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Pakistan’s unprecedented arrest and court-martial of a former spy chief raises the heat on Imran Khan and could be the precursor to prosecuting the jailed former prime minister on charges of treason and attempting to incite a mutiny in the military. 

Imran Khan has been feuding with Pakistan’s all-powerful military after a falling out with then-army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2022, following which he was ousted from office in a parliamentary vote that he said was orchestrated by the generals.

The military has denied any involvement in his ouster. Khan has been public about the clash, which has led to the worst political turmoil in the South Asian nation in decades. The 71-year-old former cricket star has a devoted following, and any further military action against him could result in more unrest.

Supporters of Khan went on the rampage on May 9 last year after he was briefly arrested, vandalising military installations across the country. It was the most serious challenge to the power of the military in Pakistan’s 75-year history.

Khan is on trial in a civilian court for allegedly abetting the violence, a charge he has denied. But he can face more serious charges of treason and mutiny after last month’s arrest of Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, a Khan ally who is a former chief of the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence.

Treason and mutiny are tried by military court. Such trials are not open to the public, and the charges carry a maximum punishment of death.

The arrest of Faiz Hameed signals the potential prosecution of former Prime Minister Imran Khan on charges of treason and incitement to rebellion.

More on this story: Political turmoil in Pakistan: future scenarios

The conflict between Khan and the military began after a falling-out with General Qamar Javed Bajwa in 2022, which led to Khan’s ouster as prime minister. Despite this, Khan, who remains a popular political figure, asserts that the military orchestrated his removal.

The publication notes that Hameed’s arrest may increase pressure on Imran Khan, who is already under investigation for inciting unrest following his brief detention in May 2023.

We suggest that Hameed’s arrest is part of an effort to bolster the charges against Khan, who has so far managed to avoid more serious accusations.

Thus, the arrest will be used to put pressure on Faiz Hameed to provide information that helps implicate Khan in the May 9 violence which the army chief sees as mutiny and an act of treason. Government officials have repeatedly said Hameed worked with Khan to plan the riots. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told last month that Khan provided the manpower while Hameed masterminded the conspiracy. 

Current army chief General Asim Munir said that there could be no compromise or deal with the planners and architects of this dark chapter in history of Pakistan.

According to Imran Khan, Hameed’s arrest was meant to ultimately target him as other cases against him were falling part.

“He thinks that government is trying his  case in a military court.

Hameed is being tried by court-martial on charges of corruption, misuse of power in service and violation of the Army Act after his 2022 retirement. The charges are punishable by a jail sentence of up to 14 years.

The retired officer is also accused of transgressing legal and constitutional boundaries for his personal interest at the behest of some particular political elements. 

Khan handpicked Hameed in 2019 as ISI chief, one of the most powerful positions in Pakistan, at the intersection of domestic politics, the military and Pakistan’s foreign relations. 

Hameed’s transfer from the ISI to a corps command two years later, which Khan initially opposed, highlighted the first public signs of divisions between Khan and Bajwa, the then army chief.

Khan has acknowledged in interviews to local media that he wanted Hameed to remain as the head of the ISI in 2021, when he said the opposition was planning to oust him.

Hameed’s arrest came after a string of legal victories for Khan in civilian courts, despite allegations by several senior judges, in a letter to the chief justice that was published in local media, of pressure to decide cases against the former premier.

While the military denies pressurising judges, the allegations have put the two institutions at loggerheads.

It would be in the interest of the army’s top brass to hold a trial under military law since that would “forestall any judicial intervention” in support of Kha.

 Media are not allowed at military trials, and verdicts are announced in short statements from the military without details of evidence.

Military courts are secretive and their procedures arcane.

The army, by trying one of its own, was demonstrating it is not ready to provide any space to Khan, who won the most seats in a national election earlier this year despite being in jail.Imran Khan’s trial by a military court would signal the army leadership’s resolve to eliminate Khan from the political scene no matter how high the cost.

More on this story: The Politics of the February 8, 2024, General Elections in Pakistan

More on this story: Pakistani ISI strengthens political influence in the country by lobbying for the legislation amendments 

More on this story: Pakistani ISI head replacement might speak for China’s growing foothold amid developments in Afghanistan

Documents obtained as part of a new case against social media influencers Andrew and Tristan Tate, who have been charged with human trafficking, money laundering and organized crime, deepen questions over their opaque webcam finances.

On Aug. 21, Romanian police raided the homes of the brothers and some of their associates and arrested the pair. The recent allegations list 35 victims and accuse Andrew Tate of trafficking a minor for sexual exploitation and having sexual relations with another minor.

The brothers are also accused of seeking to intimidate and corrupt witnesses to stop them from giving evidence to prosecutors or to pressure them to give false evidence. Two other accomplices are also accused of interfering with the investigation. The prosecutors seized 16 cars and a motorcycle from the Tates, according to a press release.

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The day after the raid, a judge placed Tristan Tate on bail and Andrew Tate on house arrest pending further pre-trial hearings. The same judge also warned that the evidence of money laundering was insufficient in the prosecutors’ case, according to local media. A spokesperson for DIICOT, Romania’s law enforcement unit dedicated to investigating organized crime, declined to comment.

The Tate brothers and two of their associates are currently awaiting trial on separate  charges of human trafficking from 2023; in that case, Andrew Tate was also charged with rape.

The brothers and their alleged accomplices have denied wrongdoing in both cases. A spokesperson for the Tates declined to comment for this article.

EVERY ACCUSATION AGAINST ME IS A LIE.

EVERY SINGLE ONE IS FABRICATED.

ENOUGH OF THE CORRUPTION. pic.twitter.com/3nlGxDJHbV

— Andrew Tate (@Cobratate) August 22, 2024

ICIJ and Romanian partner Context previously reported on Tristan Tate’s account with Paxum, a Canadian company that catered to the adult entertainment industry later purchased by Paxum Bank, a small Caribbean financial institution. The firms shared the name Paxum and similar website branding.  The mother of Paxum Bank’s owner, Anton Postolnikov, was also one of the owners of Paxum Inc., according to Romanian media reports.

Using Tristan Tate’s leaked banking records, ICIJ found that an adult webcam platform deposited a total of $2.6 million into Tate’s Paxum account until shortly before he and his brother were charged with human trafficking. Andrew was also charged with raping one of the women he allegedly trafficked.

As part of the most recent investigation, prosecutors obtained transcripts of text messages and phone conversations that shed further light on the pair’s use of their Paxum account in what was allegedly a complex online webcam business running since at least 2015. Due to stringent anonymity rules, ICIJ could not establish if the women mentioned in the prosecutors’ transcripts are also among the 35 victims in the new set of allegations.

According to the transcripts, on Oct. 23, 2019, Andrew Tate texted his brother to ask about a “missing payment. Paxum? The October 15 payment.” Tristan Tate replied: “it could be a large payment. A double payment is coming up.” (ICIJ translated the relevant exchanges from the transcripts from Romanian to English, based on the prosecutors’ own translation of the Tates’ original English conversation. ICIJ’s translation may not exactly match the original conversation, which was not presented in court.)

On the same day — in an exchange found elsewhere in the wiretap transcripts — Tristan told his brother that one of the women who worked for them “asked to see what is in the bank account. It all goes in at the same time through Paxum. 15,000 went in from all three girls,” he added, without specifying the currency.

We’ll open accounts at all the banks. We’ll spread the money.

— Andrew Tate in wiretap transcripts

An ICIJ review of Tristan Tate’s Paxum account statements shows that multiple payments from webcam platform MFCXY were made to the Paxum account in the weeks leading up to the conversation. On Oct. 1, 2019, three payments of $5,180.95, $9,634.20 and $5,407 were deposited, followed by one payment of $7,034.15 on Oct. 21, 2019.

On Nov. 11 the same year, according to one transcript, Andrew asked Tristan: “Has the video cam money arrived? Paxum? Has it arrived at Paxum only a few days ago? How much was the money from video cam?” A payment of $18,785.15 from MFCXY hit Tristan Tate’s account on Nov 4., 2019, the leaked files show.

The wiretap transcripts circulated by the prosecution, coupled with the account activity reviewed by ICIJ, suggest that Tristan Tate may have been using the Paxum account to collect webcam income from multiple women in his employ. The transcripts appear to show the brothers agreeing to keep a portion of the income the women earned in the Tates’ webcam business.

When Tristan complains that one of the women is demanding a 40% share of her earnings from webcam shows, Andrew tells him to “shoot her” or “falsify” the account statements for their crypto holdings, or “give her 30 and tell her it’s 40, blame the currency exchange rate” — implying that the women did not have access to the bank account where their own earnings were sent.

According to other evidence submitted by prosecutors in court and obtained by ICIJ partner Context, the Tate brothers offered online classes to their followers on how to profit from OnlyFans — an online adult entertainment subscription website — including social media marketing strategies and convincing men to subscribe to paid adult content.OnlyFans’s owner also owns MFCXY Inc., the company that initiated the money transfers to Tristan Tate’s Paxum account. The company did not reply to ICIJ’s request to comment in May.

Ahead of the May article, Paxum Bank denied any impropriety and sent a letter through a lawyer warning that publication of confidential bank information could lead to legal action against ICIJ.

On Sept. 4, a spokesperson for Paxum issued a new explanation.

“Notwithstanding what you purportedly believe to be factual, Paxum Bank has never opened or maintained accounts for either of the Tate brothers. Perhaps you and others are confusing the bank with an unrelated entity called Paxum Inc., which was a Canadian company with a different owner and unrelated management and which no longer operates.”

ICIJ has found multiple transfers out of Tate’s accounts which arrived at his other accounts with banks in Europe such as Santander and Raiffeisen and were marked with the address of Paxum Bank in Dominica, while also bearing the “customer name” of “paxumbank ltd” on the wire transfer document. Tate’s account statements are headed with Paxum Bank’s address in Dominica, rather than the Canadian address of the now-defunct Paxum Inc.

Paxum Bank said in a later statement that after it purchased the assets of Paxum Inc. in late 2022, the bank’s IT system auto-generated a change from Paxum Inc. to Paxum Bank in previous electronic records, which meant that transactions that were made by Paxum Inc. would erroneously appear to have been made by Paxum Bank.

The wiretap transcripts also contain discussions between the brothers about opening multiple bank accounts and keeping relatively low balances, seemingly to avoid attention from compliance departments — a tactic sometimes used by those seeking to evade anti-money laundering checks at banks. “We’ll open accounts at all the banks. We’ll spread the money,” Andrew said, according to the transcripts. “We’ll keep the balance low. We can buy another house. We don’t need large balances in bank accounts.”

In one instance, Andrew says he ignored a request from a bank to update his personal details, and the account remained open despite this.

“Following the rules never works,” Andrew told Tristan, according to the transcript.

In the South Caucasus, a clash of interests involving Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan continues, with Russia aligning itself with Ankara and Baku at the expense of Tehran’s goals.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are pushing to secure control of a key strip of land along Armenia’s southern border with Iran—known as the “Zangezur Corridor”—an extraterritorial route connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and Turkiye. This corridor would provide Turkey direct access to the Caspian Sea and bolster its influence in the region, raising security concerns. The northern part of Iran is home to Azeri populations, and Tehran fears potential future destabilization by Azerbaijan. Iran has taken these risks seriously, asserting that it is prepared to intervene militarily to prevent such a scenario. As a countermeasure, Tehran is advocating for its own route, passing through Iranian territory.

Russia, increasingly isolated on the world stage, finds itself in need of Ankara’s support—a NATO member—and appears willing to sacrifice Tehran’s interests in this matter.

The Russian Foreign Ministry, through spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, has expressed support for the Turkic project. In response, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council for Economic Coordination, took to the social media platform X, denouncing the stance of Russian officials regarding the Zangezur passage. Rezaei stated, “The behavior of Russian officials concerning the Zangezur Corridor is utterly unacceptable and clearly contradicts their purported friendly ties and strategic relations with Iran. These ambiguities must be resolved.”

Moscow, meanwhile, has shown little regard for Armenia’s interests, seemingly preparing for the eventual ousting of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his replacement with a more Russia-aligned figure.

More on this story: Russia will compensate for damage from inaction in Karabakh by toppling Pashinyan in Armenia within next three days

From our perspective, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement is not a result of incompetence. Instead, it likely reflects growing frustration within the Kremlin towards Tehran, which is evident in Moscow’s political maneuvers.

More on this story: The Composition of the Russian Delegation at the Iranian President’s Inauguration Highlights Bilateral Issues

More on this story: Russian delegation level at the funeral of Raisi shows Moscow’s lack of trust in Tehran

We believe this behavior stems from Russia’s expectation that Iran, as a member of the UN Security Council, should show greater flexibility and involvement in Russian-led influence operations in the Middle East—such as escalating tensions with Israel. This is not the first instance where Moscow has taken actions that could be seen as a deliberate affront to Iran’s leadership. The Kremlin likely assumes that Tehran, feeling trapped by its limited options, will ultimately overlook these slights.

More on this story: Kremlin’s Efforts to Incite a Larger War in the Middle East Involving Iran and Israel

More on this story: Russia to further encourage Iran-Israel conflict

Russia’s stance on the Zangezur Corridor involves geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus, is influenced by a range of strategic concerns, and Iran’s interests may not align with Moscow’s broader regional objectives.

1. Russia’s Regional Balancing Act: Russia views the South Caucasus as a critical region for its influence, especially in relation to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia traditionally tries to maintain a balance between the two, and backing a transport corridor that connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia (the Zangezur Corridor) may benefit Azerbaijan, Turkey, and others, but not Iran.

2. Alignment with Azerbaijan and Turkiye: Azerbaijan and Turkey have strong economic and geopolitical interests in the Zangezur Corridor. Russia’s relations with Turkiye, especially in balancing NATO’s influence, and its role as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could explain why it might prioritize the corridor despite Iranian concerns. Turkey’s growing influence in the region serves as both a rival and a partner for Russia, especially considering energy routes and military presence.

3. Iran’s Concerns: Iran sees the Zangezur Corridor as a potential threat to its influence, since it bypasses Iranian territory and strengthens Azerbaijan’s strategic standing. Tehran is also concerned about increased Turkish influence in the region, which could undermine its interests.

4. Economic and Strategic Interests: The corridor would facilitate easier transit for energy and trade between Azerbaijan and Turkey, making it a strategically valuable route. Russia, seeing an opportunity for economic gain and to strengthen ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkiye, might be less inclined to prioritize Iran’s interests.

Ultimately, Russia’s decision to seemingly disregard Iran’s concerns may be a calculated geopolitical move to strengthen its own influence in the South Caucasus, maintain ties with Turkiye, and secure its role as a dominant player in regional politics.

With the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) soaring across industries and use cases, preventing AI-driven software supply chain attacks has never been more important.

Recent research by SentinelOne exposed a new ransomware actor, dubbed NullBulge, which targets software supply chains by weaponizing code in open-source repositories like Hugging Face and GitHub. The group, claiming to be a hacktivist organization motivated by an anti-AI cause, specifically targets these resources to poison data sets used in AI model training.

No matter whether you use mainstream AI solutions, integrate them into your existing tech stacks via application programming interfaces (APIs) or even develop your own models from open-source foundation models, the entire AI software supply chain is now squarely in the spotlight of cyberattackers.

Poisoning open-source data sets

Open-source components play a critical role in the AI supply chain. Only the largest enterprises have access to the vast amounts of data needed to train a model from scratch, so they have to rely heavily on open-source data sets like LAION 5B or Common Corpus. The sheer size of these data sets also means it’s extremely difficult to maintain data quality and compliance with copyright and privacy laws. By contrast, many mainstream generative AI models like ChatGPT are black boxes in that they use their own curated data sets. This comes with its own set of security challenges.

Verticalized and proprietary models may refine open-source foundation models with additional training using their own data sets. For example, a company developing a next-generation customer service chatbot might use its previous customer communications records to create a model tailored to their specific needs. Such data has long been a target for cyber criminals, but the meteoric rise of generative AI has made it all the more attractive to nefarious actors.

By targeting these data sets, cyber criminals can poison them with misinformation or malicious code and data. Then, once that compromised information enters the AI model training process, we start to see a ripple effect spanning the entire AI software lifecycle. It can take thousands of hours and a vast amount of computing power to train a large language model (LLM). It’s an enormously costly endeavor, both financially and environmentally. However, if the data sets used in the training have been compromised, chances are the whole process has to start from scratch.

Explore AI cybersecurity solutions

Other attack vectors on the rise

Most AI software supply chain attacks take place through backdoor tampering methods like those mentioned above. However, that’s certainly not the only way, especially as cyberattacks targeting AI systems become increasingly widespread and sophisticated. Another method is the flood attack, where attackers send huge amounts of non-malicious information through an AI system in an attempt to cover up something else — such as a piece of malicious code.

We’re also seeing a rise in attacks against APIs, especially those lacking robust authentication procedures. APIs are essential for integrating AI into the myriad functions businesses now use it for, and while it’s often assumed that API security is on the solution vendor, in reality, it’s very much a shared responsibility.

Recent examples of AI API attacks include the ZenML compromise or the Nvidia AI Platform vulnerability. While both have been addressed by their respective vendors, more will follow as cyber criminals expand and diversify attacks against software supply chains.

Safeguarding your AI projects

None of this should be taken as a warning to stay away from AI. After all, you wouldn’t stop using email because of the risk of phishing scams. What these developments do mean is that AI is now the new frontier in cyber crime, and security must be hard-baked into everything you do when developing, deploying, using and maintaining AI-powered technologies — whether they’re your own or provided by a third-party vendor.

To do that, businesses need complete traceability for all components used in AI development. They also need full explainability and verification for every AI-generated output. You can’t do that without keeping humans in the loop and putting security at the forefront of your strategy. If, however, you view AI solely as a way to save time and cut costs by laying off workers, with little regard for the consequences, then it’s just a matter of time before disaster strikes.

AI-powered security solutions also play a critical role in countering the threats. They’re not a replacement for talented security analysts but a powerful augmentation that helps them do what they do best on a scale that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.

The post How cyber criminals are compromising AI software supply chains appeared first on Security Intelligence.

The Justice Department on Thursday charged Dimitri Simes, pro-Russian pundit and former head of a Washington think tank, along with his wife, Anastasia Simes, with violating US sanctions by accepting millions of dollars from a Russian state television network and laundering the proceeds.

Reached by phone in Moscow, where he has a home, Dimitri Simes, who was an adviser to Trump’s 2016 campaign, declined to comment on the allegations against him. But he denounced the charges against his wife as “lies and half-truths” and argued that the Biden administration is targeting the couple to punish him for expressing pro-Russian views.

“If you think this is a law abiding administration [it] would be shocking, but no, I am not terribly surprised,” Simes said, of the charges against his wife.

“I think that Mr. Garland would have to be ashamed of producing something like that,” Simes added. “It is beneath the dignity of the Department of Justice.”

Simes indicated that he does not plan to return the US to face the charges. He said he believes the Justice Department charged him “to stop me from coming to the US.”

“They want to punish me” for criticizing US support for Ukraine, he claimed.

Simes said he “would most certainly welcome an opportunity to come to a trial in Washington as a witness” to testify against Biden administration officials “who betrayed the US…and are trying to start World War III.”

The indictment against the couple alleges that they received $1 million, a personal car and driver, and a stipend for an apartment in Moscow, in exchange for work they did for Russia’s state-owned Channel One after the US sanctioned the network over Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

“These defendants allegedly violated sanctions that were put in place in response to Russia’s illegal aggression in Ukraine,” Matthew Graves, the US Attorney for Washington DC, said in a statement announcing the indictments. “Such violations harm our national security interests—a fact that Dimitri Simes, with the deep experience he gained in national affairs after fleeing the Soviet Union and becoming a US citizen, should have uniquely appreciated.”

Simes is the former longtime head of the Center for National Interest, which was founded by Richard Nixon in 1994 and advocates for “strategic realism” in US foreign policy. Simes’ efforts in 2016 to arrange contacts between the Trump campaign and Russia drew scrutiny from special counsel Robert Mueller, but Simes was not accused of wrongdoing.

The charges against the Simes couple are part of a Justice Department crackdown on Russian influence efforts. Federal prosecutors yesterday indicted two employees of Russian state-controlled network Russia Today with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act by secretly running a right-leaning media company they used to push pro-Kremlin messaging.

The site featured content from pro-Trump pundits including Benny Johnson and Tim Pool. Both Johnson and Pool said they are victims of the scheme.

Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, said the defendants in the Tenet case “used American-based individuals and entities to exploit, frankly, our free society to try to undermine our election,” including by deploying “unwitting influencers to push Russian propaganda and pro-Russian messaging.” 

DOJ alleges that Anastasia Simes received funds from a Russian businessman named Alexander Udodov, whom the Treasury Department sanctioned last year for his support for the Russian government. Prosecutors allege that Anastasia Simes helped Udodov evade sanctions by “purchasing art and antiques for the benefit of Udodov from galleries and auction houses in the United States and Europe, and having the items shipped to her residence in Huntly, Virginia, where they were stored for onward shipment to Russia.”

Anastasia Simes could not be reached, but Dimitri Simes said his those charges against his wife are false. “She started working with [Udodov] before the sanctions and was never aware of any sanctions” against the oligarch, Simes said.

He also said his wife took no steps, such as contacting a shipping company, “to ship goods to Russia.”

“There was no conspiracy, nothing,” Simes said. “She has a legitimate business. I am proud of my wife. I am very supportive of what she is doing.”

Simes’ attorney David Rivkin declined to comment.

The gender gap in cybersecurity isn’t a new issue. The lack of women in cybersecurity and IT has been making headlines for years — even decades. While progress has been made, there is still significant work to do, especially regarding salary.

The recent  ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study highlighted numerous cybersecurity issues regarding women in the field. In fact, only 17% of the 14,865 respondents to the survey were women.

Pay gap between men and women

One of the most concerning disparities revealed by the study is a persistent pay gap. The study found that U.S. male cybersecurity professionals are paid higher on average than females of the same level. The results show an average salary of $148,035 for men and $141,066 for women. A pay gap also exists globally, with the average global salary for women being $109,609 and for men $115,003.

ISC2 also found a gender pay disparity among people of color in the U.S. The study found that men of color earned an average of $143,610, and women of color earned $135,630. However, the study wasn’t able to compare salaries for people of color on a global basis.

Lack of women in cybersecurity

The study also showed a gap between the number of men and the number of women who work in cybersecurity. Based on the results, ISC2 found that only 20% to 25% of people working in the cybersecurity field are women. Because the percentage of women under 30 years of age in cybersecurity was 26% compared to 16% among women between 39 and 44, the report created optimism that more younger women are choosing cybersecurity as a career.

Interestingly, teams with women on them seemed to have a higher proportion of women than of men, illustrating that women likely seek out teams and companies that have other women working in cybersecurity. Women reported a higher number of women team members (30%) compared to men (22%).

However, 11% of security teams were found to have no women at all, with only 4% saying that it was an equal split between men and women. The industries with the highest number of no-women security teams included IT services (19%), financial services (13%) and government (11%). Mid-sized organizations with 100 to 999 employees were most likely to have security teams with no women.

However, the report also found several areas of concern regarding women’s experiences working in the cybersecurity field:

• 29% of women in cybersecurity reported discrimination at work, with 19% of men reporting discrimination
• 36% of women felt they could not be authentic at work, with 29% of men reporting this sentiment
• 78% of women felt it was essential for their security team to succeed, compared to 68% of men
• 66% of women feel that diversity within the security team contributed to the security team’s success, compared to 51% of men

Using hiring initiatives to increase women on security teams

The gaps in cybersecurity — both pay and gender — won’t be resolved without a focused effort by industry and companies. Many companies are seeing results by adopting specific DEI hiring initiatives, such as skills-based hiring, and using job descriptions that refer to DEI programs/goals.

The ISC2 report found that businesses using skills-based hiring have an average of 25.5% women in their workforces compared with 22.2% for businesses using other methods. By including DEI program goals in job descriptions, companies can also increase the number of women on their security teams, with 26.6% for those using these types of job descriptions vs. 22.3% for women at those that do not.

Lack of perspectives hurts cybersecurity teams

Without women on cybersecurity teams, security teams lack the wide range of experience and perspectives needed to reduce security risks. Organizations can improve their security by focusing on increasing the number of women on their team, which also means eliminating the pay gap.

“Broader than cybersecurity, there’s a body of research that says the more perspectives you bring to the table, the better off you will be at problem-solving,” Clar Rosso, CEO of ISC2, told Dark Reading. “In cybersecurity, which is a very complex, growing threat landscape, the more perspectives that we bring to the table to solve problems, the more likely we will be able to impact our cyber defense.”

The post New report shows ongoing gender pay gap in cybersecurity appeared first on Security Intelligence.

A federal indictment unsealed on Wednesday alleges that a Tennessee-based media company which played home to several prominent right-leaning online commentators was secretly a Russian government-backed influence operation. The company is accused of receiving nearly $10 million from employees of Russia Today (RT), a Russian state-backed media company, as part of “a scheme to create and distribute content to U.S. audiences with hidden Russian government messaging,” according to Attorney General Merrick Garland.

Tenet Media worked with American conservative or heterodox media figures, including Dave Rubin, Benny Johnson, Tim Pool, and Lauren Southern, who variously present themselves as independent journalists, documentarians, and political commentators. Not all of them immediately commented on having been publicly linked to a foreign propaganda site, but Johnson soon tweeted that he and other influencers had been “victims in this alleged scheme.” In his own tweet, Pool echoed that line, writing, in part, “Should these allegations prove true, I as well as the other personalities and commentators were deceived and are victims.” Rubin, too, described himself as a victim, adding, “I knew absolutely nothing about any of this fraudulent activity. Period.”

The indictment, filed in the Southern District of New York, alleges that RT and two specific employees, Kostiantyn “Kostya” Kalashnikov and Elena “Lena” Afanasyeva, worked to funnel money to Tenet Media as part of a series of “covert projects” to shape the opinions of Western audiences. RT has faced cancellations and sanctions in the United States, Europe, Canada, and the UK after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; federal authorities allege those travails led the company to instead create more covert means of influencing public perception.

While Tenet is only referred to in the indictment as “U.S. Company 1,” details made it readily identifiable. The indictment alleges that Tenet’s coverage “contain[ed] commentary on events and issues in the United States, such as immigration, inflation, and other topics…consistent with the Government of Russia’s interest in amplifying U.S. domestic divisions.”  

The indictment also alleges that not everyone affiliated with Tenet was unaware of the scheme, stating that “Founders 1 and 2” of the company knew the source of their funding. The founders of Tenet Media are Lauren Chen and her husband; Chen is a conservative influencer and YouTuber who’s hosted a show on Blaze TV and who’s affiliated with Turning Point USA. Her husband, Liam Donovan, identifies himself on Twitter as the president of Tenet Media. 

The indictment alleges that the RT officials and Founders 1 and 2 “also worked together to deceive two U.S. online commentators (“Commentator-I” and “Commentator-2″), who respectively have over 2.4 million and 1.3 million YouTube subscribers.” Dave Rubin has 2.4 million YouTube subscribers, while Tim Pool has 1.37 million.

The indictment indicates that even some of the people working at Tenet found their content heavy-handed. On February 15 of this year, Afanasyeva, using the name Helena Shudra, shared a video in a company Discord channel of what the indictment calls “a well-known U.S. political commentator visiting a grocery store in Russia.” While he’s not named in the indictment, it clearly matches Tucker Carlson, who toured such a grocery store, declaring himself slackjawed in wonder at how nice it was.

“Later that day,” the indictment adds, “Producer-I privately messaged Founder-2 on Discord: ‘They want me to post this’—referencing the video that Afanasyeva posted—but ‘it just feels like overt shilling.’ Founder-2 replied that Founder-I ‘thinks we should put it out there.’ Producer-I acquiesced, responding, ‘alright I’ll put it out tomorrow.’”

Tenet’s recent content on sites like YouTube, Twitter, and TikTok has been heavily larded with critical commentary about Kamala Harris. Conservative political commentator and documented plagiarist Benny Johnson, for instance, recently starred in a video about her “empty words.”

The allegations against Kalashnikov and Afanasyeva, who are charged with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and conspiracy to commit money laundering, were part of a broader effort against what US authorities allege were Russian influence sites seeking to subvert the elections. Earlier on Wednesday, the Justice Department announced it had seized 32 internet domains used in what they called “Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns.” 

At an Aspen Institute event on Wednesday afternoon, a DOJ official, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, said the Russians charged in the case “used American-based individuals and entities to exploit, frankly, our free society to try to undermine our election,” including by deploying “unwitting influencers to push Russian propaganda and pro-Russian messaging.” 

One of the last things Tenet posted on their social media sites before the indictment was unsealed concerned—ironically enough—a government employee accused of secretly acting as a foreign agent. Tenet posted a video of Linda Sun, a former aide to New York governors Andrew Cuomo and Kathy Hochul who has been charged with using her position to benefit the Chinese government. Tenet seemed to suggest that a few words Sun offered on a video call endorsing diversity, equity, and inclusion measures were part of an alleged foreign-backed messaging plot.

“Why would the Chinese government want to push DEI in America?” a tweet from Tenet read.

Abby Vesoulis contributed reporting.

Update, September 4: This story has been updated to include Johnson, Rubin and Pool’s comments.

New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art expelled an attorney for the Cambodian government from a Tuesday meeting between museum officials and the representatives of Cambodia’s culture ministry, heightening tensions in a yearslong campaign to press the museum to return Khmer treasures to their home country.

The attorney, Brad Gordon, has been one of the most prominent faces of Cambodia’s national effort to trace lost ancient artifacts looted during years of turbulent civil war. Gordon has worked for the Cambodian government in that capacity for a decade. Many of the pieces were trafficked to the United States and other Western nations and sold to ultrawealthy art patrons and some of the world’s largest museums, including the Met.

Officials from Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts visited the Met on Tuesday as part of a U.S. State Department program that provides tours of U.S. institutions for foreigners. While the Cambodian delegations’ itinerary included stops at multiple American museums, their visit to the Met held special significance — and sensitivity — because of Cambodia’s extensive push to reclaim cultural objects from the museum.

In recent years, the museum’s Cambodian pieces have been a focal point of increasing scrutiny on the Met’s collection by journalists and law enforcement. In 2021, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and its partners began asking the Met questions about more than a dozen pieces in its collection that had passed through the hands of accused antiquities trafficker Douglas Latchford or his associates. This followed a long run of attention from online sleuths, including the Chasing Aphrodite blog. Latchford was indicted in 2019 by federal prosecutors in New York and accused of helping orchestrate the large-scale looting of Cambodian cultural heritage decades ago. Latchford died in 2020 before the case against him proceeded.

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In March 2023, ICIJ and media partners found at least 1,109 pieces in the Met’s collection that were previously owned by individuals who had been either indicted or convicted of antiquities crimes. The museum subsequently hired a team of researchers to vet its collection, and in December it announced it would repatriate more than a dozen works to Cambodia. But that didn’t end the saga. The Cambodian government claims that dozens more of its stolen treasures remain in the Met’s collection, and it wants them back.

Gordon said that when he arrived at the Met on Tuesday, he was led to a conference room where the Cambodian delegation would meet with Met officials. Immediately upon arriving, he said, two Met attorneys approached him and asked to speak with him privately outside the conference room. He said he was then asked to gather his belongings. From there, the officials told Gordon he was barred from the meeting before a guard escorted him out of the museum, according to his account.

A Met spokesperson said that Gordon had not been invited to the meeting and was “asked politely to leave.” The spokesperson said that afterward, “The Met continued amicable discussions with their Cambodian colleagues, including a gallery tour and agreement to meet further to expand cooperation.”

Among the planned attendees at the meeting was Lucian Simmons, the Met’s new head of provenance research. Last year the museum hired Simmons to lead a team of researchers to scour and identify potentially problematic pieces in the museum’s collection. Simmons’ hiring was portrayed in the press as a sign of the museum bolstering its approach toward addressing concerns over trafficked art in its sprawling collection.

Gordon said that the exact agenda of yesterday’s meeting was unclear but related to conservation issues. He told ICIJ that he had been specifically asked to join the meeting by H.E. Hab Touch, a senior official in the Cambodian culture ministry, who is leading the delegation.

“As you know, we are in the midst of negotiations for the return of additional stolen artefacts from the Met,” Gordon said in an email to several State Department officials that he shared with ICIJ. He added that because the situation with the Met was delicate, the Cambodian delegation had been “very clear that they wanted me as their counsel to be present” in the meeting.

Gordon said he pleaded with the Met to let him stay in the meeting, with a member of the delegation even calling Cambodia’s minister of culture to affirm the importance of his attendance. Gordon added that the Met officials offered no explanation for his expulsion apart from saying it was a State Department meeting.

“After the MET rejected the Minister’s request for me to attend, I agreed to leave,” Gordon told the State Department. “I have never felt so humiliated in my life.”

The campaign is drawing to a close for Algeria’s presidential election this weekend. The only real unknown is how many voters will turn out. 

Tuesday was the final day of campaigning for the vote on Saturday, 7 September, with a media blackout to be imposed from Wednesday. The outcome is largely predictable – Incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune willsecure his re-election with a majority of votes in the first of the two rounds of voting. We’ve expected, this election has proceeded without any surprises. In this country, elections tend to be meticulously orchestrated and tightly managed. Tebboune has the support of the administration as the incumbent president.He has eased relations with Algeria’s powerful military. He is also expected to benefit from a change in the election schedule, which left his rivals with less time to campaign. Originally scheduled for December, the poll was brought forward because of what the President called the current international situation and the dangers looming over Algeria.

The country typically avoids holding elections in the summer, when intense heat makes campaigning difficult – but this year’s campaign kicked off in mid-August.

While campaign staff would usually head out into streets and markets to talk to voters, in recent weeks they have tried to meet voters in their homes.

The opposition has complained of intimidation, with dozens of people arrested last month over alleged election fraud and three would-be candidates placed under judicial supervision.

The opposition leader, Fethi Ghares, was detained last week. He stands accused of insulting the president and spreading disinformation online.

 the so-called ban on leaving the national territory (ISTN), rarely justified by a court decision, affects hundreds of activists, journalists, businessmen and politicians.

A prominent figure on Algeria’s secular left, Ghares was involved in the 2019 Hirak movement, the series of mass protests that led to the ousting of long-time president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. His party, the Democratic and Social Movement, succeeded the Algerian Communist Party, but was banned in February 2023.

“The situation is disastrous because civic space and freedoms have been reduced over the years since the start of the Hirak and there are strong reasons to believe that the situation could potentially get worse. 

It is very difficult to do politics in Algeria. and to exist as an opponent. Some journalists or even citizens who have published posts on social media can get arrested.

A lot of people still fear repercussions and do not speak to journalists, for instance, because they are afraid for their safety. People ultimately do not make comments on politics in public, or say things that are a little general.

However Algeria’s political system itself is evolving, and is no longer set around this duality between the armed forces and the political power. Civilians are trying to have a role.

With members of the opposition calling for a boycott, however, some voters are refusing to participate. This is an authoritarian regime that does not respect the rules of democracy. Every Algerian knows the outcome of this election in advance. The current regime fully assumes its authoritarian natureAuthoritarian laws justify the repression of political opponents. In 2021, the Algerian authorities amended the penal code to qualify as a terrorist act and sabotage “any act targeting the security of the state, national unity, stability and the normal functioning of institutions”through actions that “work or incite by any means whatsoever to access power or change the system of governance by non-constitutional means and to undermine the integrity of the national territory.

Article 97 of the penal code, for example, prohibits any type of gathering, while the 2012 laws relating to political parties and associations subject the formation of an NGO or a political party to prior government approval.

In 2023, a new milestone in the restriction of freedom of expression was reached with the adoption of a law on information that bans Algerians with dual nationality from owning or being shareholders in a media outlet in Algeria.

Algerian election campaign marked by social pledges and claims of unfair play.

The last presidential election of 2019 was widely boycotted, resulting in low turnout that undermined the legitimacy of Tebboune’s victory.

The president and his supporters are hoping to up participation this time round.

The public appears to be responding positively to Tebboune’s leadership and policy decisions. The crucial question now is whether this level of support will endure, and what the implications of another five years under Tebboune’s leadership will be for Algeria’s future.”

But In its sixty-two-year modern history, Algeria has never witnessed a smooth transfer of power from one president to another.

The country’s first post-independence president was deposed in a military coup after just three years in office. The coup leader, Houari Boumediene, ruled with an iron grip for more than a decade, entrenching a system of military rule with a thin civilian façade that has endured ever since.

His successor, Chadli Bendjedid, elected in 1979, ruled until an oil price slump obliged the state to curtail social spending, provoking a crisis. His solution, a hasty political opening, nearly delivered the country to an extremist Islamist party. To prevent that outcome, the army seized power in 1992, triggering a civil war. The military tapped independence hero Mohamed Boudiaf—but soon regretted its choice when he launched ambitious anti-corruption and reform campaigns that threatened its interests. After just five months in office, Boudiaf was assassinated on live television by his own bodyguard. the army’s hand-picked candidate, former Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, won an election intended to turn the page on Algeria’s “dark decade.” He was reelected three times and, despite being incapacitated by poor health, remained le pouvoir’s default pick in 2019.

Tebboune, a former regional governor, housing minister, and failed prime minister—who holds the distinction of being Algeria’s shortest-serving premier, lasting less than three months in 2017—emerged as the army’s anointed pick in the controversial polls, which protesters boycotted. He was elected amid record-low turnout.

The Military Establishment:

• Role in Elections: The military in Algeria has historically played a significant role in the country’s politics. While they may not publicly endorse a specific candidate, their support is crucial for anyone aspiring to hold the presidency. They are likely to back a candidate who aligns with their interests and can ensure stability. This will be the  incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
• Potential Candidates: If the military perceives a candidate as a stabilizing force or someone who will maintain the status quo, they are more likely to support that person, either overtly or behind the scenes.

More on this story: Military rift hits Algerian chief of staff

2. The National Liberation Front (FLN):

• Support Base: The FLN, the party that led Algeria to independence, has been a dominant political force in the country. However, its influence has waned in recent years due to internal divisions and public dissatisfaction.
• Alliances: The FLN may support a candidate who promises to revitalize the party or someone who represents the traditional power structure in Algeria.

3. Islamist Parties:

• Influence: Islamist parties, such as the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), have a substantial support base, especially among those dissatisfied with the current system. They are likely to support a candidate who promises reforms that align with their religious and political goals.
• Unity or Fragmentation: Islamist parties in Algeria have a history of both uniting and fragmenting, so their support could be split among different candidates, depending on who best represents their interests.

4. Civil Society and Protest Movements:

• Hirak Movement: The Hirak protest movement, which began in 2019, represents a significant force in Algerian politics. It includes a broad coalition of civil society groups, activists, and ordinary citizens demanding systemic change.
• Support for Reformist Candidates: This movement is likely to back candidates who advocate for genuine reforms, transparency, and an end to corruption. However, they may also call for a boycott if they believe the elections are not free and fair.

5. International Actors:

• France and Other Foreign Powers: Algeria’s former colonial power, France, as well as other countries, may have an interest in the outcome of the elections. While they may not openly endorse candidates, their diplomatic actions and relationships could indirectly influence the election by signaling preferences for stability or reform. We assured This is incumbent President Tebboune.
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6. Incumbent or Government-Backed Candidates:

• Government Support: Candidates backed by the current government or those perceived to be close to the existing power structures, including the presidency and the ruling party, are likely to receive support from state institutions and resources.This is incumbent President Abdelmadjid Tebboune.
• Public Reception: However, public perception of these candidates could be mixed, especially if they are seen as representatives of the status quo, which has been a source of frustration for many Algerians.

7. Youth and First-Time Voters:

• Decisive Factor: Algeria has a young population, and youth voters could play a crucial role in the elections. Their support may go to candidates who address issues like unemployment, education, and social justice.
• Support for Change: Given the disenchantment with traditional politics, younger voters might gravitate toward newer, more progressive candidates who promise change.

The support in Algeria’s elections will depend on how various candidates position themselves in relation to the military, political parties, civil society, and the general public’s demands. The military’s role is pivotal, but the influence of protest movements and the public’s appetite for reform will also shape the election’s dynamics.

Eswatini’s King Mswati III’s plans to wed Nomcebo Zuma, the daughter of former South African President Jacob Zuma, as his 16th wife. This will strengthen the ties between the two leaders.

A royal delegation from Eswatini visited Jacob Zuma’s homestead at Nkandla in July in accordance with tradition, marking the start of Mswati’s marriage proposal to Zuma.

This union can be seen as a strategic move, cementing economic and political interests.

President Zuma’s role and capacity to be a major ambassador for Swaziland or the Swazi royal family is a noncontestable issue and has become even far more important in view with the development or the emergence of MK [uMkhonto weSizwe] as a political party with President Zuma as its absolute president.

However,  Zuma’s diminished role in South African politics renders him unable to influence Swazi politics.

But the marriage strengthening bilateral relations between the king of Swaziland and the former president. The former president of South Africa and king are actually business partners and so, we expect that part of their relationship will actually blossom.

Zuma is expected to go on trial on multiple corruption and racketeering charges next April. He has pleaded not guilty.

Meanwhile, Mswati has been criticized for his controversial polygamy and lavish lifestyle.

This high-profile wedding, with its steep dowry of 100 cattle and R2 million (2 million rands(, or USD $113,300 and all the other hidden costs associated with a wedding of this nature, puts a significant strain on Swaziland’s economy. Within royal circles, this union has also been met with internal opposition among the royal wives. … This marriage will cause an uproar.

Whether seen as a strategic union of two powerful families or a personal decision to extend influence and financial gain, the king’s marriage to Nomcebo Zuma will have a lasting impact on the two nations’ ties, for better or worse.

The engagement between King Mswati III of Eswatini and Princess Ntandoyesizwe, carries several potential implications:

1. Strengthening of Political Ties between Eswatini and South Africa:

• Diplomatic Relations: The marriage could symbolize a deepening of ties between Eswatini and South Africa, especially given the familial connection to a former South African leader. This could foster stronger diplomatic relations and closer collaboration between the two nations, which already share cultural and historical ties.
• Political Influence: By aligning with a family that has held significant political power in South Africa, King Mswati might gain a more influential position or a channel to influence political matters in the region.

2. Impact on Domestic Politics in Eswatini:

• Public Perception: Eswatini has experienced political unrest, with calls for democratic reforms and more participation from the public in governance. King Mswati’s engagement to someone from a high-profile political family might be seen as a move to bolster his position, but it could also attract criticism if seen as prioritizing alliances over addressing domestic issues.
• Symbolic Unity: For supporters of the monarchy, this engagement might be seen as a strengthening of traditional and royal values, reinforcing the king’s stature as a leader who can unite influential families.

3. Economic Implications:

• Business and Economic Ventures: The Zuma family has various business interests, and this alliance could pave the way for economic collaborations or investments between businesses in South Africa and Eswatini. It could potentially attract South African investors who are aligned with or influenced by the Zuma family.
• Tourism and Cultural Exchange: The engagement could lead to an increase in tourism and cultural exchanges between the two countries, capitalizing on the royal connection and shared cultural heritage.

4. Regional Power Dynamics:

• Influence in Southern Africa: The marriage may influence regional power dynamics, especially within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Zuma family’s involvement in South African politics, coupled with King Mswati’s status as Africa’s last absolute monarch, could create a bloc of influence, affecting negotiations and alliances within the SADC region.
• Potential for Mediation Roles: Given their statuses, both families might be seen as potential mediators or power brokers in regional conflicts or disputes, which could impact political negotiations in southern Africa.

5. Public Opinion and Reactions:

• Criticism and Support: The engagement has already sparked diverse reactions on social media, with some viewing it as a union of power and wealth, while others criticize it as part of ongoing political maneuvering. The public’s reaction will play a crucial role in shaping the narrative around this engagement.
• Gender and Social Justice Issues: In both Eswatini and South Africa, issues related to gender equality and social justice are prominent. The engagement could bring these topics to the forefront, especially considering King Mswati’s history of multiple marriages and the ongoing debates about traditional versus modern values.

6. Potential Impact on Jacob Zuma’s Legacy:

• Public Perception: The engagement could affect how Jacob Zuma is perceived, especially if it is seen as extending his influence beyond his political career. It may also be viewed as a way for him to maintain relevance in South African and regional politics.
• Legal and Corruption Cases: Zuma faces ongoing legal battles in South Africa over corruption charges. The royal connection could be seen as a strategic move to gain favor or leverage, although it is unlikely to directly impact legal proceedings.

7. Cultural and Traditional Significance:

• Traditional Alliances: Marriages have historically been used to cement alliances and strengthen ties between powerful families. This engagement could be seen as a continuation of that tradition, reinforcing the cultural practices of both the Zulu and Swazi peoples.
• Royal Protocols and Customs: The engagement may highlight and reinforce traditional customs and protocols within the royal families, setting an example for other traditional leaders in the region.

In conclusion, while the engagement is primarily a personal and familial matter, it has broader political, economic, and social implications for Eswatini, South Africa, and the southern African region. The actual impact will depend on how these relationships and alliances are managed and perceived by the public and political leaders.

More on this story: Monarchy in Eswatini about to fall, China-orchestrated

More on this story: Battle for the throne of Zulu King is likely to continue amid Misulu’s coronation

More on this story: Eswatini’s repression is intensifying ahead of the upcoming elections