Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley listens as she is introduced during a campaign stop in Hooksett, New Hampshire, U.S., November 20, 2023. REUTERS/Brian Snyder
The conservative U.S. political network led by billionaire Charles Koch on Tuesday endorsed Nikki Haley for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, giving the former South Carolina governor a boost among party rivals struggling to make a dent against frontrunner Donald Trump.
The influential group, which pushes for tax cuts and less government regulation, has made clear that beating former president Trump in the primaries is a top priority, as they think he would lose the November 2024 election to President Joe Biden. Biden beat incumbent Trump in the 2020 White House race.
“We would support a candidate capable of turning the page on Washington’s toxic culture – and a candidate who can win. And last night, we concluded that analysis,” the Koch group, Americans for Prosperity Action, said in a statement.
“That candidate is Nikki Haley.”
The group said its internal polling confirms anecdotal reports from activists on the ground on what they are hearing from voters in states with early presidential nominating contests.
They show Haley, the former ambassador to the United Nations, is in the best position to defeat Trump in the Republican primary, it said. Internal polling also “consistently shows” that Haley is the strongest candidate by far to beat Biden in a general election, it said.
Public opinion polls show Haley battling with Florida Governor Ron DeSantis for a distant second place behind Trump.
The super-PAC has raised over $70 million to spend on political races, an official with the group said in July.
“In sharp contrast to recent elections that were dominated by the negative baggage of Donald Trump and in which good candidates lost races that should have been won, Nikki Haley, at the top of the ticket, would boost candidates up and down the ballot, winning the key independent and moderate voters that Trump has no chance to win,” it said.
The group promised Haley “the full weight and scope of AFP Action’s unmatched grassroots army and resources” in her bid to become the next U.S. president.
Rescuers on Tuesday (November 28) were seen making preparations to evacuate workers trapped for 17 days inside a collapsed tunnel in the Indian Himalayas. Footage filmed by Reuters partner ANI showed some ambulances reversing into the entrance of the tunnel, as rescuers brought in equipment, while more ambulances and emergency vehicles waited outside.
Indian rescuers on Tuesday pulled out the first of 41 construction workers trapped inside a collapsed tunnel in the Himalayas for 17 days, hours after drilling through the debris of rock, concrete and earth to reach them, officials said.
The evacuation of the men to safety began more than six hours after rescuers broke through to end an ordeal that began early on Nov. 12 when the tunnel caved in.
“The first one is out,” a rescue official told reporters outside the 4.5 km (3 mile) tunnel in the northern state of Uttarakhand.
Ambulances with their lights flashing lined up at the mouth of the tunnel to transport the workers to a hospital about 30 km away.
The men have been getting food, water, light, oxygen and medicines through a pipe but efforts to dig a tunnel to rescue them with high-powered drilling machines were frustrated by a series of snags.
The tunnel is part of the $1.5 billion Char Dham highway, one of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s most ambitious projects, aimed at connecting four Hindu pilgrimage sites through an 890- km network of roads.
Authorities have not said what caused the cave-in but the region is prone to landslides, earthquakes and floods.
Related Galleries:
One of the trapped workers is checked out after he was rescued from the collapsed tunnel site in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. Uttarkashi District Information Officer/Handout via REUTERS
Rescue operations continue at the site where workers are trapped after a tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi, in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Ambulances move inside a tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Ambulances wait to enter a tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Rescue operations at a tunnel, where workers are trapped after the tunnel collapsed, continue through the evening, in Uttarkashi, in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Members of the team from the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) prepare to enter a tunnel to rescue trapped workers, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
People wait outside a tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
An ambulance goes inside a tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
A member of the rescue team works as rescue operations continue at a tunnel where workers are trapped, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Women watch the rescue operations at a tunnel, where workers are trapped after the tunnel collapsed, from a hillside in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Arnold Dix, President of the International Tunnelling and Underground Space Association, and Australian independent disaster investigator, receives blessings from a priest as they pray for the safe rescue of the trapped workers, outside the collapsed tunnel where rescue operations are underway, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Uttrakhand Chief Minister Pushkar Singh Dhami leaves after visiting the tunnel where workers are trapped after a tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
A concrete block is carried into the tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after a tunnel collapsed in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Policemen walk past a bulldozer as it lays down mud to flatten a road outside the tunnel where operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after a tunnel collapsed in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
A concrete block is carried into the tunnel where rescue operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after a tunnel collapsed in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Local residents pray at the site where rescue operations are underway at a tunnel, where workers are trapped after a tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Members of the State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) are briefed outside a temporary makeshift camp as rescue operations are in progress at a tunnel where workers are trapped, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Policemen walk past a bulldozer as it lays down mud to flatten a road outside the tunnel where operations are underway to rescue trapped workers, after a tunnel collapsed in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Rescue operations are in progress at a tunnel where workers are trapped, after the tunnel collapsed, in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 28, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas
Rescuers fix parts of an auger machine inside a tunnel, where workers are trapped after a portion of the tunnel collapsed in Uttarkashi in the northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 26, 2023. Uttarkashi District Information Officer/Handout via REUTERS/File photo
Rescue operations continue as evening approaches, where workers got trapped in a tunnel construction collapse in Uttarkashi, northern state of Uttarakhand, India, November 27, 2023. REUTERS/Francis Mascarenhas/File photo
Before 24 February 2022, it was a common view amongst Russia experts in the West that Putin’s autocratic regime was some kind of curiously ‘postmodernist’ phenomenon, exercising state power less through direct coercion and more through propaganda and deployment of behind-the-scenes political technology. But by now, this narrative’s credibility has been dented. Russian elites have taken to using rhetoric of open genocidal incitement, and Russia’s criminal war of aggression against Ukraine has revealed its essential brutality in a way that harks back to the worst excesses of the USSR. There is not much space left for postmodernism after all.
Estonia … should not be surprised at the recent mass bomb threats against its schools and kindergartens, and the sabotage of its underwater infrastructure.
The ‘hybridity’ of Russian military doctrine, another much talked-about topic, also rings largely hollow today. The idea that Russia would rather use non-kinetic capabilities – from cyber-attacks to weaponisation of migrants – and prefers low-intensity grey zone conflicts to all-out war, might be true, but it is not the whole truth. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has by now lasted for more than 600 days, is for the most part a conventional land war with attrition battles: precisely what various theorists of “future war” had already consigned to the dustbin of history.
However, this does not mean that the propaganda theatre in Russian politics no longer merits scholars’ attention, or that the Russia’s hybrid war has gone away. The full-scale war against Ukraine was difficult for many to foresee and is taking up much of the bandwidth of both the Russian leadership and international observers. Yet Russia also continues its sub-Article 5 aggression against its other neighbouring countries, and the West in general. In fact, it is now even more dangerous than before, because Ukraine’s prospects for success are directly linked to the support it receives from its partners, and this is something that Russia hopes to undermine with its hybrid measures.
Estonia, which has experienced some level of Russian aggression near-constantly since the early 1990s and is now one of the staunchest supporters of Ukraine, should not be surprised at the recent mass bomb threats against its schools and kindergartens, and the sabotage of its underwater infrastructure. But what we are seeing now serves as a yet another reminder that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own freedom, but also that of ours, and that of other countries bordering Russia. Supporting Ukraine is not just a moral necessity, it is also essential for regional security as a whole.
As far as other countermeasures are concerned, they must not only be carefully considered; they must also be bold. The purpose of Russia’s probing is to find out how far it is possible to go, and what the likely reaction is going to be. If the reaction remains lukewarm, then escalation will follow: for example, a drone or missile that “accidentally” falls on Estonian territory. The Russian side will naturally deny having any knowledge about where it came from, but Estonia is once again presented with a fait accompli to which it must somehow respond. If the reaction is lukewarm again, the next experiment will soon be ready in the pipeline. In fact, this is currently the only possible way to communicate with Russia: in a caveman-like fashion through reciprocal demonstrations of force and resolve.
It is up to the Estonian state to make sure that, together with our allies, we will have the last word in this exchange.
The Swedish government has decided to commission the Swedish Armed Forces to investigate the conditions for sending Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine.
The government is particularly interested in learning how a handover would affect Sweden’s own defense capabilities, and how quickly Sweden could get new Gripen jets as compensation.
Another important issue is the training of Ukrainian pilots and other ground personnel. The Swedish Armed Forces would need to provide this training, which would take time and resources.
The Swedish government is considering sending Gripen fighter jets to Ukraine, according to a report by Ekot, the Swedish public radio news program. The decision is likely to be made as early as Thursday, after a meeting of the defense committee.
Ukraine has requested a division of Gripen jets, or 16-18 aircraft. The Swedish Armed Forces will now be tasked with analyzing how this would affect Sweden’s own defense capabilities. There are currently around 90 usable Gripen jets in the Swedish inventory.
The government is also interested in learning how quickly a new Gripen jet could be ready to replace any aircraft that is sent to Ukraine. There are a number of finished hulls at Saab in Linköping, some of which are reportedly empty and others with equipment in them. The government wants to know how quickly these could be made ready for use and how much it would cost.
Another issue is the training of Ukrainian pilots, mechanics, and other ground personnel. The Swedish Armed Forces would need to provide this training, which would take time and resources.
Finally, Sweden would need to obtain permission from the United States, as a large part of the equipment in the Gripen comes from the US.
The Swedish Armed Forces is expected to submit its report on the feasibility of sending Gripen jets to Ukraine at the beginning of November. The government will then make a decision on whether to send the jets, and if so, how many.
It is important to note that there are a number of political factors that could affect the decision. For example, Turkey has blocked Sweden’s accession to NATO, and it is unlikely that Sweden would send Gripen jets to Ukraine without Turkey’s approval.
Overall, the decision of whether or not to send Gripen jets to Ukraine is a complex one with a number of factors to consider. The Swedish government will need to weigh the potential benefits of sending the jets against the potential risks and costs.
After giving a keynote speech at the “Necropolis of Communist Terror” international conference, held jointly by the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory and Memorial in Tallinn, British journalist and security expert Edward Lucas sat down for an interview with Jesse Seeberg-Gordon from the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory. The conference took place from February 8-11 and was hosted at the Estonian Film Museum.
In your presentation, you stated that the idea that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it” is false. However, you also stressed that history plays a very important role in the present-day security crisis facing Europe. How do you reconcile these two ideas?
Well, history is almost infinite when you think about it. The idea that if you don’t have a total grasp of all human history you will be in a perpetual loop repeating it just makes no sense at all. And we have historical events that have quite reasonably passed into distant memory. I mentioned the Hundred Years War and the Wars of the Roses in Britain and so on.
So, I think it’s very important that you should think hard about history, and you should know your own country’s history. And not just the nice bits, but the difficult bits as well, that’s very important. And we should also be aware that, particularly right now, Putin is using history as a weapon. This is a history-fueled war.
And so, we have a particular need to really get to grips with this. But I’m cautious about the idea of plucking a historical analogy that suits your case and then trying to use it as a sort of cudgel to make people agree with you, because I think that although analogies can be thought-provoking and often worth floating, they are very rarely conclusive.
I think Putin would score a very low grade in history.
Why do you believe the general public should care about remembering the crimes of communism? Why is it important?
Well, I think Europe has been shaped by the totalitarian episodes of the last century. And if you’re going to understand where we have to live, with our fellow Europeans… we come from very different traditions, and it’s important to understand why, for Greece, history looks one way. For Estonia, it looks another. For Finland, it’s slightly different. And as responsible, fellow citizens of Europe, that’s important. But I think we particularly need to look at it because the communist side of history has not been properly worked through, particularly in Russia. And so, Putin is not only skating over the crimes of communism, he is sort of weaponizing the imperialist side of Soviet, and before that Russian history, as a justification for his war in Ukraine.
I think if Western leaders had understood history better, if Western public opinion had understood history better, we would have been alerted a lot earlier to the danger that the Putinist regime and before that actually the Yeltsin Kremlin was posing to us.
The prime example here in Estonia is that Russia did not feel it was necessary to apologize for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or to make any reparation for the damage done. And as Lennart Meri pointed out in 1994, this is an extremely ominous sign. And if you’re not willing to confront that directly, this recent and very painful episode, that suggests that trouble lies ahead.
In your speech and just now, you’ve commented on the role of Russian imperialism as a fundamental cause for Russia’s belligerence over the last 30 years and, of course, as an impetus for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. Why do you believe that Russia struggles so terribly with coming to terms with its imperial past?
Well, I think that in 1991 we thought three things had happened and actually only two of them had happened. One was the collapse of the CPSU’s (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) political power. Another was the collapse of the planned economy. And the third, which we thought had happened, was the collapse of empire, and actually it hadn’t. It had taken a huge knock, but Russia emerged in 1991 not as a true federation, but basically as an imperial power, as we saw very quickly with the first war in Chechnya.
And I think that Russians compensated for the humiliation and chaos of their diminished status in the world and the uncertainty of knowing that everything they’d been told about economics and politics and history was false by cherishing the great power status, which was inextricably linked to the imperialist nature of the Russian state. And this had very profound consequences.
So, when you’ve lost everything else, the one thing you cling on to is empire. And as a Brit, I would say that that’s not totally dissimilar from the way that Britain sort of fetishizes the best bits of its past. And we can no longer say, that the British Empire covers a quarter of the world, but we can go on and on about 1940 and about the struggle against Hitler.
And I think Norman Davies has written very well about the difficulty of making the Second World War out to be the “good war.” It’s true that one lot of bad guys lost, and that was to be thoroughly welcomed and millions of people are alive today as a result. But the terrible mistakes that Britain made in appeasement, I would argue also that the American administrations made in the thirties of thinking this “was not our concern,” the treatment of our Polish allies, the failure to live up to the Atlantic Charter, the concessions we made to the Soviet Union at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, the failure to realize what we were dealing with, a great, great many very unpleasant features of it, some of which were probably unavoidable.
I suspect, by the time of Yalta, there wasn’t much alternative to the deal, and so we did it. But we should still not coat all this in saccharine, rose-tinted glorification. As I said in my speech, probably the two most significant cultural artifacts in understanding the Second World War are the films Casablanca and The Sound of Music. That’s where people got their history, and although they’re not entirely wrong, they’re certainly not entirely right either.
…the communist side of history has not been properly worked through, particularly in Russia. And so, Putin is not only skating over the crimes of communism, he is sort of weaponizing the imperialist side of Soviet, and before that Russian history, as a justification for his war in Ukraine.
And to return to the second half of the question, what do you think that countries like the Baltic states, Poland, or indeed the other countries of the post-Soviet space can do to help facilitate this process of rethinking the traditional narrative of World War Two, as told by the West?
Well, I think it has to start off with unflinching, professional historical inquiry, and I think that we shouldn’t respond to Putin’s weaponization of history just by trying to weaponize it ourselves. He says the Russians are the good guys and you’re the Nazis. And we shouldn’t say, well, we are actually the good guys and you’re behaving like Nazis. That won’t get anywhere.
I think, certainly as a Brit, I find that I am able to make much more progress in my arguments if I start off by acknowledging everything from the repatriation of the Cossacks back to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, as mistakes that Britain made. I think once you do that, you’ll then be in a much better position to fight these sorts of political and narrative battles.
So, I think that’s important. And there are some unpleasant and sometimes very surprising things we’ve seen in Lithuania. The debate about Jonas Noreika, who was seen as a great hero of the Lithuanian, anti-Soviet partisan movement, and there is now quite strong evidence that he may have also been a war criminal and involved in the Holocaust.
I think you just have to take this head on. You have to say, well, let’s just look at the facts and you can make separate arguments about context and so on, but in the end you don’t actually win in the long run by trying to avoid the dirty bits. So, I think that’s unflinching historical honesty and accuracy. But then also, having done that, really highlighting the extremely dangerous echoes in Putin’s weaponization of both history and geography and really something that’s quite close to Hitler’s [adoption of the German] Blut und Boden (“blood and soil”) approach.
There are very troubling echoes of all the worst things in 19th and 20th century history in what Putin is doing. And we should be quite unabashed in highlighting them, while at the same time not saying that it’s a precise analogy.
Perhaps the problem with that in some sense is that Putin presents himself as this champion of historical accuracy. He makes a big public show of bringing carefully selected documents out of the archives and saying “Let’s look at the facts,” while deliberately ignoring the bigger historical picture.
I think Putin would score a very low grade in history. I applaud politicians, who try and educate themselves about history. But there are some very important facts to be made. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, although it was reprehensible, didn’t contain secret protocols under which we handed the countries of the Baltic Sea over to either the Soviet Union or to Germany. So, I commend Putin for his enthusiasm, but I don’t commend him for his accuracy.
An amateur historian at best. In your paper today, you used an interesting analogy, focusing on a hypothetically victorious Third Reich which, after winning World War Two, followed the same trajectory as the post-war Soviet Union. Many people protest the use of such analogies between Stalinism and Nazism because of the perceived uniqueness of the Holocaust. How do you think those countries, which experienced the horrors of Stalinism can tread this fine line in a world that overwhelmingly identifies with the crimes of Hitler, while paying significantly less attention to those of Stalin?
Well, I think that it’s absolutely true that historical events are unique, and it’s a great mistake to try and create categories. We should look at the Great Leap Forward and the Culture Revolution as atrocities. We should look at Japanese rule in East Asia as an atrocity. We should look at the Holocaust as an atrocity. We should look at the Gulag and the Holodomor as atrocities.
All these deserve to be treated independently of each other, first and foremost because they were real people, real things, and they happened. And I don’t like the idea of trying to put things into boxes. I think having established the facts and the uniqueness of each historical event, it is useful sometimes to draw parallels and to say that, for example, in the Holocaust there was a kind of industrial scale to the murder, which was unlike the way the Soviet Union did its killings.
Those people, who died in the Holocaust, were actually killed in places that they knew and often by people that they knew. Those people, who died at Soviet hands, were killed and died in faraway places at the hands of people they didn’t know. I think that that’s not relativizing one or the other, but I think it’s worth it if we can inform ourselves by making these parallels. I think it’s a useful thought experiment sometimes to do analogies… I had another analogy. Imagine if America had lost the Cold War and the victorious Soviet Union had behaved towards America the way that the Americans and their allies behaved towards Russia.
I actually think we did pretty much the right thing in the nineties. But it is worth making uncomfortable, difficult analogies in order to find out why they’re wrong. And sometimes the best bit of an analogy is to say “And this is why it doesn’t work,” even though superficially it may seem that it does.
Interview conducted and edited by Jesse Seeberg-Gordon, and was originally published by The Estonian Institute of Historical Memory.
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the war has unified Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian societies while Russian speakers in these countries remain divided.
During the early months of the war, a survey conducted in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania found that the Baltics generally perceived Russia as a threat as evidenced by 83.4% of ethnic Estonians, 72.1% of ethnic Latvians, and 66.3% of ethnic Lithuanians responding that the threat posed by Russia was somewhat high. In the same survey Russian speakers did not perceive the threat the same way though with only 32.1% of Estonian Russian speakers and 18.2% of Latvian Russian speakers agreeing that Russia poses a threat. [1]
Fast forward to the summer of 2022. Another survey conducted in June in Latvia found that, 40% of Russian speaking residents in Latvia condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although this survey did not ask the same question as the first survey in March, this suggests the number of Russian speakers that disapprove of the war has increased. This number is, however, still surprisingly low given that local governments in all three Baltic nations have made attempts to limit access to Russian propaganda about the war and to try and persuade consumers with facts. This could mean that the limits and bans on Russian TV channels and print media sources in The Baltic States have been unsuccessful and that Vladimir Putin’s narratives and propaganda about the war in Ukraine are still getting through to them. There are plenty of tragic images of cities that have been destroyed and reports of Russia targeting civilian infrastructure. These acts are obviously outright illegal under international law. Nevertheless, this suggests some Russian speakers may still be receiving Kremlin propaganda narratives and are not receiving the facts or truth despite Baltic government efforts to limit and ban this kind of disinformation.
In the three Baltic nations, which were all illegally annexed, occupied, and colonized by the Soviet Union, many Russian speakers remained after the countries regained their independence in 1991. As a result, the Baltics today have significant Russian speaking minorities. Russian speaking minorities make up roughly 25% of Estonia’s population, 25% of Latvia’s population, and 5% of Lithuania’s population. Their presence has caused instances of internal tension ever since due to Baltic sensitivities based on their long, bloody and repressive historic experience under Russian and Soviet Russian rule.
Since regaining their independence though, the number on non-citizens in all three countries has diminished. Many older non-citizens have died over the past three decades, but the number of naturalized citizens has also increased. In Latvia today, only 26% of Russian speakers are non-citizens and in Estonia, they make up only 5.2% of the population. This means there are overall fewer non-citizen Russian speakers in the Baltic states.
Not surprisingly, most respondents who condemned Russia’s invasion in both surveys were younger Russian speakers (18 to 34 years old). Older Russian men supported the war. However, younger Russian speakers have grown up in a society free of Cold War communism and are less affected by Moscow’s persistent efforts of modern mind control. They are mostly EU citizens and have blended their cultures. It therefore makes sense that they would condemn Russia’s war.
Given that relations are generally strained right now between Russian speakers and ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, the Baltic governments have occasionally been the targets of criticism from the Kremlin for their policies. One example of this is when Latvia began considering adopting a law that would limit bilingualism – meaning the use of Russian would be restricted in workplaces and public places. Another example, is an Estonian political party that is considering introducing increased fines for “those who fail to meet language proficiency criteria.” In all three countries, the parliaments have declared Russia a terrorist regime and Russian TV channels are largely banned and regular Russian tourists are unable to get visas to enter any of the Baltic nations. Most recently, in December 2022, Latvia cancelled the license of exiled Russian TV station TV Rain or Dozhd after it was deemed by the government to be a threat to Latvian national security. The station had been broadcasting from Latvia after being forced to shut its Moscow studio following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All of these measures have added to tensions. While the governments of each country were sending clear messages to the Russian Federation that those who support Russia’s war in Ukraine are not welcome in the Baltic states, Russian speakers are feeling the repercussions of the Kremlin’s war, even if many of them do not support the war.
Even so, the number of Russian speakers in Latvia, for instance, that support the war dropped from 20% in the early days to 12% during the summer of 2022. Although there have not been any more recent surveys conducted in any of the Baltics since the summer, Russia’s actions and tactics continued in their ruthlessness and brutality, it is possible that this trend will continue with time and more Russian speakers will probably continue to disapprove of the war as they learn about the crimes being committed by the Russian Army. There are, however, still plenty of Russian speakers in all three countries who have remained silent throughout the war, neither supporting nor condemning the war publicly. Only time will tell if they too are persuaded to join the majority of the Baltic populations in condemning the war.
Putin’s illegal actions in Ukraine have been eye opening and should be condemned, but the question remains in the Baltic states, how can those governments shed light on the harsh realities of the war and improve relationships with their Russian speaking populations?
[1] There is a much smaller population of Russian speakers in Lithuania, so they were not polled there.
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CAiro, 30 July. /Corr. ITAR-TASS Dmitry Tarasov/. Three terrorists were blown up on July 30 by their own explosives in the suburbs of Cairo. This was reported by representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Egypt.
According to them, the incident occurred in one of the villages in the province of Giza. Two pipe bombs are known to have detonated while the extremists were transporting them in a car. The car was completely destroyed by a double explosion.
The security forces do not rule out that the explosive devices were intended to carry out terrorist attacks in Cairo. Investigators are currently trying to identify the militants.
For the entire period of the pandemic in Russia has identified 10,865,512 cases of the disease. 9,902,935 patients recovered from the virus, 322,678 died.
In Moscow, 8342 cases of coronavirus were detected during the day — the indicator exceeded the level of 8000 for the first time since June 18. 821 patients were hospitalized with COVID-19 per day. There are 507 people on the ventilator.
A high daily increase in morbidity was also registered in St. Petersburg — 4078 cases, Moscow region – 2754, Krasnodar Territory – 715, Sverdlovsk region – 597, Rostov region – 554 cases.
According to the operstab on January 14, the level of collective immunity to coronavirus in Russia is 63.7% with a goal of 80%. About 80.2 million Russians were vaccinated with the first component of the vaccine, 76.5 million people were fully vaccinated.
The island of #Cyprus, located in the Mediterranean Sea, is a real treasury of ancient cultural monuments.
Here you can find a lot of different sights: prehistoric catacombs, ruins of Roman palaces, the rich heritage of Ancient Greece… pic.twitter.com/CPdf3Jb8B1
— Anton Shkaplerov (@Anton_Astrey) January 17, 2022
Cyprus from space really looks a bit like a flounder, as pilots like to repeat.
Russian cosmonaut Anton Shkaplerov shared a photo of the island taken from the International Space Station.
“The island of Cyprus, located in The Mediterranean Sea is a real treasure trove of ancient cultural monuments. What is not here – and antediluvian catacombs, and the ruins of Roman palaces, and the richest heritage of ancient Greece …” he wrote.
Cyprus is the third largest and third most populous island in the world. The Mediterranean Sea. Located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, geographically belongs to Asia. Most of the island is occupied by mountains.
Super discounts of up to -70% on electronics, fashionable clothes, shoes and many other prices
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