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The Trump administration has employed shifting legal strategies to freeze and terminate grants, contracts, and other forms of financial assistance that are not in line with the administration’s policy priorities. After initial losses in court, its current approach is not to rely on executive orders (or other instruments requiring governmentwide action), but rather to assert that each agency is acting pursuant to its own regulations, terms, and conditions that purportedly permit the agency to freeze or terminate funding. In some cases, those agency-specific authorities do not in fact authorize the agencies to act as the administration claims. But even where regulations, terms, or conditions do purport to authorize agencies to freeze or terminate funding based on changing policy priorities, a separate statute — the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA) — may prohibit agencies from undertaking these freezes and terminations. The ICA forbids agencies from intentionally delaying or rescinding funding outside of the narrow circumstances it delineates, which do not include a president’s changing policy priorities. And no regulation, term, or condition can supersede this statutory prohibition.

Early Challenges Halt the Administration’s Initial Strategies to Stop Spending Funds

The Trump administration’s efforts to stop spending funds on programs deemed to be inconsistent with the administration’s policy priorities began on Inauguration Day. In a Jan. 20, 2025 Executive Order (E.O.) titled “Unleashing American Energy,” President Trump directed “[a]ll agencies” to “immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 . . . or the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.” The E.O. instructed agencies not to disburse funds appropriated under these two laws, even for binding obligations already entered with third parties, until senior political appointees approved the relevant disbursement.

Another E.O. issued on Jan. 20, titled “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” directed agencies to “immediately pause new obligations and disbursements of” foreign assistance funds “pending reviews of such programs for programmatic efficiency and consistency with United States foreign policy, to be conducted within 90 days.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio effectuated this E.O. several days later, directing that stop work orders be issued for nearly all existing foreign assistance.

On Jan. 27, 2025, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) vastly expanded the scope of frozen funds by issuing M-25-13, a memorandum directing federal agencies to “temporarily pause all activities related to obligation or disbursement of all Federal financial assistance.” The memorandum explained that this freeze was to provide time “to align Federal spending and action with the will of the American people as expressed through Presidential priorities.”

A group of states and several nonprofit coalitions quickly filed suits challenging M-25-13. The district court in Washington, D.C. in the nonprofits’ lawsuit promptly entered an administrative stay against enforcement of the OMB memo. Following that stay, OMB rescinded its memo. Still, the administration maintained that the rescission of M-25-13 was “NOT a rescission of the federal funding freeze,” because “[t]he President’s EO[]s on federal funding remain in full force and effect.”

Thereafter, the district court in the states’ lawsuit issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting any action to “pause, freeze, impede, block, cancel, or terminate” the states’ funding, “except on the basis of the applicable authorizing statutes, regulations, and terms.” Even after this order, the Department of Justice (DOJ) asserted that the funding freezes under the E.O.s remained in effect.

On Feb. 10, 2025, the district court in the states’ case entered a new order that explicitly prohibited the agencies from pausing funding based on the E.O.s. The court’s order also did not mention that its prior order had a carveout for actions taken “on the basis of the applicable authorizing statutes, regulations, and terms.”

The Administration’s Evolving Strategies for Impounding Funds

At this point, the administration’s strategy shifted to purportedly relying on agency-specific authority to stop spending funds. DOJ sought an emergency stay from the First Circuit, but rather than rely on the E.O.s as the primary authority for the spending freezes, the administration emphasized that the district court’s order did not specify that agencies could take action based on their “authorizing statutes, regulations, and terms.” When the District Court clarified that the administration remained free to limit access to federal funds on these bases, the administration dropped its First Circuit appeal. In subsequent district court briefing, the administration asserted that any ongoing freezes or rescissions of funding are the result of “independent agency decisions,” through which “agencies [are] implementing their own authorities.”

As in the states’ lawsuit challenging the OMB memo, in a suit challenging the administration’s actions toward foreign assistance programs, a court in Washington, D.C. has preliminarily permitted the administration to act based on terms and conditions of awards. While the court temporarily enjoined the administration from pausing or giving effect to terminations of agreements that were in place prior to the change in administrations, the court stipulated that “nothing in this order shall prohibit the Restrained Defendants from enforcing the terms of contracts or grants.” In a status report following this order, the administration took the position that “at least substantially all of the terminations, suspensions, and stop-work orders issued on [United States Agency for International Development] USAID contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements were allowed by the terms of those instruments or terms implicitly incorporated into those instruments.”

In addition to relying on purported agency-specific authority to pause or terminate awards, the Trump administration has recently argued that the relevant statutes appropriating funds give the administration authority to pause the disbursement of funds. In the administration’s view, so long as the relevant statutory provisions do not mandate disbursement “to specific entities on specific timelines,” the administration retains “discretion to temporarily pause funding.”

Regulations Governing Suspension and Termination of Grants and Contracts

Various existing regulations set out the circumstances in which an agency may pause or terminate a grant or contract.

With respect to grants, OMB issues the “Uniform Grants Guidance” (UGG) in 2 C.F.R. part 200, which is a template of regulations for agencies to adopt to govern their financial assistance awards. Most agencies have adopted the UGG in full or in large part in their own regulations.

There is no provision in the UGG that generally permits agencies to pause an award based on changing agency policy priorities. The first Trump administration did, however, add such a provision with respect to terminations. In 2020, OMB revised 2 C.F.R. 200.340(a)(2) to purportedly permit agencies to terminate a financial assistance award, “to the extent authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.”

In 2024, the Biden administration revised Section 340, and specifically 2 CFR 200.340(a)(4) and (b), to permit termination on these grounds only where such bases for termination are “clearly and unambiguously” stated in the terms and conditions of an award. OMB explained that under the revised Section 340, agencies may terminate a grant or award based on new program goals or agency priorities “[p]rovided that the language is included in the terms and condition of the award.” The Biden administration’s revised UGG went into effect on Oct. 1, 2024.

With respect to contracts, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) instructs agencies to insert a clause in their contracts that permits the agency to stop work for up to 90 days. Beyond 90 days, all parties to the contract would be required to consent to any extension of the stop worker order. The FAR also instructs agencies to include a clause in most contracts that allows the agency to terminate the contract “for convenience,” whenever the agency determinates that “a termination is in the Government’s interest.”

The Impoundment Control Act – Presidential Policy Preferences are Not a Permitted Basis for Deferring or Rescinding Appropriated Funds

Of course, regulations and terms and conditions cannot supersede contrary federal statutes. The most relevant statute here is the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA). The ICA sets forth limited circumstances in which the president or an agency may “defer” or “rescind” congressionally appropriated funds.

Under the ICA, a “deferral” encompasses any “withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of” appropriated funds, as well as “any other type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of” appropriated funds. A deferral thus includes both delays in obligating funds and delays in disbursing funds that are already obligated. When the executive branch wishes to defer funds, it must send a special message to Congress detailing the money to be deferred and the reasons for deferral.

There are only three permissible grounds for deferrals: (1) “to provide for contingencies” (which generally means keeping a small cushion in case obligations incurred with an appropriation end up costing more than anticipated); (2) “to achieve savings made possible by or through changes in requirements or greater efficiency of operations;” or (3) “as specifically provided by law.” Id. § 684(b). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly held that “policy reasons,” including efforts to ensure funds are spent in accordance with the president’s policy preferences, are not a proper basis for deferrals.

Where the president seeks to “rescind” appropriated funds, the ICA requires that the president send a special message to Congress specifying, among other things, the funds he seeks to have rescinded and the reasons for his proposal. The administration can withhold obligating the relevant funds for 45 session days after the president transmits his request, but if Congress does not rescind the funds in that period, the administration must make the funds available for obligation.

The GAO has held that “programmatic delays” in spending funds do not constitute deferrals or rescissions subject to the ICA. Per GAO, “programmatic delays occur when an agency is taking necessary steps to implement a program, but because of factors external to the program, funds temporarily go unobligated.” Permissible programmatic delays do not include when the executive branch withholds money “on its own volition” for policy reasons.

Application of the Impoundment Control Act to Suspensions and Terminations

In light of the ICA, the administration is wrong that agencies have free rein to pause or terminate grants or contracts pursuant to an agency’s “statutes, regulations, and terms.”

Regarding statutes, the ICA flatly contradicts DOJ’s assertion that agencies have “discretion to temporarily pause funding” so long as the statute appropriating funds does not mandate disbursement “to specific entities on specific timelines.” A deferral under the ICA includes any “withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of” funds. Thus, any intentional “pause” in disbursing funds is a deferral. The ICA prohibits any such pause unless it is a permissible programmatic delay (which, as explained above, does not include changed policy preferences) or the agency has followed the ICA’s procedures and criteria for deferrals.

As for regulations and terms, the ICA may prohibit suspending or terminating grants and contracts based on changing agency policy priorities—even where an agency’s regulations or terms and conditions purport to authorize such action.

A straightforward example involves funds for which the period of availability has expired. Where Congress appropriates funds for a fixed period (e.g., a single fiscal year), agencies generally must obligate the funds within that fixed period and cannot obligate the funds after. In some cases, particularly with grants, agencies may continue disbursing funds after the period for obligation has ended, as long as the funds were obligated before the funds expired.

Say, therefore, that the Department of Education awarded a grant during Fiscal Year 2024, using funds that expired at the end of that fiscal year, but for which the grant continues to be paid out over several years. If the Department were to terminate the grant now for policy reasons, the Department could not re-obligate that money for other purposes because the period of availability has ended. The appropriated funds, therefore, would go unspent. This likely would violate the ICA, even if the grant terms and conditions purported to permit the Department to terminate the grant based on changing agency policy priorities.

The ICA may also prohibit terminating grants or contracts where the period of availability has not expired. If an agency terminates grants or contracts and thereby delays the obligation or expenditure of funds, without undertaking efforts to promptly re-obligate and disburse the funds to better implement the relevant program, that may constitute an unlawful deferral under the ICA.

Similarly, if an agency terminates all or nearly all agreements that were entered using a particular appropriation, without any intent to re-obligate the funds for the purpose for which Congress appropriated the money, that may constitute an unlawful rescission under the ICA, regardless of the terms and conditions of each individual agreement. Evaluation of whether terminations violate the ICA for funds that have not expired requires a case-by-case evaluation of the stated reasons for the termination, the agency’s stated intent (or lack thereof) for re-purposing the funds, and other relevant case-specific factors.

Bringing an ICA Claim

A final note concerns an obstacle the administration is likely to raise in response to any litigation premised on ICA violations. The administration is likely to argue that, even for claims brought under the Administrative Procedure Act against final agency action, parties cannot premise claims on ICA violations because the ICA sets forth a separate procedure by which the Comptroller General may challenge certain ICA violations in the District Court for the District of Columbia.

That argument should carry no water in the context of the types of ICA violations at issue here. The ICA permits the Comptroller General to sue over only one particular type of ICA violation: a refusal to make funds “available for obligation.” The ICA does not authorize the Comptroller General to bring suit over violations involving funds already obligated, such as freezing the disbursement of obligated funds or canceling the obligations. Thus, the ICA’s authorization of the Comptroller General to sue in those limited instances should not hinder the ability of other parties to assert claims based on these other types of ICA violations.

Conclusion

The first month of the Trump administration has featured an unprecedented Executive branch campaign to refuse to honor appropriations that Congress lawfully enacted. The administration’s novel reliance on terms and conditions to interrupt entire categories of grants and contracts reflects the ends to which the administration will go to carry out this campaign. These terms and conditions were never intended to serve as a means for mass defiance of congressional prerogatives. The administration’s novel strategy for leveraging these terms and conditions may give rise to novel claims through which impacted entities may seek recourse.

IMAGE: U.S. President Donald Trump’s nominee for Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought testifies during the Senate Banking Committee nomination hearing in the Dirksen Senate Building on January 22, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images)

The post The Trump Administration Cannot Use Award Terms and Conditions to Impound Funds appeared first on Just Security.

An attractive mixed-use complex with commercial space, a Lidl discount grocery store, and apartments is rising at the corner of Bedford Avenue and Empire Boulevard in Crown Heights.

A recent visit showed a simple and modern-looking four-story white-brick veneer building at 1750 Bedford Ave. that will house the grocery store looking nearly complete on the outside. Behind it, a similarly clad but less symmetrical seven-story apartment building with balconies is still partly shrouded in scaffolding.

The complex may be a rare case of a build looking better than its renderings. The structure’s massing has been updated and plans no longer call for two more stories with a setback at the corner.

The new building has taken the place of a 1936 Art Deco Streamline Moderne Firestone Auto Supply and Service Store. The service station’s streamlined curves and prominent signage dominated the corner for decades, despite it being only one story.

The new development will bring an affordable grocery store to an area currently lacking in options, along with 57 new apartments, 18 of which will be considered affordable, developers said, though it is not yet clear what rents will be. Notably, it will do this without climbing to controversial heights, like some have pitched for the area, by using the city’s Quality Housing Program, which allows for bulkier-density buildings in exchange for keeping heights lower.

In May 2022, the Department of Buildings issued a full demolition permit to owner Jack Gold of Seventh Street Development Group, city records show. In January 2023, a new-building permit was issued for a new six-story building with 57 apartments, parking for 169 vehicles, a loading berth, and 55,998 square feet of commercial space. The permit says the commercial area, which fronts Empire Boulevard, was reduced from seven to four stories.

In 2023, it was announced that a 33,000-square-foot Lidl discount supermarket would take part of the commercial space, bringing an affordable grocery option to an area that has been labeled a food desert by local residents. At the time, Seventh Street Development Group, said the complex would have 12,000 square feet of retail space, 12,000 square feet of office space, and a 9,000 square-foot community facility. Permits show 13,501 square feet have been set aside for a community facility, and a Chipotle restaurant has also signed a lease on the ground floor.

Jeff Akerman of Rise Architecture is the architect of record. Other projects for the Brooklyn-based firm include an eight-story affordable housing development at 605 Hart Street in Bushwick and a mixed-use tower at 15 Ocean Avenue in Prospect Lefferts Gardens.

The property was purchased in 1989 by the Empire Bedford Development Company, which leased it to Firestone for years. Even after the demolition of Ebbets Field in 1960, the service station continued to be operated under the Firestone brand through at least 2019. Empire Bedford Development transferred the property to a related LLC in 2021, and it has been transferred to other related companies since. Currently city records show it is owned by 1730 Bedford Owner LLC. Gold appears to be behind the LLCs.

Empire Boulevard was once dominated by single-story service stations and garages meant to accommodate the traffic at the bustling ballpark, but in recent years, as businesses have closed down or relocated and buildings left vacant, there have been conversations about whether on not to introduce housing along the stretch.

Just up the block at 73-99 Empire Boulevard, locals recently pushed back on a developer’s plan to rezone and build a 13-story mixed-use development on the corner of Empire Boulevard and McKeever Place, saying the new building would cast shade on nearby children’s play areas, be out of context, and wouldn’t be affordable to local residents. The site currently holds a Gothic-style 1920s single-story garage.

The local community board and residents who spoke at the borough president’s hearing said they support a low-rise commercial building taking the place of the garage, and said they fear any precedent a rezoning like the one proposed would set for Empire Boulevard.

A version of this story first appeared on Brooklyn Paper’s sister site Brownstoner. 

On Friday, President Donald Trump fired the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Charles Q. Brown. This ends a distinguished career for General Brown, the second African-American to serve as the U.S. military’s most senior officer (confirmation vote 83-11), and someone who sailed through the Senate confirmation process when he was previously nominated for Air Force Chief of Staff (98-0 vote).

The firings also appear to breathe life into the military career of a retired Air Force lieutenant general, Dan Caine, whom Trump said he will nominate to take Brown’s place. What’s more, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth fired the first woman to serve as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti; Air Force Vice-Chief General James Slife; and all three Judge Advocates General (JAGs), the top uniformed attorneys for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Army Lt. Gen. Joseph B. Berger III, Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Plummer and Rear Adm. Lia M. Reynolds. In total, Trump and Hegseth fired six of the nation’s most senior officers, with more than 200 years of combined, hard-earned military experience—an unprecedented shakeup of senior military leadership.

This unprecedented purge of the nation’s top brass suggests that Trump, who has attacked former Joint Chiefs Chairman Mark Milley as insufficiently loyal and reportedly said, “I need the kind of Generals that Hitler had,” may attempt to fill these roles with officers he perceives as loyal to him personally. It also raises a host of legal and policy questions that must be addressed before the Senate can provide its advice and consent on a flurry of new military nominations. I was a senior Navy personnel lawyer in the Pentagon, and I know from experience that the legal and policy issues surrounding constitutional authorities, personnel law, and civil-military relations are complex. But here is how I would analyze them.

Did President Trump Have Authority to Fire These Senior Officers?

Presidents have wide latitude to remove senior military officers, but the nature and scope of these removals raise serious questions. Military officers serve at the discretion of the president. For example, the statute governing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ role explicitly states that “[T]he Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of four years.” And the statute establishing the position of Judge Advocate General provides that the JAG shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Historically, the president’s authority to appoint and remove officers has played a vital role in helping ensure civilian control over the military—an important constitutional principle that has served the nation well since the dawn of the republic. For example, President Harry Truman famously fired General MacArthur, a wildly popular five-star general, during the height of the Korean War for openly disagreeing with Truman over the broader American strategy on the Korean peninsula. While Truman was criticized for this decision and faced massive domestic pushback, history has validated the wisdom of subordinating the military to civilian leadership.

But Secretary Hegseth, in response to a question about his decision to fire the services’ three top JAGs, made a troubling statement on Fox News Sunday. He stated, “We want lawyers who give sound constitutional advice and don’t exist to attempt to be roadblocks to anything that happens.” Congress makes it unlawful for any officer or Department of Defense employee to interfere with the ability of the Judge Advocates General to give independent legal advice. At the very least, Hegseth’s statement that the Administration was firing the JAGs to remove them as “roadblocks” calls into question the Administration’s compliance with the spirit of this statutory requirement.

Are These Firings Unusual?

Yes. Under federal law, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Like all uniformed personnel, the Chairman is apolitical, and former Chairmen have historically served out their terms across changes in presidential administration. The Goldwater Nichols Act, which established the role of Chairman, prescribes a four-year term that begins on October 1 of an odd-numbered year—deliberately ensuring a level of continuity and stability at the Pentagon. That design of insulation from politics is undermined by firing the individual before their term ends.

While it was the president’s constitutional prerogative to remove these six senior officials, an important constitutional norm separating the military from political activities is being stressed in new and troubling ways. These six officers are not being fired for misconduct, insubordination, or any specific performance issue. The reasons are murky, but appear in part to relate to some of the senior officers’ commitment to diversity initiatives, a priority of the earlier administration.

What is the Role of Military JAG Attorneys?

No articulable reason has been offered for the mass firing of the three top JAG attorneys, who play a critical role in overseeing the military justice system and upholding the rule of law and whose summary removals are unprecedented in modern times. Former Air Force JAG Major General Charles Dunlap does an outstanding job outlining the critical role that JAGs play in providing independent, nonpartisan legal advice here. And Congress reinforces the role that JAGs play in providing expert military legal advice. Indeed, as noted above, existing law prohibits any military or civilian member in the Department of Defense from interfering in independent legal advice given by the Judge Advocate Generals of each service.

The firing without apparent cause of the service JAGs is particularly disturbing. I proudly served as a Navy JAG, and can say from experience that JAG attorneys play a critical role in providing neutral, independent, fact-based guidance to commanders up and down the chain of command. This legal advice ensures that the military follows the law and acts within its constitutionally prescribed role. That can be especially important in determining the legal boundaries for when the U.S. military can be used domestically. During the George W. Bush Administration, uniformed JAGs were purposefully kept out of the loop, excluded from the so-called “war council” that issued the infamous torture memos. Civilian leaders knew that the senior JAGs opposed the administration’s torture policy and did not want pushback. Yet how much harm did legalizing torture cause to the United States’ mission, not to mention our long-term credibility and security? Congress, angered at the sidelining of service JAGs during this episode, responded in 2008 by elevating their positions from two stars to three, a rank that each holds to this day.

Indeed, uniformed JAGs are keenly aware of the importance of adherence to the laws of war and are the military’s experts on operational law, a field of growing importance. Operators across the services depend on JAGs to advise them on how to carry out their missions safely and lawfully. I can speak to this from firsthand experience. Prior to serving as a JAG, I was a tactical jet aviator flying missions from aircraft carriers during both an international armed conflict in 2003 and operations enforcing the no-fly zone in Iraq in 2001. The operational legal environment in the Middle East during that time was extraordinarily dynamic, dangerous, and legally complex. As an aircraft mission commander, I relied on JAG officers to educate me on complex rules of engagement and translate America’s international legal obligations from the treaty to the cockpit. The JAG assigned to my aircraft carrier strike group was a former Navy SEAL—similar to many JAGs who have prior operational and combat experience. I recall peppering him with a slew of questions and real-world scenarios that we could face in the cockpit, knowing that we would just have seconds to react. His advice was critical to our safety and success.

The administration’s move to fire the top JAG attorneys is ominous, and suggests they’ll try to stack these roles with officers they believe will be more pliant and less likely to push back against unlawful orders. Defense Secretary Hegseth has already made several disparaging remarks about JAGs, who he derides as “jagoffs.” That’s insulting and demeaning to a critical component of our armed forces, and reflects an aversion to upholding the rule of law. It also misunderstands the role of JAGs and uniformed personnel more broadly, who follow lawful orders—which have a high presumption of legality—across changes in administration. This special trust is essential to the rule of law and civilian control of the military. After all, military officers take an oath to the Constitution, not to a particular person or political party.

Does the Nomination of Lieutenant General Caine Raise Any Legal Issues?

Yes. There are several legal issues arising from Lieutenant General Caine’s experience, status and current rank. To be clear, Lieutenant General Caine has had a truly extraordinary career as an Air Force pilot where he served as a White House Fellow and in a variety of top leadership positions. But the Goldwater–Nichols Act puts in place the highest of high bars for appointment to Chairman. The Senate should ensure that this appointment meets the legal prerequisites for the Chairmanship described below.

• Experience. Current law requires that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have certain prior experiences—either as Vice Chairman, or as a combatant commander or service chief—to be eligible for appointment. To date, every prior Chairman has met this requirement. While Lieutenant General Caine lacks any of these experiences, the statute allows the president to waive this requirement if he determines that “such action is necessary in the national interest.” Although President Trump can waive the requirement, Congress identified these prior experiences for a reason: to reward success at the four-star level in joint assignments. Joint assignments demand specialized skills and knowledge of joint interoperability and how the different services work together in complex operational environments. Former Senator Goldwater insisted that the military embrace joint operations to avoid disasters—such as the failure to rescue American hostages in Tehran—that demonstrated the inability of the different services to work together.
• Status. Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act governing military personnel law and the Pentagon’s organization, Congress requires that any officer appointed to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs must be an officer “of the regular components of the armed forces.” Title 10 of the U.S. Code does not expressly define “regular components,” but does distinguish between “regular” and “reserve components”—indicating that members of the Reserves are not members of regular components of the armed forces for purposes of the statute.As of this writing, it remains unclear whether Lieutenant General Caine meets the baseline requirement for appointment as a member of the “regular component.” It appears that he is currently retired. Caine served in a variety of Guard assignments and his bio notes that “from 2009-2016, Caine was a part-time member of the National Guard and a serial entrepreneur and investor.” What is his current status? Is he part of the Retired Reserve?Recalling him to active duty will be a necessary first step, but will he still be in a reserve component status? If so, that is a problem. Unlike the Goldwater–Nichols Act’s separate requirement that the Chairman have prior experience as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as a combatant commander or service chief, the statutory requirement that the Chairman come “from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces” cannot be waived by the president alone and would require action by both chambers of Congress. This question regarding status must be clarified before the Senate moves forward to vote on this nomination.
• Rank. Lieutenant General Caine is currently a three-star officer. Every nominee to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has served for years with four stars, a rank they would necessarily have attained by serving in one of the roles Congress specified as a prerequisite for appointment as Chairman. While there is no legal bar to the president nominating a three-star officer without prior joint experience given the waiver provision described above, so long as the status issue described above is resolved, the nomination of someone at the three-star rank who has not served as a combatant commander or service chief is unusual and worthy of further Senate inquiry.

Beyond the legal issues raised by Caine’s nomination, it is striking that Trump overlooked several outstanding officers who already meet the existing Goldwater–Nichols Act statutory requirements, to include leading a combatant command. For example, Admiral Sam Paparo is the Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, a command spanning 36 nations (to include China), 14 time zones, and 60 percent of the world’s population. And there are numerous four-star officers who don’t present the legal issues with experience, rank and status that I highlighted above.

What explains the end run around these dozens of qualified officers in favor of Caine, who by all accounts had an extraordinary career but falls short of the statutory criteria in multiple respects?

Does Congress Have a Role in These Military Officer Appointments?

Yes. Congress can and should respond to these unprecedented personnel moves in several ways.

First, the Senate has a strong constitutional advise and consent role for all the newly nominated military officers. And heightened scrutiny is warranted given the unusual nature of Caine’s candidacy and the broader, troubling context.

Second, the Senate must ask searching questions of a nominee who Trump himself has said expressed personal political loyalty to the president:

“He said, ‘I’ll kill for you sir,” Trump said. “Then he puts on a ‘Make America Great Again’ hat.”

The Department of Defense has strict guidance prohibiting service members from engaging in partisan political activities. Indeed, all military personnel are instructed to avoid “the inference that their political activities imply or appear to imply DoD sponsorship, approval or endorsement of a political candidate, campaign or cause.”

Caine has reportedly said he did not wear a MAGA hat, but the fact Trump has highlighted this as an apparent selling point for Caine suggests he will nominate him because he views the retired lieutenant general as a loyalist. Senators should ask him whether he wore a MAGA hat, and said “I’ll kill for you sir,” but should also ask probing questions about his view of the military’s role in our constitutional scheme and how he would respond to unlawful orders. They should ask for specific commitments that he will put his oath to the Constitution above his personal political views or loyalties. And they should also probe his qualifications to serve in a role traditionally occupied by officers with requisite experience and rank.

Third, given the broader and very serious concerns about Trump’s purge of apolitical career officers and stated desire to have loyalist generals, the Senate should consider using other tools at its disposal to push back. During the prior Congress, Senator Tuberville held up the promotions of hundreds of flag and general officers over unrelated objections to the Pentagon’s abortion policy. Tuberville’s blockade applied across the board to hundreds of officers at all ranks, the overwhelming majority of whom played no role in setting any type of Pentagon policy—and it threatened readiness and retention and harmed military families across the services, as I argued at the time. A similarly sweeping hold on all officer promotions would be just as problematic now, but Senators should consider wielding their authority in a more targeted way, including by withholding consent for specific nominees who do not pass muster.

Conclusion

Make no mistake: these firings are extraordinary and destabilize a longstanding norm of separating uniformed military members from politics. It is not an overstatement to characterize these firings as unprecedented and dangerous. What’s more, this purge is occurring against a backdrop of massively complex national security challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East, and beyond.

Congress, which the Constitution envisions having a robust role in the appointment of officers and funding the military, must assert itself. How will they respond to this troubling politicization trend?

IMAGE: The Pentagon logo and an American flag are lit up in the briefing room of Pentagon in Arlington, VA. (Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images)

The post How the Pentagon Personnel Firings Threaten Our Apolitical Military appeared first on Just Security.

Australia bans Kaspersky software over national security concerns, citing risks of foreign interference, espionage, and sabotage of government networks.

Australian Government banned products and services provided by Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky over national security concerns.

The Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs has issued a mandatory directive under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) to manage security risks to the government.

“This Direction requires Australian Government entities to prevent the installation of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. products and web services from all Australian Government systems and devices, and where found, to remove all existing instances.” reads the Direction 002-2025 issued by Australia’s Department of Home Affairs.

The Australian government has ordered to remove Kaspersky Lab products and services from all government systems by April 1, 2025, citing security risks related to foreign interference, espionage, and data exposure. Entities must also prevent the installation of Kaspersky software, reporting completion to the Department of Home Affairs.

“After considering threat and risk analysis, I have determined that the use of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. products and web services by Australian Government entities poses an unacceptable security risk to Australian Government, networks and data, arising from threats of foreign interference, espionage and sabotage.” reads the directive.

“I have also considered the important need for a strong policy signal to critical infrastructure and other Australian governments regarding the unacceptable security risk associated with the use of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. products and web services. Entities must manage the risks arising from Kaspersky Lab, Inc.’s extensive collection of user data and exposure of that data to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law. By 1 April 2025, all non-corporate Commonwealth entities must:

• Identify and remove all existing instances of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. products and web services on all Australian Government systems and devices.
• Prevent the installation of Kaspersky Lab, Inc. products and web services on all Australian Government systems and devices.
• Report completion of above requirements to the Department of Home Affairs’ Commonwealth Security Policy Branch at PSPF@homeaffairs.qov.au.”

In June 2024, the Biden administration announced the ban on the sale of Kaspersky antivirus software due to the risks posed by Russia to U.S. national security. The U.S. government implemented a new rule leveraging the powers established during the Trump administration to ban the sale of Kaspersky software, citing national security risks posed by Russia.

The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security banned the Russian cybersecurity firm because it is based in Russia.

Government experts believe that the influence of the Kremlin over the company poses a significant risk, reported Reuters. Russia-linked actors can abuse the software’s privileged access to a computer system to steal sensitive information from American computers or spread malware, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said on a briefing call with reporters on Thursday.

“Russia has shown it has the capacity and… the intent to exploit Russian companies like Kaspersky to collect and weaponize the personal information of Americans and that is why we are compelled to take the action that we are taking today,” Raimondo said on the call.

This isn’t the first time that Western governments have banned Kaspersky, but the Russian firm has always denied any link with the Russian government.

In March 2022, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) added multiple Kaspersky products and services to its Covered List saying that they pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security.

The Covered List, published by Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, included products and services that could pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

In March 2022, the German Federal Office for Information Security agency, aka BSI, also recommended consumers uninstall Kaspersky anti-virus software. The Agency warns the cybersecurity firm could be implicated in hacking attacks during the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.

According to §7 BSI law, the BSI warns against using Kaspersky Antivirus and recommends replacing it asap with defense solutions from other vendors.

The alert pointed out that antivirus software operates with high privileges on machines and if compromised could allow an attacker to take over them. BSI remarks that the trust in the reliability and self-protection of a manufacturer as well as his authentic ability to act is crucial for the safe use of any defense software. The doubts about the reliability of the manufacturer, lead the agency in considering the antivirus protection offered by the vendor risky for the IT infrastructure that uses it.

BSI warns of potential offensive cyber operations that can be conducted with the support of a Russian IT manufacturer, it also explains that the vendor could be forced to conduct attacks or be exploited for espionage purposes without its knowledge.

The United States banned government agencies from using Kaspersky defense solutions in 2017, the company rejected any allegation and also clarified that Russian policies and laws are applied to telecoms and ISPs, not security firms like Kaspersky.

In June 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution that classifies the security firm’s software as “malicious” due to the alleged link of the company with Russian intelligence.

Some European states, including the UK, the Netherlands, and Lithuania also excluded the software of the Russian firm on sensitive systems.

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, cyberespionage)

The Trump administration’s fast-track plan to end Russia’s war against Ukraine has potential and had been gaining traction, but the administration risks undermining its own approach amid chaotic inconsistencies. These inconsistencies partly reflect President Donald Trump’s personalized and ad hoc decision-making process and the confusion to which most new U.S. administrations are prone. But the different messages — sometimes pushing against Russia but more recently attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and even reflecting Russian talking points — suggest strategic differences within the administration, roughly between “peace through strength” versus “peace through great power appeasement,” i.e., ceding Ukraine to a Russian sphere of domination.

The Trump administration started strong. After his inauguration, Trump warned Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States was prepared to increase pressure on Russia if it did not join efforts to end the war. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth sketched out the initial and more positive Trump plan in remarks to counterparts in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels on Feb. 12. The gist of that had been clear for months: a ceasefire roughly along the current frontline,  with security arrangements for Ukraine, principally involving European troops.

Hegseth’s remarks were sounder substantively than initial criticism suggested. He called restoration of Ukraine’s internationally-recognized borders of 1997 “unrealistic” but did not suggest that the United States would recognize Russia’s occupation or push Ukraine to do so; he accurately asserted that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not a “realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement,” i.e., negotiated with Russia, but did not take Ukraine’s NATO membership off the table; and while being explicit that the United States would not deploy troops to Ukraine, he left open the possibility of backing European forces in other, critical ways, such as U.S. intelligence, logistics, and, if needed, air power.

This approach could work if the U.S. resists recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory, if it keeps NATO membership for Ukraine on the table, and, especially, if the United States and Europe can work out details of U.S. military support for European military forces inside Ukraine. A robust, even ad hoc, ceasefire that preserves “free” Ukraine independent from Russian occupation, this era’s version of West Germany, could become a strategic defeat for Putin and success for Ukraine, Europe, and the free world.

Europe taking more responsibility is critical substantively and is a key political demand from the Trump administration. And it seemed to be working. The Trump administration has pressed European allies to specify what they are willing to provide to support Ukraine. This blunt approach may be intended to push the Europeans to “put up or shut up.” Some Europeans at least seem to be getting closer to “putting up.” NATO and EU officials with whom I met in Brussels following Hegseth’s speech were thinking seriously about how a European force inside Ukraine could be structured and led. British Prime Minister Keith Starmer essentially accepted the U.S. challenge and is traveling to Washington to flesh it out. French President Emmanuel Macron, who has been forward-leaning on European forces in Ukraine, is also bound for Washington. The French and British are reportedly considering a force of 30,000 to back up the Ukrainians militarily, including through air defense and protection of critical infrastructure. This represents fast movement toward a commitment that seemed fantasy a few months ago.

An Adequate Start…And Then…

The first round of U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia Feb. 18 seemed like an adequate start: no breakthrough but the beginning of a process. A second round may be held later in February. The Trump administration’s approach — one track of talking to the Russians about improved relations if their war against Ukraine ended and the other track of mobilizing direct military support for Ukraine, a bold move that would strengthen the Ukrainian position — was arguably advancing. It could be the basis for a successful Trump stare-down of Putin over Ukraine should they meet: a potential win.

But things have gone sideways since.

The U.S. administration suddenly demanded preferential access to Ukrainian resources and revenue from its ports. Trump tends to determine U.S. national interests in terms of access to resources, and some U.S.-Ukrainian arrangement to the advantage of both sides could probably be worked out. But the initial U.S. demands were reportedly one-sided and presented in a way that any sovereign government would find hard to accept. The Ukrainians resisted the initial U.S. push and Trump then launched harsh, public attacks on Zelenskyy, joined by Trump advisor Elon Musk blaming Zelenskyy for the war and calling him a “dictator.” Subsequently, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the U.S. economic offer in much more balanced terms, and U.S.-Ukrainian talks on a deal are continuing. But at best, the messaging has been a distraction when the United States and Ukraine need to be pushing the Russians toward a reasonable settlement.

Trump has also pushed the Ukrainians to hold presidential elections as a precondition for negotiations, echoing a Russian demand and enabling a Russian tactic of stringing out negotiations and setting terms to its advantage. The United States has prepared its own draft U.N. General Assembly resolution that is far weaker than anything the U.S. has supported in the past and seems worded to curry favor with the Kremlin. U.S. conservatives used to make a meal of efforts to advance negotiations with Moscow through unilateral concessions and fatuous efforts to show goodwill.

These latest moves by the Trump administration risk weakening or even undermining its own declared objectives in Ukraine, with the United States quarreling with Ukraine’s leaders to the benefit of the Kremlin and to the alarm of the European allies, even as the United States is making a major request of them for military support for Ukraine.

The Trump administration’s policy swings could be tactical or temporary, reflecting Trump’s tendency to keep his friends and adversaries off balance by unpredictable changes of direction. Trump’s slamming of Zelenskyy could reflect his habitual anger when challenged, as Zelenskyy did in rejecting the initial proposal on Ukrainian resource exploitation. Trump could be seeking to pressure Zelenskyy to secure his swift acceptance of a U.S.-Russia peace plan over Ukraine.

Internal Strategic Split?

The Trump administration’s inconsistency on Ukraine may also reflect a strategic split within the administration. Some, more traditional or Reaganite Republicans, may still hold that the United States is better served by acting with its traditional allies with whom it shares common values to contend with its adversaries, a “free world strategy” directed at Russia, China, and Iran. Others may prefer the United States cut deals with autocratic powers as a preferred course. That could be called some version of realism, but it might also be termed a “1984 strategy” from George Orwell’s dystopian novel in which Oceana (the U.S. and the U.K.), Eurasia (Russia), and East Asia (China) divide up or fight over the rest of the world.

A U.S. strategy rooted in support for the free world has deep roots. From its emergence as a world power at the end of the 19^th century, the United States opposed the closed European empires of the time. In abundant self-confidence, the crafters of this strategy assumed that U.S. Yankee ingenuity would prevail in a fair playing field and that U.S. values would follow. The United States could shape the world in its own, democratic, image and get rich in the process.

This strategy was articulated in part by John Hay, secretary of state to Presidents William McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt, through his “Open Door policy” launched in 1899 and 1900, opposing European imperial carve up of China; McKinley’s foreign policy wasn’t only territorial acquisition. This U.S. approach, new for great powers, was expanded by President Woodrow Wilson in his “14 Points” speech to Congress in January 1918. It was expressed again by President Franklin Roosevelt in the “Atlantic Charter” of 1941 that he issued with Winston Churchill and finally put into practice as a cornerstone of the post-1945 order that President Harry Truman helped establish.

This free world strategy was neither clueless “idealism” nor empty posturing. Notwithstanding the many inconsistencies, hypocrisies, and blunders of U.S. foreign policy in the 20^th and 21^st centuries, including long wars in the Middle East, the order that the United States built and championed after 1945 brought the longest period of general peace in Europe since Roman times and decades of global prosperity around the world. For all the need to fix accumulated problems of trade, inadequate European security contributions, and more, the world the United States set in order after 1945 looks far better than the world from 1914-1945.

Values-Based Order From U.S. Origins

U.S. adherence to a value-based free world order is derived from the unusual origins of the American nation. The United States is not an ethno-state, with identity rooted in shared blood but, as Abraham Lincoln put it in his Gettysburg Address in 1863, “a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” Moreover, according to Lincoln, that “abstract truth [of the Declaration of Independence is] applicable to all men and all times…a rebuke and a stumbling-block to the very harbingers of re-appearing tyranny and oppression.” The foundational principles of the United States are universal or, one might say, global. 

This rough sense of equality, of U.S. national identity derived through universal, abstract values, informed the way in which the United States brought its new-found power to the world. Because the United States was founded on a principle of equality with universal application, it cannot easily dispense with such a principle in its conduct in the world.

There are other views of the best U.S. strategy, including one rooted in what the great historian Walter Russell Mead has termed the Jacksonian tradition, named after President Andrew Jackson. That tradition calls for a narrow conception of U.S. national interests as hard material interests, separate from abstract values. At its best, this can be a realist’s corrective to grandiosity in foreign policy. At its worst, it can lead to the cutting of bad deals with tyrants in the name of hard interests or expediency, a faux version of realism, such as was urged by isolationists prior to Pearl Harbor, who thought the United States should abandon the U.K. and cut a deal with Hitler.

The debate within the Trump administration over Ukraine policy may reflect a longstanding fight between these foreign policy traditions. There is a lot at stake. If the administration holds to its own, best positions about Ukraine and seeks peace through strength, it could succeed in ending Russia’s war on Ukraine on terms favorable for Ukraine, Europe, transatlantic security, and the free world. In the alternative, to the dismay of its friends and delight of its adversaries, the United States could stoop to a dirty deal with a dictator, weakening itself in the process.

IMAGE: A woman salvages items from her home after it was partially destroyed by a Russian attack earlier in the day, on January 23, 2025 in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. (Photo by Carl Court/Getty Images)

The post Trump Administration’s Mixed Signals on Russia and Ukraine May Reflect Internal Strategic Clash appeared first on Just Security.

WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron to the White House for talks on Monday at a moment of deep uncertainty about the future of transatlantic relations, with Trump transforming American foreign policy and effectively tuning out European leadership as he looks to quickly end Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Trump also has made demands for territory — Greenland, Canada, Gaza and the Panama Canal — as well as precious rare earth minerals from Ukraine. Just over a month into his second term, the “America First” president has cast an enormous shadow over what veteran U.S. diplomats and former government officials had regarded as America’s calming presence of global stability and continuity.

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Despite some notable hiccups, the military, economic and moral power of the United States has dominated the post-World War II era, most notably after the Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. All of that, some fear, may be lost if Trump gets his way and the U.S. abandons the principles under which the United Nations and numerous other international bodies were founded.

“The only conclusion you can draw is that 80 years of policy in standing up against aggressors has just been blown up without any sort of discussion or reflection,” said Ian Kelly, a U.S. ambassador to Georgia during the Obama and first Trump administration and now a professor at Northwestern University.

“I’m discouraged for a lot of reasons, but one of the reasons is that I had taken some encouragement at the beginning from the repeated references to ‘peace through strength,’” Kelly added. “This is not peace through strength — this is peace through surrender.”

Visits start on anniversary of war in Ukraine

Trump, a Republican, is hosting Macron on Monday, the three-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine. Trump is set to hold a meeting Thursday with another key European leader, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

Their visits come after Trump shook Europe with repeated criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for failing to negotiate an end to the war and rebuffing a push to sign off on a deal giving the U.S. access to Ukraine’s rare earth minerals, which could be used in the American aerospace, medical and tech industries.

European leaders also were dismayed by Trump’s decision to dispatch top aides for preliminary talks with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia without Ukrainian or European officials at the table.

Another clash is set to play out at the U.N. on Monday after the U.S. proposed a competing resolution that lacks the same demands as one from Ukraine and the European Union for Moscow’s forces to immediately withdraw from the country.

On the minerals deal, Zelenskyy initially bristled, saying it was short on security guarantees for Ukraine. He said Sunday on X that “we are making great progress“ but noted that “we want a good economic deal that will be part of a true security guarantee system for Ukraine.”

Trump administration officials say they expect to reach a deal this week that would tie the U.S. and Ukrainian economies closer together — the last thing that Russia wants.

It follows a public spat, with Trump calling Zelenskyy a “dictator” and falsely charging Kyiv with starting the war. Russia, in fact, invaded its smaller and lesser-equipped neighbor in February 2022.

Zelenskyy, who said Sunday in response to a question that he would trade his office for peace or to join NATO, then angered Trump by saying the U.S. president was living in a Russian-made “disinformation space.” Confronting Trump might not be the best approach, analysts say.

“The response to President Trump doing something to you is not to do something back right away. You tend to get this kind of reaction,” said retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, former foreign policy aide to the late Sen. John McCain and current senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

He added, “This is part of a broader issue where I know the administration’s characterizing themselves as disruptors. I think a better term might be destabilizers. And, unfortunately, the destabilizing is sometimes us and our allies.”

That complicated dynamic makes this week’s task all the more difficult for Macron and Starmer, leaders of two of America’s closest allies, as they try to navigate talks with Trump.

High-stakes talks between European and US leaders

Macron said he intends to tell Trump that it’s in the joint interest of Americans and Europeans not to show weakness to Putin during U.S.-led negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. He also suggested that he’ll make the case that how Trump handles Putin could have enormous ramifications for U.S. dealings with China, the United States’ most significant economic and military competitor.

“You can’t be weak in the face of President Putin. It’s not you, it’s not your trademark, it’s not in your interest,” Macron said on social media. “How can you then be credible in the face of China if you’re weak in the face of Putin?’”

Yet, Trump has shown a considerable measure of respect for the Russian leader. Trump said this month that he would like to see Russia rejoin what is now the Group of Seven major economies. Russia was suspended from the G8 after Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region.

Trump dismissed Zelenskyy’s complaints about Ukraine and Europe not being included in the opening of U.S.-Russia talks, suggesting he’s been negotiating “with no cards, and you get sick of it.”

Putin, on the other hand, wants to make a deal, Trump argued Friday. “He doesn’t have to make a deal. Because if he wanted, he would get the whole country,” Trump added.

The deference to Putin has left some longtime diplomats worried.

“The administration should consider going in a different direction because this isn’t going to work,” said Robert Wood, a retired career diplomat who served in multiple Republican and Democratic administrations, most recently as the deputy U.S. ambassador to the United Nations until December. “Let’s not kid ourselves: Russia started this war, and trying to rewrite the narrative isn’t going to serve the best interests of the U.S. or our allies.”

___

AP writer Chris Megerian contributed reporting.

A leak suggests that Chinese cybersecurity firm TopSec offers censorship-as-a-service services, it provided bespoke monitoring services to a state-owned enterprise facing a corruption scandal.

SentinelLABS researchers analyzed a data leak that suggests that the Chinese cybersecurity firm TopSec offers censorship-as-a-service services. The origin of the data leak is unclear, the leak is large and inconsistently formatted, complicating the full analysis. TopSec was founded in 1995, it offers cybersecurity services such as Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) and vulnerability scanning, along with “boutique” solutions to align with government initiatives and intelligence requirements.

TopSec is also a Tier 1 vulnerability supplier for China’s intelligence ministry and has provided cloud and IT security monitoring services nationwide since 2004.

The company provided monitoring services to a state-owned enterprise facing a corruption scandal.

The data leak includes infrastructure details and work logs from employees of a state-affiliated private sector security firm in China. The leak includes work logs, DevOps commands, API data, and network configs with hardcoded credentials, posing security risks to TopSec and its customers.

Some documents detail the use of web content monitoring services to enforce censorship for public and private sector customers.

“The data leak includes a document with 7,000+ lines of work logs and code used to orchestrate infrastructure for the firm’s DevOps practices and downstream customers and includes scripts that connect to several Chinese government hostnames, academic institutions and news sites.” reads the report published by SentinelLabs. “We identified work logs and system features that indicate TopSec is likely enabling content moderation for internet censorship purposes, a key strategy used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to monitor and control public opinion on issues that the state deems contentious or antisocial.”

The leaked documents show that TopSec worked on projects for China’s Ministry of Public Security in Dandong, Songjiang, and Pudong, including a “Cloud Monitoring Service Project” in Shanghai.

The leaked TopSec data reveals infrastructure management code, network probes, and work logs referencing a specific censorship tool called Sparta. Sparta, migrated from Apollo-GraphQL, processes Chinese-language content via GraphQL APIs. Severe monitoring events are flagged and shared on WeChat for internal handling, raising privacy concerns due to China’s cybersecurity laws.

The tool allows operators to find hidden links in web content, identifying content related to political criticism, violence, or pornography. The operators can filter the content by searching for sensitive words. 

A leaked document from September 2023 shows tasks related to sensitive word detection and forwarding asset identifiers to Zhao Nannan, linked to political events in Shanghai. Zhao, previously at the Ministry of Public Security, later worked at Shanghai SASAC, where she received alerts about sensitive content on the same day a corruption investigation involving the head of the Shanghai SASAC, Bai Tinghui, was announced.

News of Shanghai official Bai Tinghui’s corruption investigation was covered by major outlets and confirmed by the government. The Shanghai SASAC, where Zhao Nannan worked, posted the news on WeChat without censorship, raising questions about the “validated events” reported to her. Interestingly, the Shanghai Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection, involved in the investigation, is listed as a TopSec customer. This highlights the role of cybersecurity firms like TopSec in managing politically sensitive content in China.

“These leaks yield insight into the complex ecosystem of relationships between government entities and China’s private sector cybersecurity companies.” concludes the report.”The September 2023 situation in Shanghai provides insight into how local and national government interests are enforced through private sector partnerships. The CCP’s strategy of controlling information is multifaceted and requires significant investment in resources that enable the monitoring and alteration of content that citizens engage with. While there are still many unknown factors regarding how such censorship is applied, these findings yield insights into how collaboration occurs between the government and other entities in China.”

Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon

Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, China)

It is salutary to remember that the man set to take over Germany has not had any role in government. Friedrich Merz, whose Christian Democrats won a comfortable if unconvincing victory in Sunday’s elections, will form a government at a time of tumult on multiple fronts.

He faces an economy reeling from a decade of under-investment and entering its third year of recession, an immigration crisis exacerbated by a series of lone terror attacks, and the ever-growing popularity of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). Most of all it is facing the unprecedented collapse of relations with the U.S., on whom Germans have relied on for security since the end of World War Two.

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Read More: Exclusive: Alice Weidel on Her Far-Right AfD Party’s Rise, Elon Musk’s Support, and the German Election

Merz would see himself as a classic Conservative of the old school, somewhere perhaps between Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, a believer in traditional social values and the established security and political architecture of the postwar era that has bound Germans into the Transatlantic alliance.

When Donald Trump was re-elected U.S. President in November, Merz was confident he could do business with him—two fist-pumping men who wanted to slash bureaucracy, cut taxes, and wage war on “woke.” Yet the confrontational approach of Trump’s lieutenants at the recent Munich Security Conference—in which they lauded praise on the AfD—has changed that.

The 69-year-old Merz—a man who has interspersed politics with boardroom life as Chairman of the German arm of Blackrock, the investment house—is keen not to waste time. As he made clear during his victory speech, “the world isn’t waiting for us.” Germany, he added, could not spend months haggling over the finer points of a coalition agreement while Ukraine’s fate is decided by Trump and the man whom they feel has captured him, Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s chief diplomat, reiterated that point, expressing the hope that a new government is formed “as quickly as possible, as we really need to move on with decisions at the European level which requires German participation.”

With Emmanuel Macron in Washington today, and Keir Starmer following on Thursday, Europe is seeking to persuade Trump to step back from his seeming endorsement of Putin’s Ukraine position. Both the French and British leaders have been coordinating their positions, stressing the need for quiet diplomacy. But within hours of securing his election victory, Merz appeared to take a more confrontational approach toward the White House.

“My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” Merz said Sunday, before even the final election tally came in.

Some wondered whether this might be another example of an impetuousness that is seen, even by his confidants, as a weak spot in Merz’s character. Yet he doubled down on his position the following morning: “Now more than ever, we must put Ukraine in a position of strength. For a just peace, the attacked country must be part of peace negotiations.”

For such talk to have substance, Merz will have to show that he is prepared to borrow more to ramp up Germany’s defense budget. A decade after NATO members agreed to devote a minimum of 2% of GDP for military spending, Germany only reached that target in 2024. In order to increase it to 2.5%, let alone a new 3% target, will cost tens of billions. For that, the incoming government will have to reform its so-called “debt brake” that places stringent limits on public debt.

It seems that Merz is prepared to do that, with the support of the center-left Social Democrats. The outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s SPD suffered a humiliating result, falling into third place to a historic low. They are now expected to play a junior role in a center-right administration. Yet some of Merz’s agenda will be hard for it to accede to, particularly elements of his economic reform package such as welfare cuts and tax breaks, and his plans to crack down hard on illegal migration.

In one respect, the row with Trump makes Merz’s task harder; it is a warning to mainstream on the politicians on both the left and right of what may follow if they fail to form a durable coalition. Encouraged by its best-ever result, with 20% of the vote, and boosted by the boisterous support of Elon Musk and others in the Trump Administration, the AfD is waiting in the wings. It is preparing a second front of attack the moment the new government faces its next crisis.

The far-right in Germany is confident that its moment will come, again.

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A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Here’s today’s news:

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Israel will delay the release of 620 Palestinian prisoners planned for last Saturday until the release of further hostages “has been assured,” and Hamas commits to releasing them without “humiliating ceremonies,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced yesterday. Hamas, which released six Israeli hostages on Saturday, condemned the delay as representing a “clear violation” of the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Isabel Kershner, Aaron Boxerman, Adam Rasgon, and Fatima AbdulKarim report for the New York Times; Reuters reports.

White House envoy Steve Witkoff yesterday said he will travel to the Middle East on Wednesday to discuss the possibility of extending the first phase of Gaza’s ceasefire deal with Israel, Qatar, and Egypt. Barak Ravid reports for Axios.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR — U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 

The Trump administration on Friday has called on Ukraine to replace its draft U.N. resolution condemning Russia’s war with a U.S.-sponsored statement with no mentions of Russian responsibility, according to diplomats. Ukraine refused to withdraw the resolution, an official added. Siobhán O’Grady, Karen DeYoung, Michael Birnbaum, and Ellen Francis report for the Washington Post.

U.S. negotiators have raised the possibility of cutting off Ukraine’s access to the SpaceX-owned Starlink satellite internet system if Ukraine does not agree to a minerals deal, according to sources. On Saturday, the Polish deputy prime minister said that Poland has been paying for Ukraine’s Starlink subscription and “cannot imagine” a contract for a commercial service to which Warsaw is a party being terminated.  Andrea Shalal and Joey Roulette report for Reuters; Reuters reports.

The United States expects an agreement on U.S. access to Ukraine’s minerals to be signed this week, President Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said yesterday. Kanishka Singh reports for Reuters.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR 

Ukraine and the United States are still negotiating the deal to trade Ukraine’s minerals for American aid, Zelenskyy said yesterday, adding that he rejected the latest U.S. proposal requiring Ukraine to pay $500 billion using its natural resources revenues. Constant Méheut and Andrew E. Kramer report for the New York Times.

Zelenskyy yesterday said he is ready to give up his position in exchange for peace in Ukraine or NATO membership. Max Hunder, Anastasiia Malenko, and Yuliia Dysa report for Reuters.

Russia has launched its largest drone attack against Ukraine to date on the eve of the third anniversary of Moscow’s invasion, Zelenskyy said yesterday. Elena Giordano reports for POLITICO.

SYRIA 

Syria’s national dialogue conference will start on February 25th, two members of its preparatory committee said yesterday. Reuters reports.

Israel will not tolerate the presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces in southern Syria and wants the territory to be demilitarized, Netanyahu said yesterday. Reuters reports. 

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

Germany’s mainstream conservative party won the national election yesterday, with the far-right Alternative for Germany party doubling its previous result to become the nation’s second-largest party according to provisional results. Vanessa Gera reports for AP News.

Israel has expelled the residents of the occupied West Bank’s Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur Shams refugee camps, Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz said yesterday. The “empty” camps would be occupied by the Israeli military for the coming year to “prevent the return of residents and resurgence of terrorism,” with tanks deployed into the West Bank for the first time in more than 20 years, Katz added. Tom Bennett reports for BBC News; Raneen Sawafta and James Mackenzie report for Reuters.

Tens of thousands of mourners yesterday participated in the long-delayed public funeral for Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by an Israeli airstrike in September. Freddie Clayton reports for NBC News.  

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces paramilitary signed a charter to form a parallel government with allied political and armed groups on Saturday, signatories said. Meanwhile, Sudan’s army yesterday said it had seized back control of the el-Gitaina town and broke RSF’s year-long siege on the city of el-Obeid. Khalid Abdelaziz reports for Reuters; Samy Magdy reports for AP News.

A Kenyan police officer was killed in Haiti yesterday during an operation to help combat gang violence in the country, officials said, in what appears to be the first death of a Kenyan officer forming part of the international contingent stationed in Haiti. Yan Zhuang reports for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS 

The Office of Personnel Management on Saturday sent a mass email instructing federal government workers to summarize their accomplishments for the week by today. In an earlier post on X, Elon Musk said employees who do not answer would lose their jobs. The employees of several federal agencies were told by their agency leaders not to reply to the email pending further guidance. Kate Conger, Eileen Sullivan, and Christina Jewett report for the New York Times; Jonathan Landay, Joseph Ax and Sarah N. Lynch report for Reuters.

Trump on Friday announced he is replacing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown with a retired three-star officer, Lt. Gen. Dan “Razin” Caine. Shortly afterwards, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said he would dismiss five other senior officers, including Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the first female chief of naval operations, and Gen. James Slife, a top Air Force officer as well as the three top military lawyers in the Army, U.S. Air Force, and Navy. Missy Ryan and Dan Lamothe report for the Washington Post.

FBI Director Kash Patel is expected to be named chief of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), a White House official said. Separately, Trump yesterday announced he was naming conservative podcaster Dan Bongino as Deputy FBI Director. Yamiche Alcindor, Ryan J. Reilly, and Nnamdi Egwuonwu report for NBC News; Jessica Piper reports for POLITICO.

The Social Security Administration was investigating Leland Dudek on suspicion of improperly sharing information with DOGE when Trump elevated Dudek last week to be acting Commissioner of the agency, sources say. Lisa Rein reports for the Washington Post; Ken Thomas reports for the Wall Street Journal.

The Trump administration on Friday removed the acting director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Caleb Vitello, from his post amid frustration over the pace of deportations, sources say. It is not yet clear who will replace Vitello. Michelle Hackman and Josh Dawsey report for the Wall Street Journal.

The Pentagon will fire 5,400 civilian probationary workers starting this week, a senior Defense Department personnel official said in a Friday statement. Eric Schmitt reports for the New York Times.

Kash Patel on Friday told FBI employees he wants to move 1,000 officers from the Washington D.C. area to field offices across the country and reassign 500 support staff members to the bureau’s Alabama campus, sources say. Adam Goldman and Devlin Barrett report for the New York Times.

The Trump administration has drawn up plans to start deporting unaccompanied migrant children and is ramping up plans to detain undocumented immigrants at military sites across the United States, according to sources and internal documents. Marisa Taylor, Ted Hesson, and Kristina Cooke report for Reuters; Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Hamed Aleaziz, and Eric Schmitt report for the New York Times.

OTHER U.S. DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 

Former Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio was arrested outside the Capitol on Friday and charged with assaulting a female protester. Owen Hayes, Ryan J. Reilly, Frank Thorp V, and Dareh Gregorian report for NBC News.

The Washington D.C. police on Friday confirmed they are investigating Rep. Cory Mills (R-FL) in connection with a report of an assault on a woman last week. Aimee Ortiz reports for the New York Times.

The federal judge overseeing the corruption case against New York Mayor Eric Adams declined to immediately grant the DOJ request to drop the charges against Adams, appointing an outside lawyer to present a case against the move. Jeremy Roebuck and Shayna Jacobs report for the Washington Post.

The Supreme Court on Friday ruled a group of Jewish Holocaust survivors could not sue Hungary in the United States to recover the proceeds of property stolen by its state-owned railway. Adam Liptak reports for the New York Times.

U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Trump administration yesterday notified at least 1,600 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) staffers they were fired and told most of its staffers worldwide that they were on administrative leave as of today. Ellen Knickmeyer reports for AP News.

Russian and U.S. teams are planning to hold a meeting this week to further discuss improving relations, a senior Russian diplomat said yesterday. Reuters reports.

Germany’s likely next Chancellor Friedrich Merz yesterday said Europe should achieve “independence” from the United States “as quickly as possible” due to Trump’s “indifference” to the region’s fate. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Laura Pitel, and Olaf Storbeck report for the Financial Times.

The U.S. military yesterday announced it transported about 15 new migrant detainees from Texas to Guantánamo Bay. Carol Rosenberg reports for the New York Times.

Deportees from the United States arrived in Costa Rica in a state of “visible distress,” not knowing where they were and desperately seeking to reach their relatives, according to a sharply critical report released on Friday by Costa Rica’s ombudsman. Annie Correal and David Bolaños report for the New York Times.

TRUMP ADMINISTRATION LITIGATION

The Supreme Court on Friday ruled that Trump cannot yet bring an appeal seeking to remove Hampton Dellinger, the head of the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, holding Trump’s application in abeyance until a temporary restraining order issued by a lower court expires in two days. Zach Schonfeld reports for the Hill. 

A federal judge on Friday ruled the Trump administration can for now proceed with a move to put thousands of USAID’s workers on administrative leave, saying that the plaintiffs have not shown irreparable harm that would justify the grant of an injunction. Zoë Richards reports for NBC News.

The Trump administration’s bid to cut funding from DEI programs violates the First Amendment by penalizing private organizations based on their viewpoints and chilling federal contractors’ speech, a federal judge ruled Friday. Kyle Cheney reports for POLITICO.

A federal judge on Friday extended an order blocking DOGE’s access to Treasury Department payment systems, citing the Treasury’s “rushed and ad hoc process” for granting access to the systems. Michael Stratford reports for POLITICO.

A federal judge on Friday agreed to extend an order blocking the National Institutes of Health from reducing funding to medical and scientific research institutions. Zach Montague reports for the New York Times.

The Associated Press on Friday filed a lawsuit accusing three Trump administration officials of interfering with its freedom of speech by blocking the service’s access to presidential events. David Bauder reports for AP News. 

New York City on Friday sued Trump and administration officials over the White House clawback of $80 million earmarked for immigrant services in the city. Joe Anuta reports for POLITICO.

Did you miss this? Stay up-to-date with our Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions

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The nation’s military service academies have become a central battleground in the new Trump administration’s “war on woke.” At the confirmation hearing for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) warned, “It now appears they are a breeding ground for leftist activists and champions of DEI and Critical [Race] Theory.”

Hegseth pledged to tackle the problem by getting rid of the civilian professors from “left-wing, woke universities” who “try to push that into service academies” and replace them with battle-hardened, uniformed officers. President Trump may be going even further: On Feb. 10, he dismissed the Board of Visitors for all four service academies to combat their infiltration by “Woke Leftist Ideologues.” Trump then pledged on his Truth Social platform to: “Make the Military Academies GREAT AGAIN.”

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Each side in this debate accuses the other of dragging the country’s revered service academies into culture wars and political debate. But the truth is, our service academies have been a part of such battles since their very inception. For more than two centuries, the service academies have been both pawns and prizes in evolving cultural and political fights.

George Washington recommended establishing a military academy as early as 1783. Theoretically, it should’ve been an easy win. During the Revolutionary War, Washington’s Continental Army had depended on the good graces of foreign officers like the Prussian Baron von Steuben, who instilled order and discipline in the ragtag forces at Valley Forge, and Tadeusz Kościuszko a Polish engineer who designed the fortifications at West Point, among other places. It seemed obvious that if the U.S. wanted to maintain its new independence, it would need to educate its officers in the art and science of war.

But the establishment of a U.S. military academy became politically divisive, tied up for decades by competing visions for the nation.

Read More: Affirmative Action Still an Option at West Point, But Supreme Court Likely to Have Final Say

The initial debate pitted the Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, against the Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson. The Federalists dreamed of a commercial colossus rivaling the empires of Europe, whereas the Republicans imagined a simple, agrarian republic of yeoman farmers defended by citizen militias, with no need for a federal military academy. When General Washington became President Washington, he tried to prevent the emergence of parties by bringing both factions into his administration, making both Jefferson and Hamilton cabinet secretaries. But this effectively gave both men a veto over major initiatives, and no proposal for a military academy made it out of cabinet debates.

Two days before his death in 1799, Washington was still writing wistfully about the need for an academy.

But Jefferson quickly shifted gears when he became president in 1801, suggesting that his objection was not to a military academy per se, but rather to putting such a powerful institution at the disposal of elitist Federalists like Hamilton. A year later, he signed into law the Military Peace Establishment Act of 1802, which finally created the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

But despite Republicans dominating politics over the next three decades, the nature and purpose of the new academy remained unresolved. Republican purists wanted a simple, technical training school that kept the costs low and, more importantly, kept the officer corps from evolving into an aristocracy. Many other Republicans, however, were expansionists, who had a continent to conquer. Further, they were proponents of Enlightenment science and education, with no vehicle for advancing those aims other than the Academy.

This factional dispute almost proved fatal in West Point’s early years. As the Chief of Engineers, Jonathan Williams was, by law, Superintendent of the Academy, and he envisioned “a great national establishment to… rival any in Europe.” But his duties mostly kept him away from West Point, and day-to-day leadership fell to Alden Partridge, who preferred to run things more like a drill sergeant. If the Army wasn’t sure how to run the Academy, neither was the government—in 1811, the Secretary of War ordered most of the cadets away for service elsewhere in the Army, effectively shutting it down for a year and a half.

It seemed Williams’ vision won out when, in 1817, President James Monroe appointed Sylvanus Thayer as Superintendent. Thayer inaugurated a set of reforms that established West Point as the nation’s premier scientific and engineering school and secured himself a legacy as the “Father of the Military Academy.” But Partridge was so committed to his rival vision for the Academy that the path for this progress had to be cleared by dragging him away from West Point under arrest.

Further, while Thayer’s firm hand eliminated one set of factional disputes, he envisioned the science and engineering program at West Point as serving strictly military ends. This vision created a new set of problems, because he took over the academy just as the Republican Party split into factions. The “National Republicans” led by John Quincy Adams wanted to grow the nation’s infrastructure. They needed civil engineers to build roads, canals, and railways to promote the national economy and support westward expansion. West Point was the only school that could provide them, but Thayer resisted any changes to the curriculum.

Finally, in 1824, a frustrated Congress passed the General Survey Act, which authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to support internal improvements. The law left Thayer with little choice but to green light the development of the nation’s first civil engineering program.

Read More: West Point Disbands Cadet Clubs Following Trump’s Anti-DEI Order

The General Survey Act also gave now-President Adams and his administration broad authority to dole out federal money in very targeted ways. West Point graduates led many of these internal improvement projects. Many took private pay, in addition to their military salaries, then cashed in on their taxpayer-funded education by leaving the Army for more lucrative civilian employment. This smelled of corruption, and it fueled the rise of Andrew Jackson’s Democratic Republican (eventually just Democratic) Party, as the National Republicans became the Whig Party.

The Academy became an easy target for Jackson, the self-taught, populist hero of the Battle of New Orleans. After he defeated Adams in 1828, Jackson actively antagonized Thayer by repeatedly reinstating cadets Thayer had expelled for disciplinary infractions, including for pro-Jackson political demonstrations. Partridge resurfaced to join congressional Democrats like Davy Crockett who called for abolishing West Point altogether.

Thayer resigned in frustration, but the Academy survived. Having made his political point, Jackson stopped meddling and instead deferred to Thayer’s successors in their disciplinary decisions.

In the Romantic era that followed, there were so many demands for additions to the Academy’s curriculum—history, literature, rhetoric—that the course of study was expanded to five years to accommodate them all, before the Civil War forced a return to the four-year program. This pattern continued through secession and Civil War, Reconstruction, the 20th century Civil Rights Movement, the other rights revolutions that made the academies more diverse, and through to the present day. A growing U.S. military also created the need for additional service academies to train officers for the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard.

Neither woke progressivism nor MAGA populism are terms that would be familiar to Hamilton, Jefferson, Partridge, Thayer, or Jackson. But the underlying debate would resonate with all of them.

Today, cadets and midshipmen at the academies study theories of civil-military relations that emphasize the apolitical nature of military service and a strict separation of military institutions from partisan concerns. Yet, this goal has never fully matched the reality of military education. Because the U.S. is a democracy, the military—including our military academies—have never been fully insulated from the political and cultural concerns of the day. And, in fact, they are obligated to respond to the needs of the nation, as determined by the citizens at the polls.

The principal concern, voiced by both sides in every era, is that the service academies continue to produce leaders who can defend the nation in times of war. The challenge for the current leaders of all of the academies will be—as it was for their predecessors—to stay focused on that mission amid the political noise.

Ryan Shaw is a professor of practice in history and strategy at Arizona State University. A retired Army officer, he previously taught U.S. history at West Point.

Made by History takes readers beyond the headlines with articles written and edited by professional historians. Learn more about Made by History at TIME here. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.