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(NewsNation) — A day after signing an executive order to begin dissolving the Department of Education, President Donald Trump has announced where some of the agency’s programs will end up.

The president has not yet provided a timeline for the agencies’ responsibilities to transfer.

SBA to take over student loans: Trump

The nation’s student loan portfolio will be handled by the Small Business Administration, Trump said Friday.

He called it a “pretty complicated deal, and that’s coming out of the Department of Education immediately.” 

The Education Department currently runs the biggest grant program for low-income students, the Pell Grant program, along with formula funding and student loans.

Created in 1953, the SBA is “fully dedicated to small business and provides counseling, capital, and contracting expertise,” according to its official website. While it does handle multiple funding and grant programs, they are all focused on serving America’s small businesses.

It is unknown whether transferring the the Education Department’s purview to SBA will disrupt or delay services in administering loans.

This move echoes Trump’s previous promises about the programs. On Thursday, Trump said the DOE’s “useful functions such as Pell grants, Title I funding, resources for children with disabilities and special needs will be fully preserved.”

“They are going to be preserved in full and redistributed to other agencies and departments,” he said.

Trump: RFK Jr. to lead ‘special needs,’ nutrition programs

Trump on Friday said the the Health and Human Services Department, led by Robert F. Kennedy, will handle “special needs” and nutrition programs.

Kennedy’s “Make America Healthy Again” rhetoric has targeted America’s food supply, specifically food additives and poor nutrition among children.

The HHS secretary has drawn criticism from the disability community over his past linking of autism and vaccines, which he doubled down on during his Congressional confirmation hearing for the position.

NewsNation’s Elina Shirazi, Ashley N. Soriano contributed to this report.

The International Court of Justice has issued emergency orders (“indicated provisional measures”) three times in the case brought by South Africa against Israel alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in the Gaza Strip. The Court should do so again. If South Africa does not request additional provisional measures promptly, then the Court should indicate them at its own initiative without delay.

Under article 76(1) of the ICJ’s Rules of Court:

At the request of a party or proprio motu, the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.

Several significant changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions concerning provisional measures justify their modification.

First, Israel’s closure of all border crossing points on Mar. 2, 2025 is denying almost all humanitarian relief from entering Gaza. This intentional deprivation of food, medical supplies, shelter, and other essential goods is even more extreme than that underway at the time of the Court’s prior decisions. Israel’s cutoff of electricity on Mar. 9 has also impaired water desalination and placed the overall supply of water at risk. This near-total denial of humanitarian relief creates a further risk of deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy a substantial part of the Palestinian group.

Second, Israel’s current military campaign is killing civilians at a much higher rate than the military campaign underway at the time of the Court’s prior decisions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reportedly killed over 500 people in three days, including at least 312 women and children. Credible reports indicate that some of these attacks may have exclusively killed civilians. The continuation of this military campaign risks directly killing a substantial part of the Palestinian group.

Finally, Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister have stated their intention to remove the civilian population from Gaza, and Israeli media reports indicate that the current military campaign is designed to facilitate that aim. The forcible displacement of two million civilians plainly risks the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian group as such, either as a means of driving survivors from their land or as a consequence if displacement is to areas unable to provide survivors with the basic means of survival.

The consequences of these three changes compound one another. The denial of medical supplies increases the lethality of the military campaign. The military campaign impedes the provision of medical care. The forcible displacement of civilians would likely involve extreme violence while separating civilians from the few medical facilities still capable of treating them.

While the Court need not definitively find that Israel is acting with genocidal intent before indicating provisional measures and prior to a final judgment on the merits of the case, official statements of intent by high-ranking officials are relevant to the Court’s finding of further risk of irreparable prejudice. On Mar. 19, 2025, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz issued the following statement on social media with English and Arabic subtitles:

“Residents of Gaza, this is your final warning. The first Sinwar destroyed Gaza, and the second Sinwar will bring upon it total ruin. The Israeli Air Force’s attack against Hamas terrorists was only the first step. What follows will be far harsher, and you will bear the full cost.

Evacuation of the population from combat zones will soon resume. If all Israeli hostages are not released and Hamas is not kicked out of Gaza, Israel will act with force you have not known before.

Take the advice of the U.S. President: return the hostages and kick out Hamas, and new options will open up for you—including relocation to other parts of the world for those who choose. The alternative is destruction and total devastation.”

Katz’s statement indicates that Israel’s military campaign is intended to kill civilians, cause serious harm to civilians, and inflict destructive conditions on civilians until the civilian population somehow removes Hamas from Gaza and rescues Israeli hostages—two results the IDF has been unable to achieve in 16 months of brutal war. Whether civilians are directly targeted or killed in disproportionate attacks on military objectives, their deaths as part of the promised “destruction and total devastation” are intended as a means of pressuring surviving civilians to remove Hamas and rescue hostages. Such a military campaign clearly risks destroying a substantial part of the Palestinian group. Katz’s statement also confirms that Israel’s leaders intend to remove civilians from Gaza, though on Katz’s account removal is tantamount to a reward for removing Hamas and rescuing hostages. The far more likely outcome is “total devastation.”

The conditions for the modification of the Court’s provisional measures are clearly met. The changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions risk consequences that current measures do not fully address, entailing a further risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention. In view of the fundamental values sought to be protected by the Genocide Convention, the extreme vulnerability of the civilian population in Gaza, and the intensity of Israel’s military campaign, the Court is faced with a situation of extreme urgency that would justify immediate action without holding oral hearings.

The Court should indicate provisional measures along the following lines:

The State of Israel shall immediately halt its current military offensive in Gaza, and refrain from any other action which may kill a substantial part of the Palestinian group in Gaza or inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

The State of Israel shall immediately reopen all available border crossing points and ensure the unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, at a level matching or exceeding that achieved during February 2025.

The State of Israel shall ensure with immediate effect that its military does not deport or forcibly transfer Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, including by physical force, threat of force, coercion, or taking advantage of a coercive environment, or forcibly displace Palestinians within the Gaza Strip in a way that may involve or could result in the destruction of the Palestinian group in Gaza in whole or in part.

The first proposed measure is designed to halt the current offensive but does not preclude proportionate responses to rocket fire or targeted hostage rescue operations. The second proposed measure sets  February 2025 as the minimum standard for humanitarian access because that period demonstrated the level of humanitarian relief that can be provided when Israel lifts restrictions and facilitates humanitarian access. The third proposed measure responds to another major change in the situation that creates further risk and requires the Court’s immediate intervention. The Court should indicate such measures without delay.

Legal Framework and Background

Under the Genocide Convention, genocide includes certain acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, as such. These acts include killing members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.

On Jan. 26, 2024, the Court found that the Palestinians “appear to constitute” a protected group under the Genocide Convention, that “Palestinians in the Gaza Strip form a substantial part of the protected group,” and therefore the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide is “plausible.” The Court examined the factual circumstances before it, including the nature of Israel’s conduct, statements by Israeli officials, and the consequences for Palestinians in Gaza. The Court found that “there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights found by the Court to be plausible, before it gives its final decision,” including “the right of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to be protected from acts of genocide.” On that basis, the Court indicated a series of provisional measures, including that Israel prevent acts of genocide as well as incitement to commit genocide, and “take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”

On Feb. 16, 2024, the Court found that the “perilous situation” in Gaza “demands immediate and effective implementation of the provisional measures indicated” in January but “does not demand the indication of additional provisional measures.”

On Mar. 28, 2024, the Court found that “the spread of famine and starvation” was a change in the situation since its January decision, that this change entailed a further risk of irreparable prejudice that its prior decision did not fully address, and that this change justified the modification of its prior decision. The Court indicated further provisional measures, specifying the forms of humanitarian assistance that Israel must ensure. Notably, the Court invited written observations from Israel but did not hold oral hearings.

On May 24, 2024, the Court found that “the worsening conditions of life faced by civilians in the Rafah Governorate” was a change in the situation since its March decision, that this change entailed a further risk of irreparable prejudice that its prior decisions did not fully address, and that this change justified the modification of its prior decisions. The Court indicated further provisional measures, including that Israel shall “[i]mmediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” and “[m]aintain open the Rafah crossing for unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance.”

The same legal conditions justifying modification are satisfied here. The changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions risk consequences that current measures do not fully address, entailing a further risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention. These changes in the situation justify the modification of the Court’s prior decisions, either at South Africa’s request or at the Court’s own initiative, as described below.

Indication and Modification Under the Rules of Court

The ICJ’s Rules of Court provide that the Court may indicate, modify, or revoke provisional measures either at the request of a party or on its own initiative (proprio motu). When the Court acts proprio motu, it may take a decision without an oral hearing “in the event of extreme urgency.” Indeed, the Court indicated provisional measures proprio motu without receiving written observations in the LaGrand case discussed below. In contrast, the Court may not modify or revoke provisional measures without receiving written observations (art. 76(3)).

The measures proposed above are best understood as new measures rather than modifications of existing measures. While the second proposed measure resembles prior measures concerning humanitarian assistance, it makes a distinct demand (to reopen all available border crossings) and sets a new standard for compliance (the level of aid delivered in February 2025). As explained below, the conditions for the indication (rather than modification) of provisional measures proprio motu are also met, so the proposed measures may be indicated without receiving written observations.

Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court provides that:

The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties.

This provision has been part of the ICJ’s procedural framework since 1936 and remains “clearly established” within the Rules, affirming the ICJ’s discretionary authority to act in urgent situations to prevent irreparable harm. Importantly, Article 75(1) permits the Court to proceed without holding oral hearings in circumstances of “extreme urgency.” This is supported by precedents from the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice (see here and here).

The ICJ’s framework for provisional measures includes other key provisions. Article 41 of the ICJ Statute empowers the Court to indicate provisional measures when circumstances require action to preserve the respective rights of the parties. This power is exercised only if the Court determines there is urgency, interpreted by the Court as a “real and imminent risk” that irreparable harm will occur to the rights at stake before the Court renders its final decision.

Article 75(1) allows the ICJ to examine proprio motu whether “the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures.” In the LaGrand case, the ICJ clarified that the exercise of its proprio motu powers depends on “the particular circumstances of the case,” which include circumstances that “would cause irreparable harm to the rights claimed” before the Court. Thus, the LaGrand standard builds on the general urgency framework established under Article 41 but, importantly, introduces the concept of “extreme urgency” as a heightened threshold requiring immediate judicial action. This heightened focus makes Article 75(1) distinct because it enables the Court to act without relying on a party’s formal request, responding to circumstances that may preclude timely intervention by the parties themselves.

By contrast, Article 76(1) explicitly ties the Court’s ability to revoke or modify existing measures to the existence of “some change in the situation.” This standard acts as a procedural safeguard, ensuring judicial consistency while allowing responsiveness to evolving conditions. Nonetheless, it is somewhat backward-looking, focusing on whether a material change justifies reconsideration of prior measures, rather than on the forward-looking need, like Article 75(1), to prevent irreparable harm based on extreme urgency.

Conceptually, it would appear that the standards under Articles 75(1) and 76(1) are distinct; Article 76(1) requires a demonstrable change, while Article 75(1) permits the Court to act based on the urgency and gravity of existing circumstances, regardless of whether they represent a departure from prior conditions. However, in practice, these tests may overlap. Situations extreme enough to meet the urgency and gravity threshold required for proprio motu action under Article 75(1) may arise from “some change in the situation” that would also satisfy the Article 76(1) threshold. Conversely, not all changes in the situation under Article 76(1) may meet the “extreme urgency” threshold required for Article 75(1). The LaGrand decision underscores the unique role of Article 75(1) in enabling the ICJ to act proprio motu in cases of extreme urgency, where irreparable harm is imminent and judicial intervention cannot wait. While the urgency requirement is a constant in the ICJ’s provisional measures framework, Article 75(1) reflects the Court’s discretion to respond independently when circumstances demand immediate action to protect the rights at stake.

Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court in Practice

The ICJ has invoked Article 75(1) only once. This was in the LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America). In that case, the ICJ acted just one day after Germany’s request for provisional measures, indicating measures without holding a hearing or receiving written observations from the respondent State. The urgency of the situation — preventing the execution of Walter LaGrand — required the Court to act swiftly to avoid irreparable harm. Following LaGrand, the decision to invoke Article 75(1) depends on the Court’s assessment “in the light of the particular circumstances.”

South Africa’s Feb. 12, 2024 request for provisional measures to the ICJ explicitly invoked Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court, urging the Court to consider additional provisional measures proprio motu. Israel’s Feb. 15, 2024 response to South Africa’s request reinforced a key procedural point: the ICJ’s ability to act proprio motu under Article 75(1) is not contingent on any party’s formal request. As such, the ICJ’s procedural flexibility under Article 75(1) remains unbound by party submissions, allowing the Court to respond to situations of extreme urgency to safeguard the right to be protected from acts of genocide where they are at serious risk of irreparable harm. Ultimately, the Court did not exercise this authority at that time. Since then, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has deteriorated to levels unimaginable not only in February but since the ICJ’s last order of provisional measures in May 2024. The circumstances surpass the extreme urgency of LaGrand, involving not just the survival of an individual but the survival of a population.

In each of its prior decisions, the Court found that the civilian population in Gaza was “extremely vulnerable.” The Court also repeatedly found that, in view of “the fundamental values sought to be protected by the Genocide Convention, the plausible rights in question in these proceedings” including the right to be protected from acts of genocide “are of such a nature that prejudice to them is capable of causing irreparable harm.” In light of the intensity of Israel’s current military campaign, the near-total denial of humanitarian access as an official policy, and the stated intention to remove Palestinians from Gaza, the situation is clearly one of extreme urgency that warrants the indication of provisional measures without an oral hearing or written observations.

Conclusion

The ICJ should indicate provisional measures directing Israel to immediately halt its current military campaign, restore the level of humanitarian assistance achieved in February 2025, and refrain from displacing Palestinians from Gaza. The Court has the legal authority to act. It must use its authority now, before it is too late.

We are not naïve. Israel has plainly violated the Court’s prior orders and may violate the proposed measures as well. But Israel’s apparent disregard for the Court’s authority cannot justify any of us failing to discharge our own responsibilities, let alone the responsibilities of the International Court of Justice.

IMAGE: Palestinians flee with their belongings Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on March 21, 2025. (Photo by Bashar Taleb/AFP via Getty Images)

The post “In the Event of Extreme Urgency”: The International Court of Justice Must Indicate New Provisional Measures to Protect Civilians in Gaza appeared first on Just Security.

Reporters for Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America could be forced to return to repressive countries where their work puts them at risk of persecution and imprisonment following an executive order from President Donald Trump last week.

The order, which gutted the U.S. Agency for Global Media, the federal agency that oversees the three outlets, also endangers their journalists who are currently jailed in several countries. Their employers provided them and their families with financial support and publicly advocated for their release.

On Saturday, the agency notified RFE/RL and RFA — with budgets of roughly $142 million and $63 million, respectively — that it was terminating their federal grants and that any unobligated funds must be returned. Voice of America staff were told by email that they were on administrative leave, effective immediately.

Around 30 RFA employees risk having their visas revoked, leaving them in limbo, said Tamara Bralo, RFA’s director for journalist safety. This includes reporters living and working in the U.S. and abroad, including some whose home countries effectively view them as criminals.

“The possibility that people who worked for a U.S. Congress-funded organization are now at a risk of being sent to countries where they’re going to get arrested, I cannot tell you how disheartening it is,” she said. “They stood up to censorship in their countries at an incredible risk to themselves.”

The possibility that people who worked for a U.S. Congress-funded organization are now at a risk of being sent to countries where they’re going to get arrested, I cannot tell you how disheartening it is.

— RFA director for journalist safety Tamara Bralo

A journalist from Asia on an employment visa, who asked not to be named because he is not authorized to speak to the press, said he would leave the U.S. if his visa is revoked, but going home is not an option.

“By working for RFA we are effectively banished from going home,” he said. “These people decided to come and work for RFA because they believe in RFA’s mission. They believe in the idea of having freedom of press, and they desperately wanted to bring the idea of free and uncensored information to their home countries.”

The journalist said some of his colleagues had been blacklisted by their governments and labeled “enemies of the state” for supporting RFA’s mission. “If they have to return to their home country, there is a big, big chance that they will be put in jail.”

The media outlets were the only source of independent news in dozens of countries, often only accessible via VPN. RFE/RL and VOA are designated as “undesirable organizations” in Russia, making it illegal to interact with their content. And RFA, one of the first to report on the arbitrary detentions and mass-internment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in China, has been consistently blocked in China. RFA, RFE/RL and VOA together reached speakers of more than 60 languages, including Tibetan, Khmer, Kyrgyz and Pashto.

RFE/RL declined to comment on the risks its reporters now face but wrote in a lawsuit filed on Tuesday against the Agency for Global Media that reporters who are forced to return home “could be criminally prosecuted, imprisoned, or tortured because of their work for RFE/RL.” The government of the Czech Republic, where RFE/RL is headquartered, has been rallying European countries to step in and fill the gaps left by the U.S. funding cuts since the news broke.

ICIJ previously partnered with RFE on the 2024 Caspian Cabals investigation.

In addition to reporters who may lose their visas, jailed journalists and their families could be left to fend for themselves once funding dries out. At least 9 journalists from RFE/RL, RFA and VOA are currently detained in Myanmar, Vietnam, Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, including Ihar Losik, who is being held incommunicado in Belarus as part of a 15-year prison sentence. The Washington Post has detailed some of the harsh conditions under which the journalists are being held.

“Being a regular prisoner is bad enough, but being a political prisoner is the worst,” the RFA journalist on an employment visa said, describing the inhumane conditions that some of his colleagues are experiencing, including being chained up and not receiving adequate food rations. “RFA supports their family, and through their family, supports them. So without the support, it would definitely impact their experience in jail massively.”

The funding cuts have gratified authoritarian governments, including China which has long seen the outlets’ coverage of human rights issues as a threat. On Sunday, an editorial in The Global Times, a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party, called VOA “propaganda poison.” And since Trump’s order, the number of state-backed individuals attacking RFA journalists on social media has multiplied, according to Bralo.

Clayton Weimers, executive director of Reporters Without Borders USA, called the cuts “a massive win for authoritarian regimes.”

“Look at who is celebrating the loudest. It’s the Chinese Communist Party. It’s the Kremlin,” Weimers said. “They are thrilled to see that these independent journalists who were thorns in their sides for decades are no longer going to be doing their journalism.”

On Wednesday, Reporters Without Borders and 26 other press freedom organizations called on Congress to protect the Agency for Global Media and the affected reporters.

These are the latest in a slew of funding cuts that have endangered news organizations across the globe, including those that receive grants from the U.S. Agency for International Development. ICIJ does not receive funding from USAID or the Agency for Global Media, but it did receive assistance from the State Department which accounted for 6.2% of its expenses in 2024 and 8.6% of its budget in 2025.

 

On March 20, Forward Defense senior fellow Robert Soofer joined Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering, USAF (Ret.), and Chris Williams for NSSA’s SpaceTime event, “Golden Dome for America.” The discussion explored the policy, budgetary, and programmatic implications of President Trump’s recent executive order establishing a homeland air and missile defense system.

The post Soofer featured at NSSA’s SpaceTime event on “Golden Dome for America” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

(Editor’s note: This is Part 2 of a two-part analysis, following Part 1: Why the ICC Should Respect Immunities of Heads of Third States.)

Who Will Join Duterte at the ICC? A Plea for Realism

The arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is a welcome and much needed success for the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is the first arrest for the ICC since 2022. It comes at a time when commentators are freely discussing how the ICC is on the precipice and are asking what will follow the Court’s slow-motion death. As important as this arrest is, the relieved and jubilant reactions since then also underline how precarious the Court’s situation now is.

Over time, the ICC has dug itself into a deep hole primarily by poor case selection, with too much emphasis on unrealistic cases against Heads of State and other leaders, coupled with a lack of respect for international law’s long-established rules on immunities. This combination has led to minimal results and maximal resistance from both States parties and third States. For the ICC to find the way up, the question after Duterte’s arrest should not be whether it can now move on to confront more powerful leaders, but rather how it can become more effective and have more trials.

ICC Case Selection: Too Many Symbolic Dead-Ends

The ICC’s longstanding focus on leadership cases – including cases against senior State officials – has not only brought it into questionable legal waters, but also led to minimal results. As a rule, leadership cases are the most difficult cases to prosecute. They often require complex evidence and generate the most resistance, since senior officials generally have more resources and support than others. Even leaving immunities aside, these cases are the least likely to yield arrests and convictions.

Some years ago, there was an impression that the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) would chart a more realistic course and would focus on cases that have a decent chance of leading to successful prosecutions. That approach has not borne out. The Court is now best known for a string of failed cases and unfulfilled arrest warrants for Heads of States and a mostly empty courtroom.

This situation is mostly by choice, not necessity. The lack of success at the ICC stems from a number of factors, some in the ICC’s control and some not. In my view, one of those factors is the error of the OTP focusing too much on the highest ranks of potential accused. A different approach would not solve all of the ICC’s challenges but would be an important step towards making it a more effective court.

Nothing in the ICC’s legal framework requires it to focus only on those most responsible. It is a self-imposed limitation. Surely, the argument that the ICC cannot prosecute everyone and therefore must be selective in its focus would be strong if the ICC was at risk of being overwhelmed. But the opposite is true. Yes, the Court has a complex mandate and no coercive powers of its own. But as has been pointed out many times by now, better results are possible for a Court with this mandate and these resources. What it requires is a stronger focus on realistic cases rather than symbolic dead-ends.

The fact that the ICC operates in a difficult environment and has too often not received the support it should have, even when it comes to arresting “small fish,” makes it all the more important to focus on situations where there is a reasonable prospect of success and on cases that are likely to succeed. As far as we know, that is not happening. Public arrest warrants from the ICC are sparse, certainly when compared to national practice for the same or comparable crimes, and most have clearly not been selected based on their chances of actual execution. It seems unlikely that arrest warrants under seal are very different. Duterte was the first arrest for the ICC in years, while there is regular information on potential suspects of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction traveling the world.

It is a fundamental misconception that international prosecutors should focus on the most powerful defendants to be considered successful. For the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Duško Tadic case contributed more to the development of international criminal law than the case against former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. For the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the case against former mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu was at least as significant as the case against former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda.

Obviously, case selection must entail more than an assessment which cases can successfully be brought to the Court. But as explored in more detail here, legitimacy for the ICC can be found in many other factors than the high status of its defendants.

Effective international criminal law enforcement demands realism, patience, and a sense of humility. The ICC was never going to instantly change the world, and it will not end wars. What it should have done, was quietly build a line of high quality cases that would have contributed to an increasing body of convictions for international crimes, setting precedents for national courts, authoritatively interpreting new crimes, and incrementally changing perceptions of the international rule of law. Successful prosecutions establishing the facts can spur more cases in other jurisdictions and contribute to State responsibility cases, regardless of the stature of the defendants in the criminal case. If done right, such a movement can slowly change perceptions of the international rule of law and gradually raise the bar on who is within reach of the law, and who is above it.

The choice to ignore practical constraints and focus on high-level defendants means the ICC is now associated more with its inability to progress these cases than with positive results. (The Guardian opined that Duterte’s arrest “helps make the court and its mission feel less theoretical.”) That is a problem that can affect more than only its cases against Heads of State. While it is unknown what Italy would have done if the OTP had made different choices long ago, surely the decision to not execute an ICC’s arrest warrant is easier when many States have previously made the same decision, without consequences, than if one is the first and only State to do so.

Prosecutors, national or international, should focus most of their time and resources on cases where they can achieve results. There are good reasons to occasionally bring cases which are more symbolic than realistic, but these must be exceptional. Symbolic confrontations have little value if they are not followed up by results in the courtroom. Prosecutors should avoid creating a general impression that cooperation is optional and lack of results is the norm.

The OTP has long been ignoring a fact that was apparent even to its most ardent supporters: that, in the words of Benjamin Ferencz, the ICC “manifests all the helplessness of a new born babe” and that the best that could be hoped for was that “given assistance, in time, it will mature and hopefully will become an increasingly powerful moral force in deterring terrible crimes that, in the past, were committed with impunity.” Instead, the Prosecutor is trying to fast forward to a stage of authority for which the Court neither has the credentials nor the political support and thus mostly collects grand symbolic gestures against individuals who will not see the inside of a courtroom anytime soon.

The lack of trials also affects the ICC’s ability to successfully prosecute leaders if it ever gets them to the courtroom. Prosecutors and courts need practice and routine to be efficient and successful. More complex cases often lean on facts, procedures, and precedents established in smaller cases. Like the mountaineer who insists that he will only climb Mount Everest and snubs practice on smaller mountains, an ICC aiming to tackle only an occasional leadership case is likelier to perish than to succeed. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the case against Duterte will be successful, or follow the unfortunate examples of senior Congolese leader Jean-Pierre Bemba (acquitted, and now again in government), former Côte d’Ivoire president Laurent Gbagbo (acquitted), and former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta (charges withdrawn).

A Duty to Prosecute?

The OTP pursues a homeopathic version of international criminal law enforcement, with a minimal number of arrest warrants and even fewer trials, justified by the alleged need to focus only on the highest echelons of suspects. It is an open question how this can be reconciled with the duty to prosecute emphasized in the preambles of the Rome Statute. The kind of leadership cases that the OTP mostly focuses on is a small fraction of the potential prosecutions under its mandate. States have an obligation to investigate and prosecute all these crimes. If they substantially invest in the ICC as a necessary tool for fully effective prosecutions, why then do they accept the OTP refusing to do a productive job? Why is it acceptable for the OTP to limit its activities to the fraction of its mandate least likely to be successful? Any national prosecutor deciding to focus almost exclusively on the top one percent of his or her legally authorized mandate, resulting in hardly any cases at all, would be corrected. Why would it be acceptable for an international prosecutor with a mostly empty courtroom schedule to do so?

Achieving Actual Results

Neither Duterte’s arrest nor U.S. sanctions against the ICC should distract from the urgent need for change within the Court. Given its mandate and resources, one arrest every few years is far from enough for the ICC. The Court’s lack of trials is a matter of choice, not necessity. Its dominant focus on symbolic cases against Heads of States has ground the work of the Court to a near standstill and contributed to increased resistance among States against the effective enforcement of international criminal law. States parties to the ICC should generally be deferential to the Court, and some rallying around the flag in current times is understandable and justified, but silence about the Court’s persisting fundamental problems does not help anyone. Saving the ICC requires the Court tackling more problems than described in this article and my recent contribution on immunities. But rigorous respect for international law and a realistic case selection policy aimed at a full implementation of its mandate would make an important contribution to achieving actual results.

IMAGE: The International Criminal Court in The Hague (via Getty Images).

The post Who Will Join Duterte at the ICC? A Plea for Realism appeared first on Just Security.

The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is over. What was left of it ended in the early hours of March 18, when Israel launched a bombing campaign that killed more than 400 people in a single night, according to initial assessments. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the strikes were “just the beginning” and Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened the “citizens of Gaza” with “far more severe” attacks that would bring Gaza to “complete ruin.” Two weeks previously, Israel had already reverted to blocking entry of all goods and supplies into Gaza, including food and other humanitarian essentials. A week later, Israel cut off electricity to the enclave, noting explicitly that the primary impact would be on water desalination.

These catastrophic developments have extinguished the glimmer of hope that characterized the first six weeks of the ceasefire, when hostages and detainees were being returned, the fighting had subsided, and Israel was finally facilitating a broad and consistent flow of humanitarian aid. The ceasefire was “allowing nearly everyone in Gaza to receive food parcels,” United Nations Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told reporters in New York in early March. After months of devastating food insecurity, woefully inadequate access to water, and a decimated medical system, Palestinians in Gaza were beginning to receive urgently needed sustenance, rudimentary means of shelter, and medical treatment. Exemplifying the change, 40-year old Ibrahim Abu Sultan from Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp told NPR, “Before the ceasefire, we would eat one meal every two or three days. Now we can at least have a meal a day.”

To be sure, more ominous signs persisted even during those six weeks. Although reduced in scale, Israeli attacks in Gaza continued throughout (and in apparent violation of) the ceasefire. U.S. and Israeli leaders openly discussed patently illegal proposals to push Palestinians out of Gaza. Hamas’s process of returning hostages through degrading public spectacles included outrages upon personal dignity, a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and a war crime. The condition of those returned also suggested that additional war crimes had taken place while they were in captivity. Investigations have concluded that Israel’s detention practices have also entailed grave war crimes, and the condition of released Palestinian detainees likewise provided evidence of criminal mistreatment. Moreover, throughout this period, Israel conducted a severe escalation of violence and displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank.

Nonetheless, the ceasefire offered a glimmer of hope where there had been none. Now, that hope is shattered and the fragile trajectory of recovery is in rapid reverse.

In what follows, I focus exclusively on the legal implications of Israel’s renewed policy of deprivation since March 2. In my view, Israel’s decision to cut off Gaza’s civilian population from the external supply of essential goods clearly violates international humanitarian law. It also almost certainly entails the resumption and continuation of crimes charged in the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Netanyahu, including principally the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and certain associated crimes against humanity.

Those charges stem primarily from Israel’s impediment of humanitarian relief, beginning with the total siege order of Oct. 9, 2023. Gaza is under siege again, implicating many of the same legal considerations. Nonetheless, it is important to reexamine the situation in light of the current conditions of the civilian population in Gaza, the arguments Israel is making in its defense, and the conflict’s shifting legal context. If anything, the violation has only become starker.

Before the Ceasefire

For 15 months following Hamas’s deadly assault on October 7, 2023, Israel waged a devastating air and ground campaign in Gaza, while severely restricting humanitarian access, particularly to northern Gaza. Israeli forces have destroyed most buildings. Close to the entire population of Gaza has been displaced, in many cases multiple times. At least 48,000 Palestinians are estimated to have been killed and more than 111,000 injured, although both numbers are likely to be significant undercounts. According to expert assessments, Israel pushed Gazans to the brink of famine on several occasions, with the percentage of people suffering emergency or catastrophe levels of food insecurity unprecedented in the two decades in which the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a tool for tracking potential famine, has been in operation.

Israel’s deprivation of food, water, and essential medical supplies and treatment to Palestinians in Gaza during this period took multiple forms. Israeli airstrikes attacked, killed, or destroyed agricultural land, farm animals, water systems, and humanitarian workers. Desalination plants were rendered inoperable through the denial of fuel and electricity. Medical infrastructure was cut off from power, bombed, and destroyed. And Israel blocked humanitarian aid throughout the 15-month period, albeit with varying levels of intensity and with variation across different areas of Gaza. The impediment to humanitarian access was especially severe in northern Gaza, which suffered extended periods of total or near-total siege.

Making matters worse, the Israeli Knesset adopted legislation on Oct. 28, 2024, banning UNRWA, the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, from operating in Israel and forbidding contact between Israeli officials and the agency. UNRWA is widely understood to be the “backbone” of humanitarian delivery in Gaza. Israel’s decision was predicated in part on its earlier allegation that 19 UNRWA staffers (out of a workforce of 13,000 in Gaza) participated in Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Upon being informed of these allegations in January 2024, UNRWA swiftly fired the staff members in question, while the U.N. Secretary-General tasked the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) with investigating the issue. The investigation led to a determination that nine of those accused may have been involved in the October 7 attacks, but the evidence still needed to be authenticated and corroborated. Only one of the original 19 was rehired, on the grounds that OIOS obtained no evidence to support the allegation of their involvement. Less than two months later, the Knesset adopted the UNRWA ban, which entered into effect on January 30. The anticipated impacts are potentially dire.

In a related vein, on March 10, Amichai Chikli, Israel’s minister of diaspora and combating antisemitism, announced, “a new procedure,” that would revoke the license of international humanitarian organizations working with the Palestinian population if they “published statements in support of the prosecution of Israeli citizens at the International Criminal Court.”

Before assessing the situation today, it is also worth noting several international judicial developments. In May 2024, the ICC Prosecutor applied for arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as three now-deceased Hamas leaders, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The centerpiece of the case against Netanyahu and Gallant is alleged starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Warrants for both men were issued in November. The same acts of deprivation are also at the crux of South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). South Africa’s case, brought under the Genocide Convention, has led to three separate provisional measures orders, all of which have direct implications for Israel’s obligations regarding humanitarian access. Separately, the UNRWA ban has prompted the U.N. General Assembly to request an advisory opinion on Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations, and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. That process is now underway. Meanwhile, the ICJ’s advisory opinion of July 2024 on Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has added jurisprudential weight to doctrinal points that are relevant to current assessments of Israeli conduct vis-à-vis Gaza, most notably by affirming that Israel is bound by at least some provisions of the law of belligerent occupation in Gaza.

A Return to Siege

On Jan. 19, the first phase of the ceasefire went into effect. Pursuant to that agreement, Hamas began a phased release of hostages, whose taking and detention has been a war crime from start to finish. Israel, as well as releasing Palestinian prisoners, facilitated large-scale humanitarian access. As I have previously argued, its failure to have done so previously entailed a consistent violation of IHL. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza started to improve.

As the first phase of the ceasefire expired, however, the delivery of desperately needed supplies slowed to a halt. On March 2, Netanyahu announced that Israel would prevent “the entry of goods and supplies into Gaza” in an effort to exercise leverage over Hamas.  Food prices rose sharply in Gaza’s markets and aid organizations moved quickly to ration the stockpiles of aid they had already brought in. A week later, Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen announced, “I have now signed an order to cut off electricity to the Gaza Strip immediately.” The primary target was a water desalination plant, as Cohen himself acknowledged.

In Netanyahu’s announcement of the new siege, he warned, “There will be no free lunch. If Hamas thinks that it will be possible to continue the ceasefire or benefit from the terms of the first stage, without us receiving hostages, it is sorely mistaken.” Humanitarian aid is being impeded and withheld expressly as a bargaining chip.

To justify this stance, Israeli officials have made two claims. First, as they did throughout the 15 months prior to the ceasefire, they allege that Hamas is diverting and hording the aid. In his announcement, Netanyahu argued, “Hamas currently controls all of the supplies and goods that are being sent to the Gaza Strip. It is abusing the Gazan population that is trying to receive the aid, it is shooting at them, and is turning the humanitarian aid into a budget for terrorism directed against us.” Second, Israeli officials have minimized the likely humanitarian impact of their actions. As reported in the Times of Israel, “Israel believes enough aid has entered the enclave in recent weeks to last Gaza for several months.” Simultaneously, the Israeli government is seeking to avoid domestic judicial scrutiny of these claims and their relationship to its legal obligations by arguing that the denial of humanitarian access to Gaza raises considerations that “go beyond and are outside the realm of law.”

Evaluating Israel’s Arguments

On the facts, Israel’s claims are deeply unconvincing.

Humanitarian actors have consistently contradicted Israel’s allegations of massive aid diversion by Hamas. In September, Refugees International published a study, which relied on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders (government officials in Israel and Jordan, humanitarian officials, staff of international NGOs involved in the cross-border aid response, people inside Gaza, and evacuated Palestinians). The study’s authors found “little evidence to support the allegation that Hamas is diverting humanitarian aid at a large scale.” Regarding the more recent situation during the ceasefire, “Multiple humanitarian aid groups operating inside Gaza have said they distribute the aid they receive directly to those in need.”

The separate claim that Palestinians in Gaza are currently adequately supplied due to the expanded humanitarian delivery during the ceasefire is profoundly misleading.

Shortly after the renewed siege was announced, UNICEF reported, “conditions for children remain extremely dire. Seven newborn babies reportedly died from hypothermia over the past week because they lacked access to sufficiently warm clothes and blankets, shelter, or medical care.” After a four-day mission in March to Gaza and the West Bank, Edouard Beigbeder, UNICEF’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, noted that “more than 180,000 doses of essential childhood routine vaccines, enough to fully vaccinate and protect 60,000 children under 2 years of age, as well as 20 lifesaving ventilators for neonatal intensive care units” were blocked and waiting for delivery just outside Gaza. With a reduction of 70 percent of desalinated water due to the electricity cutoff, reports already indicate a severe deterioration in access to potable water. U.N. agencies estimate that 1.8 million of Gaza’s 2.1 million residents “urgently need water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance.” Israel’s deprivation of water in Gaza was one of the most devastating aspects of the 15 months prior to the ceasefire. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme reported that “it has no major stockpile of food in Gaza because it focused on distributing all incoming food to hungry people” stating that “existing stocks are enough to keep bakeries and kitchens running for under two weeks.”

More broadly, the current reality is that there is no stable source of sustenance and medical care other than through external humanitarian delivery—the source that Israel has now comprehensively shut down. The total lack of alternatives is even more acute today than it was at the time of the initial siege order in October 2023. Since then, Israel has destroyed the agricultural, medical, residential, and water infrastructure of Gaza. The population is almost entirely displaced and unable to access permanent shelter. To claim that the population is adequately supplied in virtue of aid delivery during six weeks of ceasefire access is to obscure the fact that cutting off aid now entails denying the only sustainable source of sustenance going forward.

Quite apart from these issues, the question of whether there is adequate supply cannot be answered simply by calculating whether the aggregate number of calories that have been allowed in should theoretically be sufficient for the population in question over a defined period of time. This caloric balance sheet approach evaluates humanitarian need in the abstract, divorced from its practical reality. A genuine assessment of adequate supply requires evaluating access and distribution. Immediately upon the announced siege, food prices shot up. They continue to rise. Within days, six out of 25 bakeries supported by the World Food Programme were forced to close. Reports indicate that “at least 80 community kitchens may soon run out of stock.” And this was before Israel launched its massive bombing campaign on March 18 and promised further massive destruction and displacement.

Moreover, the risk of deterioration must be understood in relation to the prior 15 months of deprivation. In an earlier warning, the IPC Famine Review Committee stressed that temporary improvements to food access “should not allow room for complacency” about the risk of famine, particularly given the increased vulnerability associated with prolonged crisis. As Alex de Waal has shown, societies plunged into catastrophic food insecurity suffer significantly elevated mortality and have significantly elevated humanitarian needs for months after humanitarian assistance starts to flow. Data collected by the Global Nutrition Cluster indicated that “since the ceasefire, over 3,000 children and 1,000 pregnant or breastfeeding women have been referred for acute malnutrition treatment.”

Even if all of this were not already clear, Israel’s claims regarding adequate stockpiles and Hamas hording do not stand on their own terms. The renewed siege is explicitly coercive. Netanyahu described it as a response to “Hamas’s rejection of the Witkoff framework” (referring to the Trump administration envoy) and promised “additional consequences” if “Hamas continues to stick to its position.” But if it were true that (i) the existing supply of aid were adequate, and (ii) Hamas were able to divert all existing stocks for its own benefit, there would be no immediate coercive impact on the armed group itself. On the contrary, according to Netanyahu’s own claims, civilian suffering would necessarily be prior to any coercive impact on Hamas. The purported logic of the siege works only if one assumes it will persist through widespread and severe civilian deprivation.

This was all true prior to Israel’s resumption of massive bombing. The latter, to which Netanyahu had already alluded in the siege announcement, has dramatically worsened a dire situation. Taking each of these points in combination, it is simply impossible to credit claims that stockpiles in Gaza on March 2 were such that Israel faced no humanitarian imperative to grant access in the period since.

How the Renewed Siege Violates International Law

The renewed siege is in violation of IHL and it adds further evidence to the central criminal charge against Netanyahu at the ICC.

At the level of IHL, it is now even clearer than it was in October 2023 that Israel bears obligations under the law of belligerent occupation. As I wrote at the time, there was already a strong argument then that, due to its enduring control of Gaza’s borders, Israel retained occupying power status despite its withdrawal from the territory in 2005. In the intervening months, two things have happened. First, key jurisprudence has developed in support of that assessment. Second, Israel’s level of control has escalated, surpassing even a more demanding threshold for the applicability of the law of belligerent occupation.

In July 2024, the ICJ put its jurisprudential weight behind the view that “Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip” in 2005 did “not entirely release it of its obligations under the law of occupation.” The Court explained that Israel’s responsibilities “have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control.” As Judge Sarah Cleveland indicated in her separate opinion, among the “commensurate” obligations that most closely tracked the level of Israel’s “effective control” prior to Oct. 7, 2023 are those related to the provision of food, water, medical provisions, and humanitarian access. This adds significant support to the view that Israel bore the relevant obligations from the start of this iteration of the conflict.

Second, during its ground incursion after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, Israel took full control over certain areas of Gaza and substantially greater control over the remainder, while eliminating Hamas’s system of civilian control. This led nine leading Israeli professors of international law to assess in April 2024 that, at least in northern Gaza, Israel’s level of control “amounts to full belligerent occupation.” Three months later, Marco Longobardo concluded, “After 7th October 2023, there is no doubt that the Gaza Strip is under occupation and that Israel is the occupying power.” The ICJ reasoned that the argument for obligations under the law of belligerent occupation holds “even more so since 7 October 2023.”

Of course, Israel withdrew its ground forces during the ceasefire. However, there is no plausible case to be made that Israel exited in a way that allows any form of autonomous control and governance within Gaza. The comprehensive destruction of all elements of basic infrastructure across Gaza has created a condition of total dependence on what Israel does or does not allow, particularly in relation to what is crossing the borders. Whatever one’s view on whether Israel’s obligations as occupying power lapsed upon its withdrawal in 2005, the recent ceasefire withdrawal had no such implication. In any event, the IDF has already reasserted a high level of control in key areas in the short time since Israel terminated the ceasefire.

As the occupying power, Israel has a primary duty to “ensur[e] the food and medical supplies of the population,” to the fullest extent of the means available to it (Geneva Convention IV, article 55). Moreover, whenever “whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” (article 59). Pursuant to the same provision, “All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection.”

Israel is plainly not acting to the “fullest extent of the means available to it” to ensure food and medical supplies to Palestinians in Gaza. It is blocking the only source of precisely such supplies. Given the currently “inadequate supply” of essentials to at the very least “part of the population” of Gaza (and soon, if not already, its entirety), Israel bears a clear obligation to agree to relief schemes under article 59. To cut off the external supply of essentials in this scenario straightforwardly contravenes international humanitarian law.

Netanyahu’s statement seeks to avoid this implication by arguing that it is Hamas that is “abusing the Gazan population that is trying to receive aid.” To the extent Hamas is looting aid or denying it to civilians, that would entail violations of IHL and war crimes on its part. But it does not change Israel’s obligations to the civilian population. Moreover, pitting Hamas and the population against one another by cutting off the current supply (which humanitarians have affirmed had been reaching civilians in need), directly contradicts Israel’s obligation to “restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,” per the foundational rule of the law of occupation in article 43 of the Hague Regulations. Even accepting limits on how comprehensively Israel can achieve that restoration under current conditions, one thing that is unambiguously within its power is to refrain from cutting off humanitarian supplies in a way that will manufacture extreme scarcity and generate severe threats to public order and safety.

Defending Israel’s conduct, some have pointed to article 23 of Geneva Convention IV to argue that Israel is not required to “allow the free passage” of essentials if it has “serious reasons for fearing:

(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods.”

This argument distorts the legal reality. The caveats listed in that section of article 23 apply explicitly and exclusively to the humanitarian access “obligation …. indicated in the preceding paragraph” of article 23, which is not specific to belligerent occupation. In other words, they codify not general authorizations to limit aid, but specific caveats to the specific obligations defined in article 23. By its own terms, article 23 of the Fourth Convention does not authorize what articles 55 and 59 prohibit. That is to say, in occupied territory, the requirements to grant access and ensure food and medical supply hold without modification according to the enumerated caveats in article 23.

But the point is not limited to belligerent occupation or the internal structure of Geneva Convention IV. International humanitarian law did not stop developing in 1949. Significant additional obligations have subsequently taken hold. And just as the caveats internal to article 23 do not authorize the violation of other articles of Convention IV, they are equally unable to authorize the violation of rules of IHL external to the Fourth Convention.

Today, even if it were not bound by the obligations of an occupying power, Israel would still be bound by (a) the customary prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and (b) the customary requirements (i) not to arbitrarily deny consent to humanitarian access and (ii) to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to which it consents in that regard. Indeed, Israel’s own High Court of Justice recognized the customary relevance of these obligations to its control over the supply of essentials into Gaza as far back as 2008 (Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed 2008). Israeli litigation regarding the application of these rules to the current situation in Gaza is ongoing.

None of these rules is subject to the caveats in article 23 of Geneva Convention IV, which, again, apply only to the requirements of that specific provision. Notably, even States such as the United Kingdom and Germany, both of which have been largely supportive of Israel, have expressed “deep concern at the Government of Israel’s announcement on 2 March to halt all entry of goods and supplies into Gaza” and have called on “the Government of Israel to abide by its international obligations to ensure full, rapid, safe and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance to the population in Gaza.” With a blanket prohibition of access to a population in need, there can be little doubt that Israel is failing that duty.

The prohibition of starvation of civilians is particularly significant, as it underpins the central war crime with which Netanyahu is charged at the ICC. Based on information released by the ICC, the arrest warrant for Netanyahu is predicated primarily on his impediment of relief supplies, per the terms of article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the ICC Statute. At the ICC, criminal liability attaches when a perpetrator (i) deprives civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, (ii) with the intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare.

There is no question that this latest iteration of the siege involves the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival. Food is the quintessential object indispensable to survival and is legally cognizable as such even assuming the fact of existing (and here depleting) alternative stocks. Essential medicines also clearly qualify.

Electricity can be more complicated. In this case, however, the Israeli government was clear that the denied electricity “was used for a desalination and wastewater treatment facility.” Although Israel’s energy minister argued that “this will force them to use their fuel stocks,” this rationale concedes that the electricity was not serving a military use. Rather, it was supporting the functioning of what is unambiguously an object indispensable to survival (a water desalination plant) and it was cut off with that in mind. As noted in a recent U.N. update on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, “Without electricity, the plant can only provide about 2,500 cubic metres of water per day and the amount of drinking water available in southern Gaza will be substantially reduced, affecting approximately 600,000 people.” In issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber emphasized that “cutting off electricity … had a severe impact on the availability of water in Gaza and the ability of hospitals to provide medical care” and was one of the practices that “created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children due to malnutrition and dehydration.” These findings led it to include electricity denial as a component of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and the crime against humanity of murder.

As in earlier iterations, the current deprivation of humanitarian aid and electricity is clearly directed at a civilian population. The presence of combatants in Gaza does not change the civilian character of the population as a whole, given that the latter is overwhelmingly comprised of civilians (e.g. Protocol I, article 50(3); ICTY Prosecutor v. Karadžić Trial Judgment 2016). To cut off the supply of essentials, such as food, medical supplies, or the electricity necessary for desalination to Gaza as a whole is to deprive a civilian population of objects indispensable to survival. Here, the rules relating to starvation must be understood in light of the “basic rule” of IHL, pursuant to which parties to the conflict must, in all military operations, distinguish between the civilian population and combatants (Protocol I, article 48).

The remaining question relates to criminal intent. I have outlined the range of arguments on that point at length in a law review article and in an earlier Just Security essay. As explained in those pieces, and as articulated at the time of the ICC warrant application, a composite analysis of (a) the underlying IHL on starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, codified in article 54 of Additional Protocol I, and (b) “intent,” as defined in article 30 of the ICC Statute, supports the assessment that acting with the intent to starve civilians as a method of warfare includes either of the two following alternatives:

• Engaging in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival for the purpose of denying the sustenance value of those objects to civilians or to a civilian population. This form of intent can attach before it is certain that civilians will be reduced to a state of starvation.

or:

• Engaging in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival in the knowledge that this deprivation is virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation. This form of intent can attach even if civilian sustenance denial is not the purpose.

Even assuming that current stocks of humanitarian essentials in Gaza preclude finding that the current iteration of the siege is, at this stage, virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation, it is clear that this step has been taken with a view to denying the sustenance value of the blocked objects. As detailed above, both Netanyahu and Cohen, the energy minister, have been unabashed about their hope to coerce. That coercive effect relies upon denying the sustenance value of the things that are being blocked or undermined: humanitarian aid and water desalination. The deprivation of these essentials is directed at a population that is unambiguously civilian. For those reasons, the starvation war crime is again implicated.

Given the widespread nature of these practices, a similar analysis would extend to the crimes against humanity of inhumane acts, persecution, and (where lethality is virtually certain) murder. Each of these is included already in the warrant for Netanyahu.

Efforts to Marginalize Humanitarian Organizations

Israel’s ban on UNRWA and its move to exclude humanitarian actors that have supported legal efforts to hold Israel or its officials accountable may also violate IHL. In considering that question, the ensuing analysis leaves aside questions regarding Israel’s relevant obligations under the UN Charter and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

In general terms, a belligerent is not required to provide access to any one specific humanitarian actor. As long as it is not arbitrarily withholding consent to humanitarian action or impeding delivery, it has a certain level of discretion regarding the specific humanitarian organizations with which it works. There are distinctive constraints relevant to the specific situation of UNRWA, however, that make it harder to reconcile Israel’s ban on engagement with the agency with key obligations of IHL. There are additional concerns relating to restrictions on organizations that have supported ICC investigations of Israeli officials.

In the context of belligerent occupation, preexisting “relief societies shall be permitted to continue their humanitarian activities” as long as they act in accordance with humanitarian principles (art. 63, GC IV). The provision names Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, but the category is expressly not exclusive to them. The ICRC Commentary explains the provision’s reference to “other relief societies” on the grounds that “no method of alleviating suffering must be ignored.”

Could UNRWA qualify? The agency’s work in Gaza clearly preexisted Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, and Israel agreed to its continued operations at the time. There is widespread consensus that UNRWA performs a critical humanitarian relief function, especially in Gaza. And the agency describes the humanitarian principles as being “at the heart of all” of its operations. In 2014, the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions adopted a declaration in which parties supported the activities “of the International Committee of the Red Cross, … of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and of other impartial humanitarian organizations.” Although not specific to article 63, this arguably supports the classification of UNRWA alongside Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in that context. UNRWA had emphasized its commitment to humanitarian principles in a submission to the Conference.

At the same time, UNRWA performs a more diverse array of functions than ordinary humanitarian relief organizations. The agency describes its work in the broader terms of “human development and humanitarian services.” However, in addition to relief societies, article 63 also covers “the activities and personnel of special organizations of a non-military character, which already exist or which may be established, for the purpose of ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population by the maintenance of the essential public utility services, by the distribution of relief and by the organization of rescues.” (art. 63, GC IV). A strong argument could be made that UNRWA fits within this category, at least if the list of functions is not understood to be exhaustive. Moreover, some of UNRWA’s activities that are not enumerated in article 63, such as education, are the subject of other provisions requiring facilitation by the occupying power (art. 50, GC IV). The ICRC Commentary emphasizes that the latter protection applies to “a wide variety of institutions and establishments” for children and “must be respected whatever their status under the law of the country and whether they are privately run or under State control.”

Of course, Israel’s explanation of its withdrawal of consent and prohibition of engagement with the agency implies UNRWA does not operate according to humanitarian principles—a failure that would appear to eliminate the article 63 shield of its continued activities. Claims by Israeli political leaders that UNRWA is fundamentally compromised or complicit in activities hostile to Israel are both longstanding and long contested. Certainly, the allegation regarding specific participants in the October 7 attacks should not itself be taken to vitiate the humanitarian character or impartiality of the agency as a whole, given that UNRWA quickly fired those individuals and launched an internal investigation. The ICJ could play a key role by opining authoritatively on UNRWA’s compliance with humanitarian principles and status under article 63 in its prospective advisory opinion on Israel’s obligations of cooperation with the United Nations.

Strikingly in that respect, UNRWA is widely understood by States and humanitarians to be the backbone of humanitarian action in Gaza. As the ban loomed, UNRWA Commissioner General Philippe Lazzarini told the Security Council, “Since October 2023, we have delivered two-thirds of all food assistance, provided shelter to over a million displaced persons, and vaccinated a quarter of a million children against polio.”

Article 63 aside, in the case of an organization of that scale and with that unique level of situational integration, the general discretion belligerents retain regarding working with specific humanitarian organizations must attend to humanitarian practicalities. Under current circumstances, it is not clear that Israel can discharge either its primary obligations as an occupying power or its obligations to facilitate humanitarian relief without engaging with UNRWA.

Additionally, in its March provisional measures order in the genocide case, the ICJ required Israel to “[t]ake all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance …” Given UNRWA’s central role in humanitarian response, including as articulated by other U.N. agencies, the UNRWA ban legislation would appear to violate Israel’s obligations under this order.

Finally, with respect to the threat to humanitarian organizations other than UNRWA, their satisfaction of the criteria of independence and impartiality cannot be conditioned on their silence in the face of IHL violations. On the contrary, contributing to the work of the ICC through identifying serious violations of international humanitarian law is fully aligned with the mission of IHL. Arguably, States have an obligation to facilitate—and certainly not to sanction—such engagement as part of their common article 1 and customary duty to ensure respect for IHL. The requirement of impartiality attaches to the delivery of relief. Advocacy pursuant to the standards of international law cannot impugn an organization’s humanitarian status.

Overall, the renewed cut-off of aid and electricity to Gaza and its overt framing as part of a coercive negotiation strategy reflects a profoundly dangerous normalization of the weaponization of aid and the use of civilian populations as bargaining chips. Efforts to marginalize key humanitarian actors are likely to exacerbate an already dire situation. The Israeli government’s willingness to pursue this path indicates Netanyahu’s presumption of impunity despite the ICC warrant for his arrest. ICC States Parties—including those that consider themselves to be leading supporters of the Court—have much to answer for in that regard. It is long past time to state clearly and without equivocation that warrants will be executed. More broadly, states must act now to use all available leverage to demand the restoration of humanitarian access and an immediate cease-fire.

IMAGE: Palestinian children in Beit Lahia, Gaza, on March 17, 2025. (Photo by SAEED JARAS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)

The post Gaza and Israel’s Renewed Policy of Deprivation appeared first on Just Security.

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A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the past 24 hours. Here’s today’s news:

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

The situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate toward full-scale war, with Hamas firing rockets at Israel for the first time in months and the Israeli military expanding its ground operations in Gaza, raiding cities of Rafah and Beit Lahiya yesterday. Militants in Palestine had also been put on alert awaiting further instructions, according to a source from a group allied with Hamas. Aaron Boxerman, Adam Rasgon, and Patrick Kingsley report for the New York Times; Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Mahmoud Issa report for Reuters.

Israeli strikes and ground operations killed at least 91 Palestinians in Gaza yesterday, the territory’s Hamas-run health ministry said. Nidal Al-Mughrabi and Mahmoud Issa report for Reuters.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz today threatened to annex areas of Gaza to Israel if Hamas refuses to release the hostages, saying that he has instructed the IDF to seize additional areas of the territory and issue evacuation orders for Palestinians. Emanuel Fabian reports for the Times of Israel.

The Israeli government today voted to dismiss the Shin Bet intelligence agency Director, Ronen Bar. The move is likely to escalate the domestic political and constitutional crises in Israel. Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

Each day of renewed violence in Gaza makes the safe return of the remaining hostages more unlikely, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East Khaled Khiari told a Security Council briefing yesterday. Reuters reports.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR — U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The United States is seeking to reopen negotiations on the terms of U.S. access to Ukraine’s minerals and energy assets and is working on widening its economic demands, two Ukrainian officials said. President Trump said yesterday that the United States would sign the Ukraine minerals deal “very shortly.” Christopher Miller, Ben Hall, Paola Tamma, and James Politi report for the Financial Times.

Europe’s military powers are drawing up plans for a pitch to the Trump administration to manage transfer of NATO competences to Europe over the next five to 10 years and other means of taking on greater responsibilities for the continent’s defense from the United States, sources say. Henry Foy and Ben Hall report for the Financial Times.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukrainian and U.S. officials will meet for peace talks in Saudi Arabia next Monday, as will representatives from the United States and Russia, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin “must stop making unnecessary demands that only prolong the war”, Zelenskyy said ahead of the talks. Vicky Wong reports for BBC News.

Ukraine struck an airfield deep inside Russian territory early yesterday, Ukrainian officials confirmed, as Russia’s continued drone strikes on Ukraine killed at least five people, injured dozens, and damaged civilian infrastructure in the port city of Odesa. Maria Varenikova reports for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS 

The Pentagon was scheduled to brief Elon Musk on the U.S. military top-secret operational plans for potential armed conflict with China today, U.S. officials told the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal yesterday. Trump and Pentagon officials denied the report, saying that China “will not even be mentioned or discussed” during Musk’s Pentagon visit, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth saying the “informal” meeting would focus on “innovation, efficiencies & smarter production.” In a social media post, Musk said that Pentagon sources who “maliciously leak false information … will be found” and prosecuted. Eric Schmitt, Eric Lipton, Julian E. Barnes, Ryan Mac, and Maggie Haberman report; Alexander Ward and Nancy A. Youssef report; Csongor Körömi reports for POLITICO.

Trump yesterday announced he would rescind the punitive executive order against Paul, Weiss after the law firm made several concessions, including a promise to provide free legal representation on behalf of conservative causes. The White House statement announcing the move also referenced a commitment to abandon diversity, equity, and inclusion policies, but the promise was not included in the agreement between the firm and the White House, sources added. Daniel Barnes reports for POLITICO; Michael S. Schmidt reports for the New York Times.

The FBI has reassigned staff from an office focused on combating domestic terrorism and has scrapped a tool used to track such investigations, sources say. Andrew Goudsward and Sarah N. Lynch report for Reuters.

Trump yesterday signed an executive order intended to boost the production of critical minerals in the United States, invoking emergency powers under the Defense Production Act to expand domestic U.S. mining production. Brett Samuels and Rachel Frazin report for the Hill.

Trump administration officials are proposing to move USAID operations to be run under State Department authority and rename the agency to the U.S. Agency for International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA), according to a memo obtained by POLITICO. Nahal Toosi and Daniel Lippman report. 

The Pentagon is cancelling more than $580 million in “wasteful” grants and contracts, Defense Secretary Hegseth announced yesterday. Ellen Mitchel reports for the Hill.

The Trump administration has reassigned John Ullyot, formerly a senior Defense Department spokesperson, following the fallout over Ullyot’s defense of the Pentagon’s removal of an online article about the military background of Jackie Robinson, sources say. Dan Lamothe reports for the Washington Post.

OTHER U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

The Justice Department yesterday asked to replace Trump as a defendant in a series of civil lawsuits seeking to hold the President accountable for his supporters’ attack on the Capitol, arguing that Trump was acting in his official capacity on Jan. 6, 2021, and hence the federal government should take his place. If successful, the move would shield Trump from any potential financial liability in the lawsuits. Alan Feuer reports for the New York Times.

Elon Musk’s political action committee is offering Wisconsin voters $100 to sign a petition expressing their opposition to “activist judges,” ahead of an April 1 election that will determine the composition of the ideologically divided bench in the swing state. Alex Isenstadt reports for Axios.

The White House is scrambling to mitigate the effects of a data breach after inadvertently making public the Social Security numbers of more than 400 former congressional staffers and others when publishing files related to President John Kennedy’s assassination, a White House official said. William Wan, Aaron Schaffer, Clara Ence Morse, and Cat Zakrzewski report for the Washington Post.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. intelligence assessments contradict Trump’s claim that the Tren de Aragua gang is committing crimes in the United States at the direction of Venezuela’s government, according to officials familiar with the briefings. Trump used the assertion as the basis for invoking the Alien Enemies Act to summarily transfer a group of Venezuelans to a high-security prison in El Salvador. Charlie Savage and Julian E. Barnes report for the New York Times.

The Taliban yesterday released a U.S. citizen abducted more than two years ago while traveling through Afghanistan as a tourist, the State Department said yesterday. Eric Tucker reports for AP News.

A French scientist was prevented from entering the United States this month over the opinions he expressed about Trump’s academic research policies in private message exchanges, the French government said yesterday. A Homeland Security Department spokesperson described the allegation that the removal was based on the researcher’s political beliefs as “blatantly false” and claimed that the man had  “confidential information” on his phone. Aurelien Breeden reports for the New York Times; Saskya Vandoorne reports for CNN.

A senior Israeli delegation is scheduled to visit the White House for high-level consultations on Iran’s nuclear program next week, according to U.S. and Israeli officials. Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

The Treasury yesterday sanctioned a Chinese refining company and its chief executive and other entities linked to purchases of Iranian crude oil in a bid to step up the U.S. “maximum pressure” on Iran. Anthony Harrup reports for the Wall Street Journal.

The State Department has approved what would be the first sale of advanced precision kill weapon systems (APKWS) to Saudi Arabia for $100 million, the Pentagon announced yesterday. Mike Stone reports for Reuters.

67,000 white South Africans have expressed interest in seeking refugee status in the United States under a program announced by the Trump administration last month, the U.S. embassy in Pretoria said yesterday. Gerald Imray reports for AP News.

Migrants from Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and China deported by the United States say they are hopping from embassy to embassy in Panama in an attempt to seek asylum in any country that will accept them, amid worries they will be forgotten with no clear pathway offered by authorities. Matias Delacroix and Megan Janetsky report for AP News.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Sudanese military today said it retook the Republican Palace in Khartoum, the last major bastion of the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary in Sudan’s capital, in a major symbolic victory for Sudan’s government. Samy Magdy and Jon Gambrell report for AP News.

Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney is poised to call a snap federal election for April 28 this weekend, according to Canadian media reports. Reuters reports.

Police in Turkey yesterday used tear gas and rubber bullets against demonstrators, with protests against the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem Imamoglu continuing into their third day. Emily Wither and Toby Luckhurst report for BBC News.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

The Trump administration’s explanations of why its deportations of immigrants to El Salvador did not amount to a breach of a court order are “woefully insufficient,” with officials “evad[ing] their obligations” to provide the details of their actions, a federal judge ruled yesterday in a sternly written order instructing the administration to provide a series of detailed responses to the judge’s questions in the coming days. Alan Feuer reports for the New York Times.

A federal judge yesterday barred DOGE employees from accessing sensitive Social Security Administration data and ordered its staffers to delete any personally identifiable information they obtained, ruling that DOGE “essentially engaged in a fishing expedition … based on little more than suspicion” of fraud at the SSA. “It has launched a search for the proverbial needle in the haystack, without any concrete knowledge that the needle is actually in the haystack,” she added. Maegan Vazquez reports for the Washington Post.

The Trump administration is blocked from removing an Indian-born Georgetown University scholar from the United States after a judge issued an order restraining the man’s deportation pending a court review of the lawfulness of his detention. Josh Gerstein and Kyle Cheney report for POLITICO.

A federal judge yesterday ruled that Columbia University is not to give information about student disciplinary actions over to the House Education and Workforce Committee until a hearing on the merits of a challenge against the move filed by detained activist Mahmoud Khalil. Lexi Lonas Cochran reports for the Hill.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions

The post Early Edition: March 21, 2025 appeared first on Just Security.

Symantec researchers linked a custom backdoor, called Betruger, found in recent ransomware attacks to an affiliate of the RansomHub operation.

Symantec’s Threat Hunter team has identified a custom backdoor, named Betruger, linked to a RansomHub affiliate. Designed for ransomware attacks, Betruger combines multiple functions into a single tool to minimize detection. It enables screenshot capture, credential theft, keystroke logging, network scanning, and privilege escalation, reducing the need for multiple tools and lowering the attack footprint.

“The Symantec Threat Hunter team has observed activity from a custom backdoor that can be tied to a RansomHub affiliate.” reads the analysis published by Symantec. “RansomHub is a Ransomware-as-a-Service offering and the backdoor has been named Betruger. This is a multi-function backdoor which appears to have been developed specifically for carrying out ransomware attacks. Betruger incorporates functionality typically seen across multiple tools leveraged during ransomware attacks.”

Ransomware groups usually rely on legitimate tools and public malware like Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike. Custom tools are rare but used for data theft, like Exmatter and Exbyte.

Betruger backdoor is disguised as “mailer.exe” or “turbomailer.exe,” the researchers noticed that lacks mailing functions, likely to appear legitimate.

Experts believe that Betruger may have been developed to minimize the amount of new tools dropped on a targeted network during a ransomware attack. 

RansomHub affiliates use many other tools, the group also exploits techniques like BYOVD to disable security mechanisms. Attackers use vulnerabilities like CVE-2022-24521 and CVE-2023-27532 to escalate privileges and leak credentials. Additional tools in recent attacks include Impacket, Stowaway Proxy, Rclone, Mimikatz, SystemBC, and several remote access tools like ScreenConnect, Atera, and Splashtop, all aiding in data exfiltration and remote access during ransomware campaigns.

“The Betruger backdoor was deployed in several recent RansomHub attacks, suggesting that it is available to at least one affiliate. RansomHub is a RaaS operation run by a cybercrime group Symantec calls Greenbottle. Active since February 2024, Greenbottle has quickly grown RansomHub, becoming the most prolific ransomware operation by the third quarter of 2024, responsible for the highest number of claimed attacks.” concludes the report. “The group has reportedly won over many affiliates by offering them better terms compared to rival operations, such as a great percentage of ransom payments and a payment model where the affiliate is paid by the victim before passing on the operator’s cut.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, RansomHub)

The security situation in the Balkans has deteriorated, with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) facing its most severe political and security crisis since the end of the war in 1995. The state, composed of three entities, is under threat as the autonomous region of Republika Srpska (RS) has banned the state police and judiciary system. This comes in response to Milorad Dodik’s conviction for undermining the constitution. The Sarajevo court sentenced Dodik to one year in prison and imposed a six-year ban on holding public office for opposing the decisions of the international peace envoy, Christian Schmidt. However, this decision is not final, and Dodik has the right to appeal. Instead of filing a complaint, Dodik responded by enacting laws that prohibit the judiciary and state police from operating in RS.

Immediately following the verdict, Dodik gathered RS citizens and delivered a speech as provocative as his previous ones. Among other statements, he vowed to resist surrender with the support of Russia and emphasized the backing of the Serbian people. He hinted at asking Russia to veto the extension of the European peacekeeping mission in Bosnia at the United Nations Security Council meeting scheduled for November. He also invited his ally, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, to visit Banja Luka, a request that Vučić promptly accepted.

Last week, the president of Republika Srpska ignored a state-level arrest warrant. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has since issued an international arrest warrant for Milorad Dodik, along with RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković and National Assembly Speaker Nenad Stevandić, all accused of unconstitutional conduct. Dodik’s long-standing attempt to subjugate BiH’s national institutions or even separate RS from BiH has reached a critical point. His rhetoric is not new—he has frequently advocated for RS’s separation and has consistently denied the genocide in Srebrenica, even after the UN Security Council passed a resolution classifying the massacre as an act of genocide by the Yugoslavian army. The European Union has repeatedly condemned Dodik’s inflammatory and divisive rhetoric, urging him to respect BiH’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.

Backed by his allies in the Balkans—Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—Dodik has advanced Russia’s destabilizing agenda in the region. His current efforts aim to renegotiate agreements he previously accepted under the Dayton Accords, which were designed to end the war and establish BiH’s governing institutions. Recent developments suggest that the crisis in BiH was orchestrated from Belgrade, with Vučić offering almost daily support to Dodik. Dodik has cultivated a perception among RS’s Serbian citizens that he is their protector. However, in the best-case scenario, RS citizens themselves should hold him accountable. A multimillionaire leader, sanctioned by the US and condemned by his own country, is doing no favors for the Serbian people in BiH. While Dodik remains trapped in the past, 30 years of peace in Bosnia are at risk.

As the international constellation is not quite positive, Dodik has revived the conflict in BiH in the hope that the administration of President Donald Trump will favor the Serbian separatist agenda. NATO chief Marco Rubio, during a recent visit to Bosnia and Kosovo, said that Dodik’s actions are undermining Bosnia’s institutions and threatening its security and stability, calling on US partners in the region “to join us in pushing back against this dangerous and destabilizing behavior. While this statement was a blow to Dodik, the bigger challenge for the US and the EU remains preserving the Dayton Accords. BiH institutions are taking cautious and responsible measures in addressing the Dodik issue. SIPA, the state police agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has played a limited but supportive role in recent operations alongside the Border Police in Republika Srpska to de-escalate tensions.

Meanwhile, Dodik’s supporters, Vučić and Orbán, are facing domestic challenges, as citizens in their respective countries fight corruption and authoritarianism. The Kremlin-style repression of protesters in Serbia and Hungary could soon be mirrored in RS. While Dodik has never faced a more precarious political situation, his 19-year reign, marked by US sanctions and a conviction for constitutional violations, is unraveling. The trust of BiH’s Serbs in him is waning, and if anyone is to blame for their current predicament, it is Milorad Dodik himself.

Reports suggest that Dodik is hiding in Serbia, while others speculate that he has fled to Russia. Regardless, he must return to face justice for the destructive policies he has imposed on his own people. Serbia is the more likely refuge, as it has become a safe haven for criminals. For over a year and a half, Serbia has harbored Milan Radoičić, the orchestrator of the Banjska attack in Kosovo, which was backed by the Serbian state. Despite accepting responsibility for the attack, Radoičić remains in Serbia, treated as a hero.Three decades after war tore Bosnia and Herzegovina apart, its already fragile peace is under renewed threat. Milorad Dodik’s defiance of state authority has escalated tensions, creating a political deadlock many views as the gravest challenge yet to the Dayton Accords. While the US and EU are unlikely to allow another full-scale war, the risk of internal conflict, with potential casualties, remains high. The EU’s next steps remain uncertain—will it push for a review of the Dayton Accords or consider replacing Dodik with another RS representative in the tripartite presidency? The immediate solutions are limited. One thing is clear: the international community has tolerated Dodik’s actions for far too long. As a result, BiH will likely remain in a state of paralysis for the foreseeable future. However, one thing is certain—this marks the end of Milorad Dodik’s political career. The European Union will not allow itself to be embarrassed in Bosnia and Herzegovina again. While another occupation-style war is unlikely, ethnic conflict and violence remain real possibilities. The cause of this instability is clear—the separatist leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Milorad Dodik.

Experts warn of the active exploitation of two recently patched security vulnerabilities affecting Cisco Smart Licensing Utility.

Cisco disclosed two vulnerabilities in its Smart Licensing Utility: CVE-2024-20439, a static credential backdoor, and CVE-2024-20440, an information disclosure flaw. Attackers can exploit the backdoor to access sensitive log files. While no active exploitation was initially observed, the publication of exploit details has led to recent attack activity.

“Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Smart Licensing Utility could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to collect sensitive information or administer Cisco Smart Licensing Utility services on a system while the software is running.” reads the advisory.

Below are the descriptions of the two vulnerabilities:

• CVE-2024-20439 (CVSS score: 9.8) – The flaw is related to the presence of an undocumented static admin credential, allowing attackers to log in with administrative privileges via the Cisco Smart Licensing Utility API.
• CVE-2024-20440 (CVSS score: 9.8) – The vulnerability is due to excessive verbosity in a debug log file. An attacker could exploit this issue by sending a specially crafted HTTP request to an affected device and obtain log files that contain sensitive data, including credentials that can be used to access the API.

The IT giant has already released software updates that address these flaws. There are no workarounds to address the two issues.

Researchers at SANS Internet Storm Center now warn that the two issues are actively exploited in attacks.

“These two vulnerabilities are somewhat connected. The first one is one of the many backdoors Cisco likes to equip its products with. A simple fixed password that can be used to obtain access. The second one is a log file that logs more than it should. Using the first vulnerability, an attacker may access the log file.” reads the advisory published by SANS. “A quick search didn’t show any active exploitation, but details, including the backdoor credentials, were published in a blog by Nicholas Starke shortly after Cisco released its advisory [2]. So it is no surprise that we are seeing some exploit activity”

SANS researchers warn that the group attempting to exploit the two vulnerabilities is also targeting configuration files and possibly CVE-2024-0305 (CVSS score: 5.3), likely exploiting a DVR vulnerability.

SANS’s advisory does not provide information about the identity or motivation of the attackers exploiting the two flaws.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Cisco Smart Licensing Utility)