women under 30 years of age in cybersecurity was 26% compared to 16% among women between 39 and 44, the report created optimism that more younger women are choosing cybersecurity as a career.

Interestingly, teams with women on them seemed to have a higher proportion of women than of men, illustrating that women likely seek out teams and companies that have other women working in cybersecurity. Women reported a higher number of women team members (30%) compared to men (22%).

However, 11% of security teams were found to have no women at all, with only 4% saying that it was an equal split between men and women. The industries with the highest number of no-women security teams included IT services (19%), financial services (13%) and government (11%). Mid-sized organizations with 100 to 999 employees were most likely to have security teams with no women.

However, the report also found several areas of concern regarding women’s experiences working in the cybersecurity field:

• 29% of women in cybersecurity reported discrimination at work, with 19% of men reporting discrimination
• 36% of women felt they could not be authentic at work, with 29% of men reporting this sentiment
• 78% of women felt it was essential for their security team to succeed, compared to 68% of men
• 66% of women feel that diversity within the security team contributed to the security team’s success, compared to 51% of men

Using hiring initiatives to increase women on security teams

The gaps in cybersecurity — both pay and gender — won’t be resolved without a focused effort by industry and companies. Many companies are seeing results by adopting specific DEI hiring initiatives, such as skills-based hiring, and using job descriptions that refer to DEI programs/goals.

The ISC2 report found that businesses using skills-based hiring have an average of 25.5% women in their workforces compared with 22.2% for businesses using other methods. By including DEI program goals in job descriptions, companies can also increase the number of women on their security teams, with 26.6% for those using these types of job descriptions vs. 22.3% for women at those that do not.

Lack of perspectives hurts cybersecurity teams

Without women on cybersecurity teams, security teams lack the wide range of experience and perspectives needed to reduce security risks. Organizations can improve their security by focusing on increasing the number of women on their team, which also means eliminating the pay gap.

“Broader than cybersecurity, there’s a body of research that says the more perspectives you bring to the table, the better off you will be at problem-solving,” Clar Rosso, CEO of ISC2, told Dark Reading. “In cybersecurity, which is a very complex, growing threat landscape, the more perspectives that we bring to the table to solve problems, the more likely we will be able to impact our cyber defense.”

The post New report shows ongoing gender pay gap in cybersecurity appeared first on Security Intelligence.

A federal indictment unsealed on Wednesday alleges that a Tennessee-based media company which played home to several prominent right-leaning online commentators was secretly a Russian government-backed influence operation. The company is accused of receiving nearly $10 million from employees of Russia Today (RT), a Russian state-backed media company, as part of “a scheme to create and distribute content to U.S. audiences with hidden Russian government messaging,” according to Attorney General Merrick Garland.

Tenet Media worked with American conservative or heterodox media figures, including Dave Rubin, Benny Johnson, Tim Pool, and Lauren Southern, who variously present themselves as independent journalists, documentarians, and political commentators. Not all of them immediately commented on having been publicly linked to a foreign propaganda site, but Johnson soon tweeted that he and other influencers had been “victims in this alleged scheme.” In his own tweet, Pool echoed that line, writing, in part, “Should these allegations prove true, I as well as the other personalities and commentators were deceived and are victims.” Rubin, too, described himself as a victim, adding, “I knew absolutely nothing about any of this fraudulent activity. Period.”

The indictment, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleges that RT and two specific employees, Kostiantyn “Kostya” Kalashnikov and Elena “Lena” Afanasyeva, worked to funnel money to Tenet Media as part of a series of “covert projects” to shape the opinions of Western audiences. RT has faced cancellations and sanctions in the United States, Europe, Canada, and the UK after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; federal authorities allege those travails led the company to instead create more covert means of influencing public perception.

While Tenet is only referred to in the indictment as “U.S. Company 1,” details made it readily identifiable. The indictment alleges that Tenet’s coverage “contain[ed] commentary on events and issues in the United States, such as immigration, inflation, and other topics…consistent with the Government of Russia’s interest in amplifying U.S. domestic divisions.”  

The indictment also alleges that not everyone affiliated with Tenet was unaware of the scheme, stating that “Founders 1 and 2” of the company knew the source of their funding. The founders of Tenet Media are Lauren Chen and her husband; Chen is a conservative influencer and YouTuber who’s hosted a show on Blaze TV and who’s affiliated with Turning Point USA. Her husband, Liam Donovan, identifies himself on Twitter as the president of Tenet Media. 

The indictment alleges that the RT officials and Founders 1 and 2 “also worked together to deceive two U.S. online commentators (“Commentator-I” and “Commentator-2″), who respectively have over 2.4 million and 1.3 million YouTube subscribers.” Dave Rubin has 2.4 million YouTube subscribers, while Tim Pool has 1.37 million.

The indictment indicates that even some of the people working at Tenet found their content heavy-handed. On February 15 of this year, Afanasyeva, using the name Helena Shudra, shared a video in a company Discord channel of what the indictment calls “a well-known U.S. political commentator visiting a grocery store in Russia.” While he’s not named in the indictment, it clearly matches Tucker Carlson, who toured such a grocery store, declaring himself slackjawed in wonder at how nice it was.

“Later that day,” the indictment adds, “Producer-I privately messaged Founder-2 on Discord: ‘They want me to post this’—referencing the video that Afanasyeva posted—but ‘it just feels like overt shilling.’ Founder-2 replied that Founder-I ‘thinks we should put it out there.’ Producer-I acquiesced, responding, ‘alright I’ll put it out tomorrow.’”

Tenet’s recent content on sites like YouTube, Twitter, and TikTok has been heavily larded with critical commentary about Kamala Harris. Conservative political commentator and documented plagiarist Benny Johnson, for instance, recently starred in a video about her “empty words.”

The allegations against Kalashnikov and Afanasyeva, who are charged with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and conspiracy to commit money laundering, were part of a broader effort against what US authorities allege were Russian influence sites seeking to subvert the elections. Earlier on Wednesday, the Justice Department announced it had seized 32 internet domains used in what they called “Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns.” 

At an Aspen Institute event on Wednesday afternoon, a DOJ official, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, said the Russians charged in the case “used American-based individuals and entities to exploit, frankly, our free society to try to undermine our election,” including by deploying “unwitting influencers to push Russian propaganda and pro-Russian messaging.” 

One of the last things Tenet posted on their social media sites before the indictment was unsealed concerned—ironically enough—a government employee accused of secretly acting as a foreign agent. Tenet posted a video of Linda Sun, a former aide to New York governors Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul who has been charged with using her position to benefit the Chinese government. Tenet seemed to suggest that a few words Sun offered on a video call endorsing diversity, equity, and inclusion measures were part of an alleged foreign-backed messaging plot.

“Why would the Chinese government want to push DEI in America?” a tweet from Tenet read.

Abby Vesoulis contributed reporting.

Update, September 4: This story has been updated to include Johnson, Rubin and Pool’s comments.