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On February 24, Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Scowcroft Center, was interviewed on BBC World Service on the Trump administration’s approach to ending the war in Ukraine. He notes that President Trump’s actions are consistent with his presidential campaign rhetoric, as well as his actions during his first term. He asks whether a mineral deal between Washington and Kyiv could be a stronger security guarantee for Ukraine than NATO membership.   

[L]et’s judge the Trump administration less on the rhetoric and the symbolism and let’s see if they can’t get a peace in Ukraine [and] if they can’t get European allies to spend more [on defense].

Matthew Kroenig

The post Kroenig interviewed on BBC World Service on President Trump’s rhetoric and actions on Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Today marks the third anniversary of the unprecedented package of Group of Seven (G7) sanctions deployed against Russia following the launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. To the surprise of many, the anniversary coincides with musings by the new Trump administration on “normalizing” relations with Moscow. This normalization would come with “future cooperation . . . on historic economic and investment opportunities,” which would supposedly require the lifting of sanctions.

It’s true that the power of sanctions was oversold by some Western commentators and officials at the beginning of the war, particularly when it was hoped that they might force Moscow to change course.

In reality, once it became clear that the shock of bold measures like the immobilization of Russia’s reserves weren’t going to cause a domestic financial crisis, the aim of the sanctions shifted. Since then, the sanctions have been part of a long-term effort to erode Russia’s ability to sustain its war economy by depriving it of income through import bans and the oil price cap—which has had mediocre results since it was implemented in in December 2022—and depriving it of technology and resources through export controls.

While Moscow has found ways to mitigate the impact of these measures, growing deficits, unsustainable subsidies, and the rising cost of debt servicing show that economic pressure is still working. Removing restrictions without significant concessions risks emboldening not only Russia but also other states contemplating economic and military aggression.

The argument now for strategic patience—for keeping sanctions on Russia in place—is not just a convenient excuse for the lack of immediate results. It reflects a deeper reality about how economic pressure works over time.

Russia’s economy has grown each year since its full-scale invasion. But since 2023, this has mainly been because of increased government spending, which is changing the structure of Russia’s economy and making entire sectors more reliant on the war. Once French auto producer Renault left Russia in the aftermath of the full-scale invasion, the plants of firms it partnered with in the country were requisitioned.

Moscow has had several levers at its disposal to manage the fiscal effects of an economy increasingly propped up by the government. Special quarterly and annual taxes on oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas income have allowed the Kremlin to capture additional revenue as prices have fluctuated (mainly upwards). War spending has shrunk the share of oil and gas in Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the share of oil-and-gas taxation in the overall tax take. The latter has moved from 35.8 percent before the war to 41.6 percent in the bumper year of 2022, when prices spiked in response to the war, to a predicted 27 percent in 2025. The government still makes regular deposits into Russia’s National Wealth Fund, but these no longer follow a predictable rule with a cutoff oil price above which the income delta is saved. The fund has little visibility into its own future and can merely try to slow the pace of the exhaustion of its holdings.

Growing deficits still represent a risk. Russia is cut off from international lending and can therefore only reach into its rainy-day fund or issue more domestic bonds. As the chart below shows, the government’s withdrawals from the National Wealth Fund do not cover annual deficits entirely. But every year since the full-scale invasion started, Moscow has been forced to withdraw more than the budget law it tends to publish just a few weeks earlier suggests it will. The bills for many Russian public agencies and subsidies accumulate in December, just as economic activity slows down for the holiday season.

In dollar terms, the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund, which was estimated to be worth $112.7 billion out of a total $200 billion before the war, is running out. For most of 2023 and 2024, the weak ruble slowed the fund’s decline because non-ruble assets could be converted more favorably. But the ruble’s recent appreciation on the back of market sentiment around a “deal” means the withdrawals will hit the fund’s dollar value faster. If the 2024 rate of withdrawal from the fund’s current dollar value is used, and if one assumes few liquid assets have been sold so far, then the government can only rely on its liquid savings for another one to two years. 

It’s important to note that Russia’s nonliquid assets aren’t all immobilized and can still be sold. This might include its shares in state banks or the national airline, Aeroflot, which needed an emergency capital injection from the fund in 2022. And while they aren’t meant to be used for government spending, the reserves that the Central Bank of Russia still has access to could also be used to plug future deficits. This would be interpreted as a very negative signal for price stability, however, and could result in already high inflation expectations climbing further.

What stands out in early 2025 is that, after a predictably costly December, the Russian government’s spending in January was also markedly above trend, at half a trillion rubles ($5.77 billion) for that month alone. This is the sort of result sanctions policymakers are happy to present, but it is important to look beyond one bad month. In spring 2023, for example, Russia’s year-to-date deficit was already 17 percent above the deficit planned for the whole year. But the government still managed to pull in more oil and gas income later and finish the year with a more manageable deficit, which measured below 2 percent of GDP.

In January, historian Craig Kennedy’s much-publicized research showed that Moscow was also relying heavily on concessionary loans to the military-industrial complex. This allows more funds to be channeled to the war effort without appearing as defense or “classified” items in the state budget—which both increased greatly in 2022. The explosion of credit in the Russian economy, despite a high interest rate environment, is indeed striking, and it is clear that this credit is disproportionately being directed to firms that are supporting the war effort.

However, it is more challenging to identify when the centrally planned credit boom will come back to haunt the government. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the credit market has seen a major shift from short-term loans in favor of long-term loans lasting more than a year. Were the loans not being kicked into the long grass, the low rate of nonperforming loans might already be increasing.

With the limited information available to observers outside Russia, the country’s banks appear well capitalized for now and high interest rates are helping convince Russians to keep their cash in the financial system. But even without deep insight into the liabilities taken on by Russian banks, one can see that the aggressive loan policy is already hampering efforts to cut inflation and even pushing up the deficit.

Why? Since high interest rates are a deterrent from taking on more debt, the government has had to increase its subsidies to help banks keep lending at preferential rates. Russian banks are lending first to households, but heavy industry represents the second, growing category at the expense of farming. These are costing the government more every year and becoming another deficit-driving liability, like inflation. These liabilities not only force the government to increase salaries, pensions, and other social payments, but also pressure the Central Bank to keep interest rates—and therefore government borrowing costs—high.

In 2025, Russia’s planned federal budget expenditures on debt servicing will amount to 3.2 trillion rubles ($37 billion), which is nearly 40 percent higher than the plan for 2024, and 2.1 times higher than in 2023. Despite this, the actual government debt itself is growing at a much slower pace, with an expected increase of 38 percent by the end of 2025 compared to 2023. 

Sanctions are having an unmistakable effect, albeit below the inflated expectations of many in the West in early 2022. Lifting sanctions now would provide relief to a system that is showing clear signs of stress. It would also be a signal to third countries currently on the fence about selling to Russia that they can get away with what they’ve stopped short of doing so far. Since the sanctions were put in place, China has not lent money to the Russian state, and Chinese banks are reticent to enter the Russian market for fear of US secondary sanctions. Will they be so reticent now?

Rather than lifting sanctions prematurely, policymakers should focus on closing loopholes, tightening enforcement, and maintaining coordination among allies. A premature retreat would weaken US leverage and embolden the axis of authoritarian regimes that are already helping each other circumvent Western policies, as my colleague Kim Donovan detailed in her testimony last week before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

The question is not whether sanctions worked instantly, but whether the world can afford the long-term consequences of abandoning them too soon.

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Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Why the US should not lift sanctions against Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

President Donald Trump doesn’t have fond feelings for whistleblowers.

During his first term, Trump’s Justice Department carried out a clandestine spying operation to try to catch leakers. On the campaign trail, Trump on multiple occasions threatened to arrest journalists who don’t reveal their sources — and suggested they should be raped in prison until they give up names.

For those who want to speak out against wrongdoing within the U.S. government, it has never been more critical to take steps to keep themselves safe. So we compiled these best practices for leaking information in public interest under the Trump administration.

Don’t Call or Text

Phone calls and text messages are convenient, but they aren’t safe for whistleblowers. As outlined in a December report from the Office of the Inspector General, the Justice Department in Trump’s first term repeatedly utilized “compulsory processes” — which include subpoenas, search warrants, and court orders — to request “non-content communications records” from phone carriers serving journalists at CNN, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. The requests were for both the reporters’ work numbers and their personal numbers.

Non-content records don’t include the communications themselves — such as copies of text messages or voicemails. Instead, government investigators were keen to gather metadata pertaining to the communications: for instance, who sent a message or made a call to a journalist’s phone and at what time.

Even if the contents of the conversation are not recorded, the metadata establishes clear links between parties.

If a metadata search turns up evidence of communication with journalists or rights groups, this alone could reveal who is behind a leak.

Don’t Email

Never use a work or personal email address when communicating with journalists.

In its attempt to root out leaks during Trump’s first term, the Justice Department also sought non-content information pertaining to reporters’ email communications from their email service providers. They wanted details such as the time an email was sent and received, as well as the sender’s email address.

While email encryption technology can encrypt the body of the email message and in some cases subject lines as well, the email addresses themselves and dates and times emails are sent and received are not encrypted.

This means it’s not hard for investigators to use email records to draw a clear line between a journalist and their source — even if they can’t determine what information specifically was exchanged.

Setting up a separate email account entirely for communicating with journalists or rights groups is an option, but there are a number of potential gotchas. For instance, care should be taken to not reveal any identifying information when setting up a burner email account: Don’t use your phone number for two-factor authentication, choose a throwaway username that is not linked to you in any way, and select a vetted VPN or the Tor network to mask your IP address. Considering all these obstacles, it’s often best to avoid email altogether.

Don’t Reach Out on Social Media

The owners of tech’s biggest social media platforms have shown varying degrees of fealty to the Trump administration. These genuflections include Mark Zuckerberg ending DEI programs at Meta, Andy Yen, the CEO of “privacy-first” email provider Proton, going on about how the Republican party today stands for “the little guys,” and Elon Musk, the owner of X, calling shots as a “special government employee.”

The fact that Trump’s richest fan also owns a popular social media platform should give pause about using X to share sensitive information. It doesn’t take an overactive imagination to see a scenario in which the companies that own communication channels are willing to provide user information to a government they’re eager to please.

Although social media direct messages are generally unencrypted by default, some social media platforms now offer optional end-to-end encrypted messaging, though this feature needs to be enabled manually. For instance, X direct messages can be encrypted if both parties are verified users, and Facebook Messenger can also be used to send encrypted DMs. But the metadata, or non-content information, would still reveal that your account was in contact with a reporter’s account.

Selectively Use Encrypted Communication Tools

Similar metadata risks apply to messaging platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp. Telegram offers encryption, but it is not enabled by default and comes with a number of limitations. WhatsApp encrypts messages by default, but nonetheless reveals a variety of metadata about communications themselves.

Given the way government investigators typically demand non-content communication records, end-to-end encryption alone does not mask whether or not someone is talking to journalists or other entities.

Secure communication tools such as Signal and Session minimize the amount of metadata and user information that platform operators themselves can access.

Signal can identify the date a particular account was created, as well as when the account last accessed the service. It can also identify a phone number associated with an active username, which is vastly less metadata than other messaging platforms collect.   

If you’re concerned about your username being linked to your phone number, change your username at regular intervals, which would prevent past usernames from being tied to your phone number.

Signal routinely posts copies of the requests for user information it receives from the government. These disclosures show that Signal tends to share merely when a particular account was last accessed and first created. Government requests for information from service providers, however, may come with non-disclosure orders that could legally prevent operators from posting notice of these demands on their transparency pages and potentially bar them from notifying the affected users themselves.

Session, a messenger whose tagline is “send messages, not metadata” reduces the amount of information it stores about its users by, for instance, not using centralized servers to relay messages.  

Nothing Is a Substitute for OPSEC

But the best end-to-end encryption and metadata minimization won’t keep you safe without basic operational security.

Digital access logs may reveal who viewed, printed, or downloaded a copy of the file, and when. The more files you access, the more likely it is that you may be the one common individual who accessed all those files.

Avoid whistleblower communications while physically present at work. Aside from someone seeing your screen, your employer may also be able to identify that you accessed a particular communication service while on a company network.

Under no circumstances should you also use work devices when communicating with or transferring data to reporters or rights groups.

Equally risky are personal devices with any work-assigned device management apps installed. It might seem old-fashioned, but rather than taking a screenshot of a specific document or chat record on a work device, take a photo of the screen with a separate one-time use phone, or at least a personal device.

Make clear to anyone you might alert of wrongdoing that leaked photos or documents generally should not be published in their entirety. That’s because source material can potentially be linked to the specific device with which it was captured.

A photo showing a file on your computer monitor, for instance, might include a blemish or a smudge of dirt on the screen. More sophisticated forensic techniques, such as watermarking, can be used to trace the origins of a leaked email or video conference.

Even emails seemingly sent to a large number of recipients may be individually watermarked, with each message containing some unique change that can be traced to a single recipient. That’s why it’s safest for journalists not to reproduce emails verbatim and instead rely on selective quotes or summarizations.

After communicating with outside parties, ensure that no records of sensitive communications persist. Be sure to delete not just specific messages, but entire chat histories from all linked devices on which your messaging app of choice is installed. Request that anyone with whom you share sensitive information does the same. Remember to not save each other in your contacts lists, either.

Blowing the whistle can have a real impact in the world, but it also comes with risks — the threat of prosecution or losing your job among them. Although leak investigations may again become a priority in the Trump administration, these dos and don’ts can help reduce the chances of exposing yourself when you’re shining light on wrongdoing.

The post How to Leak Under the Trump Administration appeared first on The Intercept.

Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Sanctions Evasion, Illicit Oil Transport, and Financial Secrecy

Russia actively uses a shadow fleet to circumvent international sanctions, transport oil, and evade financial oversight. One of the key tools in this scheme is the frequent alteration of vessel identification data—changing names, flags, and ownership. This allows them to conceal their true affiliation and continue illegal operations.

Below is a list of nine vessels that exhibit clear signs of belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet. These ships have repeatedly changed names and flags, docked at Russian ports to load oil, turned off their AIS tracking systems, operated without proper insurance, or are linked to sanctioned owners. These facts highlight the urgent need for coordinated efforts by the U.S., the U.K., the EU, and international regulators to combat the illegal fleet that finances Russia’s aggression.

Our researchers have identified key examples of vessels engaged in shadow activities, including:

• INVICTA (IMO: 9250543) – Over recent years, this ship has changed multiple names (NEOMI, WONDER AVIOR, MEGALONISSOS) and flags (Panama, Marshall Islands, now Guinea), a clear indicator of efforts to evade oversight.
• VIRAT (IMO: 9832559) – Has repeatedly changed its name (VALOUR, CRUDESUN) and flags (Haiti, Liberia, the U.S., now Panama).
• PICTOR (IMO: 9322827) – Has a long history of renaming (PERIA, IMPERIA, MINERVA ANTARCTICA, etc.) and switching between flags (Eswatini, Liberia, Cayman Islands).
• LADOGA (IMO: 9339313) – Switched to the Russian flag on April 5, 2024, clearly indicating its use in Russian oil transportation schemes.
• AMAX ARROW (IMO: 9419448) – Frequently changes names (TARGET, ADVANTAGE ARROW, HENG TAI) and flags (Malta, Panama, now Marshall Islands).
• EMINENT (IMO: 9383950) – Operates under the Panamanian flag, previously known as ELEGANCE, STAR PROSPERITY, CHAMPION PROSPERITY, pointing to attempts to obscure ownership history.
• BREEZE (IMO: 9305568) – Formerly SCF BALTICA, recently switched to the flag of São Tomé and Príncipe, a common tactic among sanctioned vessels.
• SAKHALIN (IMO: 9249128) – Has been sailing under the Russian flag since April 2024, after previously switching between multiple jurisdictions.
• CANGJIE (IMO: 9299680) – Changed flags from Liberia to India, another typical maneuver to obscure true ownership.

All of these vessels changed their flag or name after being placed on various sanctions lists.

Common Strategies for Evading Sanctions

• Frequent Name and Flag Changes – This allows vessels to bypass blacklists and continue operations.
• AIS Manipulation – Turning off the Automatic Identification System (AIS) enables vessels to disappear from tracking systems while at sea.
• Illegal Insurance Practices – Many of these ships operate without proper insurance or through front companies, violating international maritime regulations.
• Use of Shell Companies – Russia employs intermediary firms, such as “Invest Flot,” which has a suspiciously low registered capital of 10,000 rubles. Russian registries conceal the managers of this entity, but through electronic contacts, the involvement of Gennady Semenov—affiliated with another Sovcomflot structure, Novoshipinvest—can be traced. This company is also managed by the sanctioned “SKF Arktika.” A similar scheme is observed with “Southern Fleet.”
• Fake Safety Certifications – Shadow fleet vessels like Liteyny Prospect, Sakhalin, and Ladoga operate under falsified “maritime safety” documents issued by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. Additionally, tankers such as Liteyny Prospect, Ladoga, and Zaliv Baikal use insurance documents from the Moscow-based “Ingosstrakh.”
• Use of Lesser-Known Registries – Countries like Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Marshall Islands have weak regulatory oversight, allowing these fleets to operate outside international norms.
• Ship-to-Ship Transfers – Oil transported from Russian ports is transferred between vessels at sea, making it difficult to trace its origin.

Strengthening Global Measures Against Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Despite existing sanctions, Russia’s shadow fleet remains a serious threat to global security and economic stability. Therefore, the U.S., U.K., EU, and their partners must implement stricter measures, including:

• Stronger flag-state enforcement – Countries must rigorously monitor vessels that change their flag or name after 2022 to quickly identify potential violations.
• Increased penalties for insurers and port operators – Companies facilitating shadow fleet activities should face sanctions.
• Creation of an international database of suspicious vessels – This would prevent these ships from being repeatedly used for sanction evasion.
• Enhanced monitoring of ship-to-ship transfers in international waters – New mechanisms must be established to track such operations in key maritime regions.

This analysis clearly demonstrates that the vessels INVICTA, VIRAT, PICTOR, LADOGA, AMAX ARROW, EMINENT, BREEZE, SAKHALIN, and CANGJIE are part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which helps finance the country’s military aggression. Given this, the international community must unite to increase sanctions pressure, strengthen maritime oversight, and penalize all participants in these illicit schemes. Only coordinated action by the U.S., EU, and the U.K. can effectively block Russian oil flows and cut off funding for the Kremlin’s aggressive policies.

With the Gaza ceasefire teetering on the edge of collapse, Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vt., introduced new legislation aimed at halting the sale of bombs, missiles, and artillery shells to Israel.

Sanders’s move comes three months after he forced earlier votes that put senators on the record about arming Israel amid the assault on Gaza that left tens of thousands of civilians dead.

“It would be unconscionable to provide more of the bombs and weapons Israel has used to kill so many civilians.”

That effort fell far short and the latest resolutions have even less of a chance with Republican control of the Senate. Still, Sanders said he believed it was important to keep trying to block arms sales to Israel considering President Donald Trump’s remarks about “taking” Gaza for the U.S.

“With Trump and Netanyahu openly talking about forcibly displacing millions of Palestinians from Gaza — in other words, ethnic cleansing — it would be unconscionable to provide more of the bombs and weapons Israel has used to kill so many civilians and make life unlivable in Gaza,” he said in a release.

Sanders introduced four resolutions on February 20 identifying the weapon sales he wants to block. They cover $6.8 billion in sales for 2,166 small-diameter bombs and 2,800 500-pound bombs, along with guidance kits; $688 million for 615 more small-diameter bombs and more than 15,000 guidance kits; $660 million for Hellfire air-to-ground missiles; and $313 million for 10,000 155mm high explosive artillery shells.

The Institute for Middle East Understanding Policy Project said the weapons at issue have been used in strikes in Gaza and Lebanon that amounted to war crimes, including attacks on schools, refugee camps, and in supposed safe zones.

Sanders said Israel had a right to defend itself against the October 7, 2023, attacks led by Hamas, but that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government had violated international law by responding with “an all-out war against the entire Palestinian people.”

Under the law covering arms sales to foreign powers, Sanders can force a Senate floor vote on his resolutions. If they were to pass the Senate, they would still need to pass the House and either gain the president’s approval or overcome a veto to become law — all highly unlikely scenarios.

The votes will once again force Senate Democrats on the record about whether they support transferring more weapons to Israel — including a slate of new senators who will be weighing in for the first time. The upper chamber of Congress has gained six new Republicans and six new Democrats since Sanders’s previous resolutions in November.

Support for those earlier resolutions topped out at 19 votes, all Democrats or independents who caucus with the Democrats.

“A lot of Democrats were uncomfortable going against a president of their own party.”

Sanders’s office did not immediately respond to a question about whether he plans to force a floor vote on the latest resolutions. A vote in favor of the last round generated a backlash for a vulnerable Democratic incumbent, Sen. Jon Ossoff, D-Ga., who could face a tough re-election battle next year.

Matt Duss, the executive vice president of the Center for International Policy and a former foreign policy adviser to Sanders, said it was possible that more Democrats could vote in support this time.

“I know a lot of Democrats were uncomfortable going against a president of their own party. They shouldn’t have been,” he said. “I hope they will be more inclined to support a measure like this, now that it’s a Republican president.”

The Trump administration earlier this month moved to sidestep congressional review of $7 billion in arms sales to Israel, angering even Democrats who have generally been supportive of such weapons transfers.

Trump on Monday rescinded a Biden-era policy memo requiring the recipients of U.S. weapons to certify that they were not using them to violate human rights law and would not block humanitarian aid, according to the Washington Post.

The policy had proven to be toothless when it came to Israel, critics said, but some observers worried that repealing it would only encourage further violations of international law.

Duss, who’s criticized the memo as a gimmick, said that regardless of whether it is in place, U.S. law conditions military aid on respect for human rights.

The post Bernie Sanders Hasn’t Stopped Arms Sales to Israel — But He Won’t Stop Trying appeared first on The Intercept.

Germany’s election results may at first seem like just another success for conservative and far-right forces. The Christian Democrats won the most votes of any party with 28.52 percent. Their leader, Friedrich Merz, who has pushed the party significantly rightward during his tenure, will likely be the next chancellor. The far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD – Elon Musk’s cause célèbre – came second, winning just over 20 percent, or around one in five votes. The AfD will remain outside of any ruling coalition in the parliament, thanks only to an enduring postwar commitment from Germany’s other major parties to never form a coalition with an explicitly far-right entity.

The centrist Social Democratic Party earned record low results, with 16 percent, and fellow centrists in the Green Party lost a significant number of votes. Democrats in the U.S. would do well to learn from their mistakes, and instead take notes from Germany’s left-wing party, Die Linke, or The Left — the only party to dramatically exceed expectations on Sunday.

Based on the vote counts alone, this could seem counterintuitive: Die Linke only won 9 percent. As recently as a month ago, however, it seemed feasible that the party could fail to garner the 5 percent of votes necessary to earn seats in Germany’s parliament at all. The party outperformed, especially with young women voters; it won 27 percent of all first-time voters and gained 30,000 new members in the last month of the election campaign. Their surprise comeback offers a lesson in what is required to build — or at least begin to build — party political resistance to the far-right.

Die Linke’s relative successes, and the accumulating failures of the Greens and the Social Democrats, are further grounds to reject the centrist liberal insistence on bending to the right to keep the far-right at bay. The centrist strategy, aside from being morally turpitudinous, has been a losing one; it only serves to legitimize far-right frameworks and bolster right-wing parties.

Die Linke, meanwhile, gained significant ground with an unambiguously leftist economic platform, which also — and this is crucial — refused to throw minorities under the bus. They focused on so-called “bread and butter” issues like rent and the rising cost of living, transport, and pensions, and defended trans and immigrant rights. They ran as the only party to robustly oppose far-right politics with strong words and policies.

The election results undermine claims that the left must embrace “anti-woke” positions if we are to challenge the racist far-right. One German party specifically deployed this strategy and failed to win enough votes to enter parliament.

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, or BSW, named after its famous leader, formed as a split from Die Linke early last year and pushed a program of economic redistribution and worker protections, alongside anti-immigrant and anti-LGBTQ+ stances — a nationalist social democracy, willing to treat many thousands of people as disposable, while pushing to segment the international working class with protectionist nation-state borders. Wagenknecht was not rewarded. Meanwhile, her former party’s clarity on class struggle as a clear priority, but intractable from race and gender struggles, appealed far more.

Hundreds of thousands of German voters disturbed by the rise of the far-right sought an anti-fascist alternative. This was particularly true after the Christian Democrats’ Merz caused public outcry in January when he pushed through a harsh anti-immigrant proposal in parliament by relying on votes from the AfD. The move was seen as a breach of the “firewall” prohibiting collaboration with far-right parties, upheld since 1945. The Christian Democrats may have won the most votes on Sunday, but it was nonetheless the party’s second lowest result in its history.

Most other major parties condemned Merz, but it was only Die Linke that had any real ground to stand on. The Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats under current Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and even Green Party leaders, have all to varying degrees spent the last decade-plus weakening the so-called firewall with their own support for harsh immigration restrictions. The German center’s commitment to supporting Israel and its genocide, while violently criminalizing support for Palestine at home, is matched only by the U.S.

Die Linke has also not been strong enough across the board when it comes to condemning Israel’s war crimes and Germany’s complicity in them, but it is also one of the only parties openly opposed to sending weapons to Israel. (The only other party was Wagenknecht’s, with its attempt to pair anti-imperialist foreign policy with domestic xenophobia and racism.) Die Linke candidates like Ferat Koçak, an outspoken advocate for Palestinian freedom, modeled what a thoroughgoing anti-fascist, anti-racist, pro-working class platform can look like – putting economic issues front and center, but refusing to pander to a notion of the working class that prioritizes white men. Koçak will be the first member Die Linke to ever win a seat in West Germany.

“I knocked on doors and when people said they voted AfD, I said ‘Okay, but if you want, you can still come to my office and I’ll check if your heating bill is too high.’”

On Monday, the New York Times credited Die Linke’s savvy social media campaigning for its surge in support – which was by far the strongest with young, urban, and particularly women voters. And there’s no doubt that the party’s TikTok and Instagram game is strong. One of Die Linke’s leaders, 36-year-old Heidi Reichinnek, has over a million viewers across the platforms, where she posts well-edited, accessible, educational content to push the party’s core message. Jan van Aken, another co-leader, clearly expressed Die Linke’s message on mainstream talk shows and the like. Social and traditional media efforts were no more vital, though, than a mass door-knocking strategy, in which Die Linke candidates and organizers made a point to ask would-be voters about their challenges and struggles.

“I knocked on doors and when people said they voted AfD, I said ‘Okay, but if you want, you can still come to my office and I’ll check if your heating bill is too high,’” Ines Schwerdtner, another of the party co-leaders, said in a press conference on Monday.

There are, of course, limits to mapping Germany’s multiparty liberal capitalist democracy onto the U.S.’s two-party leviathan. Certain similarities and patterns are, however, too strong to ignore. As is true with establishment Democrats, the German parties that span the liberal-to-conservative center have all lurched rightward on anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in the last decade, while attempting the impossible balancing act of serving capitalist interests and claiming to stand for the working class. Redistributive economic reforms and state investment in social welfare have been insufficient. Ideological commitments to austerity pervade, bolstering the right-wing, anti-immigrant myth that there is too little to go around.

Concerns about fascism from the lips of figures like Merz can ring hollow when AfD leaders have accused — with good reason – the Christian Democrats of copying their far-right anti-immigration program. Likewise, former President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris warned of the fascistic threat of Trump, but were complicit in genocide, the criminalization of left-wing and pro-Palestine protest, and racist fearmongering over immigration and crime. These liberal capitalists have failed to offer a bulwark to the right, let alone an alternative.

Die Linke’s example is not a clear road map to anti-fascist victory; the AfD earned twice as many votes and further cemented gains in its strongholds in Germany’s east. The mistake, though, would be to treat the German election as a story of political polarization, in need of centrist correction. There has been a repudiation of the liberal center: The Green Party, a green capitalist liberal party that has drifted far from its leftist roots, lost 700,000 voters to Die Linke compared to the 2021 elections; the Social Democrats, who will likely form the governing coalition with Merz’s party, lost 560,000 votes to Die Linke.

The neoliberal austerity paradigms that helped foster 21st century fascist movements will not be the answer. Die Linke’s proposal is a simple one: We don’t need to moderate fascism, we need to oppose it.

Correction: February 26, 2025
This story has been updated to reflect that, while its numbers were down, the Green Party did not score a record-low vote.

The post Grow a Spine: Democrats Have a Lot to Learn From the German Left appeared first on The Intercept.

Ibrahim Traoré, the current leader of Burkina Faso, is a military officer who took power through a coup in 2022. Here is an analysis based on his public actions, speeches, and leadership style.

Psychological Profile of Ibrahim Traoré

1. Decisive and Strategic Thinker

1. His ability to seize power at a young age (in his mid-30s) suggests strong strategic thinking and confidence.
2. He likely possesses high situational awareness, which is essential in military leadership and political maneuvering.
3. Charismatic and Inspirational

2. Traoré has positioned himself as a figure of resistance against foreign influence, particularly in rejecting ties with former colonial powers like France.
3. His rhetoric appeals to nationalism and Pan-Africanism, indicating a capacity for emotional intelligence and persuasion.
4. High-Stress Tolerance and Risk-Taking

3. Leading a coup and governing under regional instability requires a strong tolerance for stress and risk.
4. His willingness to defy international pressure shows he is not easily swayed by external forces.
5. Authoritarian Tendencies with a Populist Appeal

4. He has consolidated power, restricted opposition, and promoted military rule, which suggests a preference for control and order over democratic processes.
5. However, his populist approach resonates with many citizens who feel disillusioned with previous governments.
6. Resilient but Potentially Paranoid

5. Given the history of political instability in Burkina Faso, he may exhibit a level of paranoia common among leaders who come to power through force.
6. His crackdown on dissent and reshuffling of military ranks suggest he is highly cautious about internal threats.
7. Nationalistic and Anti-Imperialist Worldview

6. His rejection of Western alliances and embrace of Russian and African partnerships reflect a deeply ingrained nationalistic ideology.
7. This could stem from a personal or ideological belief in self-reliance or a strategic move to secure power.
9. Ibrahim Traoré appears to be a pragmatic, charismatic, and risk-taking leader who thrives in high-pressure environments. His leadership style leans toward authoritarianism, with strong nationalistic and populist tendencies. Whether he will be remembered as a revolutionary hero or another military strongman depends on how he navigates Burkina Faso’s ongoing challenges.

Ibrahim Traoré, like any leader, has potential psychological weaknesses that could impact his leadership and decision-making. Based on his actions and leadership style, here are some possible vulnerabilities:

1. Susceptibility to Paranoia and Distrust

• Coming to power through a coup means he is constantly aware of internal and external threats.
• His crackdown on dissent and reshuffling of military ranks suggest he may struggle with trust, which can lead to instability within his government.
• If unchecked, this paranoia could result in excessive purges or alienation of key allies.

2. Impulsiveness and Risk-Taking Behavior

• His rapid rise to power and bold decisions, such as cutting ties with France and pivoting toward Russia, indicate a high tolerance for risk.
• While this can be an asset, it may also lead to reckless or poorly calculated moves that backfire.
• If he acts too hastily without considering long-term consequences, Burkina Faso could face diplomatic or economic fallout.

3. Authoritarian Tendencies and Resistance to Criticism

• Leaders who consolidate power through military means often struggle with accepting dissenting opinions.
• If he surrounds himself only with loyalists, he risks making decisions in an echo chamber, limiting his ability to adapt to changing realities.
• Over time, suppression of opposition could breed resentment, making him more vulnerable to uprisings.

4. Nationalistic Zeal That May Blind Him to Practical Realities

• His strong anti-colonial and nationalist stance appeals to many, but it might also lead to isolating Burkina Faso from beneficial international partnerships.
• Economic and security challenges require pragmatic alliances, and if ideology trumps practicality, it could weaken the country’s development.

5. Potential Struggles with Long-Term Governance

• Military leaders who take power through coups often excel in crisis but struggle in long-term state-building.
• If he does not transition from a war-time mentality to sustainable governance, his leadership could stagnate.
• Managing civilian institutions and economic growth requires a different skill set than military strategy.

6. Over-Reliance on Military Solutions

• His background suggests a preference for forceful approaches rather than diplomatic or economic solutions.
• If he continues to prioritize military actions over political reconciliation and economic reform, the country’s deeper problems—poverty, corruption, and infrastructure deficits—may worsen.

Traoré’s biggest personal weaknesses likely revolve around distrust, impulsiveness, authoritarian tendencies, and a potential struggle with long-term governance. If he does not balance his military instincts with pragmatic statecraft, he risks repeating the cycle of instability that has plagued Burkina Faso.

Ibrahim Traoré has strengthened Burkina Faso’s ties with Russia, positioning himself within the growing trend of African leaders seeking alternatives to Western influence, particularly former colonial powers like France. His connection to Russia can be analyzed through several key areas:

1. Military Cooperation and Security Support

• Russian military assistance: Traoré has sought security partnerships with Russia, likely through the Wagner Group or other Kremlin-backed paramilitary forces, to help combat jihadist insurgencies in Burkina Faso.
• Weapons and training: Reports suggest that Burkina Faso has received Russian military equipment and expertise, similar to what other Sahelian nations like Mali have done.
• Reduced French influence: Since taking power, Traoré has distanced Burkina Faso from France, expelling French troops and military advisors while embracing Russian support.

2. Political and Diplomatic Alignment

• Anti-Western rhetoric: Traoré’s speeches often criticize Western neocolonialism, aligning with Russia’s narrative of positioning itself as a liberator of African nations from Western control.
• Participation in Russia-Africa summits: Burkina Faso has engaged in diplomatic talks with Russia, participating in forums and summits aimed at boosting African-Russian cooperation.
• Closer ties with Mali and Niger: Traoré has aligned Burkina Faso with the military-led governments of Mali and Niger, both of whom have also turned to Russia after expelling Western forces.

3. Economic and Resource-Based Interests

• Potential resource deals: While less publicized than in other African nations, Burkina Faso’s gold and natural resources could be of interest to Russia, particularly as a means of economic exchange for military aid.
• Shift from Western development aid: Russia offers partnerships that do not come with the same governance or human rights conditions as Western aid, making it an attractive alternative for Traoré’s government.

4. Influence of the Wagner Group

• Mercenary involvement: Though not officially confirmed, it is highly likely that Russian mercenaries—whether directly under Wagner or another Kremlin-backed entity—have a presence in Burkina Faso, mirroring their activities in Mali and the Central African Republic.
• Security assurances: Wagner’s involvement would provide Traoré with personal and regime security, reducing his dependence on local military factions that could pose a coup threat.

5. Broader Geopolitical Implications

• Part of a wider Russian strategy: Russia has expanded its influence across Africa, particularly in nations with military governments seeking alternatives to Western partnerships.
• A shift in alliances: Burkina Faso’s realignment with Russia represents a broader geopolitical shift in the Sahel, where traditional Western influence is being challenged by new global power dynamics.

Conclusion

Traoré’s connection to Russia appears strategic rather than ideological—he is leveraging Russian support for military aid, security backing, and political survival while reducing French influence. However, the extent of this relationship remains fluid, and its long-term impact on Burkina Faso’s stability is yet to be seen.

Ibrahim Traoré’s growing alliance with Russia carries several risks for Burkina Faso, both in the short and long term. Here are the key potential dangers:

1. Over-Reliance on Russia for Security

• Uncertain Commitment: Russia’s support is often transactional. If its geopolitical priorities shift (e.g., Ukraine or other conflicts), Burkina Faso could be left vulnerable.
• Wagner Group Instability: If Russia restructures its mercenary operations, Burkina Faso may lose critical security support.
• Limited Military Effectiveness: While Russian-backed forces have been active in places like Mali and the Central African Republic, their success against insurgencies has been mixed. Burkina Faso may not see the security improvements it expects.

2. Economic and Diplomatic Isolation

• Strained Western Relations: As Burkina Faso moves closer to Russia, it risks losing Western economic aid, trade agreements, and development assistance. This could worsen economic conditions.
• Sanctions Risks: If Western nations view Traoré’s ties with Russia as a threat, they could impose sanctions, similar to what has happened in other African countries engaging heavily with Moscow.
• Investor Concerns: Western businesses may withdraw from Burkina Faso, limiting foreign direct investment and slowing economic growth.

3. Political Legitimacy and Internal Stability Risks

• Potential Internal Power Struggles: If Russian involvement strengthens one faction of the military over others, it could create internal divisions, increasing the risk of another coup.
• Dependence on a Foreign Power: While Traoré presents his leadership as anti-imperialist, relying on Russian security forces could undermine his image as a self-reliant leader.

4. Long-Term Costs of Russian Influence

• Resource Exploitation: Russia has a history of extracting resources (gold, diamonds, etc.) from African nations under military agreements. Burkina Faso risks losing control over its natural wealth.
• Debt and Economic Dependency: If Burkina Faso receives financial or military aid from Russia, it may become economically dependent, limiting its policy freedom in the future.

5. Risk of Becoming a Proxy in Global Power Struggles

• Sahel as a Geopolitical Battleground: With increasing tensions between Russia and the West, Burkina Faso could become a pawn in a larger geopolitical conflict.
• Risk of Escalation: If the West or regional African powers see Russia’s presence as a destabilizing force, it could trigger broader conflicts in the region.

Traoré’s alliance with Russia provides short-term military and political benefits but comes with significant long-term risks, including economic instability, internal unrest, and diplomatic isolation. If he fails to balance this relationship carefully, Burkina Faso could end up in a vulnerable and dependent position, much like other African nations that have partnered with Russia.

Ibrahim Traoré’s attitude toward the United States is shaped by his broader anti-Western stance, his rejection of traditional alliances, and his pivot toward Russia. While he has not directly declared hostility toward the U.S., his actions and rhetoric suggest a distrustful and cautious approach to American influence.

1. Skepticism Toward Western Powers (Including the U.S.)

• Anti-Neocolonialism Narrative: Traoré, like other Sahelian leaders, views Western powers—including the U.S.—as part of a broader colonial legacy that still exerts influence over African affairs.
• Expulsion of French Forces: While this move was aimed at France, it sent a message to the broader Western alliance, including the U.S., that Burkina Faso seeks independence from Western military partnerships.
• Alignment with Russia: His growing ties with Russia suggest a distancing from U.S. influence, as Washington has expressed concern over Russia’s expanding role in Africa.

2. Cautious Diplomatic Engagement with the U.S.

• Maintaining Some Diplomatic Relations: Unlike Mali or Niger, which have become more openly hostile toward the U.S., Burkina Faso has not entirely severed ties. There have been occasional engagements between Burkinabé officials and U.S. diplomats.
• Security Concerns and Counterterrorism: The U.S. still sees Burkina Faso as a key player in the fight against jihadist insurgencies. However, Traoré’s rejection of French and Western military assistance complicates security cooperation.

3. Tension Over Human Rights and Governance

• U.S. Criticism of Military Rule: The U.S. has expressed concerns about democratic backsliding and human rights abuses under Traoré’s leadership.
• Potential Aid Reductions: If Burkina Faso continues its authoritarian trajectory, the U.S. could cut aid or impose sanctions, further straining relations.

4. Strategic Balancing Rather Than Open Hostility

• Not as Aggressive as Other Anti-West Leaders: Unlike leaders in Mali or Niger, who have taken a more openly confrontational stance toward the U.S., Traoré appears to be playing a balancing game—distancing himself from the West without completely cutting ties.
• Potential for Pragmatic Cooperation: If Traoré sees an opportunity for economic or security benefits, he may still engage with the U.S. on a case-by-case basis.

Traoré is not outright hostile toward the U.S., but his anti-Western rhetoric, alliance with Russia, and military rulecreate natural tensions. While he has not completely cut ties, his actions suggest he sees Washington as part of the old Western influence he wants to reduce in Burkina Faso. However, given the U.S.’s strategic interest in the Sahel, some form of engagement is likely to continue.

The U.S. faces a strategic dilemma in dealing with Ibrahim Traoré. While it wants to maintain influence in the Sahel to counter jihadist groups and Russian expansion, it also disapproves of Traoré’s authoritarian rule, human rights concerns, and growing ties with Moscow. Here are some possible U.S. responses:

1. Diplomatic Pressure and Conditional Engagement

• Encouraging a Transition to Civilian Rule: The U.S. may pressure Traoré to hold democratic elections by leveraging diplomatic talks and international coalitions (e.g., ECOWAS, the African Union).
• Human Rights and Governance Criticism: Expect continued public statements from the U.S. condemning press restrictions, opposition crackdowns, and military rule.
• Backchannel Diplomacy: While publicly criticizing him, the U.S. may still engage behind closed doors to keep communication open.

 Effectiveness: Limited—Traoré has shown little interest in Western-backed democratic transitions and may resist U.S. demands.

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2. Cutting Military and Economic Aid

• Suspending Military Assistance: The U.S. may reduce or cut security aid to Burkina Faso, as it has done with other military regimes (e.g., Mali, Niger).
• Ending Development Programs: Economic aid, infrastructure investments, and humanitarian support could be scaled back to signal disapproval.
• Targeted Sanctions: If human rights violations worsen, the U.S. might impose sanctions on key Burkinabé officials, restricting travel and assets.

 Effectiveness: Risky—While this would pressure Traoré, it could push him even closer to Russia and China, further reducing U.S. influence.

3. Covert and Strategic Engagement

• Maintaining Intelligence Cooperation: Since the U.S. still has counterterrorism interests in the Sahel, it may quietly cooperate with Traoré’s government on intelligence-sharing against jihadist threats.
• Using Regional Allies: The U.S. may work with neighboring countries (like Ghana or Chad) to influence Burkina Faso indirectly rather than directly confronting Traoré.
• Engaging Civil Society: Supporting non-governmental organizations (NGOs), opposition groups, and pro-democracy movements in Burkina Faso could keep long-term U.S. influence alive.

 Effectiveness: Moderate—This allows the U.S. to stay involved without openly challenging Traoré, reducing the risk of him fully embracing Russia.

4. Allowing a “Wait-and-See” Approach

• Not Directly Confronting Traoré: The U.S. may avoid aggressive actions and simply observe how Burkina Faso evolves under his leadership.
• Monitoring Regional Trends: Since Niger and Mali have also moved toward Russia, the U.S. may focus on the broader Sahel situation rather than singling out Traoré.
• Reengaging If He Softens His Stance: If Traoré later seeks diversified partnerships, the U.S. could offer incentives (aid, trade deals) to pull him back toward Western alliances.

 Effectiveness: Long-term gamble—If Traoré strengthens ties with Russia, the U.S. may lose influence permanently, but if he later seeks alternatives, it could regain ground.

The U.S. is likely to use a mix of diplomatic pressure, selective engagement, and quiet intelligence cooperation while reducing direct military or economic aid. If Traoré leans too far toward Russia, expect stronger U.S. responses, possibly including sanctions or regional containment strategies.

This story was originally published on Vince Beiser’s Substack, Power Metal, to which you can subscribe here.

Just days before President Trump called Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator” who was somehow to blame for Russia’s invasion of his country, Trump floated the only slightly less controversial idea that Kyiv should pay the US for protection, in the form of Ukrainian minerals. “I told them I want the equivalent of like, $500 billion worth of rare earth, and they’ve essentially agreed to do that,” he said on Fox News on February 10. “We have to get something.”

Besides the glaring moral questions this proposal raises, there’s a practical one: Can Ukraine actually deliver what Trump wants?

Breaking China’s critical metal dominance “is one of the main geopolitical drivers in Washington right now.”

First, as the author of a recent book that covers the global trade and geopolitics of metals, I’m sure Trump is not talking only about rare earths. This is a term that confuses many people; it’s often mistakenly applied to all the critical metals we need for the Electro-Digital Age. In fact, rare earths are a subset of those critical metals.

Rare earths are a group of 17 obscure, esoterically named elements, like praseodymium and yttrium, that are crucial for electric car motors, cellphones, wind turbines, and a range of health and military technologies. The more familiar-sounding critical metals, like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper, are not rare earths.

Anyway, Ukraine does have some rare earths. But no one knows exactly how much, or even where they are. Ukraine’s claims about its mineral riches are based on Soviet-era exploration that was carried out decades ago. “Unfortunately, there is no modern assessment” of rare earth reserves in Ukraine, the former director general of the Ukrainian Geological Survey told S&P Global. And there aren’t any active rare earth mines, either.

We do know that Ukraine holds sizable deposits of several other important metals and minerals, including:

• Lithium, graphite, and to a lesser extent nickel and cobalt, all of which are needed for the batteries that run EVs, cell phones and other cordless electronics
• Titanium, important for many military technologies
• Gallium and germanium, essential for semiconductors, TV and phone screens, solar panels, and military gear

In theory, gaining access to Ukraine’s minerals could not only make America money but help it reduce its dependence on China for these substances. The danger of that dependence was highlighted in December when Beijing banned exports of gallium and germanium. Breaking China’s critical metal dominance “is one of the main geopolitical drivers in Washington right now,” Bryan Bille, a policy expert at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, tells me.

And Ukraine is willing to cut some kind of deal. Kyiv has been courting American investment since 2023. According to the New York Times, that push included a Trump-Zelensky meeting and visits to the US from Ukrainian officials pitching deals for lithium and titanium. The US and Ukraine are still discussing some kind of metals-for-security deal.

Whatever happens at the abstract heights of international diplomacy, however, there are major obstacles on the ground. Ukraine’s metals aren’t piled up in a treasure chamber somewhere. They’re in the ground—often in ground that Russian troops are standing on.

As much as half of Ukraine’s total mineral resources are estimated to be in the four eastern regions largely occupied by Russia. At least two established lithium deposits are in Russian-held territory, and another is just a few miles from the current front line. Few investors want to put their cash into mines within artillery range of a war zone.

Mines also require lots of energy, and the war has mauled Ukraine’s power grid. Ditto for roads and other transportation infrastructure. Plus there’s the inevitable environmental damage to be considered. Critical metal mining in Ukraine “has the potential to impact wetlands and rivers, old-growth forest and steppe,” cautions the Conflict and Environment Observatory.

“Given these barriers to mining and investment, we don’t expect any new substantial critical mineral supply anytime soon,” says Bille. Nor, it seems, should Ukraine expect any substantial new help from America anytime soon. Indeed, amid the negotiations over Ukraine’s future, Russian president Vladimir Putin, eager to reciprocate America’s newly friendly attitude toward his country, has extended a metallic olive branch.

On Monday, the Times reported, Putin bragged on state TV that “Russia’s deposits of rare earth minerals used in high-tech manufacturing were ‘orders of magnitude’ greater than Ukraine’s. He said Russia could work with American companies to help develop those deposits, even inside Russian-occupied Ukraine.” 

During his first term, President Donald Trump issued a public health emergency known as Title 42 to expel asylum-seekers and other immigrants in the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic. President Joe Biden used the same tactic to empower U.S. Customs and Border Protection to block immigrants from countries with Covid outbreaks.

Now, even as his administration works to disassemble U.S. public health infrastructure, Trump is expected to deploy Title 42 again — this time to block immigrants from countries with recent cases of tuberculosis.

Experts argue there’s even less of a justification for invoking Title 42 now, noting the hypocrisy of using public health as an excuse to deny rights to asylum-seekers while systematically enabling the spread of disease at home and abroad. 

“The first [Trump administration], there didn’t seem to be that much concern over masking and getting vaccines widely dispersed,” said Juan Pedroza, a sociology professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz. “And that seems to still be the case now with the new Trump administration being very skeptical of research science when it comes to public health. At the same time that they’re saying they’re concerned about public health when it comes to immigration.” 

Last week, the Trump administration blocked federal funding for schools with Covid-19 vaccine mandates. Earlier this month, the administration significantly reduced funding to the National Institutes of Health, halting $1.5 billion in medical research funds. And the administration’s cuts to humanitarian assistance have plunged global vaccine efforts into chaos, leaving millions more susceptible to disease. 

“America is going to become less secure from a global health security [perspective], which increases chances of epidemics and pandemics.”

Dr. Paul Spiegel, an epidemiologist and director of the Center for Humanitarian Health at Johns Hopkins University, described the situation as “ironic.”

“You have the administration pulling out of the World Health Organization and the pandemic treaty. You have them pulling out of the Paris Agreement, and there’s no question that climate change is going to have a big effect on where diseases are going to move and survive,” he said. “America is going to become less secure from a global health security [perspective], which increases chances of epidemics and pandemics.”

Even with the administration taking many steps that will make a global pandemic more likely in the long run, Spiegel said there is “absolutely” no public health justification for shutting the southern border at this time. 

The epidemiologist pointed to recent cases of outbreaks of serious communicable diseases in the U.S., such as the measles outbreak in Texas. The issue there wasn’t immigrants; it was low rates of vaccination. 

Erroneously linking immigrant communities to the spread of infectious diseases is, unfortunately, a “tale as old as time,” said Pedroza at UC Santa Cruz. “You can find in the United States plenty of evidence of people saying that immigrants are bringing disease and will be contaminating the nation, including public health.” 

Pedroza pointed to historical examples such as the screenings and quarantines at Ellis Island for incoming immigrants and the racist policies along the southern border used against Mexican immigrants. “This is not the first time we’ve been here,” he said.

To Amada Armenta, an immigrant rights professor at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, Trump’s desire to invoke Title 42 is clearly divorced from actual health concerns. “Him wanting to shut down the asylum system is 100 percent not about public health at all,” she said. 

Despite the transparent nature of Trump’s efforts, Armenta said that connecting immigrants to disease has real-world consequences that ricochet past the border. “Whether he calls them criminals or people who carry diseases — which we know are not true — his rhetoric drives opinion,” she said. 

But the biggest price, if the administration issues Title 42, will be paid by immigrants and asylum-seekers along the southern border. 

“People have the right to apply for asylum,” she said. “And really, what this does is it just completely traps people in places where they’re very vulnerable.”

The post Title 42 Isn’t About Public Health — It’s About Keeping Immigrants Out appeared first on The Intercept.

Why wait until St. Patrick’s Day to raise a pint when the festivities have already begun? New York City Beer Week is in full swing, running through March 2, bringing a citywide celebration of craft beer to over 40 breweries—including plenty of exciting events in Queens.

This annual showcase of local brewing talent offers beer lovers a chance to sample exclusive releases, enjoy brewery tours, and take part in unique events ranging from trivia nights to beer-pairing dinners. Queens, home to some of the city’s most beloved breweries, is a major player in the festivities, with standout spots like SingleCut Beersmiths, Fifth Hammer Brewing Company, and Alewife Brewing, pouring special selections and hosting lively gatherings.

Beyond the beer, expect games, prizes, and collaborative brews featuring Queens-based favorites. Whether you’re a casual drinker or a die-hard craft beer enthusiast, NYC Beer Week is the perfect excuse to explore the borough’s thriving brewery scene while supporting local businesses.

With just a week left to soak up the fun, now’s the time to plan your brewery visits. Here are some must-attend events happening in Queens and around the city before Beer Week wraps up—

Game Night with Finback at The Local 

Wed., Feb. 26, 5-9 p.m.

66-75 Selfridge St., Forest Hills

Finback, a Long Island City-based brewery, is hosting a game night at The Local in Forest Hills, a beer bar with delicious burgers, wings, sandwiches, and more. Finback beer will be the star of the evening, but the space has a selection of over 200 cans and bottles and nine craft beers on tap. Some board games will be available, but guests are encouraged to bring their own bar-friendly board games.

KCBC and Pink Book Society Presents: Dynamite Evolution Beer Launch at The Bier & Cheese Collective

Wed., Feb. 26, 6-9 p.m.

35-11 Ditmars Blvd., Astoria

Kings County Brewing Company (KCBC), a Brooklyn-based beer company, is partnering up with Astoria’s beloved and delicious Bier and Cheese Collective. The event will feature a beer tasting of their latest IPA, Dynamite Evolution, and a cheese tasting to complement the newest beer they launched.

 

KCBC X Garvies Point at Tap House

Thurs., Feb. 27, 6-9 p.m.

72-07 Austin St., Forest Hills

KCBC is back in Queens with Glen Cove-based brewery Garvies Point for an evening of showing off their best and latest beer in Forest Hills. Stop by and try out their offerings with a friend or go solo and enjoy meeting fellow beer lovers.

Finback Opening Bash Post Hang and Bingo at NY Beer Dispensary

Sun., Feb. 23 3-7 p.m.

223 W. 14 St., Manhattan

Finback is celebrating the launch of its newest IPA, Daily Catch, available for customers to buy all year. Try their latest beer and enjoy an afternoon of playing bingo at this fun and laid-back weekend event.

 

Rockaway x Beer Run Harlem at Rockaway Brewing

Tues., Feb., 25

6-8:30 p.m.

3604 Broadway, Manhattan

Rockaway Brewing is a Long Island City-based brewery that’s collaborating with fellow brewery, Beer Run Harlem. The event will feature tastings of the breweries’ latest and best beer for a perfect way to spend a weekday evening with friends.

 

Trivia with Finback at Covenhoven

Tues., Feb. 25, 9-10:45 p.m.

730 Classon Ave., Brooklyn

Switch up your weeknight routine and enjoy a trivia night sponsored by Finback. The night will feature three Finback draft lines, beer specials, and the chance for winning teams to win prizes. 

Rockaway Brewing at Beer Table Penn Station

Wed., Feb. 26, 5-7 p.m.

87 E 42nd St., Manhattan

Get off the Penn Station stop on your way home and visit Beer Table for a tasting of one of Rockaway Brewing’s latest IPA, Hawaiian Pizza. The hazy IPA has flavors of pineapple, reduced plums, and a scent of tomato paste. Give your happy hour a great start at this fun event, which will also feature other beers and IPAs from the LIC-based brewery.

Rockaway Brewing at Craft+Carry 

Thurs., Feb. 27, 6-8 p.m.

445 Albee Square W., Brooklyn

This beer tasting will feature IPAs such as Vacation Zone Pale Ale and more of Rockaway Brewing’s tasty offerings. It is a perfect pre-weekend occasion for beer tasting, meeting new people, and enjoying the company of fellow beer lovers.