Threat actors are actively exploiting two VMware vCenter Server vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2024-38812 and CVE-2024-38813, Broadcom warns.
Broadcom warns that the two VMware vCenter Server vulnerabilities CVE-2024-38812 and CVE-2024-38813 are actively exploited in the wild.
“Updated advisory to note that VMware by Broadcom confirmed that exploitation has occurred in the wild for CVE-2024-38812 and CVE-2024-38813.” reads the advisory.
vCenter Server is a critical component in VMware virtualization and cloud computing software suite. It serves as a centralized and comprehensive management platform for VMware’s virtualized data centers.
In mid-September, Broadcom released security updates to address a critical vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-38812 (CVSS score: 9.8), in VMware vCenter Server that could lead to remote code execution.
The vulnerability is a heap-overflow vulnerability that resides in the implementation of the DCERPC protocol.
“A malicious actor with network access to vCenter Server may trigger this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted network packet potentially leading to remote code execution.” reads the advisory.
The company also addressed a privilege escalation vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-38813, in vCenter Server.
“A malicious actor with network access to vCenter Server may trigger this vulnerability to escalate privileges to root by sending a specially crafted network packet.” reads the advisory.
zbl & srs of team TZL discovered both vulnerabilities during the 2024 Matrix Cup contest and reported the flaw to Broadcom.
“These vulnerabilities are memory management and corruption issues which can be used against VMware vCenter services, potentially allowing remote code execution.” states the company.
The virtualization giant addressed the vulnerabilities with the release of the following versions:
vCenter Server 8.0 U3b and 7.0 U3s
VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x (Fixed in 8.0 U3b as an asynchronous patch)
VMware Cloud Foundation 4.x (Fixed in 7.0 U3s as an asynchronous patch)
In June, VMware addressed multiple vCenter Server vulnerabilities that remote attackers can exploit to achieve remote code execution or privilege escalation.
Two heap-overflow flaws, tracked as CVE-2024-37079 and CVE-2024-37080 respectively, impacted the implementation of the DCERPC protocol.
(NewsNation) — Prosecutors said in a court document last week that Sean “Diddy” Combs tried to contact potential witnesses for his upcoming sex trafficking trial from jail.
“The defendant has continued to engage in a relentless course of obstructive conduct designed to subvert the integrity of these proceedings,” prosecutors said in a court filing asking the judge to reject Combs’ $50 million bail request. “The defendant has shown repeatedly — even while in custody — that he will flagrantly and repeatedly flout rules in order to improperly impact the outcome of his case.”
Jail calls showed that Combs asked family members to reach out to potential victims and witnesses, prosecutors said in the filing. They also accused Combs of orchestrating social media campaigns “aimed at tainting the jury pool” and trying to publicly leak materials that could help his case. Part of this campaign included having his children post a video to their social media accounts showing them gathered to celebrate Combs’ birthday, the court filing said.
During a nationwide sweep of Bureau of Prison facilities, investigators found notes from Combs’ cell phone that included communications with a woman identified in the court filing as Witness 2.
“It is clear that when the defendant reinitiated contact with Witness 2 in September 2024, his purpose was to ensure that Witness 2 was on his side,” prosecutors wrote.
The strong inference to be drawn from Combs’ communication with Witness 2 is that he paid her after she posted a statement denying allegations of violence by him.
NewsNation reached out to Witness 2 for comment.
In their own filing, Combs’ lawyers argued that the prosecutors’ search and seizure of their clients’ notes violated his rights, according to Billboard.
“The targeted seizure of a pre-trial detainee’s work product and privileged materials — created in preparation for trial — is outrageous government conduct amounting to a substantive due process violation,” Combs’ lead attorney, Marc Agnifilo, said in the filing.
LAST WEEK, police at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland arrested four students on felony vandalism charges in relation to protests against Israel’s war on Gaza. The students were transferred to the Cuyahoga County, Ohio, jail, a detention facility subject to calls for closure over inhumane conditions, abuse by jail staff, and the use of solitary confinement. All four students were released from jail over the weekend.
The arrests are part of the long arm of the crackdowns on campus protests that started in the spring and kept pace this fall. School officials had described the spray paint as “antisemitic.”
A local news clip shows a wall spray-painted with the names of Palestine, Sudan, Congo, and Haiti. A building entrance was also splashed with red paint, including handprints, with posted signs that say, “Your school funds genocide.”
The protest and its aftermath came as Case Western was facing a federal civil rights complaint alleging bias against protesters and Palestinian students. On Wednesday, the U.S. Department of Education opened a Title VI investigation at Case Western.
The latest arrests were part of an expansive crackdown: The school spent more than $250,000 on public safety staffing, equipment, and remediation after tearing down protest encampments, including removing signs and painting over murals on a campus “spirit wall,” according to documents reviewed by The Intercept. (The school said it could not comment on the criminal investigation.)
Case Western issued notices of interim suspension or other warnings to students after protests in the spring and barred some graduating students from campus. Only one student, however, was suspended for the fall semester: Yousef Khalaf, president of the school’s undergraduate chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine.
Among seven violations referenced in the notices, Khalaf faces school disciplinary allegations for engaging in intimidating behavior, including using the chant “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.” He is barred from campus until the spring of 2026.
Khalaf said he was treated differently than other protesters. His was the only case for which the school hired an outside firm, BakerHostetler, he said. He said SJP students have been contacted by school administrators for posting flyers or attending group events. (BakerHostetler and Case Western did not respond to a request for comment.)
“They don’t treat any other club this way,” Khalaf said. “We see very clearly the ‘Palestine exception’ being applied here.”
With Israel’s war on Gaza entering its second year, Khalaf is among thousands of students and faculty members still being targeted in universities’ battles over harsh protest crackdowns, free speech, academic independence, and discrimination.
The fights are playing out online, in campus quads, internal disciplinary proceedings, and in the courts. Organizers among the students and faculty say universities are retaliating against them for their activism and restricting their civil liberties and freedom of expression while claiming to uphold both.
“The university is threatening us with sanctions that could jeopardize our academic careers if we choose to speak out again.”
As campus protests reached their height in May, Dahlia Saba, a second-year Palestinian American graduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, wrote an op-ed supporting the demonstrators’ demands. She called on the school to address calls to divest from industries that profit from Israel’s war. She and her co-author Vignesh Ramachandran, another graduate student, were met with student nonacademic disciplinary investigations that relied solely on the op-ed for evidence.
“The university is threatening us with sanctions that could jeopardize our academic careers if we choose to speak out again,” Saba said. “They’re low-level sanctions to begin with, but the university is pursuing sanctions against many people on very little evidence.”
The issue is not so much the severity of the sanctions, Saba said, but using punishments to chill students’ speech. The disciplinary actions become a tool, she said, to help universities keep track of people involved in protests for Palestine.
“They are basically trying to get any sort of sanction on people’s records,” Saba said, “so that if they speak up again, if they do anything that criticizes the university’s investment policy, or if they in any way speak out in support of Palestine or in solidarity with Palestine, that students could be scared that the university could bring further charges against them that could then enact harsher consequences.”
Police grab a protester as they move forward to break up a demonstration at the University of California at Irvine, in Irvine, Calif., on May 15, 2024. Photo: Robert Gauthier/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images
Last month, 13 police officers stormed the home of student organizers at the University of Pennsylvania to conduct a raid on suspicion of a month-old incident of vandalism in connection to Gaza protests. Pomona College unilaterally suspended 10 students for the remainder of the academic year for allegedly participating in protests for divestment.
Schools across the country spent this summerpreparing topreempt pro-Palestinian activism come fall. At a campus safetyconference, more than 450 people working on the issue discussed, among other topics, “preparing for, responding to, and recovering from on-campus protests.”
That preparation was evident as schools readied themselves last month for protests planned around the October 7 anniversary. Ahead ofplannedwalkouts and protests across New York City, administrators at Columbia University warned the community to prepare for potential violence. The night before the walkout, Columbia University Law School told professors tocall campus police on protesters.
Meanwhile, students and advocacy groups are pushing back on university administrators for their responses to protests and battling newpolicies governing protests and freedom of expression that they say show an anti-Palestinian bias.
The crackdown on student protests has led to a raft of court cases and federal complaints. Students at the University of California, Irvine sued the school chancellor and regents in July, saying the school had suspended protesters without due process. The school is arguing that an upcoming December court date is unnecessary because the suspensions have ended, said attorney Thomas Harvey, who is representing students.
“The university and the state are using whatever tools they have to stop people from protesting war crimes and genocide paid for by tax dollars and invested in by their university,” Harvey said. “Their argument is effectively about the required decorum while protesting mass death and human suffering.”
Last month, prosecutors charged at least 49 people, including Irvine students and faculty, with misdemeanors for failing to vacate encampments this spring. Arraignments will continue through mid-December, and cases that go to trial won’t do so until January or February.
The San Diego City Attorney’s Office dismissed all charges against student protesters at University of California, San Diego earlier this month. Prosecutors in Irvine, however, have shown no indication that they’ll dismiss their charges, even amid pleas from Irvine Mayor Farrah N. Khan.
Harvey, the students’ attorney, said the school is fearful of losing donors.
“It’s to their benefit financially to publicly show that they are, in quotes, cracking down,” he said. Students and faculty are facing criminal charges and disciplinary conduct hearings from the school, including suspensions and probation, he said. “It’s just a climate of real crackdown on pro-Palestinian voices.”
Similar complaints alleging discrimination against protesters and Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim students were filed against Case Western and Rutgers University in New Jersey, which is under a federal civil rights investigation. (I co-teach a class at Rutgers’s New Brunswick campus.)
In September, the University of Maryland moved to cancel a protest organized by SJP and Jewish Voice for Peace after receiving complaints about the event. The group Palestine Legal and the Council on American-Islamic Relations then filed suit over the protest cancellation. (The school declined to comment and pointed to a statement from the university president.)
Last month, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction to allow the demonstration to go ahead. The suit, which claims that the university violated students’ First Amendment rights by canceling the protest, is still pending in court.
Shatha Shahin, a third-year law student at Case Western and the president of the law school’s chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine, said the university tried to make an example of Khalaf, the undergraduate SJP president.
“There is definitely a hostility in the way they’ve treated and used Yousef as this mastermind for everything that went on behind the scenes for all the Palestine advocacy,” Shahin said.
In August, Case Western began enforcingnew rules governing speech and protest activity. Administrators prohibited encampments and the use of projected images, microphones, or bullhorns. Protests larger than 20 people now require approval from a committee.
“They speak with Hillel, they talk to Hillel, but they won’t even talk to these kids.”
“It’s very deliberate, and it’s very calculated,” said Maryam Assar, an Ohio attorney working with student protesters who is herself an alumnus of the School of Law at Case Western. “That’s why it’s really problematic that they’re going through all of these steps to silence them.”
Assar said the contrast between the treatment of pro-Palestinian organizers and other groups was stark.
“They speak with Hillel, they talk to Hillel,” she said, referring to the avowedly pro-Israel campus Jewish organization, “but they won’t even talk to these kids.”
Students protest to reinstate Students for Justice in Palestine at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J., on Dec. 14, 2023. Photo: Kyle Mazza/NurPhoto via AP
While some student protesters face retaliation from administrators, others say they’ve also faced discrimination on campus. A New Jersey man was charged in April with vandalizing the Center for Islamic Life at Rutgers University–New Brunswick on Eid al-Fitr. That same month, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the New Jersey chapter of CAIR filed a federal Title VI complaint against Rutgers alleging that the school had demonstrated a pattern of bias against Muslim and Arab students.
In a statement to The Intercept, Megan Schumann, the head of public relations at Rutgers, said the school was fully cooperating with the civil rights investigation and that the university takes seriously every claim of bias.
At the school’s protest encampment in May, a counterprotester was filmed hitting a pro-Palestine student. Schumann said Rutgers University Police Department charged the man with bias intimidation, harassment, and simple assault and that the case was pending in court.
The school negotiated with students to disband campus encampments later that month. In December 2023, Rutgers–New Brunswick had suspended its chapter of SJP for a year. The club was reinstated in January, but in August, the school slapped SJP with another suspension that is expected to last until July 2025.
“The professor clearly targeted students who were evidently Muslim and violated our personal space.”
Rutgers students have also filed dozens of complaints of bias toward Arab and Muslim students from professors and other faculty. In November, student protesters disrupted a Rutgers event with Bruce Hoffman, a self-described Zionist who works as a counterterrorism expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. A group of four Muslim students wearing hijabs who were not part of the disruption said that, after they left the event, a professor approached them. According to the student and her friends, who confirmed the story, the professor filmed them, telling them to “smile” for the camera, and accused them of ruining the event.
“She was pointing her finger in my face,” said the student, who, like her friends, asked for anonymity for fear of retaliation by the school. At least two of the students filed bias reports against the professor; a copy of one was provided to The Intercept. “The professor clearly targeted students who were evidently Muslim and violated our personal space while instigating this incident outside of the classroom which we had already left from,” she wrote. (Schumann, the Rutgers spokesperson, declined to comment on questions about specific allegations against faculty or staff.)
“This is a falsified account of the events that occurred and printing these comments about me would not only be considered defamation, but also likely rise to the level of slander,” the professor said in a statement to The Intercept. They declined to comment further.
The professor also filed a bias complaint against the students. While none of the students were found guilty of conduct violations as a result of the complaint, one was told that they were no longer eligible for a resident assistant position because of an outstanding complaint against them.
Universities have demonstrated a willingness to cave to the demands of donors to try to control free speech among students. At Case Western, Assar, the Ohio attorney, suggested such pressure was brought to bear.
“They’re really freaked out because donors are upset that this is happening,” Assar said of school administrators, “and they imagine that they can control these kids.”
When pro-Palestine students at the University of Maryland began planning their October 7 anniversary protest, the school president and other administrators initially said they would protect the group’s right to hold the protest, said Abel Amene, a fourth-year student and a board member of the school’s SJP chapter who helped organize the protest. (He is also a member of the University of Maryland student government and an elected volunteer member of D.C’s Advisory Neighborhood Commission, but did not speak in either capacity.)
“Then they began indicating that they were getting pressure through emails, through various Zionist organizations on campus and off campus, pressuring them to cancel our event,” he said.
Shortly after expressing their support for free speech, administrators proceeded to cancel the event. They said there had been “overwhelming outreach” about the protest, even while acknowledging that it posed no threat.
After the federal court order forced the school to allow the protest to proceed, Abel said, the school still took actions that restricted the demonstration. The grounds were staffed with police and non-police security, metal detectors installed, and a drone deployed over the event all day. Fencing put up by the university virtually cut the protest space in half. (In response to questions about the protest, Hafsa Siddiqi, the media relations manager for the university, pointed to an October 1 statement from school President Darryll Pines after the court ruled to let the protest proceed.)
Hundreds of University of Maryland students gather for a pro-Palestine protest in College Park, Md., on Nov. 9, 2023. Photo: Julia Nikhinson/Washington Post via Getty Images
The debacle over the protest showed the school’s bias against activists for Palestine, Abel said, and for pro-war forces, noting that University of Maryland touts its strategic partnerships with weapons manufacturers likeLockheed Martin andNorthrop Grumman.
“This is just part of a pattern we’ve seen,” he said, “where we are treated as threats and presumed to be a danger to students and a danger to the university.”
The repression of pro-Palestine activism on campus started well before October 7, Assar pointed out — including at her own alma mater. When Assar was a law student in 2022, Case Western President Eric Kaler denounced a student government vote to divest from companies that harm Palestinians as “naive” and antisemitic.
“He really created this atmosphere,” Assar said, “where speaking up in support of Palestinians and their right to be free from occupation or not have their homes stolen — he made that basically into, ‘You’re a problem if you speak up.’”
Years earlier, in 2017, the chancellor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison condemned a vote by the student government to pass legislation calling on the school to divest from corporations involved in human rights violations, including in Israel.
“We have seen the universities respond to these demands for more democratic institutions by reacting in exactly the opposite way.”
“We have seen the universities respond to these demands for more democratic institutions by reacting in exactly the opposite way,” said Saba, the Madison graduate student, “by restricting the rights that students have on campus and by increasing how much they can punish students.”
Saba said she’s felt alienated on campus as a Palestinian American student. The school used her membership in the school’s SJP chapter as a piece of evidence in the charges against her.
“There’s been a sense on this campus for a long time that Palestinian voices are not supposed to be heard,” Saba said. “These disciplinary investigations, by punishing or penalizing students for having any affiliation with student groups that speak in solidarity with Palestinians, they’re essentially telling Palestinian students that they can’t find community on this campus.”
“Because when the environment is so oppressive, when our institutions are invested in genocide, and when our taxpayer dollars are invested in genocide, the only rational response would be to try to organize against that. But these schools are criminalizing that organizing.”
At long last, the Biden administration has decided to permit Ukraine to use longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) against military targets in Russia, according to reports. This is a plus, but it comes unnecessarily late, undermining its effectiveness. Months ago, Moscow moved many of its logistical centers and much of its strategic airpower out of the range of the ATACMS. Had the White House allowed the use of these weapons against targets in Russia from the moment Ukraine received them, then the damage to Russia’s military would have been much greater.
Despite this, the decision is still welcome. For starters, these missiles will prove handy responding to Moscow’s latest escalation—the introduction of up to ten thousand North Korean troops into the war. In addition to Moscow’s months-long push to capture the eastern Ukrainian logistics hub of Pokrovsk, there is another, more intense counteroffensive underway to take back the still-substantial lands in Russia’s Kursk Oblast that were captured by Ukrainian forces in their August offensive. This counteroffensive involves approximately fifty thousand Russian and North Korean troops.
ATACMS and the French and British long-range missiles that can now be used against targets in Russia (they were held up by the United States because they contain US components) will greatly complicate Russian logistics. With the incoming Trump administration talking about a peace negotiation likely based on a ceasefire in place, Russian President Vladimir Putin desperately wants to take back all occupied Russian territory. The longer-range Western weapons may make this notably harder for Putin to achieve. That would enhance Kyiv’s leverage in future talks.
The great weakness of President Joe Biden’s policy has been his timidity in providing Ukraine the weapons systems it needed to save lives and put Russian forces on the defensive.
There is perhaps an even more important consequence of this decision. The great weakness of President Joe Biden’s policy has been his timidity in providing Ukraine the weapons systems it needed to save lives and put Russian forces on the defensive. In discussing its approach to a future negotiation, the Trump circle has talked about providing “more weapons to Ukraine with fewer restrictions on their use” if Putin declines to negotiate a reasonable peace. The Trump team has also spoken about arming Ukraine as part of an eventual agreement to prevent future Russian aggression. Biden’s decision means that the incoming administration in either contingency needs to provide Ukraine something more advanced than ATACMS. This is only sensible because ATACMS are 1) old military technology and 2) despite the public description of them as “long range,” the missiles only fly around 180 miles. The United States should be providing Ukraine truly long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks.
One last positive point here: Politics is rich with irony, and the US debate on Russian aggression in Ukraine is no exception. The reason for Biden’s timidity was that Putin got into his head with his nuclear threats, even as Ukraine and the West moved past numerous Kremlin “red lines” with no sight of a mushroom cloud on the horizon.
It is notable that Biden’s timidity is not foreign to some in the Trump camp, who have criticized Biden’s policy of supporting Ukraine as leading the United States to Armageddon. Fortunately, the three figures named to top national security posts—Senator Marco Rubio at the Department of State, Pete Hegseth at the Department of Defense, and Congressman Mike Waltz at the National Security Council—do not share this weakness. Neither does the president-elect.
The ATACMS shift will be one more decision crossing a Kremlin “red line.” Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Monday that the US decision adds “fuel to the fire,” but the Russian response is unlikely to extend beyond the usual saber rattling. This will be a timely lesson for the nervous Nellies with the ear of the president-elect—and for Trump himself.
John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as the United States’ ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.
Russia has been actively working to whitewash its atrocities in Africa, leveraging a mix of propaganda, disinformation campaigns, diplomatic maneuvering, and economic influence. Despite accusations of human rights abuses and exploitative practices, particularly through the activities of the Wagner Group, the Kremlin has employed several strategies to reshape its image on the continent.
Russia was responsible for 40% of all disinformation campaigns across the African continent due to its “cognitive warfare” campaign. In these campaigns, local grievances and African colonial history are used to deflect attention from Russia’s atrocities, which include civilian massacres and violations of human rights.
Despite claims by Russian President Vladimir Putin that his country has no record of inhumane acts in Africa, inquiries by the UN, U.S. State Department, and independent investigators confirm that Russian-backed Wagner forces perpetrated atrocities.
Disinformation is a key part of the hybrid warfare that Russia unleashed in Africa in a growing effort to expand its influence and gain control over the continent’s natural resources.
The Russian disinformation operations “pop up repressive regimes and harm civilians. Russia connected to 40% of all disinformation campaigns across the African continent, These operations arecognitive warfare run by the Russian defense ministry.
Russia identifies and inflames local grievances to use them to its advantage. The Kremlin exploits Africa’s history of colonialism to whitewash Russia’s own account of civilian massacres, human rights violations and other atrocities committed in Africa.
In alignment with that narrative, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed his country has never done anything inhumane on the African continent.
Russia seeks to position itself as a leader of the Global South, promoting alliances through platforms like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the Non-Aligned Movement. By aligning itself with other emerging economies, Russia attempts to build a coalition that challenges Western hegemony, particularly in Africa.
UN Voting Blocs: Russia uses its influence to rally African countries in international organizations like the United Nations. By securing African support in critical votes, Russia aims to counterbalance Western efforts to isolate it on issues like the Ukraine conflict.
Addressing the audience at the Kremlin’s public relations event, the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi on November 7, Putin said:
“In the history of our relations with the African continent, there has never been any shadow – never; we have never exploited African peoples, nor been engaged in anything inhumane on the African continent.”
This is false.
Russia has a dark history of human rights abuses in Africa dating back to the 18th century.
In the present day, multiple investigations by independent rights groups, journalists, think tanks, the United Nations commissions, the U.S. State Department and the European Union accuse Russian state-backed Wagner military group (now African Corps) of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Africa.
The United Nations investigation documented crimes including killing and summary execution of innocent civilians, rape of women and children, torture, force disappearances, pillaging and looting of homes.
In just one incident in Mali, the Russian Wagner forces backed by Malian troops killed upwards of 500 people in Moura village, the U.N. Human rights experts reported in May 2023.
Eyewitnesses recounted to the U.N. investigators how, on March 27, 2022, “a military helicopter flew over the village, opening fire on people, while four other helicopters landed, and troops disembarked. The soldiers corralled people into the center of the village, shooting randomly at those trying to escape.”
The Malian authorities claimed it was “an anti-terrorist military operation” against Katiba Macina, an al-Qaida-affiliated group. The surviving villagers described it as a mass murder and atrocity scene, which continued for five days. “58 women, including young girls, were raped or subjected to other forms of sexual violence” by the Wagner forces and the Malian troops, the survivors told.
The U.S. State Department report in February 2023 documented atrocities committed by Russia in Chad, Libya, Mali, Sudan and Central Africa Republic, CAR.
“The Kremlin-backed Wagner Group forces have razed entire villages and murdered civilians in the Central African Republic [CAR] to advance their economic interests in the mining sector, participated in the unlawful execution of people in Mali, raided artisanal gold mines in Sudan, and undermined democratic institutions in every country where they have worked.”
An investigative report by The Blood Gold Report, an initiative by the Washington-based Consumer Choice Center and its anti-corruption arm 21Democracy revealed the Wagner Group laundered more than $2.5 billion for the Kremlin from trade in African gold since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In February, taccording to the U.K.-based Royal United Services Institute, Russia’s military intelligence service was offering the African unstable governments a “regime survival package” that provides military and diplomatic support in exchangefor access to natural resources.
The Kremlin also has recruited hundreds of 18- to 22-year-old African women from Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, South Sudan, Sierra Leone and Nigeria to come to Russia on a false promise of a good job and high wages. Once in Russia, the women are forced to work long hours under constant surveillance for a much lower salary than promised assembling Iranian drones for Russia’s war in Ukraine, The Associated Press reported.
Black foreigners, as well as Russians of African ancestry in Russia, face constant harassment living in an atmosphere of “out of control violent racism,” the British rights watchdog Amnesty International reported.
Somali village in Luna Park in St. Petersburg, Russia.
As recently as the 20th century, an amusement park known as Somali village in Luna Park in St. Petersburg, Russia, featured enslaved Africans paraded in cages resembling human zoos.
Further back in history, Russia tried to colonize various parts of Africa but was defeated. In 1889, it claimed Sagallo village, modern-day Djibouti, but it lost its bid to France.
In 1885, Russia was among the countries scrambling for the Red Sea, though it was defeated by Britain in the battle for Sudan and Ethiopia.
The roots of Russian racism in Africa are complex and deeply intertwined with historical, political, and cultural factors that have evolved over centuries. While Russia does not have the same colonial history in Africa as Western European powers, there are several key elements that have contributed to the development of racist attitudes toward Africans.
1. Imperial Russian Ethnocentrism
Slavic Superiority: During the Russian Empire, there was a strong belief in the cultural and racial superiority of Slavs over non-Slavic peoples. This ethnocentrism was directed at various ethnic groups within the empire, including Asians and indigenous peoples in Siberia and Central Asia. Africans, although less frequently encountered, were often viewed through a similar lens of superiority.
Orientalism and “Civilizing Mission”: While Russia was not a colonial power in Africa, its imperial ambitions in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and parts of Eastern Europe were accompanied by a “civilizing mission” ideology. This ideology fostered a sense of cultural superiority over non-European peoples, including Africans, who were often depicted as “backward” or “uncivilized.”
2. Soviet Ideology and African Engagement
Anti-Colonial Solidarity vs. Racist Undercurrents: During the Cold War, the Soviet Union positioned itself as an ally of newly independent African states, offering military, economic, and ideological support. This anti-colonial stance, however, was often underpinned by a paternalistic attitude toward African nations. Africans were seen as “brothers” in the struggle against Western imperialism, but also as “junior partners” who needed guidance from the “socialist big brother.”
Racist Stereotypes in the Soviet Union: Despite the official ideology of international solidarity, everyday racism was widespread in Soviet society. African students and diplomats who came to study or work in the USSR often faced discrimination, racial slurs, and even violence. These experiences revealed a gap between the Soviet Union’s official rhetoric of racial equality and the reality of societal attitudes.
3. Post-Soviet Xenophobia and Nationalism
Resurgence of Ethnic Nationalism: After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a resurgence of ethnic nationalism and xenophobia in Russia. Economic hardships and social dislocation led to increased hostility toward foreigners, including Africans. African students and migrants in Russia were often scapegoated for social problems and faced hate crimes.
As recently as the 20th century, an amusement park known as Somali village in Luna Park in St. Petersburg, Russia, featured enslaved Africans paraded in cages resembling human zoos.
Political Exploitation of Racism: In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian nationalist groups gained prominence, promoting ideas of “Russia for Russians.” These groups often targeted non-Slavic populations, including Africans, with their xenophobic rhetoric. The government, while officially condemning racism, sometimes tacitly supported these sentiments to consolidate domestic support.
The Kremlin’s support for African nations was frequently tinged with a sense of paternalism. African leaders and students were often seen as “junior partners” who needed guidance from their “socialist big brother.” This paternalistic approach suggested that Africans were not capable of managing their own affairs without Soviet oversight, revealing an underlying racial bias masked by ideological rhetoric.
4. Contemporary Russian Neo-Colonialism in Africa
Economic and Military Interests: In recent years, Russia has re-engaged with Africa, focusing on economic investments, military cooperation, and political alliances. This renewed interest is often driven by strategic motives, such as access to natural resources and geopolitical influence. However, this engagement can also carry undertones of neo-colonial attitudes, where African nations are seen as spheres of influence rather than equal partners.
Exploitation of Mercenaries: The presence of Russian private military companies, like the Wagner Group, in countries like the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali has been marked by accusations of human rights abuses. The treatment of African populations by these mercenaries reflects a disregard for African lives, which can be seen as a form of racist exploitation.
Racial Stereotyping in Russian Media: African people are often portrayed in Russian media through stereotypical lenses, either as victims in need of saving or as sources of danger. These depictions reinforce racist attitudes among the public. Even popular culture, including movies and television, has been slow to move away from racist caricatures.
Propaganda and Soft Power: Russia’s state-controlled media, such as RT and Sputnik, often emphasize anti-Western narratives in Africa, positioning Russia as a friend to African nations against Western “neocolonialism.” However, this rhetoric does not necessarily translate to respect for African people within Russia itself, where Africans continue to face discrimination.
ConclusionThe roots of Russian racism in Africa are multifaceted, stemming from historical ethnocentrism, Soviet-era paternalism, post-Soviet xenophobia, and contemporary neo-colonial ambitions. Despite Russia’s official stance as an ally of Africa against Western dominance, deep-seated racial prejudices continue to shape the interactions between Russians and Africans both within and outside of Russia. This contradiction between official rhetoric and actual societal attitudes underscores the complexity of Russia’s relationship with Africa.
Today marks the second and final week of COP29—the annual U.N. climate change summit, which seeks solutions to the world’s top existential problem. The host? An oil-rich country that, according to the CIA World Factbook, is home to the Absheron peninsula in the Caspian Sea that local scientists say is “the ecologically most devastated area in the world.”
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Being a petro-state is not a crime. But how Azerbaijan’s fossil fuel wealth exacerbates the human condition at home and abroad makes its hosting of COP29 an Orwellian tragedy. While 95% of Azerbaijan’s exports are oil and gas, according to the environmental justice NGO Crude Accountability, the vast majority of the population is not benefiting from this wealth. Crude Accountability’s 2020 report “The Empty Bucket of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan” documents how quality of life is decreasing and, according to the World Bank, a quarter of the population is stuck in poverty.
The country’s authoritarian President Ilham Aliyev personally oversees the largest cash cow: the State Oil Fund. That may be why he considers Azerbaijan’s vast reserve of fossil fuels “a gift from God” even as it fails to uplift his people.
How did Azerbaijan ever become the COP29 host? The key to its success may well be how it has courted some of the world’s elites in ways that have put Azerbaijan in the spotlight in recent years. This long-term charm offensive, which serves to deflect criticism of Aliyev’s government and rebrand Azerbaijan as a vibrant destination, includes flying in celebrities and hosting international events like Formula 1. The practice is certainly not limited to Azerbaijan. Scholars affiliated with the National Endowment for Democracy have coined the term “sharp power” to describe affluent authoritarians’ attempts at quickly building global influence to cement their domestic rule. These days, few seem “sharper” than Azerbaijan.
The country’s poor environmental and human rights record stands out. Between the President and his late father Heydar, the Aliyevs have run Azerbaijan for more than five decades. Critics are routinely put under house arrest, jailed, exiled, and perhaps worse. Among the regime’s targets is Gubad Ibadoghlu, the lead author of Crude Accountability’s 2020 report, who was arrested in July 2023 while visiting family in Azerbaijan.
The country also recently launched a pandemic-era war of choice in 2020 in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ultimately pushed out the indigenous Armenian population within four years—in violation of International Court of Justice orders. The violent takeover followed a nine-month siege sugar-coated as an environmental protest. Azerbaijan then proudly declared Karabakh as the first region in Azerbaijan to become “net zero.” In March 2024, President Aliyev celebrated the predictable and preventableforced displacement with a traditional spring equinox bonfire, calling it a “final cleaning.”
Given Azerbaijan’s use of environmentalism to justify what leading human rights groups consider ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh, COP29 for the regime is the final rubber stamp for its autocratic and hostile tendencies, including ongoing threats of invasion against Armenia.
Yet there is grassroots pushback around the world, including from international organizations like Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, as well as climate justice activists like Greta Thunberg—who is boycotting Azerbaijan for “being a repressive, occupying state, which has committed ethnic cleansing” and for using COP29 “to greenwash their crimes”—and Azerbaijani activists. Local activists in particular are bravely speaking out despite the enormous risks at home and abroad.
Resisting dictatorships is daunting. Just ask my friend Bahruz Samadov—a brave and brilliant young academic—who shouted, “Give me a voice at COP29!” during a recent jail transfer. He is among hundreds of political prisoners in Azerbaijan, in addition to two dozen Armenian prisoners of war, including senior Karabakh leaders, who face decades behind bars. Samadov is charged with “high treason” for criticizing Azerbaijan’s policy on Nagorno-Karabakh and for his ties to Armenian activists.
Plenty of people have argued that a petro-aggressor should have never hosted COP29—but what’s done is done. The issue now is whether various heads of states and representatives from more than 180 countries at the U.N. climate conference will have the courage to speak up for the rights of Azerbaijani political prisoners and Armenian hostages, including by requesting to meet with them, and push for the safe return of the ethnically-cleansed Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Doing what’s right in Azerbaijan is hardly a regional matter. Just like Azerbaijan’s 2020 war on Nagorno-Karabakh without global repercussions arguably encouraged other autocrats like Vladimir Putin to follow suit, whatever happens in Baku this week may not stay in Baku. A petro-aggressor hosting COP29 is hardly hot air.
(Editor’s Note: This article has been edited to clarify that the text summary reflects only the contents of the October 2024 United Nations Sixth Committee debate, while the chart reflects States’ articulated views across all sessions and in written comments.)
This fall, the United Nations General Assembly’s legal arm (the Sixth Committee) convened to discuss and debate the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (Draft Articles). The meeting was the latest in a series of gatherings held under a December 2022 General Assembly resolution calling for a series of sessions to discuss elements of the International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) draft treaty, which was developed to address gaps in international law in combatting crimes against humanity.
The majority of the interventions during this round, which ran from Oct. 9-14, 2024, focused on whether to move forward with the ILC’s recommendation to use the Draft Articles as the basis for negotiating an international treaty on crimes against humanity. A significant majority of States supported this approach.
Even with this focus, a number of States expressed support for the inclusion of various gender justice proposals in a future treaty. Multiple States expressed support for the inclusion of specific gender-justice crimes, such as reproductive violence and forced marriage, and a handful of States backed the general application of a gender lens to a future convention. Only a few States expressed any concerns.
In addition to debates, States also had the opportunity to submit written comments on the Draft Articles in December 2023, and these comments were published in January 2024. Taking all of these interventions and written comments into account, 114 U.N. Member States have to date expressed either support for or openness to the inclusion of at least one aspect of gender justice in a future treaty on crimes against humanity.
The sections below highlight interventions from States on gender justice proposals from the October 2024 debate. As most States focused on the narrow question of whether to move forward to negotiations, the extent of State support for each proposal is not reflected in this summary. A full tally of State support for each gender justice proposal, as expressed in Sixth Committee debates and written comments on the Draft Articles, can be found in the chart at the end of this article.
Including the Slave Trade as a Crime
Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Bolivia all explicitly supported the inclusion of the “slave trade” as a crime in a future convention on crimes against humanity. In addition, the 54 States in the African Group joined a statement, delivered by Uganda, in support of including the slave trade as a crime. Although the Draft Articles already enumerates “enslavement” as a crime against humanity, several prominent international legal scholars have noted that “enslavement” and the “slave trade” are two separate crimes and many civil society groups have backed its incorporation into the treaty. The crime of enslavement requires the exercise of ownership power (e.g., ownership rights), whereas the crime of the slave trade includes non-ownership conduct such as bartering for or transporting slaves.
Referencing the historical impact of the slave trade, as well as the continued impact of the transatlantic slave trade and racial discrimination “which continue to the continent and people of African descent,” the African Group statement noted that “it is in this context that we continue to call for the admissions of responsibility for slavery and the slave trade… [and] reiterate our call for the inclusion of these crimes as crimes against humanity as the prohibition of these crimes is inalienable and imprescriptible.”
Sierra Leone, speaking in its national capacity, expressed that the explicit inclusion of the slave trade “would send a strong signal to the victims in the comprehensive acknowledgement of and redress for their harm,” and “urge[d]” States to include it in any future convention. (bold in original).
Nigeria noted that it “further supports the expansion of the scope of the definition of Crime Against Humanity and this is not limited to as provided in the ILC draft article, in addition to including slavery, the slave trade, colonialism and the illegal exploitation of resources.” El Salvador and Bolivia also expressed support for the inclusion of this crime.
Further, although not explicitly using the term “slave trade,” Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Haiti highlighted the effects of slavery in their interventions.
Gender Apartheid
A broad coalition of States have consistently expressed support for the codification of gender apartheid in the Draft Articles in previous sessions. In October, Afghanistan (representing the recognized government, not the Taliban), expressed its continued support for the inclusion of gender apartheid as a crime against humanity in a future convention. While discussing the effects of the current Taliban rule, Afghanistan noted that “one of the most alarming developments has been the institutionalization of gender apartheid in Afghanistan.” The delegate went on to explain that “the denial of education and employment opportunities for women is not simply a violation of their rights, it’s an assault on the very foundation of Afghan society” a “broader strategy of persecution that the international community cannot ignore.”
Gender Justice
Colombia, Spain, and Myanmar commented at the October session on the need to include a gender perspective in a future convention on crimes against humanity. Colombia highlighted that women are uniquely impacted by the nature of crimes against humanity, and that this “need[s] to be addressed” in order to achieve inclusive justice. Spain expressed support for “the inclusion of a gender-based perspective in the articles.” Myanmar also expressed its support for an international convention, specifically highlighting the effects of current atrocities on women and girls in Myanmar as an example of why a convention on crimes against humanity is so needed. “Since the illegal coup attempt in February 2021,” the delegate said, “over 5,700 were brutally killed [by] the military junta. Over 3.4 million people [have been] displaced. Over 18.6 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian [assistance], [the] majority of them are women and girls.”
Seven other States specifically highlighted the need to include a progressive perspective on sexual and/or gender-based violence in a future convention. Denmark, who spoke on behalf of the Nordic Group – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – stated that a convention on crimes against humanity “could reflect evolving definitions under customary international law and contribute to increasing prevention and accountability for grave human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based crimes.” Likewise, Spain noted that “a future convention could provide the unique opportunity to reflect on progress in international criminal law with regard to the concept of sexual crimes and gender-based violence.” While expressing a more negative view on the exclusion of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’s (Rome Statute) definition of the word “gender,” Niger expressed support for a focus on sexual violence, saying that women and girls are “raped and subject to other forms of sexual violence” that “have to be considered as crimes against humanity.”
Survivor-Centric Approach
Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic Group), El Salvador, Poland, and Mongolia all also expressed support for a survivor-centered approach to a future convention. In particular, Poland noted that it has been “a strong advocate of the victim-centered approach and [has] paid particular attention to the plight of child victims in the global efforts to fight international crimes.”
The Exclusion of the Gender Definition
On a less positive note, two States expressed their dissatisfaction with the ILC’s decision to exclude the definition of “gender” included in the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity. As noted by the ILC, excluding this gender definition in a treaty on crimes against humanity would allow space for our understanding of the term “gender” to evolve over time. In previous sessions, many States have voiced support for the ILC decision. But in October, while noting that Nigeria strongly supports moving forward with negotiations and welcomes the decision to model the definition of crimes against humanity after the Rome Statute, it “reject[s] the decision of the [ILC] to delete [paragraph] 3 of the article based on written comments submitted by some group of states.” Speaking for the first time on the topic of crimes against humanity, Niger also expressed concern regarding the ILC’s decision to omit the gender definition. The Holy See, which has U.N. observer status, also reiterated its desire to exclude the gender definition.
Analysis of Overall Growth in Gender Justice Support
The chart below tracks each gender justice-related position expressed by States over all four Sixth Committee debates as well as in written comments, reflecting a continuous increase in support over time.
(Note: An asterisk indicates a view expressed via a group statement, italics indicates an intervention from a non-member State or organization with U.N. observer status.)
Gender Justice Position
Indicating strong support of at least one element of the gender justice position
Indicating openness to at least one element of the gender justice position
Indicating opposition to at least one element of the gender justice position
In accordance with Resolution 77/249, the Sixth Committee must decide by the end of its 79th session, November 22, 2024, whether to move forward with formal negotiations for an international treaty on crimes against humanity. While the four Sixth Committee debates on crimes against humanity demonstrate significant support for the advancement of gender justice in a future convention, this progress cannot occur if States do not opt to move forward into negotiations. States committed to gender justice in international criminal law should redouble their efforts to ensure a positive outcome leading to negotiations of the much-needed convention.
IMAGE: A shot of the U.N. General Assembly hall (via Getty Images).
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin put his thumb on the scale in United States v. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad on Aug. 2 when he revoked plea agreements that the government and three defendants on trial in the Guantanamo military commissions had signed just 48 hours prior. The pleas would have brought the 9/11 case to a close for three of the four remaining defendants after 12 years of interminable pretrial litigation (the presiding judge found the fifth defendant, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, incompetent to stand trial in September 2023). The defendants would plead guilty in exchange for life imprisonment, without guarantees for certain conditions of confinement that they had sought throughout nearly two years of plea negotiations. For those familiar with the 9/11 case’s myriad and, at times spectacular, defects, it was remarkable that the government was able to get such a good deal.
Austin’s decision to intervene in the litigation at the 11th hour, to scuttle the pleas, fatally compromised the case’s independence, and may have squandered the only remaining chance at judicial finality and some measure of justice. But then, on Nov. 6, military judge Colonel Matthew McCall ruled that Austin did not have authority to withdraw from the pleas and, accordingly, he reinstated them.
The ruling offered the Biden administration, whose stated policy position has been to close Guantanamo (which requires ending the military commissions), a lifeline. It was an opportunity for Austin to acknowledge that while he reasonably believed he acted within his authority when he revoked the pleas, he would respect the court’s decision — and the judicial process more broadly — by allowing the case to move forward free from any further inappropriate interference. Instead, he doubled down by instructing prosecutors to appeal.
Austin has now set President Joe Biden up to be the one whose administration snatched defeat from the jaws of improbable victory in the most important terrorism prosecution in U.S. history. But it is not yet too late to reverse course.
Judge McCall’s Ruling
McCall’s ruling centered on the Aug. 2 memorandum that Austin sent to the convening authority (CA) for the Military Commissions, Brigadier General (Ret.) Susan Escallier. It reads as follows:
I have determined that, in light of the significance of the decision to enter into pre-trial agreements with the accused in the above-referenced case, responsibility for such a decision should rest with me as the superior convening authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2009. Effective immediately, I hereby withdraw your authority in the above-referenced case to enter into a pre-trial agreement and reserve such authority to myself.
Effective immediately, in the exercise of my authority, I hereby withdraw from the three pre-trial agreements that you signed on July 31, 2024, in the above-referenced case.
In an unambiguous and concise opinion, McCall ruled that Austin did not have the power to do what he purported to do.
Austin had signed a memorandum on Aug. 21, 2023, appointing Escallier as the CA for the Guantanamo military commissions. His memorandum required her to “exercise her independent legal judgment” with regard to judicial acts and other duties of the CA. Prior to Aug. 2, 2024, Austin did not curtail any of her authority. None of the applicable rules and regulations that provide for or govern her authority changed either. Acting pursuant to her authority, Escallier authorized prosecutors to engage in plea negotiations, approved the agreements the parties reached, and signed them.
Austin knew for at least a year that plea negotiations in the 9/11 case and other commissions cases were underway. According to McCall, “Collectively, these circumstances indicate that everyone — including the Prosecution, all Defense teams, the Secretary of Defense, and Ms. Escallier herself — understood Ms. Escallier possessed the legal authority to sign the Offers for Pretrial Agreement submitted to her and the agreements became binding upon her signature. It was appropriate and correct for each entity to understand that agreement as the status quo.” The defendants then began performance of the agreements by refraining from filing motions, requesting discovery, examining witnesses, or arguing motions. The defendants even signed stipulations of fact related to the crimes for which they are accused.
The crux of McCall’s opinion goes to timing. While some military commission rules and instructive military law jurisprudence would allow Austin, as a “superior convening authority,” to withhold from Escallier her right to take certain actions prospectively, the governing rules provide no basis to withdraw retroactively a subordinate’s authority to act after that authority was duly delegated. Were Austin permitted to “delegate authority to Ms. Escallier, recognize her independent discretion, then reverse that discretion upon disagreeing with how that discretion was utilized,” it would give him an “absolute veto over any discretionary act of the Convening Authority with which he disagrees.” That prospect, McCall continued, “is wholly inconsistent with the delegation of independence in the performance of her duties — a delegation that the Secretary of Defense personally gave Ms. Escallier concurrent with her appointment as the Convening Authority — and the notion that a superior is not permitted ‘in a specific case and after-the-fact, to influence directly the action of a subordinate convening authority with respect to the latter’s judicial acts already properly taken in that case…’” McCall further noted that while he was not resolving the defendants’ motions on unlawful influence grounds, “the idea that each of the Convening Authority’s actions and decisions are immediately reversible if the Secretary of Defense disagrees raises the specter of unlawful influence.”
McCall also rejected the government’s ancillary “bundle of sticks” argument; that Austin could reserve to himself a particular authority — i.e., pull any one stick from the overall authorities bundle — in a manner that would require the case to have two CAs. If the Aug. 2 memorandum was enforceable, that would be the result here because, by its terms, Austin only reserved authority to enter into plea agreements, not withdraw from them (an authority that, by rule, is not subject to the limitation Austin seeks). Not only would multiple CAs create process issues and forum-shopping concerns, but also, and more importantly, McCall found it “difficult to foresee the functionality of a system of co-convening authorities over different aspects of the same case where one is the boss of the other, yet remain faithful to statutory, regulatory, and case law prohibitions against unlawful influence.”
Finally, McCall determined that even if Austin’s action was lawful, he still could not withdraw from the defendants’ plea agreements. In other words, regardless of who was vested with the CA’s authority to withdraw, the CA loses the right to do so once the defendants begin performance of the terms of their agreements. As explained above, they clearly did so here by refraining from filing motions, requesting discovery, examining witnesses, arguing motions, and, importantly, by signing stipulations of fact.
For all of the opinion’s straightforward and persuasive reasoning, McCall best characterized the whole of Austin’s actions and prosecutors’ defense of them in three damning sentences: “The Prosecution’s argument presents a vision of a judicial system where the Secretary of Defense enjoys plenary authority to act in any ongoing cases referred by a duly appointed convening authority. This, of course, is antithetical to the military justice system as it has historically functioned. The 2009 [Military Commissions Act] is not so sufficiently distinct from the Uniform Code of Military Justice to adopt such an expansive and unrestrained interpretation of the Secretary of Defense’s authority.”
What is Austin Hoping to Accomplish?
The sum total of Austin’s public explanation for revoking the pleas is that he has “long believed that the families of the victims, our service members, and the American public deserve the opportunity to see military … commission trials carried out.” He has offered no further explanation for his decision to appeal Judge McCall’s ruling.
Giving Austin the benefit of the doubt that these are not purely political decisions in response to some lawmakers’ pushback when the pleas were first announced, he must be after something more than the remote prospect of a trial alone. Two plausible explanations are that he thinks a trial would result in a penalty more severe than life imprisonment — so, death — or that a trial would disclose more of the information that some victim family members want (more on that below) than would the plea process. He would be wrong on both counts.
With respect to the death penalty, the decision by the administration of then-President George W. Bush to torture the defendants, then try them in a novel war court system, almost certainly took that punishment off the table from the outset. It was, in effect, the first nail in the coffin for the death penalty in the 9/11 prosecution. In the only military commission case to date where a military jury has heard in-depth about a defendant’s torture at the hands of U.S. personnel — U.S. v. Majid Khan — the senior military officers comprising the jury recommended nearly the lowest possible sentence and urged the convening authority to grant clemency. Even were the 9/11 defendants to receive a death sentence, fundamental fairness concerns would likely doom any such sentence upon federal court review, especially because the case is built largely on evidence tainted by torture.
And now, perhaps ironically, Austin’s own actions seem to have specifically foreclosed the death penalty by triggering a specific provision in the plea agreements. In the final footnote of Judge McCall’s ruling, he explains, referring to Mohammad and co-defendant Mustafa al-Hawsawi, that “paragraph 40 of Mr. Mohammad’s PTA and paragraph 39 of Mr. Hawsawi’s PTA appear to have the effect of precluding capital litigation if the Convening Authority withdraws from the PTA for a purpose other than those specifically agreed to within their PTAs. None of those agreed-to bases for withdrawal apply.” The third defendant, Walid bin Attash, apparently has a similar, though not identical, provision in his agreement.
With respect to transparency, military commissions trials are not designed to surface all truth. Prosecutors introduce evidence, call witnesses, and pursue lines of questioning that they think will secure a conviction. Defense counsel do the same in service of challenging the government’s case. It is possible that lawyers’ strategic decisions could overlap with victim families’ interests, but there is no guarantee.
By contrast, if the goal is to learn as much information as possible from the defendants themselves, their plea agreements are the best vehicle. In addition to the stipulations of fact each defendant signed, each agreement requires the defendants to submit to “a process to respond to questions submitted by [victim family members] regarding their roles and reasons for conducting the September 11 attacks.” There is no limit on the number of questions or their substance.
Some victim family members have long sought and continue to pursue, including through litigation, specific information about Saudi Arabia’s role in the September 11 attacks. For a trial in the 9/11 case to produce any such information beyond what the defendants may know and what the Biden administration has already disclosed, the case would first have to reach that phase; then one of the parties would need to seek the information; the information would need to exist; the government would need to turn the information over; and the government would need to declassify that information so that it could be released publicly. It is not impossible that all of those conditions could be met, but it is awfully close.
During a hearing earlier this year, prosecutors told McCall they were concerned the case “may never go to trial,” and that was before the protracted litigation that will now ensue over enforceability of the pleas. If the case ever makes it to trial, it would be defense counsel who would need to make discovery requests for information about Saudi Arabia’s role in 9/11 (because if the government had more information than the Biden administration has already released, and prosecutors thought the information was relevant, both the prosecution and the defense should already have it). More importantly, to the extent additional information does exist, based on disclosures thus far it is difficult to fathom that the executive branch will declassify it in the foreseeable future, regardless of who is in office.
Leading up to the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, almost 1,800 victim family members sent a letter to Biden opposing his participation in memorial events unless the government declassified evidence that they believed would show a link between Saudi Arabia and the attacks. In response, Biden issued an executive order directing the Department of Justice and other relevant agencies to conduct a declassification review of information related to the FBI’s September 11th investigations. The process led to the disclosure of a host of documents, some heavily redacted. It is far more information than the George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump administrations were willing to release, and all of those administrations cited national security concerns as the reason for why responsive information could not be disclosed to the public.
Even in a world where the 9/11 case could make it to trial, three defendants pleading guilty now does not meaningfully affect that remote prospect, if at all. Nor does it make any more likely the remote possibility that defense counsel would request all of the information that different victim family members seek, including — if it exists — any additional information related to Saudi Arabia’s role in 9/11, and that the government would declassify and turn over all such information. Why? Because there is a fourth remaining defendant in the 9/11 case who did not plead guilty: Ammar al-Baluchi, who continues to litigate. In fact, if the pleas were to go forward, it would give those most interested in information disclosure potentially two bites at the apple: the first, at the sentencing and mitigation phase for the defendants who pled, where defense counsel could request all of the same information, and the second opportunity if/when al-Baluchi reached trial.
In sum, if Austin has been persuaded to use the 9/11 case — specifically is it relates to defendants Mohammad, Hawsawi, and bin Attash — to try to pry loose more information about Saudi Arabia’s role in 9/11, it is a vanishingly thin reed on which to gamble the judicial finality and measure of justice that many victim family members have demanded desperately for years.
A Path Forward
As of this writing, although the government has said it will appeal to the Court of Military Commission Review, it has not yet filed the petition itself. Even if it does, all it would take to stand down is for the government to request voluntary dismissal. In the meantime, the plea process could move forward without delay.
In December last year, Austin gave remarks at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California, titled “A Time for American Leadership.” He said:
As the old saying goes, if you think education is expensive, try ignorance. And if you think American leadership is expensive, consider the price of American retreat.
Over the long sweep of American history, the cost of courage has always been dwarfed by the cost of cowardice.
And the cost of abdication has always far outweighed the cost of leadership.
President Biden and Secretary Austin still have an opportunity to demonstrate such leadership in the 9/11 case by simply allowing the outcome that prosecutors, the CA, and the defendants all want. Should they fail to do so, many 9/11 victim family members will continue to pay what has been an increasingly devastating price.
IMAGE: (NOTE: Image has been reviewed by the U.S. Military prior to transmission.) The Office of Military Commissions building on June 27, 2023 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (Photo by Elise Swain/Getty Images)
The Library of Congress discloses the compromise of some of its IT systems, an alleged foreign threat actor hacked their emails.
The Library of Congress informed lawmakers about a security breach, an alleged foreign adversary compromised some of their IT systems and gained access to email communications between congressional offices and some library staff, including the Congressional Research Service.
Only email communications between congressional offices and some library staff, including the Congressional Research Service, from January to September, were affected.
The Library of Congress (LOC) is a research library in the federal national capital city of Washington, D.C. (District of Columbia), that serves as the library and research service for the two chambers of the United States Congress and the de facto national library of the United States of America. It also administers copyright law through the United States Copyright Office.
The Library of Congress notified law enforcement and the investigation is still ongoing.
The threat actor accessed email messages between January and September.
“An unidentified “adversary” hacked into the email system for the Library of Congress, accessing information sent via email between January and September 2024, the Library said.” reported the NBC News.
“The library shared news of the “cyber breach” with some Congressional offices, and NBC News obtained a copy of the message on Saturday morning. Law enforcement and the Capitol are investigating the hack. It is not yet clear who the adversary is or when precisely the hack took place.”
“The Library has mitigated the vulnerability that the adversary used to access the environment and has taken measures to prevent such incidents in the future,” reads a statement in the library’s notification.
The Library of Congress confirmed that House and Senate email networks, as well as the U.S. Copyright Office systems, were not impacted by the incident.
The library is investigating the incident to determine which email communications were compromised and impacted government officials and staff members.
In an urgent alert ten days ago, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Famine Review Committee (FRC) identified an “imminent and substantial likelihood of famine occurring, due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip.” The alert precedes a full IPC analysis that will update those released in December 2023, and then in March, June, and October of this year. The Committee was unequivocal in explaining why it did not wait for the completion of the next IPC analysis before making a statement:
Immediate action, within days not weeks, is required from all actors who are directly taking part in the conflict, or have influence on its conduct, to avert and alleviate this catastrophic situation. … If no effective action is taken by stakeholders with influence, the scale of this looming catastrophe is likely to dwarf anything we have seen so far in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023.
This dire warning reflects a humanitarian consensus. Around the same time, Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council relayed, “When I visited Gaza in February, I was shaken by what I witnessed & stories I heard. Returning this week, it is clear that the situation has drastically worsened.” Also this month, a coalition of leading humanitarian NGOs declared, “the humanitarian situation in Gaza has deteriorated to its worst point since the war began in October 2023” and the leaders of 15 United Nations and humanitarian organizations described the situation in North Gaza as “apocalyptic.” On Oct. 26, Joyce Msuya, acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned, “The entire population of North Gaza is at risk of dying.”
People who have spent their lives working in situations of humanitarian crisis are speaking with the greatest possible urgency and clarity about the catastrophic situation in Gaza. And yet, it seems that even these calls will go unheeded. The United States continues to sit on its hands, a year of leverage squandered and a new Trump administration now on the horizon. Germany, Israel’s second-largest military supplier, has also shown itself to be unwilling to take the kind of meaningful action that might help to avert the FRC’s grim forecast. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants relating to the conduct underpinning the crisis is approaching six months without answer by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Particularly in recent weeks, the intensification of the alleged criminal scheme has only strengthened the basis for issuing the warrants. More urgently, the current situation has sharpened third states’ clear obligation to act now, without any further delay, to use legally available means to cause Israel to reverse this disastrous trajectory.
Why Gaza is (Again) on the Brink of Famine
The FRC noted several key factors in the most recent deterioration of the situation in Gaza:
Israel’s decision to designate the northern Gaza Strip a combat zone and preclude access has eliminated the viability of humanitarian missions to the area.
Humanitarian access to Gaza as a whole has plummeted.
Prices for food and other essentials have soared, while the livelihoods necessary to obtain those goods have suffered a “total collapse.”
Widespread attacks have decimated health, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure.
Moreover, contrary to moments of heightened message discipline, the priorandnew Ministers of Defense, the PrimeMinister, and the head of Israel’s agency for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) have all spoken openly or deliberated at various moments about the imperative to cut Palestinians in Gaza off from the supply of objects indispensable to their survival. Those perspectives have clearsupport elsewhere in the government.
Although it has not been linear, the overall trajectory of food, water, and medical deprivation has been devastating. Israel’s severe restrictions on humanitarian access began immediately after Hamas’s October 7 attacks. It took more than 70 days before an Israeli crossing into Gaza was opened. Improvements in humanitarian access in March and April were important (FRC p.9; Refugees International pp.17-18), but they proved to be the exception. The Rafah offensive in early May precipitated a further period of deprivation (Refugees International, pp.19-23).
On the basis of this pattern, the International Court of Justice has on three occasions issued orders (“provisional measures”) in an effort to protect Palestinians’ rights under the Genocide Convention. Israel has clearly violated the orders, including through:
pursuing the Rafah offensive and shutting down the Rafah crossing into Gaza (in breach of para. 57(2)(a, b) of the third order),
and passing legislation banning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the backbone of humanitarian relief operations in the Palestinian territories, (in breach of para. 51(2)(a) of the second order),
The most recent deterioration has been accelerated by intensified impediments to humanitarian access. In mid-October, James Elder, spokesperson for UNICEF, described “probably the worst restrictions we’ve seen on humanitarian aid, ever.” In issuing its current alert, the FRC reported that, according to UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) data, “the number of aid shipments being let into the Gaza Strip (data up to Oct. 27, 2024) is lower now than at any time since October 2023.” As the FRC emphasized, this trend is reflected also in COGAT’s data. Just over a week ago, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “At no time in the past 12 months has so little help reached the Gaza Strip as is the case at the moment.”
One month ago, the United States demanded that Israel act to ensure that 350 trucks per day were entering Gaza in order to avert a deeper crisis. However, according to UN figures, the number of humanitarian trucks entering Gaza last month (October) was in single figures on multiple occasions, often below 40, and very rarely over 100. A similar pattern has continued into November. This level of restriction replicates that of late 2023. However, after a year of war, deprivation, and displacement, the pre-existing vulnerability of Palestinians in Gaza is far greater now than it was then. The FRC was careful to emphasize this point when assessing the improved food security data released in June (p.3).
The situation is worst in North Gaza. Whether operations there have formally implemented the so-called “Generals’ Plan” reportedly presented to the Israeli government in October is beside the point. Its key components are manifest in current conduct. The plan, provided to the Associated Press, recommended the use of evacuation orders that would create a zone allowing killing and starvation, on the legally spurious basis that those who remain following the orders could be considered combatants. This proposal was followed by Israel cutting offhumanitarian access to North Gaza, engaging in a process of mass evacuation, and expressing an intention not to allow Palestinians to return to their homes there. An estimated 100,000 civilians have been forcibly displaced from northern Gaza—itself implicating war crimes and crimes against humanity (ICC Statute, articles 8(2)(b)(viii), 8(2)(e)(viii), and 7(1)(d)) on forcible population transfer). Meanwhile, “between 75,000 and 95,000 people remain besieged in North Gaza without medical or food supplies.”
All of this is set to be exacerbated by Israel’s UNRWA ban, the implementation of which willdeepen the crisis and contribute further to the starvation of Palestinians in Gaza. The agency isrecognized to be the “backbone” of humanitarian distribution and provision in Gaza. In March, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was unanimous in requiring that Israel act “in full co-operation with the United Nations” to ensure, without delay, “the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance” in Gaza. No UN actor is more important in that respect than UNRWA.
The Intensification of an Alleged Criminal Strategy
In combination, this marks an intensification of the practice that underpins the ICC Prosecutor’s request for arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. The central crime alleged in those requests is starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. The other war crimes and crimes against humanity detailed in the request relate to the same underlying facts, while focusing on specific components or consequences of the starvation strategy, such as killing, inflicting great suffering, and engaging in the discriminatory violation of fundamental human rights.
Mass deprivation is also at the heart of South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel under the Genocide Convention, there in the form of the underlying act of inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of Palestinians in Gaza. The centrality of that underlying act to the case is reflected in the Court’s provisional measures orders, each of which includes a strong emphasis on humanitarian access.
I have argued previously that the ICC Prosecutor’s requests were well-founded at the time they were announced. Indeed, the evidence of criminality in Israel’s starvation tactics have, in my view, been identifiable for over a year. Instead of replicating prior arguments, three points relating to the situation today are worth emphasizing in relation to the criminal case. First, the viability of contesting criminal intent in relation to the starvation war crime has diminished to the vanishing point. Second, the Generals’ Plan was predicated in part on a legal distortion that must be debunked and rejected forcefully if presented to the ICC. Third, the evidence base for the Prosecutor’s extermination allegation is strengthening.
In my view, the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare occurs in one of two alternative situations, reflecting the criminal law distinction between direct and oblique intent and the underlying structure of the international humanitarian law (IHL) rules on objects indispensable to civilian survival.
Either:
The perpetrator(s) engaged in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival for the purpose of denying the sustenance value of those objects to civilians or to a civilian population. This form of intent can attach before it is certain that civilians will be reduced to a state of starvation.
Or:
The perpetrator(s) engaged in the deliberate deprivation of objects indispensable to survival in the knowledge that this deprivation was virtually certain to leave civilians in a state of starvation. This form of intent can attach even if civilian sustenance denial is not the purpose.
Today, there is reason to believe that both of these alternative thresholds are applicable. The Generals’ Plan was an overt proposal to deny sustenance to all who refuse to evacuate North Gaza, where tens of thousands of civilians remain. The conduct that has followed provides a strong indication that at least that component of the plan has been implemented in some form. Meanwhile, the FRC’s warning indicates in the clearest possible terms that continuing this policy entails the virtual certainty of causing civilian starvation. In short, even if a heightened criminal threshold were applied, such that both purposive denial of sustenance and a virtual certainty of civilian starvation had to coincide (rather than offering alternative bases of criminal liability), the current practice would almost certainly satisfy that elevated requirement.
More generally, and whether or not it has been formally implemented, the Generals’ Plan is predicated on a profound and indefensible legal distortion—namely that civilians can lose their protection by not evacuating an area when ordered to do so. If this is argued at the ICC, it must be rejected without equivocation. Civilians lose their protections as such under IHL only for such time as they directly participate in hostilities. (Additional Protocol I [AP I], article 51(3)) Whether by choice or ability, not leaving one’s home or otherwise evacuating an area is nowhere near the threshold of direct participation in hostilities. In other words, civilians who have remained in the besieged areas of North Gaza are no less civilian for having done so. They must be treated as such, whether in relation to the rules on starvation or those on kinetic attack. In a context of doubt as to their status, individuals must be presumed civilian. (AP I, article 50(1)) With 75,000-90,000 people still in the besieged zone (a number several times higher than plausible estimates of Hamas’s entire fighting force across the Strip), the population in that area remains predominantly civilian, and thus civilian at the aggregate level. It cannot lose its status as such in virtue of the presence of a minority of combatants (AP I, article 50(3)). Taking these points together, any military operation that has been directed against that population, including an operation of mass deprivation, is an operation targeted at civilians, regardless of whether the ultimate goal is to starve or kill the combatants within the besieged zone. To invoke evacuation “warnings” to authorize killing or starving those who would otherwise be protected would be to distort a protective feature of law to eviscerate the very framework of protections it is supposed to safeguard. Far from relieving the attacking force of its other obligations, the requirement to issue warnings supplements and augments other obligations under IHL (AP I, article 57, paragraphs (2)(c) and (5)).
One of the crimes against humanity alleged by the Prosecutor is extermination—the crime of mass-killing. The Panel of Experts in International Law that reviewed the Prosecutor’s warrant request noted that the extermination allegation attached to “deaths … resulting from or associated with the systematic deprivation of objects indispensable to the survival of Palestinian civilians in Gaza” (emphasis added), including both “deaths resulting from the use of starvation” and from “attacks on civilians gathering to obtain food and on humanitarian workers.” (paras. 22, 29) The latter entails the more evidentiarily straightforward component of this allegation. In contrast, proving extermination through starvation can be complicated due to the difficulty of establishing cause of death in a temporally stretched and multivariate context (see, for example, here p.146). However, the spate of warnings from humanitarian experts and the urgency of the identified threat in the current moment make it increasingly undeniable that impeding humanitarian aid entails a virtual certainty of lethal consequences. That strengthens the prosecutor’s case in relation to extermination.
There are several reasons for the slow progress at the ICC. In addition to the Court’s decision to allow a significant number of amicus curiae observations on issues of jurisdiction and complementarity, Judge Iulia Motoc was recently replaced by Judge Beti Hohler for medical reasons. Israel is now questioning the latter’s impartiality, which could further delay matters. It is likely that the Chamber will affirm ICC jurisdiction (as did a prior iteration of Pre-Trial Chamber I in 2021) and that it will follow past precedent on complementarity, thus allowing the case to proceed on those fronts. Assuming it does, for the reasons outlined above, the substantive allegations are only strengthening with time.
Time, however, is precisely what is lacking. And in that respect, the criminal process will be of little help. Even if the arrest warrants were issued today, criminal accountability will occur, if at all, on a schedule far removed from the urgency of the moment.
Urgency and Real-Time Legal Response
For that reason, in a recent piece, Janina Dill and I argue against focusing exclusively on criminal and other ex post accountability in assessing Israel’s conduct in Gaza. As we discuss, third states have a responsibility to exercise leverage to ensure respect for IHL in real time. Plainly, if that duty is to mean anything at all, it cannot wait for the final adjudication of the criminal responsibility of Netanyahu and Gallant at the ICC or of Israel’s state responsibility at the ICJ.
It is appropriate, then, that the legal and epistemic thresholds for such action are different from those applicable in the evaluation of ex post criminal accountability. Whereas the latter requires establishing criminal intent and meeting a high evidentiary threshold—namely, proof beyond reasonable doubt (ICC Statute, article 66(3))—states must refrain from supplying arms whenever there is an “expectation” of IHL violation and must act with due diligence to “prevent violations when there is a foreseeable risk that they will be committed” (ICRC Commentary to GC I, paras. 162, 164). The International Court of Justice recently reaffirmed IHL’s third-party requirements in this regard (para. 279). Additionally, those states that are party to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)—including, for example, Germany and the United Kingdom—must cease their supply of arms if such support “could facilitate” serious violations of IHL and, despite mitigating measures, an “overriding risk” of such violation remains (ATT, article 7).
These responsibilities are not limited to war crimes. The ICJ determined in July that the law of belligerent occupation applies to Israel’s operations in Gaza, at least to the extent “commensurate” with its degree of effective control (para. 94). Among the occupation-specific obligations that would appear to be most obviously commensurate with Israel’s control are those related to the delivery of food, water, and medicine to Gaza (Cleveland sep. op., para 24). On that point, the IHL rule (as distinct from the starvation war crime) is that Israel must “to the fullest extent of the means available to it … ensur[e] the food and medical supplies of the population” of Gaza, including by bringing “in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” (Geneva Convention IV [GC IV], article 55) Moreover, when the occupied population is inadequately supplied notwithstanding those efforts, Israel “shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” (GC IV, article 59). For third states determining whether their duty to ensure compliance is implicated, it could hardly be more apparent, given the information summarized above, that there is a clear and overriding risk that Israel is violating and will continue to violate these rules.
In a similar vein, whereas the ICJ has determined that genocide can be ascertained (as a matter of state responsibility) only when genocidal intent can be “convincingly” established, such as through a pattern of conduct that “could only point to [its] existence” (ICJ, Bosnian Genocide, para. 373), the duty to prevent genocide attaches whenever a state “learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” (ICJ, Bosnian Genocide, para. 431) A strong case can be made that existing ICJ provisional measures orders are themselves indicative of the risk necessary to trigger such preventive action, particularly in relation to Israel’s restrictions on humanitarian access (pp.678-680).
In what might have appeared to be its most significant effort to fulfil its real-time preventive duties, one month ago, the United States expressed “deep concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza” and demanded “urgent and sustained action” to reverse that trajectory through several concrete actions to be achieved within the following 30 days. The prospect of U.S. action on military support appears to have played a key role in precipitating Israel’s expansion of humanitarian access in March and April (pp.17-18). This time, U.S. requirements were more specific and thus, in principle, harder to evade. Included among its numerous concrete demands to Israel were:
Surging all forms of humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza by enabling a minimum of 350 trucks per day to enter through all four major crossings, while opening a fifth,
Instituting adequate humanitarian pauses to enable humanitarian activities,
Rescinding evacuation orders when there is no operational need, and
Ending the isolation of northern Gaza by reaffirming there will be no forced evacuation of civilians from the north to the south and ensuring continued humanitarian access to the north.
Days after the FRC issued its warning, the 30-day period specified in the United States’ letter expired. As is apparent from the FRC’s clarion call and as observed by a coalition of humanitarian NGOs, Israel clearly failed to comply with these demands. It was not close:
Israel’s actions failed to meet any of the specific criteria set out in the U.S. letter. Israel not only failed to meet the U.S. criteria that would indicate support to the humanitarian response, but concurrently took actions that dramatically worsened the situation on the ground, particularly in Northern Gaza. That situation is in an even more dire state today than a month ago.
To take just one metric, per United Nations assessments, the number of trucks entering Gaza per day was in double digits on almost every day during the 30-day period. On some days, it slipped into single digits. Even according to Israel’s numbers, the threshold of 350 per day was never reached. Northern Gaza remains isolated and besieged.
The duty to ensure respect for IHL does not include providing a 30-day grace period for compliance to those over whom one has influence, particularly in relation to a continuing violation that has been ongoing for months. And yet, even this tepid effort proved to be a false dawn in the application of the American influence that is, in the FRC’s assessment, needed immediately.
Upon the expiration of the 30-day period, State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel stated, “I certainly don’t have a change in U.S. policy to announce today.” Describing the humanitarian situation in Gaza as not “pristine,” Patel noted “some steps being taken” by Israeli authorities, while indicating that there also “need to be some additional steps.” In short, in response to the FRC’s overtly desperate plea to those with “influence” to exercise it now, the United States has decided that now is not the time. It never is. This shocking, and yet infuriatingly familiar, failure caps a year of squandered leverage. The same day, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield addressed the Security Council declaring, “we continue to reiterate there must be no forcible displacement, nor policy of starvation in Gaza, which would have grave implications under U.S. and international law” and insisting that Israel must “immediately surge humanitarian aid to civilians throughout Gaza.” This mirrored almost identical remarks made in mid-October. But the “grave implications” have never materialized.
Israel’s second most important military supplier is Germany. Last week, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “Time and again, promises have been made and not kept. As a result of strong insistence by us and on the orders of the International Court of Justice, the Israeli Government wanted ‘to flood Gaza with humanitarian assistance’ in spring. That has to happen, without any excuses. The Israeli Government must be held to this assurance.” But the FRC did not call for strongly worded public declarations. The world’s leading experts on famine have identified an urgent imperative for “immediate action” by those with influence. Nothing short of that will suffice.
The warnings could not be any clearer. It could not be more obvious that those with the capacity to act are abdicating their legal and moral responsibility to do so.
Could Arrest Warrants Make a Difference?
For the reasons noted above, action at the ICC cannot fill the gap left by the inaction of states with influence. However, there is one aspect of the issuance of warrants that should not be overlooked. Criminal exposure does not end with Netanyahu and Gallant. Warrants for either or both of them could have meaningful reverberations for others involved in the actions that underpin the criminal case.
Having emphasized that disobedience should be reserved for “the most extreme and distinct ‘black flag’ cases of a manifestly illegal order,” former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council, Eran Etzion, commented on October 22:
we have reached this point. Netanyahu and the cabinet passed a decision, which is hidden from the public, to implement the ‘[Generals’] Plan.’ This plan is a war crime … if you are a soldier or an officer, regular, permanent or reserve, it is your duty to refuse to take part in any action that constitutes a war crime. [translated by Google]
Whether or not there was in fact a secret cabinet decision to pursue the Generals’ Plan, Etzion is plainly correct about the criminality of the starvation siege that seems to reflect the implementation of that element of the plan. Of course, the imperative to refuse to participate in the mechanisms of starvation in Gaza predated his statement, and it will have long predated warrants if they are issued. But the fact of the latter may concretize the risk of individual criminal exposure.
Among others, Gallant’s replacement, Israel Katz—who himself appears to be an openadvocate of starvation methods—should take note. So, too, should anyone who implements the policy or otherwise makes a substantial contribution through knowingly facilitating it, whether in Israel or beyond.
If the actions of the first Trump administration and campaignstatements regarding Israel are a guide, the incoming U.S. administration is likely to do what it can to impede the enforcement of ICC warrants against Israeli officials. However, war crimes and crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitations (ICC Statute, article 29). They are generally thought not to be subject to amnesty. The political likelihood of being shielded in the short-term is no guarantee of perpetual impunity. The mark of international fugitive status will linger. The choice now must be to refuse to contribute to this destructive path.
Image: Children gather for a meal in Al-Bureij refugee camp, central Gaza Strip, on November 10, 2024. (Saeed Jaras/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images)
